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Abstract
In order to fully understand and appreciate India's contested national 
identity, one m ust look at the emergence and evolution of India's national symbolic 
repertoires. Indeed, political symbols are necessary elements for the defining 
national identities. Besides facilitating the process of identification, national symbols 
also generate powerful visions of the nation. Significantly, at the heart of the battle 
for the definition of the nation there is often a struggle over symbols and myths, 
which is fought, in good part, through rituals. Indeed, the m ore problematic the 
definition of nationhood, the greater the need to create symbolic structures which 
m ay substantiate and support a particular idea of the nation. Throughout the 
contem porary history of India, competing nationalist ideologies have engaged in a 
search for appropriate symbolic repertoires that could be m eaningful and acceptable 
to m ost of the Indian population. In the absence of familiar param eters of national 
identity such as ethnicity, language, religion and culture, unusual registers of 
national belonging became im portant m arkers of India's contested national identity 
during the colonial and post-colonial period.
Given the importance of symbolic politics, it is surprising that so little 
attention has been devoted to a systematic study of the symbolic repertoires of 
India's competing nationalist ideologies. Therefore, this thesis intends to make a 
contribution in this field. The main aims of this study were to obtain a general 
picture of the evolution and establishment of symbols of nationhood in India. I have 
draw n on m odernist and constructivist theories of nationalism and based on the 
identification and analysis of India's symbols of the nation and of national identity 
during its anti-colonial struggle, the Nehruvian era, and in the contemporary 
m oment, and on an in-depth review of the existing literature. While bringing to the 
fore the complex relationship between the nation and pre-existing ethno-symbolic 
resources, the findings of this study help to shed light on the operational dynamics 
at play in the construction of nationalist symbol complexes and national identity in 
India.
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"The State is invisible; it m ust be personified before 
it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, 
imagined before it can be conceived" 
[Walzer 1967:194]
CHAPTER 1 
Sym bolising the N ation
In the late evening of 14 A ugust 1947 at 10:45 p.m. Central Hall of Parliament 
House was packed to its capacity. The new national flag hung in the Cham ber against 
the wall panels that had formerly held portraits of British viceroys. A t 11 p.m. the notes 
of Vande M ataram  reverberated in the Central Hall as Suchita Kripalani -  wife of 
Congress president Acharya Kripalani -  opened the House proceedings by singing 
India's dearest patriotic song. A brief opening address by the Constituent Assembly 
Chairm an -  Dr Rajendra Prasad -  was followed by two m inutes of silence in memory 
of those who died in the struggle for freedom. N ehru then delivered his famous speech, 
'Tryst w ith Destiny', W hen m idnight approached, in keeping with indigenous 
traditions, conch shells were blown to m ark this auspicious event. The people 
assembled rose to their feed to make their pledge to dedicate themselves to the service 
of India and her people. Parliament House resonated w ith shouts of Mahatma Gandhi Ki 
Jay and Vande Mataram. At the sound of bugles, Lord M ountbatten, resplendent in his 
white uniform, was sworn in as India's first Constitutional Governor General. Mrs 
Hansa M etha then presented Rajendra Prasad the new Indian national flag while Mrs 
Kripalani closed the proceedings singing Sare Jahan se Accha Hindustan Hamara and Jana 
Gana Mana. This special Constituent Assembly meeting culm inated w ith the breaking 
of the new national flag over the assembly building. In and outside the Chamber 
jubilant crowds celebrated this m omentous event. For two days and two nights India 
witnessed scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm. In Delhi on 15 August after the 
swearing by M ountbatten -  now Governor General -  of the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet, the ceremony of the salutation of the new national flag took place in Princes' 
Park. M ountbatten proceeded form Durbar Hall to Princes' Park in a ceremonial 
carriage accompanied by horse guards and a fanfare of trum pets. An ecstatic and 
supportive crowd had  gathered along Kingsway and cheered M ountbatten w ith shouts 
Jay Hind and Pandit Nehru Ki Jay and Mahatma Gandhi ki Jay. The crowd was so
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immense at Princes7 Park that M ountbatten and N ehru had  to do w ithout their 
carefully planned ceremony and hastily hoisted the national flag. A t that p o in t a 
rainbow appeared in the sky. This memorable day ended w ith a state banquet at 
Government House hosted by the M ountbattens while Delhi crowds celebrated the 
event dancing in the streets. The next day -  16 A ugust -  at 8.30 in the m orning 
Jawaharlal N ehru addressed the crowd from the ram part of the Red Fort of Old Delhi 
and unfurled the national flag, under an impressive flypast of the Indian Air Forces. 
Flag salutations and military parades, as well as torchlight processions, marches and 
Prabhat Pheris, caste dinners, and distribution of sweets and food m arked the day 
around the country, in state capitals and district headquarters alike.
The ceremonies that accompanied the transfer of pow er on 15 A ugust 1947 paid 
symbolic hom age to the nationalist movement, its martyrs and to the ideals and values 
it enshrined. Rituals such as these articulate the values and ideals of nationhood, they 
legitimate power and symbolise a sense of belonging. Besides providing symbolic 
representations of the nation this particular rite promotes a feeling of solidarity by 
symbolically exalting the bond of the nation. In fact, mass dem onstrations of this kind 
usually have a strong emotional impact on the participants, increasing their 
identification w ith the group. By creating the opportunity for a large crowd to gather 
and by showing the crowds the great symbols of the nation (the flag, the national 
emblem, the national anthem, the army, and the people), these ceremonies boost and 
strengthen nationalist sentiments, while legitimating the political status quo.
While political analysts acknowledge these rituals' political role, they tend to 
ignore them; however, since political processes are prim arily communication 
exchanges, rituals that spark communication and stir emotions are im portant in 
political discussions. We w ould contend that "power is em bedded in linguistic 
practices" [Shapiro 1984:15], and stress that one of the essential features of all forms of 
political power is the need for representation and communication. The communication 
structure usually employed by political power (whatever its nature) is a combination of 
discursive and symbolic registers. In other words, political language in both its
22
discursive (hence verbal) and symbolic (non-verbal and visual) forms is an im portant 
instrum ent and factor of power.
These traits are common to both conservative forms of pow er and to radical or 
revolutionary political movements. M odern nationalisms, however, require strong 
symbolic constructions. These movements favour iconic and symbolic language over a 
purely verbal one. Admittedly, beyond bringing the nation into existence, one of 
nationalism 's aims is to define the nation to rally support and encourage mass 
participation for the establishment of a nation thus conceived. Given the nation's 
abstract character, however, nationalist movements necessarily dem and articulate 
systems of symbolic representations that define and transm it the nation's values and 
heighten emotional responses. This dem and arises for two reasons. First, nationalisms 
need to communicate complex abstract concepts. Concepts such as those of the nation 
or of a people, which are crucial to any nationalist ideology, are to a certain extent 
arbitrary and, although not entirely artificial, are still objects of the imagination and 
difficult to articulate. Nationalist language m ust therefore be evocative in both its 
discursive and symbolic registers. Nationalisms build complex narratives of the nation 
using a very evocative and highly metaphorical language that finds expression in 
elaborate systems of public ceremonies, rites, festivals, national m yths and symbols. 
With their suggestive, imaginative and creative language, nationalisms transform  
nations' elusive and abstract ideas into tangible realities while generating powerful 
national visions. Secondly, nationalist movements, as expected, resort to the use of a 
symbolic language to draw  support for the nationalist cause and mobilise the masses. 
Historically, the emergence of nationalisms is linked to the grow th of m odern mass 
politics [Mosse 1975] and indeed, the "ultimate force of symbols depends on their 
power to stir the emotions m oving m en into action and reaction" [Lewis 1977:2]. 
Nationalisms employ the evocative and inspirational language of symbols to unite 
people, to rally support and to encourage participation. Mass participation is essential 
to the creation of a national identity too. In addition, the choice of symbolic language 
over a terse verbal one is not simply dictated by the intrinsic evocative and emotionally 
charged character of symbols, bu t also by a pragmatic necessity: to communicate to a
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largely illiterate and semi-educated population. Ultimately, nationalism 's intrinsic 
characteristics necessitate a language whose highly evocative symbolic constructions 
and system of representations are able to support the imagery of the nation.
Such an argum ent suggests that the political world is in large part symbolically 
constructed. Politics and political processes, however, purport to be scientific and 
rational, based on objective circumstances and reason. In general, people believe that 
their political orientation is the result of rational and logical evaluations that attem pt to 
get at the real heart of the matter. We express our views and preferences by voting for 
the party that best represents our political convictions. A lthough Machiavelli had long 
ago observed that "m en in general make judgem ents m ore by appearances that by 
reality, for sight alone belongs to anyone but understanding to few" [quoted in M uir 
1981:74-75], we tend to perceive politics and political dynamics as logical and rational 
actions. Elder and Cobb [1983:2] argue that symbolic processes are neither rational nor 
irrational, bu t are instead fl-rational. Political action is not the result of a stable set of 
personal interests, logical action and extensive information; nor are people reacting 
blindly according to unconscious emotional impulses and prejudices that defy logic. To 
establish how  emotions generated by rituals and symbols influence the cognitive 
message remains an open question; however, Elder and Cobb [1983] contend that rites 
and symbols create an emotional state that makes the political message incontestable, 
because it has been constructed to appear inherently natural and emotionally 
compelling beyond any rational discussion.
According to the anthropologist Emile Durkheim  who studied Australian 
aborigines, rituals -  understood as a standardised and repetitive symbolic behaviour -  
play a crucial role in creating and m aintaining a feeling of solidarity among the 
members of society. However, this is not just typical of prim itive societies. Even those 
systems w ith highly developed organic solidarity1 need a comm on set of symbolic
1 Durkheim distinguishes between mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is 
typical of those society where individual difference are minimised and "collective 
consciousness completely envelops our whole conscience" [Durkheim 1956:129]. Organic
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representations and collective symbols of integration. Just like Durkheim 's Australian 
aborigines, m odern nations -  irrespective of their degree of complexity -  engage in 
ritual activities to advance their image of common identity through symbolic 
representations of the group: the national flag, the army, the anthem, are all symbols 
that conjure up  the image of the nation and ideas of national identity. Indeed, 
according to Abner Cohen [1969; 1974] one of the m ost im portant functions of symbols 
is their ability to objectify relations between individuals and groups and therefore to 
reify questions of identity. Thus, examining symbolic forms of nationhood contributes 
to our understanding of how  nations define their identity and articulate their claims to 
power.
In India the concept of nation and nationhood is problematic. As Kertzer 
[1988:179] puts it, the more problematic the definition of nationhood, the greater the 
need to create symbolic structures (in the form of rituals for instance) that can 
politically sustain or even destroy a particular concept of nationhood. At the heart of 
the battle for the definition of the idea of India there is a struggle over symbols and 
myths, which is fought, in good part, through ritual. For the British that ruled in India 
in the XIX and XX centuries, India was simply a geographical expression that m arked 
not "the territory of a nation and a language, bu t the territory of m any nations and 
languages" [Seeley 1931:256]. This categorical denial on the part of the British in 
acknowledging the existence of an Indian national identity has had long-lasting 
repercussions on the developm ent of Indian nationalism. Indeed the definition of w hat 
constitute Indian identity has preoccupied India not only during  the anti-colonial 
m ovem ent but also in the post-colonial period. I would contend then that the history of 
independent India is characterised by the protraction of the process of nation-making2.
solidarity, on the contrary, emerges out of difference rather than likeness between individuals 
and it is a product of the division of labour.
2 Hie term nation-making refers both to practices of nation building (a term used predominantly 
in the 1950s and 1960s to refer mainly to those practices employed by those newly independent 
countries emerging from the colonial empires and which stressed practices of nationalisation of 
state structures and institutions) and to the "pragmatics of identity formation" [Foster 1997:3], 
or in other words, to practices of creation and dissemination of a sense of national identity.
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Indian nationalists initially identified nationalism as the source of the European 
nations' power. This realisation however caused anxiety as it begged the question: can 
India be a m odem  nation following a European style nationalism  that identifies not 
just territorial and political unity bu t also cultural traits -  linguistic, religious and of 
traditions -  as essential features to the nation? This anxiety spurred a debate between 
two distinct visions of Indian nationalism: one pushed for a replica of the European 
m odel and for larger homogeneity, while the other argued for a multilayered 
nationalism  that acknowledged regional, cultural and religious diversity. Over time the 
latter was adopted as the official form of nationalism of independent India. Such a 
m ultilayered nationalism, however, needed to promote a viable national symbolic 
repertoire. In the absence of familiar param eters of national identity such as ethnicity, 
language, religion and culture, unusual registers of national belonging became 
im portant m arkers of India's contested national identity during the colonial and post­
colonial period.
In the light of contem porary theories of nationalism, this thesis considers how 
nations are social constructs and how symbols participate in this process of 
construction; it analyses the sets of meanings and values that have been used in 
making claims about national identity in India. In particular it looks at changes and 
continuities, similarities and differences in symbolic repertoires used to express notions 
of nationhood, thus analysing the role of symbols and symbolic practices in the 
construction of the nation and of national identity. Since the emergence of the 
nationalist movement, the imagined Indian nation and its associated symbolic 
repertoires have changed considerably over the years. Contesting symbolic repertoires 
have emerged. Though some symbols have remained intact -  because only revolutions 
are capable of radically changing the symbolic repertoires [Kertzer 1988] -  these have 
assum ed new  meanings. This change has not only interested the symbols cognitive 
content bu t also their affective dimension. This thesis will examine how national 
identity developed in India and why the nation came to m ean w hat it did. All forms of 
nationalism m ust address the issue of w hat it means to belong to a nation as well as 
who does and w ho does not belong. It will also explore and address questions of how
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ideas about nationality change over time by focussing on those who have dom inated 
India's symbolic activity.
My objective is to identify the symbolic repertoires of three crucial periods in 
the life of the Indian nation: the anti-colonial movement, the N ehruvian post-colonial 
period, and the years of H indutva's politics. Moreover, I assess the contribution of the 
symbolic repertoires to nationalist movements and consider the role of political, 
economic, and social contexts in this constructive process. By looking at the nationalist 
symbolic repertoires, this thesis answers the questions: w hat is India? How is India 
perceived: as a territory, culture, or a people? Is it represented as a homogeneous or a 
m ulticultural entity? How is the nation visualised? How  is national identity 
symbolically defined? How is the nation's position in the international community 
symbolically represented? This assessment of the ideological and the material 
constraints of nationalism  during the three periods under consideration is based on the 
analysis of the political actors and symbol wielders, archival research, participant 
observation and a study of national rituals and cultural practices, critical reading of 
visual texts and an examination of official documents.
Political symbolism
National narratives conjure up the image of the nation and ideas of national
identities and are enacted publicly in various forms and official procedures [Cohn and 
Dirks 1988:224]. Political actions that range from official discourse to other self- 
conscious state-controlled practices for the production and dissem ination of national 
consciousness and sentim ent of national identity [Foster 1997:3] -  poems, literature, 
advertisements, logos, letters to the editor, m onuments, architecture, currency, 
communication policies, legislations (e.g., the preamble of the constitution), arts 
program mes, schooling and education policies, public ceremonies and rites of 
integration and mobilisation -  are all symbolic formations. Symbolic forms can stand 
for "a wide range of meanings, agitate emotions, [and] spur m en into action" [Cohen 
1974:ix]. The symbols we study are symbols of nationalism and national identity. They 
are symbols of politics, of political ceremony and ritual, and of law  and social control 
[Gusfielf and Michalowicz 1984].
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Nations cannot be seen or touched if not in their symbolic representations. 
Flags, maps, currency, stamps, m onuments, ceremonies and rituals help us grasp and 
imagine Great Britain or India. Indeed, through representations we are able to perceive 
nationalities and be political [Kertzer 1988]. These items are not symbols simply 
because they stand for the nation (say the Union Jack for Great Britain or the Tiranga 
for India) bu t also because they are able to represent, trigger, and transm it a whole host 
of other associations that are more difficult to represent. These associations refer to the 
basic values and ideals that are em bedded in the notion of nationhood of a particular 
nation.
What is a Symbol?
To understand  political symbols requires a description of the general notion of
symbol. The Oxford English Dictionary defines symbols as
"Something that stands for, represents, or denotes something else (not by 
exact resemblance, bu t by vague suggestion, or by some accidental of 
conventional relation); esp. a material object representing or taken to 
represent something imm aterial or abstract, as a being, idea, quality, or 
condition; a representative or typical figure, sign, or token".
Symbols are objects that represent abstract ideas or concepts and belong to the 
category of sign. According to the linguistic Ferdinand de Saussure the sign results 
from the association of the signifier w ith the signified (include note 3 in text). This 
relationship (signification) betw een the form the sign takes (signifier) and the concept 
it represents (signified) is typically arbitrary as there is no intrinsic or inevitable 
relationship betw een the two [Saussure 1974]. Unlike icons, symbols are arbitrary in 
their relation to w hat they refer to. They neither resemble it, nor are they causally 
connected to it.
Dittm er (1977) argues that it is the distinctive m etalinguistic property of 
symbols that distinguishes political symbolism from other political language on the 
basis of its linguistic properties. The metalinguistic property of symbols refers to the 
symbols' ability of functioning both as 'object language' -  thus denoting a specific
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empirical event or object -  and as "metalanguage, referring to a series of signs [Dittmer 
1977:567]. This relationship can be expressed by the following diagram 3:
M etalanguage
Object language
Signifier Signified
Sign (Signifier)
Symbol
Signified
According to the above diagram, the possible m eanings of a symbol are given 
by the initial, literal, simpler and more obvious m eaning of the object language. Let's 
consider as an example the w ord Kargil in contem porary India. Kargil is a toponym  
referring on a denotative level to a district located on the H im alayan m ountain range 
in the northern Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. On a first connotative level, 
however, Kargil refers to a w ar India and Pakistan fought during the sum m er of 1999. 
Still on a further symbolic level, the w ord Kargil stands for military prowess, 
patriotism  and ultimately for Indianness.
Thus, a symbol m ay "integrate an indefinite series of signs into a meaningful 
synthesis while retaining the illusion of concrete reality peculiar to w ords in everyday 
language". [Dittmer 1977:567-8]. Symbols are therefore second-order semiological systems 
[Barthes 1993:114] where w hat is a sign in the first system becomes the signifier of the 
second system. Because of this, symbols are effective, economical and synthetic 
instrum ents of communication. They can condense an array of information into a 
single linguistic form for immediacy of communication. Ultimately, it is thanks to the 
metalinguistic property of symbols that the w ord Kargil is a toponym, a historical 
event (the 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan), and a sentim ent (patriotism).
Symbols of Politics
In the realm  of politics, symbols serve to represent the political reality. Elder
and Cobb described political symbols as
3 This diagram is adapted from both Barthes [1993] and Dittmer [1977],
29
"those perceived significant within a population and that characterize the 
politics of that population, [ ] The objects of significant symbolization 
include the major structure and processes of a political system, as well as 
major historical events in the life of the polity". [Elder and Cobb 1983:143]
As for purely linguistic symbols, political symbols are key elements in the 
process of political communication [Elder and Cobb 1983:3], A prim ary characteristic 
of symbols is the representation of abstract entities, the ability to draw  attention to 
things absent, and the simplification of objects representing values. Because of their 
evocative power, political symbols are effective means to express ideology and to 
champion notions about national identity [Spillman 1997], Through the employment of 
symbols nationalist m ovem ents are able to formulate articulate images of the nation.
A brief look at the Indian national flag illustrates the role of political symbols as 
expression of the political reality and as key elements in the process of political 
communication. The flag is as plain a statement as possible about sovereignty and 
national identity; it provides a powerful symbolism for the political community 
heralding a particular worldview. It is also the strongest symbol of patriotism. As an 
elem ent of communication, the flag represents the nation and its state in public 
ceremonies, sports contest and competitions and it is often displayed in times of 
trouble as well as on holidays and other patriotic occasions. Flags have proved 
particularly useful symbols of communication because they are cheap and easily made. 
Lots of people can carry them  and lots of people can see them. They can also be 
emotionally charged: besides indexing the nation-state, flags trigger patriotic 
sentiments and a sense of belonging. In m any countries, desecration, dishonouring and 
destruction of the national flag thus become offence punishable w ith a prison sentence, 
a fine and sometimes both4.
4 In India, Section 2 of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act of 1971 provides for a 
maximum jail term of three years and a fine:
Insults to Indian National Flag and Constitution of India. Whoever in any public place or in any 
other place within public view burns, mutilates, defaces, defiles disfigures, destroys, tramples 
upon or otherwise brings into contempt (whether by words, either spoken or written, or by acts) 
the Indian National Flag or the Constitution of India or any part thereof, shall be punished with 
imprisomnent for a term which may extend, to three years, or with fine, or with
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The Indian national flag is a tricolour w ith three broad horizontal colour bands: 
saffron, white and green. In the centre of the white band there is a wheel derived from 
the one that appears on the Sarnath Lion Capital erected by Asoka, the great M auryan 
king who ruled in India during the third century B.C. and converted to non-violence. 
Because national symbols are, of course, an integral part of a state official ideology, the 
Indian flag, besides representing the country, also transmits images of some of the 
m ost im portant concepts of Indian nationalism. The Tiranga not only symbolically 
represents a sense of indigenousness -  swadeshi -  but, m ost importantly, it also 
pictorially proclaims the country's final independence from Britain. These two 
concepts of indigenousness and independence are translated iconographically through 
the particular form at and design.
In the Indian flag, which avoids contentious religious symbolism, 
indigenousness is represented by both the choice of colours and the inclusion in the 
design of the Asokan wheel. While the colours saffron, white, and green denote 
respectively "courage and sacrifice, ( ) peace and truth, [and] faith and chivalry" 5,
according to India's cultural traditions6, the wheel is thought to be a symbol of India 
ancient culture7, at the same time avoiding contentious religious symbols. Moreover, in
both.[http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/natlron.html. See also the Flag Code which 
incorporates this Act at: http://www.outlookindia.com/specialfeaturem.asp? fodname=2000125 
&fname=fla gcode&sid='l ].
5 Times of India, August 6,1931, p.10
6 The design of the Indian flag drew inspiration from previous flags used by tire Indian National 
Congress during the nationalist movement, with only few modifications for what concerns the 
symbols inscribed in the flag and the order of the colour bands. Significantly, earlier flags meant 
to symbolise values that differ from the ones heralded nowadays. [See Chapter 2]
7 Asoka was tire great Mauryan ruler, known for his religious tolerance, his ahimsa (non­
violence) and his conversion to Buddhism, Although Asoka was known by tire epithet of 
chakravartin, an appellation of the emperor referring to an all-conquering monarch "whose 
wheels are rolling everywhere without obstruction" -  the wheel then symbolising the ruling 
power -  the Asokan period was also an era when ambassadors went to far off countries to bring 
messages of peace, culture and goodwill. Accordingly a further connotation of tire use of the 
Asokan emblem on the Indian national flag was to signify that India is a country whose main 
goal is the promotion of peace and harmony on the international arena. This connotation was 
supported by Nehru's endorsement of a foreign policy of non-alignment. According to this
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the post-independence period, the Asokan wheel signified the nationalist movem ent 
from its inception to the swadeshi movement. As a spinning wheel, it symbolised when 
the pow er looms of the British Empire crushed the indigenous artisan economy and 
reduced India to economic slavery. The cloth it spun became the Indian nationalists7 
uniform  and a symbol of both self-reliance and defiance.
While the colour code and the Asokan wheel stand for indigenouness, it is the 
formal design of the flag that symbolise the concept of independence. Contrary to other 
British ex-colonies (e.g., Australia and New Zealand), India did not adopt the colour 
iconography of the Union Jack -  red, white and blue -  nor its peculiar crossed pattern. 
Rather, it adopted the tricoloured pattern to symbolise the end of dom ination and the 
fact that the cultural traditions of India as an independent nation did not derive from 
the British colonial heritage. Moreover, besides connoting independence, the choice of 
the tricolour also prom pted an immediate connection w ith the liberal tradition of the 
French revolution. The tricolour was not an indigenous symbol. It was evidently part 
of the European tradition of nationalism. The adoption of the design of three vertical 
stripes was an unm istakeable gesture tow ards cosmopolitanism.
Thus, the Indian national flag does not simply stand for India; on the contrary,
its iconography is rather complex and symbolises the ideals of the newly independent
India. The symbolical m eaning of the flag was not lost on Nehru, India's first Prime
Minister. On presenting the flag to the Constituent Assembly in 1947, he recognised
that the flag was not simply identifying a new geo-political entity, bu t that it was also
telling w ith its iconography and choices of colours the story of the m aking of India. It
symbolically celebrated the new nation, its achievements, while in  the same breath it
heralded the future:
"So, (...) there is m uch m ore than will be clear on the surface. There is the 
struggle of the people for freedom, with all its ups and downs and trials and 
disasters, and there is, finally today as I move this Resolutions, a certain
reading, the Indian flag is not a flag of empire and domination but a flag connoting peaceful 
dynamism [Singh n.d.:90].
32
trium ph about it - a m easure of trium ph in the conclusion of that struggle" 
[Nehru, 1947:5].
Therefore, national symbols are not only crucial to visualising  the nation, but are 
also vital to representing the nation. Indeed, "[P]olitical symbols bring out in 
concentrated form those particular meanings and emotions" [Edelman 1964:11] that 
disclose the political culture's values and assumptions. In the case of India, the tiranga 
represents indigenousness, independence, sovereignty and internationalism.
On the Quality of Political Symbols
Elder and Cobb [1983] distinguish between higher order symbols and lower
order ones (alternatively called situational symbols). The former are usually associated 
w ith a country 's political regime or its political community; the latter usually relate to 
current authorities, non-governm ental political actors, policies and issues. The two 
authors suggest that higher order symbols tend to be more inclusive, m ore durable, 
and have a stronger affective attachm ent than those situational symbols that are related 
to current policies and political actors and that, therefore, tend to be m ore transient and 
exclusive. This thesis examines both types of symbols because the distinction is useful 
when analysing H indu nationalist symbolic repertoires in that it throw s light onto their 
relentless strategy to conflate the two types of symbols and convert situational symbols 
into high order ones.
Symbols of nationalism  are not simply illustrations of political power and 
political culture; rather they are the expressions of national identity. As such they can 
be w hat Cohen [1974] calls symbols of distinctiveness: symbols that aim  at stressing the 
group 's uniqueness and exclusiveness. These symbols aim at fostering national 
(internal) integration. According to Cohen [1969] symbolic affirmations of identity can 
be articulated by the use of symbols of kinship that can express issues of relation and in 
particular of pow er relations; by the em ploym ent of symbols of distinctiveness (such as 
myths of common descent, m arriage customs, moral exclusiveness, ritual practice and 
life style) that define the group identity as exclusive; and by the enactm ent of symbolic 
actions such as rituals (not necessarily religious, bu t also secular) that represent in
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symbolic form  the ways in which groups and individuals interact w ith other groups 
and individuals.
These symbols of distinctiveness usually find representations in w hat M erriam
[1934], in opposition to credenda, calls miranda of power. For M erriam, miranda -  or
things to be adm ired -  include all the symbolic apparatus of a governm ent, such as:
"memorial days and periods, public places and m onum ental apparatus, 
music and songs, artistic designs, in flags, decorations, statuary, uniforms, 
story and history, ceremonials of an elaborate nature, m ass demonstrations, 
w ith parades, oratory, music." [Merriam 1934:105].
Credenda -  or things to be believed:
"contain the reasons which oblige the intellect to give assent to the 
continuance of authority. And this assent m ay be due to governm ent in 
general, or to particular holders of power, or to the special system of 
authority in vogue at any given m om ent in a particular un it of pow er or to a 
special system of authority in vogue at any given m om ent in a particular 
unit of power" [Merriam 1934:113].
Credenda are therefore, justifying beliefs, or otherwise symbolisations and
articulations of the reasons to believe in the legitimate power. They are legitimating
factors, which reduce the coercive use of power. The miranda -  or things to be
adm ired -  are those symbols of the political m yth capable of both inciting people's
emotions and fostering feelings of identification and of solidarity w ith others. In
Lasswell's words, miranda are those elements of the political m yth "whose function is
to arouse adm iration arid enthusiasm, setting forth and strengthening faiths and
loyalties" [Lasswell 1949:11]. In particular, miranda,
"not only arouse emotions indulgent to the social structure, bu t also 
heighten awareness of the sharing of these emotions by others, thereby 
prom oting m utual identification and providing a basis of solidarity" [Ibid].
While credenda work on the mind, miranda have an effect on emotions [Merriam 
1934], In particular, the miranda of pow er give form to contents of credenda, including 
all the aesthetic aspects of politics.
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On the Meaning of Symbols
Symbols are by definition ambiguous and polysemic. Despite meanings always
deriving and depending in some way on the original signification of w hat Dittmer 
[1977] and Barthes [1993] call the object-language of the symbol, in symbolic 
representations there is an absence of any natural connection between the symbols and 
the symbolised -  w hat they stand for. In a way, the relationship betw een the signified 
and the significant is not arbitrary bu t culturally determined and conventional. Indeed, 
symbols do not exist in nature bu t are born out of conventions resting on param eters of 
hum an communications. As Firth [1973:56] observed "[C]riteria selected for 
classification of symbols m ay come from the natural worlds, b u t “'symbol' is a cultural 
not natural category".
Nevertheless, symbols are not totally arbitrary. There is "a formal analogy in 
logical structure betw een a symbol and its referent" [Edelman 1964:132]. Therefore, 
symbols' m eaning can be m otivated by an analogical-intuitive link. This is particularly 
true of visual symbols, which therefore become the privileged tools to represent 
abstract ideas. The difficulties related to arguing a symbol's meaning, however, are 
further complicated by the symbol's fundam ental characteristics, which are:
1. Condensation. Turner [1970:50] described the condensation quality of symbols 
as the interaction and synthesis of different m eanings for the creation of new 
complex meanings. The em inent linguist Edward Sapir had already introduced 
this concept w hen he distinguished between condensational symbols, which 
summ arise and condense experiences, feelings, and beliefs in an ongoing 
process of social interaction and communication, and referential, purely 
denotative symbols8.
8 Sapir in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Science [1934:493] gives the following definition:
"[Symbol] expresses a condensation of energy, its actual significance being out of 
all proportion to tire apparent triviality of meaning suggested by its mere form [ ] 
It seems useful to distinguish two main types of symbolism. The first of these, 
which may be called referential symbolism, embraces such claims as oral speech, 
writing, the telegraph code, national flags, flag signalling, and other organizations 
of symbols, which are agreed upon as economical devices for purpose of reference. 
The second type of symbolism is equally economical and may be termed 
condensational symbolism, for it is a highly condensed form of substitute behavior 
for direct expression, allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in 
conscious or unconscious form."
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2. Polysemy. This second characteristic of symbolic m eaning is clearly linked with 
the symbols' condensation quality. But if condensation stresses the composite 
nature of symbolic meaning, polysemy gives emphasis to the symbols' ability to 
stand for different things, to its flexibility and adaptability. Turner [1967:50] 
also defined polysemy: it stands for the capacity of symbol to be understood 
and interpreted in different ways by different people9.
3. Ambiguity. Related both to condensation and polysemy, ambiguity points to 
the fact that symbols do not have a single and distinct meaning. It is ultimately 
this characteristic that makes symbols so useful in hum an society and which is 
at the basis of symbols' strength10.
Because the scope of political communication in m odern m ass politics is to 
create and mobilise groups, political language attempts to obtain the greatest symbolic 
impact for m axim um  unifying potential, while rem aining essentially ambiguous. 
Therefore, political symbols are almost by definition all condensation symbols.
The abstractions proper to political symbolization stress that symbolic quality
which is directly linked with the functional nature of these symbols: their emotive
signification. According to Graber [1976] the symbols' emotive signification derives
from the fact that condensation symbols are:
"stimuli which carry little independent information bu t which activate a 
w ide variety of similar perceptions and connotations in their listeners. 
These perceptions and connotations usually involve fundam ental social 
values and are fraught w ith emotions". [Graber 1976:318-319]
Similarly, Elder and Cobb [1983:33] agree that because condensation symbols
"have ambiguous referents", they are "heavily laden w ith emotive content".
Specifically, according to Edelman [1964] typical condensation political symbols
"evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one 
symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past 
glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness: some one of these or 
all of them ." [Edelman 1964:6]
Scholars agree that symbolic signification functions mechanically w ithout the 
need for the receiver to be consciously aware of the structure of the symbolic process
9 Turnerl967:50. For the analysis of the symbols' polysemy in rituals see also Munn [1973:580].
10 See also Moore and Myerhoff, [1977:5].
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and to reflect on the symbolized. Therefore, symbols are crucial in political
communication, not only because they provide representations of otherwise abstract
entities, bu t also because of the emotional reaction that they can spurn and possible
conative effects: symbols sometimes do away with the need for debate and direct
people directly into action. In this sense s3unbols, as representations of abstract
collective entities, powerfully raise a sense of belonging:
"[i]n fact, w ithout condensation symbols m ost social groups, large or small, 
w ould not be able to produce the feelings of m utuality which are needed for 
group cohesion and action. Social movements which seek to generate strong 
ties among their followers may take painstaking care to create effective 
condensation symbols."[Elder and Cobb 1983]
Symbols of the Nation
Symbols of the nation are necessary elements for the definition of nationhood
and of national identities. While facilitating the process of identification, they also 
prom ote unity  and cooperation and stand for the values and ideals of the nation-state. 
But w hat are the symbols of the nation? W hat are we going to look at? Symbols of 
nations and nationalism  are those symbols that express and help to forge the character 
of national identity. Official symbols of the nation (the national emblem, the national 
anthem, and the national flag) are the m ost obvious ones; however, historic buildings, 
landm arks, postal stamps, and various insignia of national prestige and pow er are also 
im portant symbols that form part of the nationalist symbolic repertoire.
Political symbols find expression in a variety of representations: sometimes 
they are displayed alone and other times in public rituals. On these public occasions 
national symbols are paraded w ith the greatest vigour and are at their m ost impressive. 
By displaying the miranda of power, political rites dramatically represent the credenda. 
Secular political rituals are essential elements of the political system. They are 
connected with processes of political legitimation and can either be instrum ents of 
integration or of m anipulation of consent [Kertzer 1988]. The political uses of rituals 
are diverse; however, they cover four major functions [Kertzer 1996]. First and 
foremost political rituals provide symbolic representations for organisations, or in our 
case, for the nation. Because nations can exist only through symbolic representation 
[Kertzer 1988], it is m ainly through rituals that individuals are m ade aware of these
37
symbolic representations and are encouraged to identify w ith them. Rituals also 
provide the space where myths that sustain the nation are enacted and represented. 
Secondly, political rituals confer political legitimacy on both its sponsors and its 
participants. Political rituals present in highly compelling dram atic forms the 
legitim ating ideas of pow er through the em ployment of pow erful political symbols. 
Therefore, political rituals form the normative base of the socio-political order. As such 
they become expression of the values shared by the community, while being a vehicle 
for the exercise of power. This legitim ating function of rituals can be an influential 
means to m anipulate consensus and opinion.
Ritual action is also a structured system of staged political communication. As 
such it inevitably includes dram atic elements. Rather than focusing on the content of 
the message, these elements highlight its non-verbal aspects11. In addition to providing 
symbolic representations of pow er and being powerful instrum ents of legitimation, 
rituals also provide solidarity. By participating in public rituals of the nation, 
individuals are encouraged to feel like one. Aural and visual stimuli, the chemistry of 
the crowd, an emotionally charged atmosphere, all strengthen a feeling of solidarity 
and belonging. Lastly, rituals foster a particular understanding of the political reality, 
highlighting certain events, and concealing others.
Because iconicity is pursued by words and images, these answers will be given 
both discoursively and symbolically. The language of pow er and its key symbolic 
representations can be both verbally and visually represented (indeed, textual and 
visual symbols supplem ent each other) this thesis will look both at discursive and
11 Edelman, the most influential theorist of dramaturgy in the political context, defined a general 
theory of politics based on dramaturgy. Without going into details here, Edelman asserted that 
tire effectiveness of any political message depends on the coherence between the nature of the 
scene and of tire dramatic act itself, and concentrated many of his numerous works on the study 
of architecture and of tire physical contexts of so called political rituals. Moreover, Edelman 
believed that the effectiveness of political messages also depended on the style of the language 
employed and on the leadership, which can control symbolic perception and meaning. For 
instance, public national ceremonies are highly symbolical actions where nothing is left to the 
case: the date, the location, the sequence of the events and the nature of tire events itself; all 
these are carefully selected and bear a great symbolical potential [Edelman 1964].
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iconic symbolism and will be constantly shifting betw een the two. As a m atter of fact, 
power represents itself by way of w ords -  written, spoken or sung -  and images -  in 
posters, m onum ental sculptures, films, and so on. Political art -  which visually 
represents the symbolic repertoire -  provides a complementary system  of signification 
w ith its own implicit m ythology and associations. The elaboration of meaning 
presented by visual means serves not only to complement the related verbal message 
bu t also to introduce heterogeneous elements, which produce new  meanings. W ords 
often accompany images thereby providing an im portant comm entary to the visual 
representation. That is why it is im portant to juxtapose the analysis of oral and written 
discourse to its visual counterpart.
Certainly although the public image of a nation m ay be unified and appear 
symbolically simple, symbols of identity are nevertheless open to multiple 
interpretations. Indeed political actors often elaborate competing symbolical 
repertoires. The present study, however, is primarily concerned w ith  the analysis of the 
'official' symbolic imagery.
Theories of Nationalism
A ddressing the question of how national identity is symbolically reproduced
opens the discussion to different approaches to nationalism. As m entioned earlier, the 
practices of creation and dissemination of a sense of national identity -  still a major 
preoccupation of contem porary India -  are constituent parts of the nation-making 
processes. A fundam ental assum ption of this process is that nations are manufactured. 
This notion postulates the existence of an agent (or agents) drafting imaginative 
constructs [Foster 1997] of the nation and of national identity. Therefore, nation- 
m aking can be seen as an on-going process to "establish the hegem ony of a particular 
imaginative construct" [Foster 1997:9].
Three theories inform m ost of contem porary political debates on nationalism: 
instrumentalist, prim ordialist and social constructivist. Despite nationalism  being one 
of the m ost contested issues in our times, most political scientists now agree that 
nations are historically related to the advent of m odernity and to the concomitant
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economic and social changes. Some scholars such as Gellner contend that the advent of 
capitalism, industrialisation, the emergency of a bureaucratic state, tire phenom enon of 
urbanisation accompanied by a diffuse feeling of displacement, along w ith the erosion 
of traditions, created a fertile conditions for the creation of new  identities and, in 
particular, of national identities. According to this view, nationalism  depends to a large 
extent upon social circumstances and societal transformations. This analysis 
categorically dismisses the existence of nations in pre-m odern times, and reduces 
nationalism  to a purely m odern phenomenon.
According to the instrum entalist view of nationalism, nationalism is an 
ideology whose major components and cultural symbols are selected, generated ad hoc 
or m anipulated by the political elites for the legitimation of their power, for mass 
m obilisation and for purpose of economic and political domination. This theory 
stresses the fact that nations do not exist prim ordially but, instead, are systematically 
created at particular historical m oments to accommodate specific dem ands of political 
groups anim ated by economic interests. Ethnic identities are not fixed and innate; they 
change according to concomitant transformations. National identity is therefore fluid, 
changeable over time and socially acquired. Ethnic and national identities are tools in 
the hands of the elites struggling for political power and control of economic resources.
Paul Brass [1991] focuses attention not simply on the creative process entailed
by the phenom enon of identity formation (like Anderson [1991] and Hobsbawm
[1983]), bu t also on the conscious role of the elites in their m anipulation of "traditions".
For Brass [1991], the study of national identity formation is
"in large part the study of politically induced cultural change. More 
precisely, it is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites 
w ithin ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value 
and m eaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to 
defend its interest, and to compete with other groups". [Brass 1991:75]
Although Brass attributes the process of identity form ation to the dynamics of 
elite competition, he is also ready to acknowledge, like Smith [1986], the limits incurred
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by the elites in the process of selection and transformation of symbols of ethnic identity
"[P]olitical and economical elites who make use of ethnic group attributes 
are constrained by the beliefs and values which exist w ithin the group and 
which lim it the kinds of appeals which can be m ade" [Brass, 1991:16].
In fact, Brass does not deny the existence of 'prim ordial' attachments, but he
believes that their mere existence is not sufficient to determine the outcome of ethnic or
national identity during its formation, in that they can be
"subject to substantial variation for the sake of political and economic 
interests [ ] they [do not] have to become symbols of group identity. They 
became symbols of identity because elite groups [ ] prom oted them  as
such" [Brass, 1991: 85, 86].12
Critics argue that by emphasising elite m anipulation of the masses and 
considering nations and nationalism  as essentially constructed from above, the 
instrum entalists exaggerate the role of the elites and ignore the common people, who 
are treated as non-participant entities to the process of nationalism. Another criticism 
raised against Brass is that nationalism  (or a particular symbolic national identity) 
seems to emerge only as a by-product of elite competition. Despite these concerns, 
Brass's analysis offers two invaluable insights for our research. The first is that the 
analysis of national identity formation should not stop at the study of single specific 
cultural symbols, bu t should instead identify a "gram m ar" or "syntax" of national
12 It is in view of all this that Brass himself, in the introduction of Iris Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
acknowledges that he is far from the most extreme instrumentalist positions and that his "aim is 
in no way to disregard or discard the cultural forms, values and practice of distinctive ethnic 
groups as unimportant". [Brass, 1991:16]. He further explains:
"[T]he values and institutions of a persisting cultural group will suggest what 
appeals and symbols will be effective and what will not be and may also provide 
traditional avenues for mobilization and organization of the group in new 
directions. Nevertheless, the leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from 
traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the group 
and which will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define 
them. When they do so, moreover, they affect the self-definition of tire group and 
its boundaries, often to such an extent that tire ethnic community or nationality 
create out of a pre-existing ethnic group may be a very different social formation 
from its progenitor." [Brass 1991: 74-75]
41
symbols. To fully grasp the process of national identity formation, Brass [1991] stresses
the need to adopt a broader approach because the process of identity formation
"involves the m anipulation of a multiplicity of symbols and attempts to 
define a group in term s of sets of symbols. It is in the w ay in which symbols 
are combined and the emphasis given to particular symbols in relation to 
others that the boundaries of communities are established or break down". 
[Brass 1991: 99-100]
The second is mass communication's influence in the process. Consequently, 
the study of nationalism 's symbolic construction m ust be accompanied by the 
identification of national identity 's repertoires of symbols and cultural markers and by 
an analysis of the means of communication available and adopted by the elites.
Primordialists
The instrum ental theory of nationalism  runs counter to prim ordialist or evolutionary 
accounts according to which nations cannot be created at will. On the contrary, 
prim ordialists argue that nations evolved rather organically out of pre-m odern ethnic 
formations. According to this approach, nations are prim ordial, natural communities 
endow ed with a particular fixed identity, m ade up of language, customs, and creed 
where individuals retain attachm ents that provide for easy affinity w ith other people 
w ith the same background. Nationalism  is then the expression (verbal and non-verbal, 
objectified, and symbolical) of w hat already exists and ethnicity is therefore an ascribed 
trait, fixed and consistent overtime.
The most significant argum ents of this approach have been form ulated by the ethno- 
symbolists -  of which Anthony D. Smith is the m ost influential scholar. Although 
recognising the m odernity of nationalism, ethno-symbolists do not agree with the 
instrum ental m odel of nationalism. For the ethno-symbolists, the functionalist model 
proposed by the m odernists does not take into account the need to supply the nations 
of constructions such as myths, symbols and common history and memory, if not for a 
purely instrum ental end. Refuting part of the m odernist approach to nationalism, 
Smith strongly disagrees w ith the m odernists for their "systematic failure to accord 
any weight to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in 
the m odern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and
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widespread appeal of nationalism" [Smith 1999:8-9]. In fact, ethno-symbolists contend 
that the pre-m odern roots of nationalism  -  as expressed through pre-existing 
complexes of values, m yths and symbols [Smith 1989:341-356] -  are crucial to the 
formation of national identities.
"For ethno-symbolists, w hat gives nationalism its pow er are the myths, 
memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a 
popular living past has been and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by 
m odern nationalist intelligentsias. It is from these elements of myth, memory, 
symbols, and tradition that m odern national identities are reconstituted in each 
generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members cope w ith 
new challenges." [Smith 1999: 9].
A lthough Smith acknowledges that traditions, histories, genealogies, myth-symbol 
complexes of the nation are invented or, better, selected and adapted from a fixed 
repertoire for the specific purposes of nation building, he reiterates his attacks to the 
instrum entalists by insisting that history and culture
"are not simply pretexts, by which the atavistic emotions of the masses ( ) are
m anipulated, nor are they simply invented traditions designed as Eric 
Hobsbawm  claims, to channel and control the energies of the newly mobilized 
and enfranchised masses. H istory and culture form  integral parts of the fabric 
of popular visions, and of the social structures and processes in which the 
designated populations are em bedded and through which their elites m ust 
forge their strategies" [Smith 1999: 9].
Moreover, common tradition, national historical m emory, myth-symbol 
complexes are necessary inasm uch as they fulfil m an's need of m aking sense of the 
w orld around them. It is in this sense, that these cultural artefacts can trigger a sense of 
loyalty and self-sacrifice, and not simply because they are "natural" or deeply rooted in 
m an's psyche or ethnic history. According to the ethno-symbolists prim ordial 
attachm ents evolve from history and myths of common hom eland. However, the 
ethno-symbolic approach rightly emphasise that, although ethnies13 do not constitute 
nations, they do indeed m atter because they provide m yth-symbol complexes for the
13 Ethnies are "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and culture, 
having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity". [Smith 1986:32]
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ruling elites w ithout which/ "m odern nationalism w ould be rootless and arbitrary" 
[Breuilly 1996:150].
Constructivist Perspective
Criticism of prim ordialism  has focused on its failure to explain the waxing and
w aning of m ultiple ethnic identities. Moreover, prim ordialist views do not sufficiently 
address the diachronic changes and continuities in national identities. W hat they also 
fail to consider is the role of the political context: why certain symbols were chosen at 
certain m oments of time? A nd w hy did they change at all? Neither a prim ordialist nor 
an instrum entalist perspective, however, can adequately answer the questions as to 
how Indian national identity has been constructed, w hat shared symbols of identity 
were chosen, how  the latter m arked the boundaries w ithin the nation and between 
Indians and others. I argue for a process of creation and invention of symbolic 
constructions of national identities, which are partly retrieved from  common and 
traditional heritages, and partly fabricated by nationalist e lite s14. Constructivist 
approaches to the theories of nationalism are extremely useful in helping us 
understand the dynamics of national symbolic formations. Indeed, symbolic 
inventories respond both to m aterialist and ideological constraints.
Moreover, constructivism, which sees national identity as socially constructed, 
lends itself to assessing the problem  of reproduction and maintenance of symbolic 
repertoires in ordinary times. For constructivists a strong state is one that encourages 
nationalist attachm ent w ithin its population. The need for emotional attachm ent to the 
state is obviously more pronounced in times of war w hen symbolic repertoires are 
mobilised in various ways for the w ar effort (e.g., to justify conflict or in response to 
security threats). As nations need perm anently to rem ind people of their commonality, 
it is the reproduction and maintenance of a sense of national identity in times of peace
14 For some authors, nationalism in the new states became purely functional, a 'mobilisation 
system' [Apter 1963] in the hands of the elites in order to forge modern nations, in particular, to 
encourage participation and solidarity to achieve the common goal of social integration and 
economic development. Therefore, in order to mobilise the masses, the nationalist leaders had 
to build on the traditions of the people and pool elements from the ethnic resources often to 
awake collective emotions typically roused by traditional religions.
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that is particularly im portant in understanding the role of symbolic repertoires in 
keeping a sense of nationality alive. Billig [1995] calls this is peaceful reproduction of 
nationalism  'banal nationalism '. This everyday form of nationalism  despite its 
apparent naturalness constantly and silently reinforces a sense of national belonging. 
National holiday, sporting events, ritual celebrations where the symbols of the nation 
are prom inently displayed strengthen attachment to the state while weakening 
competing sub-state nationalisms. A nd indeed it is through the repetition and 
reproduction of the symbolic repertoires that a sense of attachm ent to the nation is 
constantly reinforced.
Considering the interplay of this range of circumstances also allows us to
escape the classical dichotomy pitting prim ordialists against instrum entalists on the
nature of the nation and of nationalism. In fact, one could say that it combines the two
classical approaches. According to Giesen [1988:12] "[N]ations are not givens but
historical products generated and imagined in particular public discourses". From this
point of view national identities are created situationally and are constantly changing
[Lewellen 2003:163]. This constructivist perspective requires the presence of a collective
political actor w ho w ould act as a signifying agent. This political actor -  also called a
cultural entrepreneur or even a socio-political archaeologist [San M artin 2002] -  selects
cultural elements from a wide repertoire and articulates them  in a chain of signification
that makes them  acquire a new  relevance -  a cultural repertoire that the political actor
cannot invent ex-novo. As Snow [2001] has beautifully pu t it:
"[ ] identities are not fabricated whole cloth but typically knit together by 
draw ing on threads of past and current cultural m aterials and traditions, 
structural arrangements and even prim ordial attributes. These material and 
attributes constitute the kinds of stuff from which collective identities -  
particularly ethnic, religious and national ones -  are fashioned, and thereby 
function, in varying degrees, to constrain the construction process. [ ]".
[Snow 2001:6]
From a constructionist perspective, the process through which identities are 
created, expressed, sustained and m odified is particularly im portant. Snow [2001] calls 
these processes variants of 'identity work'. According to Snow [2001], at the core of 
'identity  w ork' is the
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"generation, invocation, and maintenance of symbolic resources used to 
bound and distinguish the collectivity both internally and externally by 
accenting commonalities and differences." [Snow 2001:6]
These symbolic repertoires function as
"boundary m arkers of collective differentiation, distinguishing insiders 
from outsiders [ ] They congeal into a kind of 'semiotic bricolage' 
(Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996) that gives symbolic substance to the 
claimed distinctive 'w e', and it is largely through this bricolage that 
collective identity is expressed and known publicly"15. [ibid]
The debate betw een the theory of prim ordialism  and constructivist and 
instrum entalist points of view has been raging for some time; however, increasing 
consensus has emerged in the last few years among the scientific community. 
Prim ordialist have come to accept some of the premises of the constructivist point of
15 Eisenstatd and Giesen [1995] maintain that collective identity is expressed through three 
symbolic codes: primordial, civic and cultural. It is these symbolic codes that help in the 
construction of a common shared frame of reference and define the distinction between us and 
them, the in-group and the out-group.
Primordial codes are what are usually believed to be natural givens: gender, kinship, blood ties 
in general, ethnicity, race, language, religion and custom that emphasise common descent and 
the perception of tire group as one people. The boundaries identified by these codes are fixed, 
objective and unchangeable. These codes find expression in indigenous myths, narratives of 
origins, and exclusionary practices or symbolic rituals in processes of acquisition and allocation 
of resources in political mobilisation. According to Smith (1991 and 1995) these are codes of 
exclusion. In particular, primordialism allows for reinforcement of boundaries under conditions 
of rapid mobility and close proximity to others and offers strategies to defend the collective 
identity and its uniqueness against internal and external pressure for assimilation.
Civic codes emphasise historical continuity of identity. They are based on familiarity "of 
implicit rules of conduct, traditions and social routines that define and demarcate the boundary 
of the collectivity" [Eisenstatd and Giesen 1995:80]. In this case, the integrating norms are 
formulated independently from descent. Thus, civic codes do not presuppose that collective 
identity is based on something 'external' such as nature or the sacred. These codes allow for 
temporary permeability of boundaries enabling strangers to join in as only learnable rules of 
participation have to be followed. Strangers are thus not perceived as a threat. Interestingly 
and unlike cultural and primordial codes, for these codes of identity, belonging is not based 
primarily on the alterity between us and them. Membership is based on 'competent 
participation' in tradition-based civic practices [Schmidtke 1996:102],
Cultural codes are based on the alleged relationship between the community and the sacred, 
building on the unique relationship between the given group and the sacred and the sublime 
(god, reason, progress, or rationality). To outsiders, the boundaries are in principle open as long 
as there is willingness to adapt to the implicit social and political rule of the community. 
Strangers can be part of the group via education, cultural assimilation and conversion.
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view and even for authors such as Smith the link between ethnicity and m odern 
nationalism cannot longer be understood in a deterministic way. Traditional 
prim ordialist approaches have come under severe criticism particularly against 
deterministic assum ptions m arking the prim ordialist approaches to nationalism. The 
distinction betw een the social constructivist approach and the instrum entalist theory is 
som ewhat fine. While both view the nation as a socio-politically constructed product 
rather than an innate entity, the instrum entalist approach is m uch narrow er than the 
constructivist. Instrum entalists view the national identity as existing at a particular 
time and solely for a specific economic and political goal and cannot explain the 
persistence of group identification across time.
The constructivist approach to nationalism is very interesting and useful. On 
the one hand, because it assumes that the nation is not a fixed entity bu t a dynamic 
product constructed by a nationalist mobilization potential -  in other words the 
specific context of cultural, economic and political circumstance16 -  it allows us to deal 
w ith the changing character of the Indian nation as it has been im agined over the years. 
The dynamics of creation of national identities are not only reduced to elite 
competition bu t they are also contextualised. Like the instrumentalists, social 
constructivism recognises that identity is not fixed bu t fluid. On the other hand, 
another interesting point of this approach is that it gives relevance both to the political 
opportunity structure and to the agency of the political actor as a cultural entrepreneur 
whose field of action is nevertheless lim ited in its elaboration of an idea of the nation. It 
focuses on the dynamics of identity formation, bu t it also addresses the origins of 
ethnicity by acknowledging that language, religion, physical characteristics, and 
culture, contribute to the creation of a set of identities people can choose from. As 
Gisen argues,
"collective identity exists only if some people believe in it. [ ] Images of
collective identity are adopted by individuals as true and real if these
16 According to San Martin [2002:99] the nation must be considered as a "dynamic product, 
socio-politically constructed by the action of a nationalist movement under some given cultural, 
economic and political circumstances."
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patterns correspond to the central param eters of their life-world and 
cultural frames" [Giesen 2001:40]
Imagination and Invention
The genesis of nations and the inventive character of nationalism  have
preoccupied m any scholars in the past few years. Two of the m ost influential works 
dem and m ention here: Eric H obsbawm  and Terence Ranger's The Invention of Traditions, 
and Benedict A nderson's Imagined Communities. Both published at the beginning of the 
eighties, the two books address the question from two different perspectives: Anderson 
by individuating the factors that m ade the imagination possible -  rather than going 
through different types of imaginations; and Hobsbawm  by looking into the dynamics 
of the creative process itself, in particular, into one of the devices that m ade this 
imagination possible, the invented traditions.
Contrary to the conventional prim ordialist study of nationalism  which was 
developed on the assum ptions of a nation as a pre-existing, ethnic, uniform  dorm ant 
unitary entity, Anderson -  in his groundbreaking work, Imagined Communities -  
contends that the nation is "an imagined political community":
"It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know m ost of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the m inds of each lives the image of their communion. [ ] It is imagined as a 
community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
m ay prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the 
past two centuries, for so m any millions of people, not so m uch to kill, as 
willingly to die for such limited imaginings" [Anderson, 1991:6-7].
A nderson's theory does not simply take into account the creativity of the 
process of the im agination of the nation. Rather, Anderson is as inclined to identify the 
forces that facilitated the developm ent of the idea of nation-ness, as to delineate the 
process of im agination itself. In addition to stressing the creative character of 
nationalism, A nderson in the passage quoted above, acutely pointed out the non­
accidental character of nationalism. Industrialisation and the developm ent of 
capitalism  accompanied by the developm ent of comm unication technologies made
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possible the im agination of hom ogeneous and unified communities, which became the 
basis of nationalism. Similarly, A nderson maintains that several factors facilitated the 
developm ent of the idea of nation-ness: the standardisation of a commonly spoken 
language, which allowed communication and provided the basis for cultural identity; 
the developm ent of prin t technology, which perm itted the diffusion of collective ideas 
and information; the introduction of censuses, which classified and described society's 
members; and finally the identification and preservation of cultural m onum ents that 
could represent the people and the values of the nation [Anderson 1983: 4].
Hobsbawm  and Ranger's The Invention of Traditions examines how a nation 
constructs its origin and history through the selective remembering, forgetting and 
even invention of the past. In the opening pages of his study Hobsbaw m  gives a 
necessary definition of the invented traditions:
"’Invented tradition’ is taken to m ean a set of practices, norm ally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek 
to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity w ith the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attem pt to establish continuity w ith a suitable historic past 
[Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:Iff.]
H obsbaw m  identifies two types of invented traditions: those resulting from the 
adaptation to new  situations of old traditional forms and institutions, and the 
deliberate 'inventions' of new  traditions created to comply w ith different and novel 
purposes. In general the first type is more common. It occurs w hen pre-existing 
material is selected and adapted from the repertoire of m yths and symbols 
accum ulated over time to construct traditions of a new type for novel purposes. When, 
however, historical continuity w ith the past was lacking, some traditions had to be 
deliberately invented ex-nihilo:
"[E]ntirely new symbols and devices came into existence as part of national 
m ovem ents and states, such as the national anthem  [ ], the national flag
[ ], or the personification of the 'nation ' in symbol or image, either official,
as w ith M arianne and Germania, or unofficial, as in the cartoon stereotypes
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of John Bull, the lean Yankee Uncle Sain and the 'G erm an Michael'. 
[Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:7],
Invented traditions perform  three functions: they establish or symbolise social 
cohesion of real or artificial communities to help define collective identities, they 
establish and legitimise institutions to justify the creation of a new  state, and they 
prom ote socialisation. Because nations need these strong symbolic constructions, 
nationalism cannot be studied w ithout looking into these phenom ena [Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, 1983:14],
Here, w hat is im portant is the issue of imagination per se in bringing a 
community into being. Despite the fact that only few of the elements identified by 
A nderson strictly applied to India which witnessed a lim ited industrialisation, 
illiteracy w as raging, the spread of communication technologies w as ham pered by lack 
of resources and by the vastness of the territory, and standardisation of a common 
language happened only in form and interested only the elites (monumentalisation 
and censuses were probably the m ost im portant features that contributed to the 
imagination of the nation) A nderson's contribution is still valid. While supporting 
A nderson's thesis, I w ould argue that in India -  as in other parts of the colonial world -  
the nation em erged as an imaginative construct also thanks to the combination of a 
well-established visual culture and language w ith those m odern communication 
technologies identified by A nderson that helped the diffusion and dissem ination of 
this 'visual vocabulary of nationhood' [Freitag 1995], On the other hand Hobsbawm 's 
stress not just on the inventiveness of tradition but on its repetitiveness, greatly 
contributes to the analysis of symbolic constructs in the creation and articulation of 
national identities and to the study of dynamics of m anagem ent and reproduction of 
such symbolic repertoires.
Analysing Political Symbols
People tend to perceive politics and political dynamics as logical and rational.
Gusfield and Michalowicz [1984:418] contend that it is W eber's view of a disenchanted, 
rationalised world that dominates our perception of m odern political reality/dynamics.
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Moreover, the alleged difference between m odern and traditional societies has 
contributed to the relative disregard for symbols, rituals, ceremony and m yth in 
m odern political life [Kertzer 1988:x]. Various authors, however, including Elder and 
Cobb [1983], Bennett [1980], Dittm er [1977], Kertzer [1988; 1996], Lerner [1977] have 
referred to the significant role of symbols in politics and of symbolic repertoires in the 
construction of political and national identities. W ith some notable exceptions [Feith 
1963; Foster (ed)1997], the study of the forms in which national identity is symbolically 
reproduced, I w ould contend, has mostly preoccupied scholars studying the political 
dynamics of the first world. Symbolic repertoires of the nation are seen as significant 
factors in the evolution of national identities in particular in America, Australia, 
Europe, Russia, Germany (Mosse 1975; Spillman 1997; Edensor 2002; Pitchford 2001).
New nations, however, provide a rich setting for the study of this phenomenon 
because often the process of nation-making is on-going. M oreover, as Geertz [1971] has 
noted, in these countries ethnic identification is in conflict w ith state nationalism  as 
ethnicity has not been superseded yet by the identification w ith the state (civic 
nationalism). W hereas the importance of symbolic systems as factors in the 
construction of national identities is widely recognised in a variety of scholarly works, 
the role played by symbols and rituals within the nationalist discourse in India has 
been generally neglected. The study of political symbolism in India is usually confined 
to a single chapter or section and it has rarely been the subject of rigorous investigation. 
Moreover, scholars have generally turned their attention to either a particular historical 
period or to a specific symbol. In this respect, there are several appreciative studies of 
the political symbols of the anti-colonial m ovem ent and of H indutva. The N ehruvian 
period -  which provides a fertile ground for research -  has hardly been adequately 
discussed17. I w ould contend that one reason for this could be found in the penchant 
among scholars to focus m ainly on symbols that are derived from the religious domain. 
Indeed, religious iconography and symbolism have played an im portant role both in 
the anti-colonial m ovem ent and H indutva. My contention, however, is that national 
symbols and rites of pow er are not necessarily rooted in religion and that all societies -
17 Exceptions are Deshpande [1993], King [1994]; Masselos [1990]; Gupta [1994].
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whatever their degree of complexity -  require a common faith and common collective 
consciousness.
Thus, the dispute over the construction of the tem ple dedicated to Ram at 
Ayodhya prom pted several investigations on various aspects of the question. 
O utstanding works -  such as N andy [1995], Hansen [1999] Bhatt [2001] and Basu et al 
[1993], w ho trace the genealogy of H indutva ideology and discuss the history of the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh and the Vishva H indu Parishad -  devote only a small 
part of their research to the study of the symbolic repertoires employed by the 
H indutva political forces in the crucial years of the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, either 
by focussing on its m ost im portant symbol -  Ram -  or by examining Sangh Parivar's 
performative politics of ethno-mobilisation (e.g., Jaffrelot [1996], Assayag [1998], 
Hansen [1999], Bhatt [2001] among others). While these works present insightful 
analyses of H indu nationalists' symbolic politics, other studies focus less on the 
symbolic inventories of national identity bu t provide detailed and useful readings of 
particular national symbols. Thus, the symbol of M other India or Bharat M ata has been 
the subject of several interesting studies, as part of a gender-related analysis of 
nationalism  in India and in particular in Bengal (sometimes spurred by Chatterjee 
[1993]'s study and his analysis of the differentiation of the public and private spheres 
in India and the influence of the latter on the conceptualisation and characterisation of 
the nationalist m ovem ent in India) such as Bagchi [1990], Bose [1997], Chow dhury 
[1992], Sen [1993] and Sarkar [1987]; or as an icon of the nation itself, often highlighting 
its visual representations in different m edia such as posters, pam phlets, stickers, and 
videos (Gupta 2001; Brosius 1997 and 2005; Mckean 1996; Surjit 1993 and Ramaswami 
2003).
Literature examining India as Bharat Mata has also dealt w ith the Indian 
territory-geography's representation. The issue was raised m ostly because Mother 
India is in general represented iconographically both as a w om an (in accordance with 
H indu representation of M other earth -  Prithvi) and as em erging from the m ap of the 
subcontinent (on this see Eck 1999, Ramaswamy 2001, and Geeti Sen 2002). Other
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works, however, have focussed on India's post-colonial urban and industrial landscape 
(see in particular Bharadwaj 1983; Deshpande; Gupta N  1994; and King 1994) and 
offered an interesting reading of India's national space as a sign of national identity. 
Am ong these m onographs dedicated to the analysis of a particular symbol of 
nationality, there are several (Cohn 1989; Bean 1989; Tarlo 1996; and Bayly 1986) 
devoted to study of khadi and of dress-codes adopted by Indians during the anti­
colonial agitations, another im portant element of the symbolic capital of pre­
independence nationalism, when cloth became a symbol of both colonial exploitation 
and nationalist self-assertion.
O ther studies have focussed on the prefonnative and ritual aspect of Indian 
politics as symbolic process of construction of Indian national identity. For instance 
Assayag [1998] presents a penetrating critique of the Sangh Parivar nationalist 
processions of the 1980s while Kaur [2003] analyses the public uses of religion in 
W estern India focussing on the Ganapati Festival as a discursive arena for competing 
nationalist strategies and on its mandap tableaux as loci for the narration and 
visualisation of the nation. Cashman [1970] and Freitag [1989] have analysed the 
significant part played by popular H indu festivals and by other symbolic strategies -  in 
particular see Freitag [1988] on the cow protection m ovem ent -  in the definition of 
political identities during the anti-colonial movement. These studies proffer useful 
readings of performative politics and the importance of public rituals in the process of 
Indian identity-construction, b u t again the focus is m ore on religiously-derived 
political rituals than  secular /purely political ceremonies w ith  the exception of 
M asselos's [1990] analysis of Independence Day rituals and G upta 's examination of 
Republic Day Parade's venues.
The study of symbolic politics of nationalism in India is also concerned with 
issues related to m edia studies. The use of mass m edia -  as Anderson [1991] notes -  is 
and has been im portant in the transmission of a national culture. Visual m edia in 
particular is useful for the diffusion of symbols of the nation. Therefore it is not 
surprising that a large literature exists devoted to the analysis of the relationship
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betw een mass m edia and nationalism. These works -  w ritten m ainly in the 1950s and 
1960s (Schramm 1964 and Pye 1963 to m ention the m ost im portant) -  considered mass 
m edia essential tools for national developm ent and m odernisation. Albeit 
acknowledging this im portant function, our interest in these works regards the 
importance of m edia not just for the prom otion of m odernisation and developm ent bu t 
also for the diffusion of nationalist symbolic repertoires in India. In this respect, Fanner 
[2000], Gupta V S [1996], Chakravarkty Rangan [2000], Brosius [1999; 2005], and 
Rajagopal [2001] offer im portant contributions to the field. Rajagopal [1994, 2001] in 
particular presents a penetrating critique of the m ass-m ediated images rise to a 
prominence as a central locus of political discourse. Rajagopal highlights the 
emergence of a new  era of symbolic politics and analyses the part played by the 
serialisation of the Ram ayan epic on national television in India. Brosius [1999; 2005] 
explores the role of m oving images and mass m edia in the process of representation of 
H indutva. Despite a large am ount of works devoted to the relationship between Indian 
cinema and nationalism  (among m any see Chakravarty 1993), and few publications on 
documentaries and short films produced by the M inistry of Information and 
Broadcasting, there is very little on state-run mass m edia and tire diffusion of 
nationalist symbolic repertoires. W orth m ention here are the works by Ohm [1999]; 
Farmer [2000] Binford [1983] and Ghosh [1992] and Srirupa Roy [2003], A central 
question on the genesis, reproduction, and maintenance of symbolic repertoires thus 
remains largely unanswered.
To summ arize, while there have been several appreciative studies on symbolic 
repertoires of the nation, scholars have examined prim arily religious imagery, 
focussing either on the H indu nationalists' symbolic repertoires (both pre- and post­
independence) or on the uses of religious symbolism in contem porary Indian politics 
and of political symbol on national media. The relationship of other symbols of 
national identity w ith mass m edia is rarely discussed. Therefore, a systematic and 
comprehensive study of the emergence and establishment of competing symbolic 
repertoires of the nation in contem porary India is still missing. W hat is also lacking is a 
chronological study presenting the evolution of symbolic repertoires of the nation
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overtime. This thesis combines a chronological approach to a comprehensive analysis 
of hegemonic symbolic inventories of nationhood in India. This thesis considers a 
w ide time-interval rather that focussing on a specific point in history and studies 
India's nationalist symbolic capitals while registering the changes overtime of these 
forms of imagination. This is an im portant feature because it helps us understand "the 
diversity of ways in which people imagine themselves as being or belonging to a 
nation" [Dickie, 1996: 21]. Moreover, this study is not confined only to the analysis of 
religious symbolism and religious rituals of H indu nationalists bu t it expands to 
include secular symbols and ceremonials supporting the idea that rituals and 
symbolism not only pertain to the dom ain of religion or bear only on the political 
organisation of 'prim itive ' or exotic small scale society [Kertzer 1988] but are also 
crucial in the political arena of contem porary m odern nations. The present thesis 
contributes to the current stock of studies on social construction of national identity in 
India and on the role of symbols as significant constituents of national identity.
Chapterisation of thesis
How  therefore has the Indian, nation been imagined? Through which ritual
practices? W hat are the constituent elements of the symbolic repertoires expressing 
national identity? A nd how  have they changed over time? These are some of the 
questions addressed in this study. In this thesis we will look at w hat Gellner calls 
'garden  cultures' [1983:7] or 'h igh cultures' which he defines as "a school-mediated, 
academy supervised idiom, codified for the requirem ents of reasonably precise 
bureaucratic and technological communication" [1983:57], In these centrally sustained 
cultures, official histories, values and norm s about the nation are established. However, 
despite the control of the state apparatuses on such productions, "the fact remains that 
those w ho attem pt to fix the m eanings of nationalism [ ] m ust necessarily concentrate 
on a few selective, symbolic dimensions to suite their purposes" [Edensor 2002:vii]. 
The stress on high culture, on the bureaucratic state elites, their m anipulation 
techniques and the implicit passivity of the audience seems to negate the dynamism  of 
culture and the role of other cultural producers. This is not m eant to deny that the 
nation is reproduced and signified also in the banal realm of everyday life [Billig 1995], 
which is an equally im portant aspect of the nation-making process. It is this dynamic
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aspect of culture that leaves space and hope for alternative versions of nationalism to 
emerge and exist, "for a cultural elite propagating high culture is bu t one aspect of the 
production of national identity" [Edensor 2002:4].
This thesis analyses the role of national symbols in the construction of India's 
contested national identity by examining the competing symbolic systems that have 
emerged before and after independence. While bringing to the fore the complex 
relationship betw een the nation and pre-existing ethno-symbolic resources, the 
findings of this study shed light on the operational dynamics at play in the 
construction of nationalist m yth-symbol complexes and national identity in India. The 
material is organised chronologically, and the argum ent is developed in five chapters. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the national symbols developed during the Indian anti-colonial 
movement. This m ovem ent was characterised by the emergence of symbolic 
vocabularies, which created suggestive visions of the nation and became crucial 
elements in the shaping and developm ent of an imagined national community. The 
th ird  chapter deals w ith  the rise in post-independen t India of a state-sponsored 
national sym bolic reperto ire  show ing how  the nation  w as m ade visible th rough  a 
num ber of cu ltu ral representations, official narratives, and  other symbolic 
constructions. The fourth  chapter provides a visual and sym bolic narrative to this 
im portan t process of nation-m aking, examining also the ideological crisis of the 1970s 
and 1980s that followed the collapse of N ehru 's brand of nationalism. The fifth chapter 
takes stock of the loss of appeal of the previous official symbolic constructions of India, 
in favour of the emergence of a competing symbolic repertoire m anufactured by the 
H indu right. These issues are further discussed in the sixth chapter, which also 
examines the manifestations of the symbolic system that has since emerged in 
contem porary India.
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CHAPTER 2 
Imagining India
N ational sym bolic reperto ires w hich created "evocative visions of the nation" 
[Freitag 2001] first em erged  du ring  the Ind ian  anti-colonial m ovem ent. These suggestive 
im ages form ed the  core of a distinctive nationalist rhetoric  an d  con tribu ted  to the 
developm ent of Ind ia 's  im agined  com m unity/ form ing tire basis for the  participation  of 
the Ind ian  people  to the public sphere. D uring the nationalist m ovem en t there w ere 
m ultip le visions for Ind ia  and  its sym bolic reperto ire  found  expression in  a variety  of 
m edia such as posters, pho tography , m onum ents, figurative arts, em blem s, uniform , and 
public rituals [Freitag 2001]. The creation of a sym bolic idiom  w as called for by pressing 
com m unication needs on  the p a rts  of the nationalist leaders. The nationalist leadership, 
w ho strove to bring  the nationalist m essage to tire m asses, transla ted  and  popularised  the 
nationalist ideology into fam iliar and  intelligible form s th a t d rew  heavily  on trad itional 
m odes of expression and  on  shared  values. The em ploym ent of such  shared  sym bols and 
values steeped in  the Ind ian  trad ition  contribu ted  also to legitim ate the m ovem ent and  to 
give m oral au thority  to its leadership . M oreover, the  technological developm ents of 
m odern  com m unication in troduced  by  the British (the railw ays, tire telegraph  and  the 
boom  in  tire national and  vernacular press) all contribu ted  to tire fast diffusion of 
nationalist ideas th ro u g h o u t the  subcontinent.
H ow ever, efforts of b ringing  the nationalist m essage to tire m asses by  popularising  
it in  intelligible form s, som etim es h ad  the consequence of transform ing  localised, 
com m unal ideology and  sym bols into national ones, hr particular, to gain a broader 
appeal, tire nationalist leadersh ip  often resorted  to sym bols and  practices d raw n  from  the 
religious reperto ires. A ccording to som e scholars, one of the m ost p rom inen t in  this 
trad ition  is Brass [1991], tire justification for this does no t sim ply reside -  as it is usually  
held  -  in  the backw ard  character of the Ind ian  m asses w ho reg ard ed  their religious 
iden tity  p a ram o u n t and  w ho  therefore w ere p rone to react to appeals m ade in tire nam e of 
religion, b u t also on tire m anipu la tive  in tentions of the leadership . W hilst in  agreem ent
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w ith  Brass, I also argue in  favour of Sm ith [1989] according to w hom  nations rely on p re ­
existing com plexes of values, m yths and  sym bols. Therefore, it could be argued  that in  the 
process of creation and  inven tion  of sym bolic constructions, d ie  m yth-sym bol system s 
tirat su p p o rt the nation  are partly  retrieved  from  com m on and  trad itional heritages, and 
partly  fabricated  by  nationalist elites.
It is w ith  these argum ents and  considerations in  m ind  that in  this chapter I explore 
the n a tu re  of sym bolic codes of Ind ia 's  nationalist m ovem ent. H ow  d id  the Indian  
nationalist m ovem ent articulate ideas of tire na tion  and  of na tional identity? W hich w ere 
its ritua l practices and  w hich form ats and  m edia d id  it em ploy to com m unicate to the 
m asses? The p re-independence sym bolic reperto ire is characterised by  tw o dom inant 
features: the use of trad itional and  fam iliar form s of com m unication and  the u tilization  of 
religious idiom s. I therefore begin  w ith  assessing the trad itional m ethods of m obilisation 
in  use in colonial Ind ia  as it is th rough  the analysis of p ro p ag an d a  and  political 
cam paigning th a t m yths, sym bols and  rituals of the nationalist m ovem en t can be easily 
identified. I then  p rov ide  an overview  of die political id iom s u tilized  du ring  the 
nationalist m ovem ent. The follow ing section establishes die setting  in  w hich these 
processes occurred, focussing in  particu lar on the evolution of d ie  m ed iods of p ropaganda  
and  m ass m obilisation em ployed  d u ring  die nationalist m ovem ent. In  the  last p a rt I 
analyse the sym bolic reperto ire  of Ind ian  nationalism  and  its m ost im portan t recurren t 
them es and  sym bols.
Methods of Mobilisation
Being a sm all m ovem ent led by a w esternised and anglicised u rb an  elite, at the
beginning, Ind ian  nationalism  w as expressed in w ritten  form , th ro u g h  the English and  
vernacular press, petitions and  sm all publications alike. Later it developed  a set of 
com m unication strategies for the  m ost p a rt based on already tested  and  som etim es m ore 
localised form s of protest. H ow ever, die m ovem ent lacked uniform ity , as it w as no t 
necessarily a w ell-organised m ovem ent b u t a m ore spontaneous one. M oreover, despite 
the fact th a t the Ind ian  N ational Congress came to epitom ise Ind ian  nationalism , it w as by 
no  m eans tire sole political organisation th a t took p a rt in the  nationalist m ovem ent.
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Political p ropaganda  and  m obilisation practices w ere therefore m ore likely to be 
uncoord inated  th an  centrally organised. O nly in  particu lar cases, such  as du ring  the two 
m ost im portan t non-cooperation  m ass cam paigns of 1921 an d  1930-31 w as there better 
coordination. It is therefore n o t possible to talk of a na tionalist p ropaganda. Even w ith  the 
Congress a t the heigh t of its p ro p a g a n d is ts  efforts, a lack of un ifo rm ity  and  a certain 
degree of im prov isation  w ere the n o rm  [Pandey 1975]. D espite this lack of coordination 
one can still detect a p a tte rn  of m obilisation tha t w as characteristic of th is period  and  that 
contribu ted  to the  creation of a specific im agination of the Ind ian  nation.
hr o rder to rally  su p p o rt to the nationalist cause, p ro p ag an d a  w as directed at 
d ifferent recipients: the ind igenous business com m unity, som e particu lar sections of 
society w hich felt excluded  from  the m ovem ent (such as tire M uslim ), the  m asses in 
general, the governm ent, and  the in ternational public opinion. All political parties and 
also reform ist religious organisations p roduced  and  issued p ro p ag an d a  m aterial of all 
sorts. N ationalist p ropaganda  w as m ainly  carried  ou t w ith  the help  of the w ritten  m edia: 
new spapers and  books w ere w idely  em ployed to publicize nationalist ideology and 
cam paigns1. H ow ever, given Ind ia 's  large illiteracy rates, non-periodical p ropaganda  w as 
greatly  resorted  to2. P am phleteering3, p lacard ing  (pasting of poste r in  public  spaces), 
ballads, folksongs, patias4 and  sym bolic activities such as collective perform ances w here
1 The Indian press played a crucial role in the national and political awakening of India, By the end 
of the nineteenth century there were already five hundred Indian newspapers and journals both in 
English and in the vernacular languages [Pandey 1975].
2 Pandey [1975] distinguishes between periodical and non-periodical propaganda. While the first 
debated the view of the leaders of the nationalist movement and general nationalist policy, non­
periodical propaganda tackled a whole different range of issues more relevant to Indian masses. In 
the latter, exhortation and direct appeals to join the struggle, as well as 'congratulations for the 
great nationalist spirit displayed' [Pandey 1975:217] were dominant.
3 Pamphlets were usually written in verses and in vernacular (or Hindi/English and a vernacular). 
They were sung at village fairs, or during festivals, appealing to religious sentiments, and to the 
shared reservoir of myths and folklore. Gupta [2001:96] with regards to the Cow Protection 
Movement notes: "[B]oth the handbills stated that they should not only be read, but narrated to 
others. In most of the villages of Faizabad, letters were circulated claiming that a 'akashvani' had 
warned not to give charity to Muslims, not to sell cattle to them and to have no dealings with 
them."
4 Patias (or village telegraph as the British called it) were chain letters written generally in 
vernacular. Their main purpose was to incite mobilisation and frequently the recipient of the letter 
had to copy and send several other copies to other villages.
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sym bols or set of sym bols w ere being p a rad ed  or used, w ere som e of the m ethods used  to 
give voice to the m ovem en t and  m obilise su p p o rt5.
The m ajority of these m odes of m obilisation found their o rig in  in  trad itional form s 
of resistance to authority . Indeed, the perpe tuation  of the old m odes of criticism  of 
au thority  and  of w ell-tried  m odes of public debate and  p ro test becam e an im portan t 
characteristic of the nationalist m ovem ent betw een the end  of the n ineteen th  century  and 
the early  tw entie th  century  [G upta 2001 and  Pandey  1975]. It is now adays w idely 
accepted th a t before the adven t of the  British and  the em ergence of an  Ind ian  public 
sphere p roper, there already existed in India form s of resistance to au tho rity  and  even of 
public debate [Bayly 1996], These could  either be expressed and  transm itted  by a well- 
established system  of public  debate and  inform ation order, or by  stag ing  form s of p ro test 
w hich w ou ld  im pinge on the m oral obligations tha t b ound  the ru led  w ith  the rulers. 
Ind ia 's  trad itional in form ation  o rder w as n o t necessarily h ierarchical and  included  all 
form s of com m unication, w hich encouraged tire sp read  of social critique. These found 
expression in  air array  of w ritten  form s, w hich included  poetic satire, handbills, placards, 
and  new sletter. H ow ever, social critique w as n o t lim ited to a w ritten  form . It included 
pow erfu l oral and  v isual m odes of com m unication, w hich encouraged  the sp read  of 
public debate even am ong the illiterate. These form s consisted of ironic v isual displays at 
public p o p u lar festivals, cu ltural perform ances of ballads and  epics, public  recitations and  
itineran t theatre  com panies [Bayly 1996].
5 For instance, the success of the Cow Protection movement -  which spread across north India in 
the 1880s campaigning for the prohibition of the slaughtering of the cow -  is believed to rest on its 
use of a combination of modern and traditional forms of communication. For its organisational 
support, the Cow Protection Movement not only relied on the establishment of regional and local 
Gaurakshini Sabhas (Associations for the Protection of the Cow) but also on gau swamis -  itinerant 
preachers. While the Sabhas functioned as the centre of agitational and propagandists activities 
raising funds, organising lectures and distributing pamphlets, poems and drawings, gau swamis 
toured extensively from village to village. They lectured also at market places and during fairs thus 
taking advantage of the large and often sympathetic crowds that collected there. Like traditional 
bards, these itinerant agitators made extensive use of visual as well as verbal traditional idioms. 
British records of the time [see for instance: LP&J/6/365 file 84, 1894, and SVN 1888] report of at 
least three different types of pictures that were publicly displayed during lectures by gau swamis in 
the first years of the 1890s.On this, see Freitag [1980].
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Pre-m odern  form s of p ro test also revolved a round  a princip le  of civil disobedience 
and  d epended  on a concept of m oral au thority  shared  by the ru le rs  and  by the ru led . 
Their na tu re  -  i.e. being  derived  from  a principle of m u tua l m oral obligations betw een  the 
ru lers and  the ru led  -  d ictated  the form s th a t they eventually  took. D harna, traga, koor, 
bunds6 w ere all w idesp read  and  w ell-know n. Indeed, evidence of early  n ineteen th  century 
d isturbances show s th a t this type of civil disobedience w as the m ost recu rren t form  of 
pro test7. These w ere all form s of self-sacrifice and  cessation of cooperation betw een  the 
ru lers and  the ru led , w hose success depended  on the existence of a com m onality  of m oral 
and  ethical ideals be tw een  the involved parties w ho w ere expected to "share, even if 
tem porarily , certain  com m on socio-political or religious values" [D haram pal, 1971: 
XXVIII; LX-LXI]. Indeed, form s of resistance to au thority  w ere inheren t to India 's 
conceptualisation of pow er, a lthough it shou ld  be observed th a t the pu rpose  of such 
m odes of p ro test w as n o t to overthrow  pow er b u t to rem ind  the ru lers  of their obligations 
tow ards the ruled.
The Emergence of a Religious Idiom
In  India, d u ring  the nationalist m ovem ent the sym bolic reperto ire  w as couched in
a religious idiom . A ccording to D onald Sm ith m ass m obilisation in  transitional societies is 
rooted in a religious id iom  because religion can p rov ide  the nationalist leaders w ith 
pow erfu l tools to m obilize the m asses [Smith 1970:124]. The reason  for this rests on the
6 Dharna or dhurna consisted in sitting -  as a sign of protest -  in front of the door or house of 
another person who was allegedly accused of wrongdoing. Both the protester and the accused 
were expected to observe strict fast and abstain from their usual occupations. Traga and koor were 
both practices of self-immolation, whereas bunds were a form of non-cooperation and resistance to 
authority particularly widespread in Maharashtra. Patias was widely resorted too. The reports that 
the Acting Magistrate of the city of Benares, W. Bird, sent to the Government at Fort William, 
during the house-tax protest of 1810-1811 can be particularly interesting. On 25th December 1810 he 
wrote: "The people are extremely clamorous: they have shut up their shop, abandoned their usual 
occupations, and assemble in multitude with a view to extort from me an immediate compliance 
with their demands" [Dharampal 1971:5]. Few days later, he reported: "...every class of workmen 
engaged unanimously in this conspiracy, and it was carried to such an extent that during the 26th, 
the dead bodies were actually cast neglected into the Ganges, because the proper people could not 
be prevailed upon to administer the customary rites." [Dharampal 1971:6]
7 First-hand primary source material (such as texts of publicly posted placards, folksongs, popular 
paintings, illustrations by story tellers and contemporary records of pre-British time) of these and 
previous riots is very scarce. Evidence is mainly available from British records of the time (such as 
administrative accounts of protests) and from contemporary newspaper reports,
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fact tha t "in  trad itional societies, religion is a m ass phenom enon , politics is not: in 
transitional societies, religion can serve as the  m eans by  w hich  the m asses becom e 
politicised" [Smith 1970:124].
H ow ever, according to H aynes the u tilization  of a religious language is n o t ju st a 
m atter-of-fact necessity b u t also a sym ptom  of a search by ind igenous elites for a counter- 
hegem onic political rhetoric. H aynes suggests three w ays in  w hich the elites can 
rhetorically address their audiences: a non-hegem onic pattern , a hegem onic pattern  and  a 
counter-hegem onic p a tte rn  [1991:26]. D ifferent levels of accom m odation and  resistance to 
colonialism  d istingu ish  the three patterns. In the non-hegem onic adap ta tion  indigenous 
leaders are n o t fully b ilingual in the colonial and pre-colonial languages of au thority  and 
adop ted  tire dom inan t language only tem porarily  and  only w hen  needed . In tire 
hegem onic p a tte rn  tire ind igenous leadership  is fully bilingual and  consider colonially 
derived  principles as com m onsense. Tire under-classes are excluded w hile indigenous 
idiom s persist in  certain  d istinct public or private spheres of life. The counter-hegem onic 
pa tte rn  probably  em erges from  a prev ious hegem onic phase. The leadersh ip  is heavily 
exposed to hegem onic ideas b u t eventually  see no  bargain ing  pow er left. The indigenous 
elites therefore strive to create a new  language th a t attem pts bo th  to escape and  confront 
colonial rule. They still add ress the tw o audience using the language of the colonisers 
(even if only to subvert it) w hile evoking po ten t m yths and  sym bols belonging to the 
vernacular languages in  an  a ttem p t to com bine tire tw o languages [H aynes 1991:27-28]. 
H aynes' insights in to  the n a tu re  of the language adop ted  by  tire ind igenous leaders to 
address audiences and  transm it their dem ands is very im portan t because it points to the 
sym bolic behav iour -  rhetoric  and  ritua l -  of the nationalist m ovem ent.
As tire na tionalist m ovem ent evolved, the u tilization  of a trad itional idiom  
changed w ith  tim e. O ne can distinguish  betw een different phases. A ccording to H aynes 
[1991] pre- and  post-independen t nationalist leaders in  general follow ed the hegem onic 
p a tte rn  only to briefly abandon  it du ring  tire counter-hegem onic G andh ian  years8. It w as
8 Gandhian counter-hegemonic language eventually failed to become institutionalised as a
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during  G andh i's  years th a t a new  language "rooted  in  local conceptions of religiousness 
and  honor" [H aynes 1991:203-204] w as created. It w as th ro u g h  th is pow erfu l political 
idiom  that the m asses w ere p ersuaded  " tha t it w as n o t only  possible to oppose the 
governm ent an d  m ake it bend  to their w ishes b u t also a m oral im perative  to do so" [ibid.].
H ow ever, even before G andh i's  arrival, the Ind ian  nationalist elites u tilized  a 
religious idiom . In  Bengal du ring  the an ti-partition  agitation in 1905, the  nationalist elites 
m ade use of a political id iom  couched in the shakta religious trad itions of the u rb an  H indu  
u p p e r castes [Southard 1980]. In  particular, shakta sym bolism , the  im agery of the H indu  
cult of Kali w orsh ip  and  V edanta philosophy  form ed the basis of th is political idiom . The 
nation  w as im agined  like the goddess Kali w ho becam e a sym bol of the m otherland. 
Accordingly, na tionalists w ere represen ted  as her loyal devotees. The Bengalese patriot, 
Bipin C handra  Pal, u rg ed  his com patrio ts to use  Kali Pujas to popu larise  the m ovem ent, 
w hile the p o p u lar annual D urga Puja w as used  to p ropagate  the  identification of the 
goddess w ith  the nation  [Southard 1980]. There are also records of collective vow s being 
taken at Kali tem ples to abstain  from  foreign goods [Southard 1980:371]. H ow ever, I 
w ould  argue, in  Bengal the elites tended  to follow  the hegem onic p a tte rn  of adap ta tion  to 
colonialism . The ind igenous leadersh ip  em braced colonially derived  principles and 
regarded  them  as com m onsense. H ow ever, it also realised th a t it h a d  to perpetuate  p re­
colonial form s of dom ination  either to create a follow ing or to m ain ta in  its elite status. It is 
therefore u n d e r these circum stances that pre-colonial idiom s continued  to be em ployed. 
M oreover, as H aynes, notes:
"By appealing  to m em bers of their ow n society in die local idiom s of 
ind igenous politics and  by  engaging in behavior tiiat p rov ides a certain check 
on colonial policies, such as "inefficiency," "corruption," "nepotism ," and  o ther 
obstructions to progress, ind igenous elites m ay susta in  the su p p o rt of critical 
elem ents of d ieir ow n  society. But at d ie sam e tim e, by m ain tain ing  a 
specialized control over the  languages needed  to com m unicate directly w ith  
die ru ling  group, the  elite m ay effectively keep the larger popu la tion  outside 
die m ost crucial dom ains of political decision-m aking. The underclasses are
replacement for the colonially-derived language and according to Haynes the elites resorted once 
again to the use of a hegemonic language after independence.
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unab le  to participate  in  the outer arenas, w here the shape of the  larger polity  is 
determ ined , because they lack access to the necessary linguistic tools. This 
contributes bo th  to the m aintenance of colonial hegem ony  and  to the 
perp e tu a tio n  of underclass dependence on the elite, th a t is, to factionalism /' 
[H aynes 1991:26-27].
Indeed, according to Southard  [1980:354] the u tilization  of th is type of religious 
id iom  w as n o t for m ass m obilisation as the m asses w ere either M uslim s or followers of 
the V aisnava cult of Radha-K rishna. O n tire contrary, tire u tilization  on the p a rt of the 
an ti-partition  leadersh ip  of the  shakta sym bolism  w as to guaran tee  tire su p p o rt of the 
landed  u p p e r castes. It w as air a ttem pt to in tegrate the u rb an  English educated  up p er 
castes w ith  the ru ra l u p p e r  castes th rough  their com m on religious traditions.
W hile tire Bengali elites show ed a lack of concern w ith  the choice or u tilization  of a 
religious sym bolism  drat could have appealed  to M uslim s and  V aishnavas and  risked to 
sp lit the m asses according to religious lines, G andhi's  religious id iom  offered the leaders 
"air opportun ity  to reach ou t to large num bers of people m ore effectively than  they had  
been  able to do th rough  their specialized appeal" [H aynes 1991:212]. G andhi's  strength  
lay in  hav ing  b roken  decisively from  a language em bedded  in  colonially derived 
principles of constitu tional justice and  in  hav ing  created a new  political language. G andhi 
defined his vision w idr a language steeped  in  H in d u  religious trad ition  and  discourse, 
u sing  concepts of ahimsa (non-violence), tapas (self-suffering or penance), tyag  
(renunciation), and  dharma (duty). H e also refused  the m yth  of evo lu tionary  change upon  
w hich colonial ru le  w as based. H e created a counter-m yth th a t w as based  u p o n  the 
intrinsic superiority  of the  Ind ian  civilization w hich w as being  u n d erm in ed  by  the contact 
w ith die W est. T urn ing  upside-dow n  the colonial-nationalist assum ption  tha t spirituality, 
anti-m aterialism , d ie  princip le of non-violence, and  the belief in  the social du ties w ere a 
sign of India 's w eakness and  backw ardness, he suggested  instead  th a t they w ere die 
source of Ind ia 's  strengdi. In a sim ilar fashion he defined die Ind ian  nation  in term s of 
shared  cu ltu ral traits rad ie r than  of an assum ed overarching political u n ity  [H aynes 1991].
The language em ployed  by  G andhi n o t only rejected the form s of the standard
vocabulary  of public  politics, b u t in fused  it also w id i a po ten t term inology derived  from
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devotional H indu ism . The strength  of G andhi's  rhetoric lay in  its m etaphorical value 
tha t
"created  pow erfu l cognitive associations betw een  term s d raw n  from  tw o 
prev iously  d istinct idiom s: the distant, baffling, and  em otively  neu tra l 
language of public  politics and  the m ore im m ediate, em otionally  charged 
language of H in d u  and  Jain religious experience [...] [The new  idiom ] had  
an  im m ediacy and  a pow er absent in  parliam entary  trad ition  and  civic 
debate [...] offering pow erfu l new  cultural m eanings th a t w ou ld  insp ire or 
even coerce participation  in  public  politics". [H aynes 1991: 221, 223]
The Settings
As m en tioned  before, tire p redom inan tly  elitist character and  'm end ican t 
constitu tionalism ' of the Ind ian  N ational Congress [Khilnani 1997:26] w as responsible for 
the na tu re  of its early  p ropaganda. For years, the Congress rem ained  just an elite 
m o v em en t9. It w as isolated  from  the m asses and  for the first tw en ty  years it w as 
dom inated  by an English educated, u p p e r  caste/class H indu  m inority . W hilst p leading  
com plete loyalty  to the British crow n, its m ain  goals w ere to increase participation  of 
educated  Indians in  the  public  adm in istra tion  and  in  the political life of the country  (on 
the lines of tire opposition  in  W estm inster), im prove the living conditions of tire Indians 
m ainly  w ith  regard  to education, reduce the cost of m ilitary  and  civil adm inistration, cut 
dow n  and  reform  land  revenue to encourage agricu ltural p roduction , p ro tect and 
p rom ote  ind igenous industries and  finally m ain tain  freedom  of speech and  of the press. 
Significantly its p ro p ag an d a  w as p rim arily  d irected  a t the British governm ent, ra ther than  
tire Ind ian  m asses. Indeed , Congress delegates w ere speaking for the  people  of India no t 
to them 10. N o t surprising ly  then, p ropaganda  w as m ainly  hr w ritten  form: petitions and  
reso lu tion  w ere p assed  and  signed; m eetings w ere he ld  w hile tire p ress du ly  reported  and
9 The Indian National Congress was born in 1885. However, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, a nationalist conscience had slowly developed in India. This movement promoted social 
and cultural awakening, and was inspired by ideas of rationalism and humanism, with a stress on
science and education for regeneration of India against its most obscurantist cultural practices. It 
was mainly directed towards religious reforms as many of the customs the modernising elites 
wanted to reform were sanctioned by religion. Various political associations and religious reform 
groups, usually provincial in character and dominated by traditional wealthy merchants and 
landlords, were established throughout the country. These associations exerted pressure through 
petitions, the press and mobilisation of public opinion at home and in Great Britain [Pandey 1975]. 
i° w hen not directly addressing the British Government, Congress propaganda was directed to the 
British public to rally support for the Indian cause.
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su ppo rted  the m ovem ent. H av ing  faith  in  the sense of justice of the British ru lers and  in 
constitu tional agitation, petitions an d  the press w ere the only possible m eans of 
p ropaganda  a t their disposal.
The tu rn  of the century  b rough t som e significant changes to the nationalist 
m ovem ent. The rise of the m ilitan t extrem ist w ing  w ith in  d ie  Congress, w ho  set m ore 
radical goals, w as probab ly  the m ost im portan t of them . E xtrem ists' ideas gathered 
m om entum  d u ring  the agitations against Viceroy Lord C urzon 's  decision to d iv ide Bengal 
of 190511. Instead  of directing their a ttention to the educated  u p p e r  class m inority, for the 
first tim e the radicals identified  in the m asses the agents of the nationalist m ovem ent. But 
to d raw  the m asses into the m ovem ent, the extrem ists -  u n d e r  the leadersh ip  of Bal 
G angadhar Tilak -  resorted  to new  types of m obilisation techniques. The political 
m ethods they advocated  in  o rder to popularise  the m ovem ent w ere popu lar public 
festivals12 as w ell as boycotts, passive resistance, and  m ass actions of self-sacrifice. People 
w ere m obilised th rough  lectures, books, pam phlets, songs, poem s, public  m eetings, 
gym nasium  -  such  as the  ones established by B arindra K um ar Ghose (brother of 
A urobindo) for the  physical and  political education of die youtii. In particular, m ass 
public m eetings, large processions, and  hartals (strikes) becam e im portan t m ethods of 
m obilisation. This change in  m obilisation strategies no t only h a d  die m erit of popularising  
the m ovem ent b u t it also a ltered  significantly the sym bolic language of Indian 
nationalism . If u p  un til then, concepts of die na tion  and  of national iden tity  w ere couched 
in  a p redom inan tly  w estern ised  idiom , w id i the  em ergence of the extrem ists die 
m ovem ent em ployed  a language tha t increasingly rested  on ind igenous traditions. N ew  
w ays of im agining die na tion  em erged.
11 By 1900 the Bengal province extended from the Burmese border to the Gangetic plains. In 1905 
Bengal was divided in two provinces admittedly for administrative purposes. By effectively cutting 
off the Bengali's Hindu elites (based in Calcutta) from the Muslim majority based in the eastern 
part of the province, the partition sparked fierce opposition among the nascent nationalist 
movement, which interpreted Lord Curzon's decision as an attempt at dividing the movement 
along class and religious lines. The protest movement that emerged was expressed mostly through 
the boycott of British goods and the support of swadeshi (indigenous) industry. The partition of 
Bengal was eventually revoked.
12 On Tilak's innovative methods of mobilisation and on the emergence of performative politics see 
Kaur 2003.
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By 1910, the  m obilisation against the partition  of Bengal h a d  subsided. H ow ever, 
soon another im portan t event con tribu ted  to the rad icalisation  of the nationalist 
m ovem ent. The First W orld  W ar h a d  a significant im pact on tire Ind ian  opinion w ith 
regard  to tire n a tu re  and  p u rpose  of British ru le in  India [Brown 1999]. The M ontagu- 
C helm sford  Reform s of 1919 and  tire enactm ent of tire R ow latt Acts of tire sam e year tha t 
extended the em ergency coercive pow ers assum ed by the British G overnm ent du ring  the 
w ar, fu rther exasperated  tire now  politically self-conscious Ind ian  m asses. D em onstrations 
and  strikes w ere held  th ro u g h o u t tire country. W hereas p rev iously  the Congress 
petitioned  the British governm ent to g ran t adm inistrative reform s, by  1916 even the so- 
called m oderates w ere asking for an  advance tow ards self-governm ent, or sw am p3.
hr tire sam e years, the  em ergence of G andhi14 as the new  C ongress leader w as a 
tu rn ing  po in t for the struggle  for independence. The w ay in  w hich politics and  m ass 
m obilisation w ere  conducted  from  then  onw ards w as a sign of this political 
transform ation. G andhi in troduced  novel m ethods of pro tests th a t he  h ad  devised w hile 
w orking  as a law yer in  South Africa. Satyagraha -  literally 'tru th -fo rce ', b u t also m eaning 
passive resistance and  disobedience to tire law  -  lay at tire core of h is m obilisation 
strategy. Tire non-cooperation  and  civil disobedience cam paigns th a t follow ed involved a 
po p u lar p rogram m e of opposition  to the governm ent tha t included  n o t only sym bolical 
activities such as resignation  of titles and  honours, refusal to partic ipa te  in elections and 
legislatures, non-paym en t of taxes, general strikes, public  fasting, sit-ins, boycott of 
governm ent schools, courts of law , jobs and  even of foreign goods, b u t also saw  tire 
creation of a core of sym bols such as a na tionalist flag, a national un ifo rm  and  a national 
hym n. These changes allow ed the em ergence of a new  p a tte rn  of political participation 
an d  the final transform ation  of the Ind ian  nationalism  from  an elitist m ovem ent to a
13 This call for siuaraj was ratified by the Congress and Muslim League on December 1916. This 
came to be known as the Lucknow Pact. The Pact also sanctioned the agreement between the 
Congress and Muslim League. For the first time the Congress recognised the Muslim League as the 
political party representing the Muslims and agreed to the institution of separate electorates for 
Hindus and Muslims in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils.
14 The bibliography on Gandhi is immense. A good biography is Brown 1989. Brown 1977, Kumar 
(ed.) 1971 and Sarkar 1976 offer excellent accounts of Gandhi's political thought and politics.
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popular one.
The change of m obilisation techniques and  the inclusion of the m asses in the 
m ovem ent b ro u g h t a change in  the  articulation of ideas of the n a tion  and  of national 
iden tity  and  an  ind igenisation  of the  nationalist idiom . Indeed, one could argue th a t one 
of the m ain  reasons beh ind  Tilak 's and  G andhi's  success resided  in  their u se  of a symbolic 
reperto ire of nationalism  largely  derived from  trad itional form s of p ro tes t and  rooted  in 
fam iliar d iscursive and  v isual languages. H ow ever, despite die trad itional roots of the 
nationalist form s of p ropaganda , it should  be m ade clear tiiat it w as a com bination of 
trad itional and  m o d ern  elem ents th a t characterised Ind ia 's  late nationalism . Indeed, the 
nationalist m ovem ent w as an entirely  m o d em  phenom enon. H ow ever, by em ploying a 
fam iliar id iom  m ade-up  of equally fam iliar images, popu lar m yths and  stories this new  
m essage of a na tional iden tity  could be conveyed w ithou t fear of m isunderstand ings or 
failure of com m unication. It was d ie use of trad itional m yths and  sym bols -  tha t w ere 
reinvented and  rein terpreted  (as die Cow protection m ovem ent testifies) -  and  the 
em ploym ent of long-established form s of resistance to au thority  d ia t "help  to explain w hy 
political leaders in  a poor country  w id i a relatively low  rate of general literacy should 
have been  able to create a w idely  d iffused and  popu lar nationalist m ovem ent so early" 
[Bayly 1996:2],
The Symbolic Code of the Indian Nationalist M ovem ent
The sym bolic system  of the  nationalist m ovem ent w as vast and  it w as articulated
th ro u g h  sym bols of space, th rough  p o p u lar songs hym ns and  prayers, th rough  the 
enactm ent of sym bolic practices such as public cerem onies and  ritua ls  of iconoclasm  such 
as die public bu rn ing  of foreign clotii and  th rough  die em ploym ent and  display of 
p o pu lar em blem s. These sym bols, rites and  festivals w ere n o t sim ply superfluous 
appendages of the nationalist m ovem ent b u t w ere its m ain  in strum en ts [Figes and 
Kolonikskii, 1999]. The non-m arginality  of symbolic politics d id  n o t escape die British 
authorities w ho repeated ly  tried  to ban  die use of such sym bols (such as die singing of die 
song Vande M ataram , the flying of die national flag and  even die w earing  of w hat came to 
be know n as the 'G andh i cap ') and  the perform ance of certain sym bolic activities.
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The sym bolic id iom  of the Ind ian  nationalist m ovem en t ideally  articulated  
concepts of cu ltural an d  territo ria l un ity , pan-Indianism , sxvadeshi (indigenousness), and 
integration. U nity  w as sym bolised by the representation  of n a tu ra l bo rders and  by 
resorting  to im ages of Ind ia 's  sacred geography, w hile pan-Ind ian ism  w as typified by 
elem ents of cu ltural syncretism  and  assim ilation. U nity  and  in tegration  w ere also 
sym bolically enacted du ring  the celebration of public rituals. Swadeshi w as sym bolised, 
am ong other things, th rough  the choice of an indigenous lifestyle. N ationalism  passed  
from  a phase of acute w estern isation  and  rejection of all th ings Ind ian , to a phase of neo ­
traditionalism . W ith  the revaluation  of Indian  traditions the Ind ian  elites sw itched to 
vernaculars, Ind ian ised  their custom s, dresses, eating habits and  tastes in  in terior design 
(the ab rup t change of lifestyle of the N ehrus is em blem atic of this period). By 
encapsulating  the idea of Ind ia  in  a new  w holly  Ind ian  sym bolic id iom  they created a new  
national style, m irro ring  a desire for tire em ergence of an aesthetic th a t w ou ld  be 
distinctly Indian. Indeed, swadeshi also poin ts to the process of refashioning of Ind ia 's  
cu ltu ral and  im aginative contours w hen  colonial form ulations sta rted  to be critically 
confronted by  the educated  elites in a search for "an essentially Ind ian  genius, an Indian  
m ode of perception  and  th o u g h t that w as often structu red  in  critical coun terpo in t to the 
m ind  of E urope" [Tharu and  Lalita 1993:71-72]. Khadi, the hand-spun , hand-w oven  fabric, 
becam e another pow erfu l em blem  of tire nationalist m ovem ent along w ith  the charkha, the 
sp inning  w heel, also a sym bol of the m ovem ent's  m oral stance. Like o ther form s of 
political agitation, the nationalism  m odes of symbolic com m unication w ere necessarily 
based on pre-existing m odes of expression. Because one of tire aim s of com m unication is 
readability , the m ateria l a t the d isposal of agitators w as tha t one derived  from  pre-existing 
form s. This v ib ran t and  lively tradition , w hich used  the vocabulary  and  g ram m ar of a 
popu lar idiom , w as to be d iscarded  w ith  the com ing of independence. A new  national 
v isual language, shorn  of its religious iconographies -  b u t also of its vitality -  w as to 
dom inate In d ia 's  post-colonial panoram a. The section tha t follow s is an account of the 
nationalist m ovem en t's  p rom inen t sym bolic constructions.
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Symbolic National Space
A ccording to Sm ith nations identify  "a definite social space w ith in  w hich m em bers
m ust live and  w ork, and  dem arcate an historic territo ry  that locates a com m unity  in  tim e 
and  space" [1991:16], The construction of a na tion  in  term s of territo ry  is probably  one of 
the m ost pow erfu l an d  explicit sym bolic m arkers of the com m unity. N ations are indeed  
spaces of p rim ary  belonging and  "national space provides a com m on-sense context for 
situating  identity" [Edensor 2002:65], The nation  is spatially d istingu ished  as a bounded  
entity  w ith  bo rders  th a t separate  it from  other national entities. H ie  defin ition  of physical 
national borders understood  also as cu ltural boundaries is im portan t in the designation of 
a national com m unity  in  th a t "the consciousness of the com m unity  is [...] encapsulated  in 
the perception  of its boundaries" [Cohen 1985:13], A ccording to T hongchai [1994] am ong 
the practices of im agination  of the nation, the identification of d ie na tional com m unity 
w ith  w hat he term s a 'geo-body ' -  a territorial entity  -  w as crucial for the  visualisation of 
the nation. Edensor [2002:40] contends tha t nations are conjured u p  by im ages of a 
particu lar landscape w hich becom es a synecdoche "loaded w ith  sym bolic values" that 
"stand  for national v irtues". This is w h a t Short [1991] calls 'na tional landscape ideologies'. 
Landscape is a signifier of national identity  because it can "com bine geographical 
belonging w ith  com plex narratives of hum an  exploits, ex traord inary  characters and 
cultural historical heroes" [Archetti 1998:189], Because in  Ind ia  there  w as an isom orphic 
relationship  betw een cu ltu ral geography and  sacred geography, places that acquired 
national sym bolic po ten tia l belonged for the m ain  p a rt to the relig ious dom ain. Therefore, 
Ind ia 's  sym bolic national space becam e coterm inous w ith  the concept of India as a holy 
land. H ie  reason  for the pre-em inence of a religious sym bolic space m ost likely rests on 
Ind ia 's  im pu ted  lack of political unity. Politically, the land  has alw ays been  fragm ented in 
num erous reigns ru led  by regional dynasties. O nly the G uptas, the M auryas and  the 
M ughals u n d er A kbar created large em pires tha t encom passed the w id th  and  b read th  of 
India.
This conceptualisation of the national territory as a sacred land  becam e an 
im portan t sym bol for the represen ta tion  of the Ind ian  nation  [M andelbaum  1972:401]. 
Indeed, in  Ind ia  there existed a conception of a larger com m unity  even before colonialism
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[Van der Veer 1994], and  before the em ergence of a public sphere  p ro p er an d  the creation 
and  "partic ipa tion  in  collective rituals in form ed by an ideological fram ew ork  that came to 
equate 'com m unity ' and  'n a tio n ' [Freitag 1989:178]. E laborating on  the no tion  that 
nationalism  does n o t replace "the bonds of local k insh ip" b u t expands them  "so as to 
include larger popu la tions in  the nation" [Van der Veer, 1994:107], V an der Veer contends 
tha t pre-colonial practices of m igration  and  pilgrim age -  in tended  as "m ovem ents beyond 
the boundaries of local com m unities" [ibid] -  p rov ided  the o p p o rtun ity  for the circulation 
of people, goods, and  inform ation and  the transcendence of specific, local com m unities 
w ith  the larger society creating a larger fram ew ork of reference w hich  Ind ian  nationalism  
w ould  later appropriate . In Puranic literatu re  India is the m ythical A ryavarta  or 
Bharatvarshn, a land  w hose n a tu ra l physical borders m ark  ou t a sacred geography  m apped  
ou t by its religious centres. In the epic narra tive  of the Ramayana it is the  peregrinations of 
Ram  -  avatar (incarnation) of V ishnu -  across the subcontinent to save the w orld  from  the 
dem ons, tha t instil a sense of territoriality  and  of sacred geographical u n ity  [Van der Veer 
1994],
This rep resen ta tion  of India as a sacred land  is therefore quintessentially  H indu. 
Indeed , this expanse is m arked  by  several sacred centres linked  am ong them selves by 
trad itional p ilgrim age rou tes th a t suggest a sense of geographical u n ity  and  sacredness. 
This sacred geography  of d ie m otherland  is epitom ised by  the reverence to Ind ia 's  
topographical features, its g rea t rivers and  m oun ta in  ranges w ith in  the H in d u  traditions. 
The H im alayas and  its peaks, the V indhya m oun ta in  range, Ind ia 's  m igh ty  rivers -  the 
Ganges, Y am una, N arm ada, K averi to nam e only a few  -  all resonate  w ith  m ythological 
associations and  are sacred p o p u lar p ilgrim age destinations. Besides the g rea t m ounta in  
ranges and  rivers, o ther p laces associated to H in d u  m ythological h istory  are im portan t 
H in d u  p ilgrim age centres. These are tirthas, crossing places, w here "the gods have 
'crossed  dow n ' in to  this w orld  as avatar as" and  "w here  earth ly  p ilgrim s can m ake their 
sp iritua l crossings" [Eck 1998:65-66]. But it is also the entirety  of In d ia 's  land  th a t is sacred 
for the H indus. A  p o p u lar p ilgrim age sees the devotees c ircum am bulate  the w hole 
coun try  as they w ou ld  for a tem ple, passing  from  the four dhams -  w here  the divine is said 
to reside -  a t the four card inal po in ts at B adrinath, Puri, R am eshvaram , and  D varaka,
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This "Brahm inic im agination  of the Ind ian  nation" [K hilnani 1997:161] form ed the 
core of the H in d u  nationalist discourse and  w as articulated  at perfection by Savarkar -  
leader of the H in d u  M ahasabha w ho  coined the term  H indutva  and  p ro v id ed  a definition 
for the H in d u  nation. A  p rom inen t elem ent in  Savarkar's ideology regard ing  the 
definition of the  Ind ian  nation  is the equivalence of pitrbhii (fatherland) and  matribhu  
(m otherland) w ith  punyabhu  (holyland). In  h is definition, Ind ia 's  physical reality  is at the 
h eart of the definition of the H in du /Ind ian  nation. The w ord  H in d u  itself -  w hich for 
Savarkar is a w ord  that can be regarded  equivalen t to the adjective Indian, ra ther than  an 
ep ithe t tha t indicates som eone's religious orientations -  is derived  from  the nam e of the 
river S indhu (Indus) th a t runs in  the north -w estern  p lains of India. As such, tire w ord  
H indu  does n o t deno te  religion, b u t only territorial belonging, th u s  giving the Indian 
nation  its na tu ra l geographical boundaries. Indeed, the m eanings of territory and 
belonging transm itted  by the w ord  S indhu /H indu  are fundam en ta l for Savarkar w ho 
argued  that: "the m ost im portan t factor th a t contribu ted  to tire cohesion, streng th  and  the 
sense of un ity  of peop le  is th a t they shou ld  possess an in ternally  w ell connected and 
externally w ell dem arcated  'local hab ita tion ', and  a 'n am e ' th a t could, b y  its very  m ention, 
rouse up  tire cherished im age of their m otherland  as w ell as the loved  m em ories of their 
past"  [Savarkar 1969:66]15.
It is n o t su rp rising  therefore that tire Ind ian  nationalism  m ovem en t gave prim acy 
to tire geographical and  physical features of India in  its iconization of the  geographical 
nation-space as a w om an and  H indu  goddess -  B harat M ata (M other India). H ow ever, 
according to R am asw am y [2003] the m ap  of India -  as p roduced  by  w estern  cartography 
-  d id  no t becom e a "pow erfu l em blem  for the anti-colonial nationalism " as A nderson  m ay 
w an t us to believe [A nderson 1991:175]. A lthough the m ap  of India d id  becom e an 
im portan t reference po in t of im agination  for tire nationalist m ovem ent, it becam e a 
pow erfu l sym bol of nationalism  only w hen  it w as associated or em bodied w ith  the
15 On Savarkar see Chapter 4 and 5
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gendered  im age of B harat M ata16. This association of Bharat M ata w ith  the m ap  of India 
w as rep roduced  in  the B harat M ata tem ple at Banaras, com pleted  in  1936. There, in  the 
sanctum  sancto rum  of the tem ple dedicated  to B harat M ata, instead  of the usua l statue of 
the deity, there is a m arble m ap of India [G upta 2001] [Fig. 1].
Besides being rep roduced  in  the geographical body of tire m ap , another w ay to 
conceptualise tire na tion  w as to rep resen t a gendered  im age of B harat M ata superim posed  
or em erging from  a m ap  of India. Ram asw am y argues th a t the  cartographic 
representation  of the Ind ian  nation  is crucial as
"the m ap  of India tha t bestow s u p o n  Bharat M ata her s ta tus as a territorial 
goddess p resid ing  over the  em ergent geo-body 'Ind ia ', and  th a t grants her an 
iconographic presence tha t d istinguishes her from  n u m erous o ther H in d u  
goddesses on  w hose she is clearly parasitic. [...] These bodyscapes facilitate the 
sacralisation of Ind ia 's  geobody in  a w ay th a t w ou ld  have  been  im possible for 
the scientific m odern  m ap  w ith  its d isenchanted conception of territory" 
[R am asw am y 2003:173,180].
In  these instances, it is the superim position  of the  cartographic im age of Ind ia  and 
the im age of B harat M ata th a t m ade  the v isual representations of Ind ia  com pelling. The 
territory  w as n o t ju s t an im personal territo ry  b u t w as an im ated  by  a sacred goddess. 
Personifications of Ind ia  as B harat M ata w ere n o t alw ays accom panied or superim posed  
on Ind ia 's  geobody. B harat M ata acquired  an im portance of he r ow n. B harat M ata w as 
rep roduced  in a variety  of v isual m edia  and  w as also invoked  verbally  in poem s, songs 
and  pam phlets. Iconographically, B harat M ata could be easily m istaken  for a H indu  
goddess. In her com plex and  syncretic iconography and  sym bology B harat M ata 
encom passes all aspects of the goddess. She is bo th  the pure, n u rtu rin g  m other and  the
16 Cartographic representations of the nation space are closely connected to notions of landscape. 
This aspect of nationalism has been examined by Novak [1992] who argued for the relevance of 
landscape painting in nineteenth century America as a central signifier for to the discourse of 
nationalism. Similarly Pinney [1992:1], referring to the Nathdvara god posters (that became 
popular in the second half of the 1920s), argues that in India's popular prints (that needed not to be 
overtly political) landscape is "represented through a stylised aesthetic which expresses a historical 
and moral topophilia" and contributed to imagine the Indian nation as an ideal nation-space 
[Pinneyl997: 861 ff],
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pow erful nation. In this, she becom es the em bodim ent and the repository  of India 's 
cultural values and  heritage. The choice of depicting the Indian  nation as a H indu 
goddess w as very successful because as such, Bharat M ata could assum e different forms 
accordingly to the d ifferent aspects that the im age w anted to evoke. W hen represented 
sim ply as the devi, she could be the benevolent m other or the faithful com panion. But she 
could be also depicted  as Kali, the black one, em bodim ent of unrestra ined  fierce energy, 
an im age this one that fitted particularly  well into the political idiom  of nationalism .
Fig. 1 Relief M ap of India -  Bharat M ata  Tem ple V aranasi
The sym bolism  of the French revolution initiated the fashion of representing 
allegorically the abstract ideas of liberty, freedom  and the nation  w ith  fem ale characters 
[A gulhon 1981]. The general conception of the iconography of Bharat M ata bears 
rem arkable resem blance to this allegorical tradition. There is one depiction of Bharat M ata 
that has explicit them atic and form al correspondence w ith this iconographic nationalist.
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This illustration appeared  on the cover of the "U nited States of India" a m onthly review  
p rin ted  in San Francisco by the Pacific C oast H industan i in 1923. This d raw ing  show s a 
stately fem ale figure in a long pleated garm ent (rem iniscent of a sari) of classical 
inspiration and long flow ing hair parted  in the m iddle, floating in the air. Like other 
im ages of M other India, she em erges from  the m ap of India [Fig. 2].
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Fig. 2 The U nited States of India
This tim e the m ap of India w here her feet d isappear is p a rt of a globe. Like Ravi 
V arm a's pain ting  Tarini (see below), her sari b low n by the w ind  takes the shape of the 
subcontinent. W ith her left hand  she is ho lding a bunch of lotus flow ers on her breast;
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w ith her righ t hand  she is blow ing a long trum ped  (a call to arm y?). D espite clearly 
harking on iconographies typical of Ind ia 's  figurative art, this visualisation of India as a 
young nym ph w as heavily influenced by a visual idiom  derived  from  W estern nationalist 
trad ition  [Fig 3].
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Fig. 3 Bharat M ata Em erging from  M ap of India -  Om  A n ja  Knilendar 1919.
O n the contrary, in popu lar political prints, the general conception of the form and 
iconography of M other India bears rem arkable resem blance in term s of figuration, 
com position, and  postu re  to the depiction of the female deity of god posters. Bharat M ata 
of the bazaar posters is m ostly fashioned after three principal Ind ian  goddesses, Durga, 
Kali and Lakshm i -  only few of the m any m anifestation of the goddess17 -  com bining the
17 Within the Hindu pantheon goddesses occupy a place as prestigious as the one occupied by male 
gods. Every Indian village has its own grama-devi, village goddess, who is the incarnation of the
76
m ost salient iconographical tra its of the three divinities. G oddesses are in  general depicted 
as beau tifu l young  w om en, sensual yet vo lup tuous conjuring u p  the im age of the 
attractive m aiden  and  of d ie  n u rtu rin g  m other. Like Lakshm i and  D urga, M other India 
w ears a re d 18 sari, enriched  by  gold decorations. She is heavily  bejewelled: necklaces, 
bangles, rings and  earrings richly adorn  he r figure.
A crow n -  sym bol of sovereignty -  adorns her head. Like D urga, she is som etim es 
depicted  rid ing  a lion or a tiger. She carries a triden t and  the C ongress flag is usually  
depicted  resting  on her righ t shoulder. W hile the triden t is rem iniscent of D urga19, the 
C ongress flag identifies her as Bharat M ata20. Because in trad itional iconography righ t is 
the side usually  associated w ith  the goddess' destructive energy21, the  Congress flag 
resting on her rig h t shou lder is like a w eapon and  M other Ind ia  becom es a fighter for the 
nationalist cause. In  a p rin t called A ryam ata22 she is depicted  exactly like Durga: w earing  a 
w hite sari23 w ith  an ornate bo rder and a blouse, she is sitting on a rock w ith  one of her 
foot resting on a crouching tiger. She has four arm s in w hich  she holds the typical 
attribu tes of D urga: a tw o-po in ted  spear, a trident, a mace, arid a scim itar [Fig.4 and  5].
cosmic devi. Goddesses are worshipped as the personification of the female principle of creation 
and reproduction and they are often called with the appellation Mata, Amman, Ayi, mother. Their 
creative and reproductive power is epitomised in Hindu mythology by the concept of shakti.
Shakti is the primordial energy without which the universe could not have been created and it is 
conceptualised as a female being. Shakti worship is the worship of this power, which is personified 
as a female and is generally conceived as the all-pervading mother goddess who is regarded 
according to this tradition as the supreme creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe.
18 In Hindu iconography red is the colour generally associated with fertility.
19 The trident is also one of Durga's many weapons.
20 While Mother India's iconography is heavily borrowed from other Hindu goddesses', the 
Congress flag is the only item that is proper to the iconography of Bharat Mata.
21 On the right hand(s) the goddess usually holds several weapons, while on the left hand(s) she 
holds symbols of her creative powers (plants, pots etc).
22 British Library EPP1/38.
23 In Hindu iconography Saraswati usually wears a white sari, symbolising purity and simplicity.
77
Fig. 4 A stra  Dan -  Bharat M ata/D urga bestow ing a sw ord  to Subhas C handra Bose
Fig. 5 D urga -  T raditional Iconography
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O ther m ages of Ind ia  that d rew  even m ore on the m ythological and  iconographic 
traditions of d ie subcontinent becam e very  po p u lar and acquired a m uch  longer appeal 
than  the typical bazaar paintings. Ravi V arm a's Tarini and  A ban ind rana th  Tagore's 
M other India of 1905 belong  to this tradition. Ravi V arm a's Tarini w as considered die first 
exam ple of die personification of M other India as a young  w om an, b u t it was 
A ban indranath  T agore's M other India d ia t epitom ised the elites' nationalist aspirations for 
the first tim e. A ban indranad i Tagore w ater-colour po rtra it of B harat M ata is probably  the 
first fully successful a ttem pt to objectify die ideology of the national m ovem ent, m erging 
it w ith  H in d u  trad itional iconography. Its overtly political tone becom es m ore ev ident if 
w e place it in  the context in  w hich die pa in ting  w as created. The an ti-partition  swadeshi 
agitation rocked Bengal in  1904-1905 and  die pa in ting  is A ban indranath 's  contribution to 
the swadeshi m ovem ent. By 1907 A ban indranad i w as recognised as the greatest Indian 
painter, hav ing  set the param eters for and  created a new  Ind ian  iconography deriv ing his 
insp iration  from  classical Ind ian  literature, H indu  m ytiiology and  Ind ian  history, h i diis 
painting, B harat M ata is conceived as the  H in d u  goddess Lakshm i, clad in  the robes of a 
V aishnava nun . D epicted w ith  four arm s as a conventional H in d u  deity, she carries four 
unconventional objects: anna (food), vastra  (clotiiing), siksha (secular know ledge) and  diksa 
(spiritual know ledge), thus sym bolising economic, cultural and  sp iritua l swadeshi [M itter 
1994:295]. h i d ie nationalist m etaphor, she is sym bolically b od i d ie em bodim ent of the 
land  and  die n u rtu rin g  m other and  wife w ho sustains her ch ildren  an d  h usband  in  their 
fight to defend  and  liberate her, p rov id ing  the tools -  the  objects she he ld  in her hands -  to 
achieve diese goals. M etaphorically  she is thus the shakti, the active fem ale energy having 
found insp iration  in  the trad itional H in d u  iconography w here the tantric  trad ition  of 
shakti h ad  rep resen ted  die divine m otiier in  her iconic m anifestations as Ganga, Yam una, 
and  D urga24. [Fig.6].
24 For Sister Nivedita the propaganda value of the picture of Mother India (particularly 
Abanindranath Tagore's) was invaluable. She wrote that she would reprint it "by tens and 
thousands, and scatter it broadcast over the land, till there was not a peasant's cottage nor a
craftsman's h u t  that had not the presentment of Bharat-Mata somewhere on its walls" [Sister
Nivedita, Works, 111:60, quoted in Mitter 1994:296].
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Fig. 6 Abanindranath Tagore's Bharat Mata
R am asw am y [2003] traces the origin of the representation of the Indian nation as a 
w om an to the 1870s w hen Kiran C handra B andyopadhyay 's play, Bharat M ata, first 
perform ed in 1873, popu larised  the im age of India as a d ispossessed  m otherland. 
H ow ever, the trad ition  of representing  the Indian nation w ith  a strong  gendered  and 
religious25 sym bolism  can be ascribed to the influence of Bankim  C handra Chatterjee's 
popu lar novel A n an dam ath 2b (Bhattacharya [2003], Bagchi [1990], Sarkar [1987] and 
R am asw am y [2003]]). This popu lar novel no t only inspired the v isual idiom  of Bharat
25 Bankim Chandra Chatterjee made Hinduism central to the concept of nationalism and his 
imagery rested on this notion.
26 Although the novel Anandmath tells the story of Bhavananda planning an armed insurrection 
against Muslim rulers of Bengal with his band of sanyasis, the poem Vande Mataram included in the 
text quickly became one of India's most popular patriotic songs particularly after the insurgencies 
that followed Lord Curzon's decision to divide Bengal in two separate provinces in 1905. In 
Bankim's novel, Vande Mataram is the hymn sung by the sanyasis, the followers of the ascetic 
Bhavananda who have relinquished all their earthly possessions and family links to devote their 
life to the cause of motherland personified as the goddess Durga/Lakshmi. Therefore, the song is 
essentially a hymn in honour of India conceived as a Hindu goddess. For the text of the song Vande 
Mataram see Appendix 1. See later for a discussion on the importance of songs and hymns in the 
nationalist symbolic repertoire.
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M ata27 b u t also m arked  the  invention  of a particu lar m atriotism  [G upta 2001], w hich 
com bined E uropean  political concepts of the  nation-state  and  of pa trio tism  w ith  the 
com plex trad ition  of m ythological elaboration and  ritua l w orsh ip  of the  H indu  devi. This 
m atriotism  w as also a successful com bination of the heroic im agery of Anandam ath  and the 
elem ents th a t defined  Savarkar's H induness.
The reason  beh ind  A nandam ath's significant im pact onto the nationalist sym bolic 
reperto ire perhaps rests on  the pow erfu l representations of the m o therland  that occur 
repeated ly  in  the text. Two passages are particu larly  im portan t. The first one occurs w hen 
M ahendra is show n  a round  the various shrines of the m onastery  [Part I, chapter II] and 
the second one is the h y m n  Vande M ataram  itself. The rise to p rom inence of the hym n 
Vande M ataram  as a national sym bol will be dealt w ith later on. W hat is of im portance to 
us here  is B ankim 's conceptualisation and  iconisation of die m otherland . Both instances 
w ere extrem ely im portan t for form ation of the sym bolism  of M other India. In the first 
instance, M ahendra  is show n im ages of M other India as she was, as she is and  as she will 
be. The first im age is an im age of d ie goddess as "the bearer of the earth , perfectly form ed 
and  decorated  w ith  every o rnam ent28" [Lipner 2005:150]. The second im age of the M other- 
as-she-is is a nak ed  Kali "[BJlackened and  sh rouded  in  darkness [...] robbed  of 
everydiing" [Lipner 2005:150]. Finally, M ahendra  is show n as im age of d ie M other-as-she- 
will-be: a go lden  ten-arm ed  im age of the goddess. The im agery evoked here  is poignant:
"H er ten  arm s reach ou t in  ten  directions, adorned  w ith  various pow ers in the 
form  of d ie different w eapons she holds, the enem y crushed  at her feet, w hile 
the m igh ty  lion w ho has taken  refuge there is engaged  in  destroying  the foe, 
Behold her w hose arm s are the directions [...], w ho ho lds various w eapons 
and  crushes the enem y and  roam s on die lordly  lion 's  back, w ho has Lakshm i 
personify ing  good fortune on he r right, and  d ie  goddess of speech w ho 
bestow s w isdom  and  learn ing  on her left, w ith  K artikeya signifying strength  
and  G anesh good success, in  attendance!" [Lipner 2005:150]
27 The first example of the visual identification of the nation with a woman is of 1885 when 
Harishcandra Haidar illustrated Bankim's hymn Vande Mataram, in the Bengali's children's 
magazine Balak [Guha-Thakurta, 1992:90].
28 "she who subdued the wild beasts such as the elephant and lion underfoot and set up her lotus 
throne in the dwelling place. She was happy and beautiful adorned with every ornament, radiant 
as the risen sun and full of majesty" [Lipner 2005:150]
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It is this later graphic represen ta tion  of the m otherland  th a t w as to have  incredible 
influence on the nationalist sym bolic reperto ire. As w e have h ad  occasion to note  earlier 
on, in  po p u lar political p rin ts, the  iconography of M other Ind ia  bo rrow ed  heavily from  
the m ost salient iconographical traits of the goddesses D urga, Kali an d  Lakshm i.
Vande M ataram  elaborates fu rther the them e of the personification of the  land  as a 
w om an and  eventually  as a goddess. In the  first stanzas of Vande M ataram  is p redom inan t 
die identification of the land  w id i the  im age of a w om an. The rich and  evocative 
descrip tive vocabulary  (see A ppendix  I) bu ilds u p o n  a very w ell established sym bolism  of 
the land  as a w om an w hich  is steeped  in  the H indu  tradition. This po in t is further 
substan tia ted  by  the identification of the land  w id i die im age of the goddess in the 
follow ing stanzas th a t m irro rs a pow erfu l and im plicit theology organic to H indu  
devotion [Lipner 2005:97].
To sum  up , the general conception of die iconography of B harat M ata has its 
origins in  B ankim 's novel Anandm ath  and  it h inged  on pre-existing sym bolic constructs 
and  fam iliar reperto ires of im ages and  representations. It is tiierefore feasible th a t die 
strik ing popu larity  of M other Ind ia 's  v isual vocabulary rested  w ith  d ie  recognisability 
and  intelligibility of d ie  v isual and  verbal im age of the land  as a w om an  and  as a goddess 
set in the H in d u  traditions. Indeed, Bharat M ata 's extraord inary  appeal w as based  m ostly 
on its origins roo ted  in  the religious and  cultural trad itions of India. W hile m atriotism  (die 
identification of the nation  as a n u rtu rin g  m otiier) is a com m on feature of nationalist 
m ovem ents a round  die globe, B harat M ata is expression of a particu la r form  of p ietism  
steeped  in  H in d u  trad itions of devotion. Bharat M ata is n o t only the allegorical 
representation  of the nation, she is a H in d u  deity  in her ow n right, w ith  m odern  tem ples, 
p rayers and  rituals specially dedicated  to her. That is, w hile resting  firm ly also on the 
influence of m odern  nationalist politics, and  on die E uropean  political concepts of na tion ­
state and  m atriotism , B harat M ata exceptional significance and  role w itiiin die Indian 
nationalist m ovem ent w as d ius roo ted  in  Ind ia 's  folkloric religious trad itions
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The nationalist m ovem ent p rov ided  several iconic and  an-iconic representations of 
M other India. B ut w h a t exactly does the predilection for an allegorical yet religious 
represen tation  of Ind ia  as a w om an and  as a fem ale deity  really m ean? This b lend  of the 
allegorical represen ta tion  of the nation  w ith  trad itional H in d u  iconography sym bolises a 
new  synthesis of p as t and  p resent, m odern ity  and  tradition . C onceptually  B harat M ata is 
m odern  -  nationalism  is a m odern  phenom enon  -  b u t (iconographically) she is ancient. 
She becam e bo th  the idealised  Ind ian  w om an and  the m etaphorical nation. As the 
epitom ised fem ale, she is pure , n u rtu rin g  and  m otherly, yet, as the  m ythological Devi, she 
is physically  pow erfu l and  terrible. She is the v isual expression of the  principles of pow er 
and  prosperity .
The identification of the Ind ian  nation  w ith  a fem ale figure  and  its iconographic 
represen tation  as B harat M ata served also to conceptualise no tions of na tional identity  in 
tw o d istinct ways. O n the one hand , the m ap-like im age of M other India becam e the 
m etonym  of Ind ian  nationalism , the em bodim ent of a v ision of In d ia 's  un ity , h istory  and 
heritage. In the  represen tations of India as a geographical m ap  Ind ia 's  different 
com m unities w ere b ro u g h t into relationship  w ith  each o ther th rough  their shared 
relationship  to som e specific ideologically loaded  landscape. O n  die odier hand , in the 
represen tation  of India as a goddess the  bond  betw een die n a tio n  and  its citizens is 
m ed ia ted  tiirough  religion. T hat is die people  of Ind ia  em erge as a na tion  only in relation 
to the sacred and  the nation  takes d ie form  of a collectivity of peop le  u n ited  by religious 
practices and  beliefs. Ind ians are therefore those w ho inhabit the land  that circum scribe 
her body, w ho revere her as a goddess and  w ho are ready  to sacrifice their life in her 
defence.
Heroes and Martyrs
Fem inised im ages of the nation  such as tiiose of B harat M ata relate to other
gendered  im ages of die na tionalist sym bolic repertoire. W hile B harat M ata can be 
inscribed in  narra tives of d ie na tion  w hich encapsulate notions of p u rity  and  honou r of 
the  nation, im ages of m arty rs and  heroes evoke conceptions of strength , hero ism  and  
selflessness. In general, these ideal m ales w ere represen ted  as heroic freedom  fighters.
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This aspect of nationalist sym bolism  is particularly  ev ident in  p o p u la r political prints. In 
the m ajority of the  cases, these p o p u lar political p rin ts are figural: they  w ere portra its  of 
na tionalist leaders or of m arty rs  w ho sacrificed their life for Ind ia 's  freedom . Sometimes, 
calls to join the nationalist m ovem ent, or praise to the practice of satyagraha were 
included, b u t in  general the  po rtra its  w ere drafted  in  praise  of th is or th a t nationalist 
m artyr, or w ere aim ed a t representing, w ith  images, concepts such as sacrifice, 
m arty rdom , and  nationalism . This is in  contrast w ith  the fem inised im agery, w hich in its 
them atic and  form al conception is m ore allegorical and  sym bolic than  its m ale 
counterpart. In  p o p u lar posters, w om en appeared  less frequently  th an  m ale characters, 
the only obvious exception being the im age of B harat M ata. Fem inine icons such as Bharat 
M ata personify  abstract ideas of freedom , honour, purity , justice and, of course, tire 
nation, b u t they w ere h ard ly  portra its  of real characters.
The stress on  the im age m ainly  rested  on its assum ed  auspiciousness and 
u ltim ately  on tire concept and  practice of darshan, of m u tu a l eye contact, w hich w as an 
essential elem ent of H in d u  religious iconography. As in  relig ious pain tings the subjects 
usually  looked stra igh t ou t from  the prin t, w ith  very  p rom inen t eyes gazing  directly a t tire 
onlooker. H ow ever, these nationalist posters differed from  tire pu re ly  religious ones in  the 
w ay in w hich the subjects w ere depicted. W hile in  the represen ta tion  of H in d u  gods and 
goddesses their div ine status w as indexed by  their "superna tu ra l"  characteristics (usually 
graphically  represen ted  as hav ing  m ultip le body  parts), political and  nationalist posters 
u sed  a different set of v isual clues or iconographical m arkers to convey the necessary 
inform ation. First of all, tire subjects w ere depicted  in a m ore natu ralistic  way: w ith  one 
head, tw o arm s, tw o legs and  so on. M oreover, the postu re  as w ell as their characteristic 
personal a ttribu tes (clothing, headgear and  colour codes) and  tire settings of the p icture 
becam e im portan t m arkers. Som etim es the subjects w ere depicted  perform ing  a 
characteristic deed  of their life drat supposed ly  dre audience w as fam iliar w ith. A ldrough 
in  general the p rin ts  w ere accom panied by illustrative captions d rat he lped  the view ers to 
identify  dre subjects (often sam e posters w ere p rin ted  in  d ifferent languages, the m ost 
popu lar languages em ployed  being  U rdu , H ind i and  English), the specific iconographies 
of the m ost p o pu lar characters becam e fixed early on. [Fig. 7 and  Fig. 8].
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Fig. 7 A za d  M andir Fig. 8 Bhagat Singh
Iconographically  the m eaning of these prin ts is direct and  the im ages seem  to be 
sim ply com m em orative. They are usually  devoid of any subtler sym bolic or allegoric 
m essage. Their aim  is to illustrate  patriotic m arty rdom  by representing  an em blem atic 
event in the life of som e of the m ost popu lar nationalist heroes. There is usually  only one 
plane of representation. Som etim e the m ain portra it is su rrounded  by sm aller portraits of 
o ther freedom  fighters (such as Aurobindo M andir, A zad  M andir and  Bhagat Singh on the 
Scaffold)29. The poster A zadi ke D ivane30, depicting Bhagat Singh, R ajguru and Sukhdev31
29 British Library PP HinF83, PPHinF68 and EPP 1/12. The pictorial conception of this print rests on 
the idiom of popular prints. The synoptic arrangement of various portraits or episodes of a story 
around the man portrait is a typical representational technique of popular prints and of Vishnu in 
particular. According to this stylistic device a central image of Vishnu is depicted surrounded by 
his ten avatars, or incarnations.
30 British Library PIB 9/33
31 Bhagat Singh along with his two companions Sukhdev and Rajguru were hanged in Lahore 
Central Jail in 1931. They were involved in what became known as the Lahore Conspiracy Case. 
Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru killed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr Saunders, in a 
terrorist attack. They originally planned to kill the Superintendent of Police Scott who fatally 
wounded Lala Lajpati Rai in a lathi charge in occasion of a peaceful demonstration against the
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'h earing  the sentence of dea th  by  hang ing  w ith  p leasure ', is illustrative. This black and 
w hite p rin t show s the three freedom  fighters -  Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, and  Sukhdeva -  
s tand ing  in  a p rison  com pound, receiving their dea th  sentence from  an  arm y official w ho 
is accom panied by  a young  peon. This p rin t is of a stark  p lainness and sim plicity of 
m eaning. It illustrates a selected episode of the life of B hagat Singh, Rajguru and  
Sukhdeva in  an  id iom  th a t easily com m unicates the essential elem ents of the event. A part 
from  em ploying  som e v isual m etaphors that connote pow er -  for instance the detailed 
background  depicting the p rison  com pound (that also set die stage of the story); the 
representation  of an arm y officer in  h igh  uniform  and  polished  boots (connoting pow er) 
and  the w ritten  piece of p ap e r bearing the death  sentence th a t the arm y official hands to 
the three of Lahore (a clear sym bol of British established authority) -  this illustration 
m akes use of a basic pictorial vocabu lary32. Its sim ple language n o t only conveys 
im m ediacy of action b u t also aims at reaching clarity of v isual com prehension. The 
freedom  fighters are depicted  in  the u sua l stereo typed  m anner: Bhagat Singh w ith  his 
khaki un ifo rm  and  tradem ark  trilby h a t and  m oustache, Sukhdeva in  shirt, shorts, and 
h igh  socks and  R ajguru w earing  a different khaki uniform  and  black cap. Two of them  are 
cross-arm ed and  all of them  are defiantly looking at the tw o m ilitary  m en stand ing  
opposite them . Tins is m erely a v ignette depicting a particu lar even t in  tire life of Bhagat 
Singh and  of h is com patriots. In its sim plicity of execution and  stra igh tfo rw ardness of 
m eaning this is rem iniscent of v isual story-telling techniques typical of Ind ia 's  traditional 
figurative arts, according to w hose established visual idiom , episodes and  events, d raw n 
from  tire com m on epics and  folk heritage are represen ted33. Just like the depiction of a
Simon Commission in Lahore in 1928.
32 There are several other prints similar to this one, not in content but in concept. See for instance 
Mister Raj Guru, Sardar Bhagat Singh and Mister Sukhdev going to be hanged with pleasure [British 
Library PP Hin F63 and PIB 27/7] and Sardar Bhagat Singh aur uske mitrom ki phamsi [PIBin F85 and 
PIB 8/31 A].
33 Indeed, the aesthetic that characterised these prints is typical of the nationalist period. What 
characterised the aesthetic of the nationalist movement was that "articulation of nationhood.... 
produced strategies of thinking the nation that were very different from those of Western Europe" 
[Sircar 1997:107]. Within the world of mass-produced popular imagery, the mythological and the 
mythical dominated and were opposed to the secular and rational of Western aesthetics. For Sircar 
[1997], this must be seen as part of the larger effort of constructing an aesthetics that was distinctly 
Indian. Moreover, this new aesthetics that viewed and rejected realism as a sign of colonialism and 
re-appropriated traditional and familiar ways of seeing worked also to erase class differences
86
particu lar episode ex trapolated  from  the Ram ayana is identifiable and  understandab le  by 
the audience even  w ithou t the su p p o rt of the w hole narra tive  structu re , so the view ers 
and  consum ers of this particu lar illustration  w ere able to locate an d  identify  this episode 
in  the life of B hagat Singh w ithou t the use of any other v isual support. These popu lar 
political p rin ts  w ere n o t sim ple vignettes or cameos com m em orating the life and 
m arty rdom  of Ind ian  freedom  fighters, b u t they w ere also didactic in  scope, aim ing at 
educating  abou t nationalism  and  the sp irit of sacrifice for the nation. They contribu ted  to 
the estab lishm ent of a p an theon  of nationalist heroes, w hich  w ou ld  be further 
'm an ip u la ted ' by  tire post-colonial Ind ian  state [see C hapter 3, 4 and  5],
Nationalist Songs and Slogans
M ethods of m obilisation relied heavily  on oral com m unication. In die prev ious
pages w e saw  ho w  du rin g  the Cow Protection M ovem ent often  m essages w ere delivered 
by itineran t com m unication experts in  the form  of songs and ballads. Patriotic songs and 
slogans belong  to those em otionally  charged symbolic constructions th a t sim ultaneously  
perpetra te  and  reinforce the sp irit of nationalism . H ow ever, as for o ther sym bols, they are 
no t sim ply colourful ornam ents. Songs and  slogans are usually  p a rt  of m ore complex 
sym bolic activities such  as public  rituals and  processions and  can raise pow erfu l 
em otions. Indeed , the em otional state thus created can "influence peop le 's  perception of 
the political w orld" [Kertzer 1988:100]. There is indeed  an exchange betw een tire cognitive 
and  em otional poles of rituals. For T urner [1974:56] it is this exchange that "m akes 
desirable w h a t is socially necessary by establishing a righ t relationship  betw een 
invo lun tary  sentim ents and  the requirem ents of social structure. People are induced  to do 
w hat they m u st do." T hat is, a ritualised  practice can create air em otional state th a t m akes 
the m essage delivered  em otionally  com pelling. N ationalist songs and  slogans are those 
sensory devices th a t aim  at affecting peop le 's  em otional state [Kertzer 1988] by 
channelling patrio tic  fervour.
creating deep horizontal solidarities between the nationalist elites and the masses [Sircar 1997:109].
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D uring  the nationalist m ovem ent, patriotic songs and  poem s w ere seized in  great 
num bers by  the British police in  India. Indeed, this collection m ake u p  one of the largest 
single category of p rin ted  m ateria l confiscated by the British [Barrier, 1974:270]. These 
songs w ere in  the form  of poem s, sim ple songs (sangit), alha (ballads in trad itional m etre), 
phag (typical H oli songs), an d  also of updesh (serm ons). The subject rela ted  by  these songs 
and  poem s varies greatly. Topics such  as the evils of colonialism , the p ligh t of tire poor, 
ITindu-M uslim  mrity, satyagraha, praise of non-cooperation and  of non-v io len t m ethods, 
p rom otion  of swadeshi and  of the  use of the spinning-w heel (charkha), w ere com m on as 
w ell as eulogies of nationalist leaders and  m arty rs (in particu lar in  ho n o u r of Bhagat 
Singh and  G andhi).
The singing of songs, slogans and  poetry  w as no t sim ply p a rt of a com m unication 
and  m obilisation strategy. B ankim 's poem  Vande M ataram 34 beside contribu ting  to die 
creation of a gendered  im agery of the Ind ian  nation, becam e m aybe the  m ost im portan t 
patrio tic  song and  a com pelling sym bol of nationalism  capable of channelling pow erful 
em otions, as dem onstra ted  by  tire fact that m any  freedom  fighters d ied  w ith  Vande 
M ataram  on  their lips [M ajum dar 1965: 478], after the British au thorities declared die 
singing of die song seditious and  pun ishab le  even w ith  jail [Bhattacharya 2003:61-63]. 
Indeed, patrio tic  songs and  slogans w ere p a rt of the trad ition  of p ro test and  w ere 
regularly  sm ig d u rin g  processions, dem onstrations and  other public  cerem onies creating 
unity  and  so lidarity  am ong the dem onstrators. W hen die revo lu tionary  Bhagat Singh was 
p u t to trial in 1929, he u sed  die occasion as a p latform  of nationalist p ropaganda  chanting 
slogans and  singing patrio tic  songs to w hich o ther m em bers of the public  joined in, thus 
d isrup ting  court p rocedures [Deol, 1969:69]. Similarly, w hen  he and  his com panions 
(Sukliudev and  Rajguru) w ere taken  ou t of their cells to be executed tiiey chanted slogans 
that w ere repea ted  by  die odier inm ates [Deol 1969:88]. The singing of songs and  slogans 
such as these served  to create a sym bolic un ity  am ong tiiose w ho  partic ipa ted  in  the 
chanting35. A nationalist song is n o t sim ply a hym n  b u t a represen ta tion  of die country
34 For the full text of the song Vande Mataram see Appendix I.
35 The execution of criminals is a highly symbolic ceremony itself. Bhagat Singh and his 
companions tried to disrupt the ceremonial order of their execution not only by chanting slogans
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th a t helps define its sense of nationhood  w hile creating so lidarity  and  stirring  the 
em otions. Indeed, Vande M ataram  w as "intim ately connected w ith  [the] struggle for 
freedom  [...] the passion  an d  poignancy of th a t struggle"36.
As w ell as creating solidarity , songs and  slogans can be also item s of contention. In 
as m uch  as Vande M ataram  contribu ted  to channel patrio tic  fervour, it also becam e a 
d ispu ted  h ym n  th ro u g h o u t the freedom  m ovem ent. Its open  H in d u  connotations and  
Anandam ath's controversial anti-M uslim  overtones upse t M uslim s' sensibilities. A lready 
in  1908 d u rin g  h is p residen tial address at the second session of the A ll-India M uslim  
League he ld  in  A m ristar, Syed Ali Im am  voiced the objections of the  M uslim  com m unity 
to Vande M ataram  for the first time, by suggesting that "u n d er the  cloak of nationalism  
H in d u  nationalism  [wa]s p reached  in India" and  noticing the sectarian  and  com m unal 
character of the hy m n  [N oorani 1999:95], But objections to the  h y m n  by the M uslim  
com m unity  w ere n o t necessarily  done on  the g rounds of the  anti-M uslim  connotations 
th a t tinged B ankim 's novel Anandm ath. Rather, the M uslim s considered  Vande M ataram  a 
sa lu tation  to a specific H in d u  goddess and  objected to Vande M ataram  stanzas th a t openly 
referred  to the M other as the  G oddess Kali and  D urga and inv ited  the singer to bow  at the 
feet of th e  deity, a tiring considered offensive as M uslim s do n o t as a ru le practice idol 
w orship.
In  1923, M oulana M oham ed Ali, w ho p resided  over th a t year's  Congress session at 
K akinada, objected to tire singing of Vande M ataram . Indeed, tire feeling persisted  that 
Vande M ataram  could  spark  anti-M uslim  sentim ent and  during  the 1937 Calcutta session a 
subcom m ittee consisting of M aulana A zad, N ehru  and  Subhash  C handra  Bose w as
but also by refusing to wear the customary black uniform that those who were being hung were 
supposed to wear. By doing this, they aimed at changing the meaning of this ritual and challenging 
the power relation in it inscribed by reclaiming their identity as freedom fighters (and not as 
ordinary criminals) and by signifying the undying character of the nationalist movement.
35 Nehru's speech at the Constituent Assembly, Official Report on "Constituent Assembly
Debates", third session; part I; Volume VI, August 9-31, 1948. See also the resolution passed at the 
Congress Working Committee which met in Calcutta in 1937 which recognised that Vande Mataram 
"became a symbol[s] of national resistance to British Imperialism [...] a slogan of power which 
inspired our people and a greeting which ever remind us of our struggle of national freedom". 
Indian Annual Register 1937, volume II, p.327.
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appo in ted  to settle the issue w ith  the guidance of R ab indranath  Tagore. A ccording to the 
Com m ittee, Vande M ataram  w as appropria te  as p a rt of A nandm ath  b u t inapp rop ria te  as a 
national anthem . O n  th a t occasion, the Congress accepted the M uslim s' v iew poin t and  
declared that only the first tw o stanzas of the hym n  should  be sung  a t C ongress functions. 
The reso lu tion  of tire C ongress W orking C om m ittee of 1937 how ever d id  n o t subscribe to 
this view . Instead  it po in ted  ou t th a t "the m odern  evolution of tire use  of the song as p a rt 
of N ational life is of infinitely greater im portance th an  its setting  in  a h istorical novel 
before the national m ovem ent h ad  taken  shape"37.
The row  over Vande M ataram  w as never fully settled and  re-em erged w hen the 
C onstituen t A ssem bly h a d  to decide on  Ind ia 's  national anthem . As in  1937 a com prom ise 
w as found. The C onstituen t A ssem bly decreed th a t Jana Gana M ana  w ou ld  be Ind ia 's  
national anthem . H ow ever, Vande M ataram  w as recognised as Ind ia 's  national song 
carrying abou t the sam e sta tus as the national anthem . The decision of the  C onstituent 
A ssem bly w as apparen tly  taken on the g rounds th a t Jana Gana M ana  w as m ore suitable 
for band  m usic. O n  the  contrary  Vande M ataram  h ad  too m uch  alap38, thus m aking the 
hym n m ore difficult to be sung  in  un iso n 39. It is obvious d rat w hen  the C onstituent 
A ssem bly declared th a t Ind ia 's  national an them  w ou ld  be Jana Gana M ana, instead  Vande 
M ataram , tire fram ers of the  Ind ian  constitu tion w ere insp ired  by  the principles of 
dem ocracy and  secularism  th a t inform ed the sp irit of the time, and, w ed d ed  to tire view  
that divisive sym bols shou ld  be kep t in  abeyance. Jana Gana M ana  w as considered fit as a 
national an them  m ostly  because it w as shorn  of airy religious connotations being  sim ply a 
hym n to Ind ia 's  n a tu ra l beau ty40.
The Nationalist Flag
Flags as w ell as slogans and  songs are central to tire organisation  and  the
37 Indian Annual Register 1937, volume II, p.327
38 Alap is a spontaneous mode of singing, typical of South Asian classical music.
39 For a definitive statement on the issue by the President of the Constituent Assembly, Rajendra 
Prasad, see Constituent Assembly Debates, volume XII, January 24, 1950. For an exhaustive 
account of the controversy see Bhattacharya 2003.
40 Another kind of controversy tainted Jana Gana Mana over whether the song was actually 
composed in honour of the British to welcome King George V in his visit to India for his coronation 
Durbar.
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choreography of public  rituals and  dem onstrations. A flag is n o t "sim ply a decorated 
cloth, b u t the em bod im en t of a nation" [Kertzer 1988:7]. The flag, as o ther symbolic 
constructs of g roup  identity , is one of those sym bols th a t he lp  the definition of the 
boundaries of the  com m unity  it represents. It does so through  the v isual codes it em ploys 
w hich reify no tions of h isto ry  and  belonging. The fact th a t the  design of the Indian 
national flag excited hea ted  debates and  tha t it changed several tim es is sym ptom atic of 
its com plex sym bolic significance. The cerem onial pom p th a t u sua lly  accom panied the 
hoisting of the nationalist flag (as well as the repressive m easures em ployed  by  the British 
authorities) fu rther corroborates this fact. Those cerem onies w ere aim ed at consecrating 
and  at conferring legitim acy to the new  flag, w hile being statem ents of national 
sovereignty, ha 1906 the flag w as cerem onially consecrated on Boycott Day, a date that 
was observed to p ro test against the partition  of Bengal, and  w as ho isted  at the sound  of 
h u n d red  and  one crackers [Ghosh nd.: 32-33]. Similarly, in  1931 the new ly approved  
national flag w as ho isted  th ro u g h o u t India on recom m endation  of the  Congress W orking 
C om m ittee. For the British au thorities these w ere understood  as rites of rebellion that 
challenged their legitim acy and  pow er. Som etimes, tire British d id  n o t take any action 
against tire hoisting of the nationalist flag as it w as feared th a t a British in tervention  
w ould  transform  a localised cerem ony into an issue of national p ropo rtion  (as it happened  
in Jabalpur in 1923 w hen  the perm ission  to ho ist the flag on the m unicipal bu ild ing  in 
honour of a v isiting  C ongress depu ta tion  w as refused  by the British authorities). A t any 
rate, it seem s th a t the necessity to have a na tional flag w as tan tam o u n t to donning  an 
identity  to the  m ovem ent and  several p rom inen t nationalist leaders becam e involved in 
the process: Sister N ivedita, A nnie Besairt, Tilak, Savarkar, G andhi, and  N eh ru  [Singh 
n.d].
The design  of tire na tional flag changed over tire years. A t d ifferent times, different 
colours and  sym bols w ere chosen. The very  first flag w as designed  by  Sister N ivedita  in  
1906. It w as red, square  in  shape, w ith  a yellow  vajra  -  tire thunderbo lt, one of V ishnu 's 
w eapons, b u t also an em blem  of the B uddha -  in  the m iddle  of it accom panied by the 
w ords Vande M ataram  in  Bengali script. In 1907, the flag th a t im m ediately  follow ed this 
one w as a tricolour. It h ad  three b road  bands: dre top  one w as green, dre m idd le  band  was
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yellow; the bottom  ban d  w as red. O n the top band  there w ere eigh t half-open  lotuses in a 
line represen ting  the eigh t Provinces of British India. O n the m idd le  b a r Vande M ataram  
w as inscribed in D evanagari scrip t and  on the bottom  stripe there  w ere the figures of the 
su n  and  of a crescent m oon, sym bols of H indu ism  and  Islam  respectively. The H om e Rule 
flag hoisted  a t tire 1917 Congress session held  in  Calcutta w as again  very  different. It h ad  
five red  stripes a lternated  to four green  ones, w ith  seven stars dep icted  across the  flag and 
denoting  tire Saptarishi constellation. A U nion Jack w as on the left u p p e r  q u ad ran t 
tow ards tire hoist, w hile a star and  crescent m oon w ere on the righ t u p p e r  quadran t.
The design  of tire flag w as no t obviously a s tra igh tfo rw ard  affair. Given, as w e had  
p reviously  noted, tha t tire flag is one of those symbolic devices tha t help  d raw ing  dre 
sym bolic boundaries of dre com m unity, dre m ajor obstacles encountered  by the nationalist 
leadersh ip  derived  from  a difficulty in translating into sym bolic form  dre identity  of the 
nationalist m ovem ent. The inclusion or exclusion of certain em blem s, the choice of a 
particu lar p a tte rn  and  of specific colours w ere all extrem ely significant. It seem s tha t it 
w as the French tricolour, sym bol of liberty, fraternity  and  equality  th a t insp ired /w as 
beh ind  its use  in  the  nationalist flag [Singh n.d.:40]. But if it w as the French revolu tionary  
trad ition  tha t w as sym bolised by the tricolour, dre inclusion of the  U nion  Jack, as in  the 
case of the H om e Rule flag, sym bolised a political com prom ise w ith  the British crow n as 
the H om e Rule m ovem ent agitated  no t for com plete independence from  London b u t for 
dom inion  status.
The insertion  of dre slogan Vande M ataram , and of several o ther sym bols (half­
opened lotuses, star, sun  and  m oon, and  the charkha) w as to signify d istinct concepts of 
national identity . For instance, the eight half-opened lotuses in  the 1907 swadeshi flag 
w hich stood for Ind ia 's  eight British provinces indicated  tha t the  im agined  India of the 
Bengali insurrectionists d id  n o t extend beyond the British dom inions41, thus excluding 
alm ost tw o-drirds of tire territo ry  th a t w e now  identify witir tire Ind ian  state. The sym bols
41 For some, the agitations against the partition of the Bengal province were not nationalist yet, but 
simply regional in character. There is also controversy on the number of lotuses: some say they 
were seven instead of eight [Singh n.d.:40].
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of the su n  -  or star -  and  the crescent m oon identified  In d ia 's  tw o m ajor religious 
com m unities b u t ignored  the  Christians, the  Parsis, tire Sikhs and  the  Jews. The charkha -  
the sp inn ing  w heel -  ad d ed  in  1921, becam e a fundam en ta l sym bol of nationalism . Such 
w as the sym bolic im portance of the spinning-w heel, tha t since 1921 the Ind ian  nationalist 
flag h ad  to be m ade solely of khadi, the hand-spun , hand-w oven  cloth sym bol of Ind ia 's  
self-reliance and  independence.
The flag 's colour sym bolism  w as equally  im portant. The different colours stood 
for Ind ia 's  m ain  religious com m unities and  their represen ta tion  on  the flag m ean t 
p rim arily  to signify the un ity  of all Indians. Green, red, orange, yellow , saffron and  w hite 
w ere all u sed  at different tim es. Green w as generally unders tood  as the  colour sacred to 
the M uslim s and  red  as the colour sacred to the H indus. Thus, the  H om e Rule flag, w hich 
a lternated  red  and  green bands, denoted  solidarity  betw een  Ind ia 's  tw o largest religious 
com m unities42. H ow ever, th is colour sym bolism  (w hich w as m ain ta ined  in  a prelim inary  
design of the 1921 flag) w as n o t com pletely satisfactory and  on  G andh i's  suggestion the 
colour w hite  w as ad d ed  for the flag background  shou ld  also rep resen t Ind ia 's  other 
religious com m unities [Singh n.d.].
It w as n o t ju st the  colour sym bolism  that w as significant. Even the colour 
h ierarchy  w as m eaningful. A ccording to G andhi, the a rrangem en t of the three colour 
bands m ean t to sym bolise the protection of Ind ia 's  religious m inorities: " the w eakest 
num erically  occupy the first place, the  Islamic colour (green) com es next, the H indu  
colour (red) com es last, the  idea being  that the strongest shou ld  act as a shield  to the 
w e a k e s t ... A nd  to rep resen t the  equality  w ith  the least of us w ith  the  best, an equal p a rt is 
assigned to all the three colours in  the design" [G andhi 1921]. The colour sym bology of 
the Ind ian  national flag w as again significantly altered in  1931. By 1930 several people had  
expressed their unhapp iness w ith  flag 's colour schem e and  its com m unal associations43.
42 According to Sumiti Kumar Chatterjee [in Singh n.d.] who wrote an article on the nationalist flag 
on the Modern Review in 1931, the communal interpretation of the flag's colour palette was only 
relevant after 1920s. To his interpretation then, the green and red stood respectively for life and 
hope, and blood and sacrifice.
43 Chatterjee [1931 cited in Singh n.d.] thought that the communal character of the flag colour code
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O thers p ressed  for the inclusion of the saffron, the colour of the Sikhs b u t also the colour 
tha t "typified  die sp irit of renunciation, and  w as a colour w hich sym bolised an ideal 
com m on to d ie  H in d u  Yogi and  Sannyasi as w ell as to the M uslim  Faquir and  D arw esh" 
[Chatterjee 1931 in  Singh n.d.:70].
W hat w as once considered a national sym bol of un ity  and  harm ony  of all religious 
com m unities of Ind ia  (die d iree colours represen ting  die d istinct faitiis of India), w ith  the 
passing  of tim e and  the radicalisation and  polarisation  of the nationalist m ovem ent, came 
to be in terp re ted  as a sym bol of division and  com m unalism . W ith  regard  to the character 
of the early  nationalist m ovem ent Pandey  points to the fact tha t a t the tu rn  of the century 
there w ere already  signs of the affirm ation of "a vision of society as already  form ed of 
discrete com m unities, each w ith  its ow n  priorities and  in terests an d  each w itii d ie righ t to 
determ ine its ow n ('social') future: 'In d ia ' w as 'H in d u ' + 'M uslim ' + 'S ikh ' + 'C hristian ', 
etc ..."  [Pandey 1990:231], The pre-1931 Congress flag, w here the colours m ean t to 
sym bolise Ind ia 's  discrete religious com m unities and  die flag itself w as a sum m a of them  
bu t n o t dieir synthesis, significantly rep licated  these ideals.
It w as only in  1931, after the installation of a Congress Flag C om m ittee44 th a t it w as 
decided  to strip  the flag of any com m unal represen tation  w h en  it becam e necessary to 
identify  a new  sym bology for die sam e pictorial referents. A fter a year of deliberation the 
Flag C om m ittee reached  the unan im ous agreem ent tiiat die national flag:
"shou ld  be of a single colour except for the colour of d ie  device. If there  is one 
colour th a t is m ore acceptable to India as a whole, even as it is m ore distinctive 
than  anod ier one that is associated w id i tiiis ancient coun try  by  long trad ition  
it is the kesari or saffron colour. Accordingly, it is felt th a t d ie flag shou ld  be of 
kesari colour" [in Singh n .d.:75].
H ow ever, the  Congress W orking Com m ittee that m et in  Bom bay in  A ugust 1931,
was as evil as die establishment of communal electorates.
44 The Flag Committee was appointed by the Congress Working Committee at its Karachi meeting 
on April 2 1931. The Committee comprised: B Pattabhi Sitaramayya as convenor, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Vallabhabhai Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, Tara Singh, N S Hardikar and D B Kalekar.
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did  not approve the new  recom m ended design and insisted in keeping the new  flag as
close as possible to the original design. The new  agreed design for the nationalist flag was
only slightly changed from the previous pattern . In fact, the national flag had still three
broad colour bands (saffron, w hite and green) w ith a sp inning  w heel a t the centre. But it
w as the m eaning of the colour sym bolism  that w as altered:
"It is being understood  that the colours have no com m unal significance, but 
that saffron shall represent courage and sacrifice, w hite  peace and  tru th , green 
faith and chivalry, and the w heel shall represent the hope of the m asses."45
Once again the Indian  national flag defined the character of the Indian nation, 
representing the sp irit of the nation, its com m itm ent to swnraj, and  Ind ia 's  tradition  of 
synthesis. [Fig. 9]
India's Flags
Sister N ivedita
1916 H om e Rule Flag
1906 Flags
1921 Congress Flag
45 The Times of India, August 6, 1931, p. 10
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1931 C ongress Flag 1947 India 's N ational Flag
Clothing the Nationalist Movement.
O n A ugust 18 1923 a peaceful procession of satyagrahis m arched th rough  the street
of N agpur led by M akhanlal C haturvedi, Vallabhbhai Patel and  Rajendra Prasad to 
restore the "honour of ou r flag and our right to hold public processions" [Tahm ankar 
1970:71]. No slogans w here raised, and no songs sung. In this silent rite of rebellion and 
resistance to au thority  the m essage w as carried by tw o sym bolic elem ents that w ere 
louder than  w ords: the national flag and the G andhi cap. In the p rev ious section it w as 
show n how  the national flag w as a pow erful visual sign of political orientation. Here, I 
w an t to show  how  clothes can objectify a sense of identity  and belonging to a particular 
group. The G andhi cap and the w earing of khndi, the hand -spun  and  hand-w oven fabric, 
becam e such sym bols.
The quest for a national costum e em erged early in the nationalist m ovem ent. As 
we know, a nation is represented  and its identity  defined th rough  sym bols and symbolic 
practices, w hich are aim ed at differentiating its m em bers from strangers. A uniform , a 
dress code, is a visual m ark of belonging and  a concrete sym bol to w hich everybody can 
relate. Indeed belonging to a group  only happens through  sym bolic actions [Kertzer 
1988], and w earing  specific clothes is one of these sym bolic practices. Tarlo [1996:319], 
quoting  Bourdieu [1984], speaks of 'stra teg ies of distinctions'. The identification and 
creation of a national dress code is extrem ely im portan t to transm it notions of identity 
and to represent the cohesiveness of a group. A uniform  is an iconic m arker perm itting  
visibility that strengthens a sense of belonging. A uniform  defines social differences: it 
m akes the people w ho w ear it feel they belong to a particu lar g roup  and m akes them
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appear to others as belonging to the sam e group. Therefore, besides being  a sign of 
distinction, a un ifo rm  is also a sym bol of unity . It is an identifier tha t aim s at subm erging 
ind iv idual identities to th a t of the overarching g roup [Kertzer 1988].
h i colonial India, bo th  the British and  the Indians w ere engaged  in  these symbolic 
practices of identification th rough  clothing. By the end  of the  n ineteen th  century, the 
British tigh tened  their sartorial codes to d istinguish  them selves from  the educated  Indians 
w ho h ad  taken  u p  w earing  E uropean  styles of dress and  follow ing w estern  life-styles. 
Roughly arom id the  sam e tim e tha t a desire to differentiate them selves em erged am ong 
the British, Ind ian  nationalism  passed  from  a phase of acute w estern isation  and  rejection 
of all tilings Indian, to a phase  of revaluation  of traditions. They d id  so in  a ritual fashion 
by creating a n ew  national style. W hereas a t the beginning, Ind ianness w as expressed by 
the choice of a particu lar sartorial style (rejection of E uropean style for adop tion  of Indian  
dress style) as a sign of pa trio tism  [Tarlo 1996:117], w ith  the em ergence of the  swadeshi 
m ovem ent and  of G andh i's  m ass politics, Ind ian  iden tity  cam e to be represen ted  also 
th rough  the m aterials and  the choice of swadeshi fabric, in  particu lar th ro u g h  the choice of 
hand-spun , hand-w oven  khadi. The choice of clothing as a v isual sign of political 
o rientation is particu larly  significant in  India. W hile clothing in  general helps to 
d istinguish  people  from  one ano ther socially, culturally  and  physically, in  India it also 
h ad  other im portan t functions. Bayly [1986] identifies three m ain  functions of clothes in 
India. Firstly, clothes are sym bols of status and  can also record  change of status. Secondly, 
traditionally  clothing in Ind ia  is endow ed  w ith  a transform ative pow er: clothes can 
change n o t only the physical b u t also tire m oral character of the w earer. Lastly, clothes can 
be a p ledge of fu tu re  protection. M oreover, according to C ohn [1989:313], in  India clothes 
w ere linked to the n a tu re  of authority . They w ere n o t sim ple m etaphors of pow er b u t 
au thority  itself, as pow er could  be transm itted  th rough  clothing. Both C ohn [1989] and 
Bayly [1986] m u st be kep t in m ind  w hen  dealing w ith  the nationalis t use of clothes as a 
sign of patrio tism . A ccording to Bayly [1986], it w as the use by  the nationalist leadership 
and  in  particu lar by  G andhi of these sym bolic notions of clothing th a t m ade khadi a 
pow erfu l sym bol of nationalism . As early  as 1870s in Bengal it em erged  a desire to 
prov ide for a redefin ition  of Indianness th rough  clothing th a t "could  bring  about a sense
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of political un ity" [Tarlo 1996:59], The boycott of British goods, the change of lifestyle, and 
the bonfires of w estern  clothes becam e central sym bolic form s of p ro te s t46 of Indian 
nationalism  since the em ergence of the swadeshi m ovem ent47.
The swadeshi m ovem en t aim ed a t encouraging the developm en t and  the use of 
ind igenous goods th rough  the boycott of E uropean  m anufactures. A ccording to Bayly the 
prom otion  of swadeshi industries and  the boycott of foreign goods w ere concepts tha t w ere 
in tim ately  in terw oven  w ith  "notions of neighborliness, patrio tism , p u rity  and  sacrifice, all 
of w hich p ro v id ed  unify ing  ideologies m ore pow erfu l than  any single call for political 
represen tation  or independence" [Bayly 1986:285], M oreover, the boycott of foreign cloth 
fell easily w ith in  no tions of cessation of cooperation and of civil d isobedience that w ere 
the m ost com m on trad itional form s of p ro test in pre-colonial Ind ia [D haram pal 1971],
D uring  the sw adeshi m ovem ent, the  dhoti (a m an 's  w aistcloth) becam e a visible sign 
of p ro test against British policies and  an  excellent vehicle for tire expression of patriotic 
sentim ents. It becam e "the u ltim ate sym bol of swadeshi" [Tarlo 1996:60] and  of allegiance 
to the Ind ian  people: "Bengali H igh  C ourt judges, barristers, solicitors, noblem en, 
m erchants, have all d iscarded  English co s tu m e"48, T hrough  the em ploym ent of a
46 According to Deshpande [2003], swadeshi had also the merit of bringing a nationalist 
consciousness to the marketplace. By investing a number of ordinary objects with nationalist 
connotations, swadeshi transformed everyday items into symbolic aids for imagining the nation.
47 The swadeshi movement was born in Bengal at the beginning of the twentieth century and peaked 
during the agitation against the partition of Bengal of 1905. Widespread unrest and boycott of 
British goods characterised the anti-partition movement. This movement criticised the British 
government's policies of destitution of India's manufactures, as well as its oppressive revenue 
policies, which were believed to contribute to the misery of the Indian masses. Indeed, the decline 
in production of Indian fine cotton textiles depended on a web of reason. Besides the impact of 
cheap European imports mainly from Britain and Germany, a change of taste among Indians was 
an equally determining factor [Bayly 1986 and Cohn 1989]. Also, imported textiles were compatible 
with local and cultural preferences [Bayly 1986:308], Moreover, modernity partly transformed the 
value of clothes when clothes became markers of cultural change. Indeed, wearing European 
clothes was a visible sign of modernity and respectability, whereas donning Indian clothes was a 
symptom of backwardness. Other factors that contributed to the growth of foreign textile imports, 
were the improvement of communication infrastructures that reduced the costs of distribution and 
contributed to the opening up of new markets and the increase of the cost of labour in India that 
made Lancashire textiles more competitive [Bayly 1986:308].
48 Motilal Nehru, Letter 16 November, 1905. In Kumar [1982:91]
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trad itional fo rm  of dress, the people of C alcutta perfo rm ed  a h igh ly  sym bolic action, 
w hich becam e a p e rpe tual rem inder of one 's allegiances. This w as a very  regional affair 
and  although  the dhoti becam e a sym bol of swadeshi, patrio tism  and  anti-British sentim ent, 
it w as n o t conceived as a uniform . H ow ever it d id  p rov ide  a vehicle for the expression of 
the ideals of the an ti-partition  m ovem ent and  for the p rom otion  of swadeshi policies. It 
w as m ore a v isual stratagem , a v isual sign of dissent, ra ther than  an  a ttem pt to give the 
people  of Ind ia  a na tionalist uniform .
W hen G andhi becam e the leader of the Ind ian  nationalist m ovem ent things 
radically changed  n o t only in  the political objectives of the m ovem ent, b u t also w ith  
respect to the sym bolism  of clothing. G andhi appropria ted  the ideas and  the m ethods of 
the swadeshi m ovem ent and, by the first non-cooperation m ovem ent [1920-1921] the use of 
hand-spun , hand-w oven  khadi and  die G andhi cap w ere w idely  u sed  [Colin 1989:344]. It 
seem s that G andhi w as alw ays preoccupied  w ith  clothing as a m eans of signification. 
Bean [1989] po rtrays G andhi as a sem iotician w ho com m unicated w ith  clothes. A ccording 
to Bean, G andhi, after hav ing  experim ented  w ith  d ifferent dress styles, by  finally donning  
a short dhoti49 successfully com m unicated to d ie  Indian  m asses the  values and  ideals of the 
nationalist m ovem ent50. But if du ring  the an ti-partition  m ovem en t in  Bengal it w as the 
choice of sartorial style th a t becam e a sign of patriotism , w ith  G andhi it w as bo th  the style 
and  the fabric [hand-spun  and  hand-w oven  khadi] th a t becam e visible sym bols of 
nationalism , swadeshi and swaraj. For G andhi, d ie spinning, w eaving  and  w earing  of khadi 
w as the panacea against In d ia 's  grow ing im poverishm ent. "H ie  Ind ian  people w ould  be 
free from  E uropean  dom ination  bo th  politically an d  econom ically w hen  die m asses took 
to spinning, w eaving  and  w earing  hom e-spun  cloth, khadi". [G andhi in  Colin 1989:343]
H ie  im port of cheaper, m ill-w oven fabrics from  the Lancashire m ills dealt a death
49 Gandhi's short dhoti was usually referred to as loincloth or as a langoti. However, as Tarlo notes 
"[I]t was in fact much longer than either term suggest and could more accurately be called a short 
dhoti" [Tarlo 1996:71],
50 According to Parel (1969) khadi, fasting, the cow and Harijan were Gandhi's most prominent 
symbols that he used to "promote his political values, and to aid in the practice of the Gandhian 
virtues" [Parel 1969:515].
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blow  to In d ia 's  cottage in d u stry  and  w as considered to be the cause of m uch  of Ind ia 's  
poverty . It is n o t a su rp rise  therefore tha t khadi em erged as the sym bolic alternative to 
foreign m ill-cloth. The hand -spun , hand-w oven  khadi becam e a sym bol of Ind ia 's  
econom ic drain, of its poverty , of anti-Britishness b u t also of red iscovering  of indigenous 
values and  trad itions, of self-sufficiency, an d  eventually  of independence. G andhi's 
adop tion  of a sh o rt dhoti w as an  extrem e exam ple of using  cloth as a signifying practice. 
G andh i's  ow n  un ifo rm  acquired a variety  of m eanings. The dhoti w as a sym bol of 
closeness to the cause of the poor. It w as a v isual exposure of In d ia 's  poverty , of its lack of 
clothing, one of the  m ost basic necessities. H ow ever, G andhi's  dhoti signified n o t only 
Ind ia 's  econom ic p red icam en t b u t ind icated  also its solution. Indeed , the  sho rt dhoti w as a 
sym bol of G andh i's  econom ic p rogram m e for the resurgence of Ind ia 's  swadeshi 
industry51. G andhi n o t only tried  to com m unicate w ith  die m asses th ro u g h  the m eans of 
cloth (as in  d ie case of dhoti) b u t he also actively participated  in  the creation of a 'un ifo rm ' 
for the nationalist m ovem ent. A w are as he  w as of the pow er of dress to  signify sta tus and 
political belief, G andhi envisaged  the typical un ifo rm  in a loose shirt, dho ti or pyjam a 
trousers and  a cap, all m ade  o u t of hand-spun , hand-w oven  coarse khadi.
But for these sym bols to be successful, they h ad  to be ad o p ted  by  vast num ber of 
peop le  odierw ise d ie signifying pow er of this sym bolic practices w as lost. G andhi set u p  a 
num ber of organisations and  societies for the prom otion  of khadi. H e push ed  for die 
institu tions of educational schem es in  schools and  th rough  exhibitions. Boycotts of foreign 
goods, p icketing ou tside shops tiiat sold E uropean  im ports, bonfires52, door to door 
collections of foreign clothes w ere all resorted  to in o rder to popu larise  the  use of khadi
51 A further signification of Gandhi's loincloth was it being a symbol of saintliness. Gandhi's entire 
non-verbal idiom was steeped in the Hindu tradition of ascetism. Indeed, for Van der Veer 
[1994:94] "Gandhi's success. ...depended on his use of Hindu devotional discourse". Beside his 
visual appearance that was reminiscent of that of the wandering ascetics, Gandhi's own discourse 
of social transformation -  satyagraha -  was derived from the Hindu traditional discourse of 
asceticism, according to which power [shakti] results from practices of tapas [austerity] and 
brahmacarya [celibacy]. However, according to Tarlo [1996:79] Gandhi categorically refused this 
interpretation.
52 Bonfires of foreign clothes were more than a means to dramatize one's political position as they 
became symbolic rites of rebellion as what is burning is "an object that represent the enemy" 
[Kertzer 1988:121]. Moreover, bonfires "provided a means to unifying opponents of government 
policy [..] in the absence of strong organizational structure."[Kertzer 1988:122]
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and of Ind ian  style of dress. Indeed, G andhi insisted  also on the transform ative pow er of 
khadi [Bayly 1986:314] and  khadi becam e the ultim ate expression of m oral du ty  to the 
nation  and  a question  of dharma. A ccording to Bayly [1986], G andhi w eaved  his 
a rgum ents for the p rom otion  of khadi on  trad itional notions regard ing  the religious and 
m agical aspect of cloth, sp inn ing  and  w earing  of khadi. In particu lar, G andhi regarded  
sp inn ing  as "an  act of p ray er (m antra), bo th  a pu rgation  of ind iv idual sin and  a creation of 
n ew  life in  die sp inner and  in die com m unity" [Bayly 1986:313]. Indeed , the sp inn ing  and 
w eaving of khadi could " transform  the m oral fibre of die na tion" [Bayly 1986:312]. By 
1920, all C ongress m em bers w ere requ ired  to spin  at least ha lf an h o u r a day  [Tarlo 
1996:87] and  for a w hile, hav ing  spun  a certain am oun t of yarn  w as a necessary condition 
to access som e offices w id iin  Congress [Bayly 1986:313]. This g rea t stress on sp inning  
gave the charkha, the  sp inn ing  w heel, a p rom inen t place in  the  sym bolic reperto ire  of the 
nationalist m ovem ent and  in  the national flag [see above]. H ow ever, because khadi could 
be particu larly  coarse, it p resen ted  several p roblem s as m any w ere n o t entirely h appy  to 
convert to khadi and  d iscard  their cheap, b u t fine im ported  clodies. A nd  often, despite 
khadi being a fabric of un ity , it could also express social or religious differences which 
w ere came to be "expressed in  the fineness of the khadi, d ie types of fibres used, the 
colour, the decoration  and  of course die style in  w hich die khadi w as w orn" [Tarlo 
1996:104].
Beside the adop tion  of a un iform  of loose sh irt and  pijam a bottom s, the cap -  tha t 
cam e to be know n sim ply as the G andhi cap -  becam e probably  the m ore versatile symbol 
of nationalism . The cap w as another one of G andhi's  deliberate creations53. G andhi w as 
aw are of die significance of headgear as a signifier of social, religious and  regional 
identification in India, as he  w as particu larly  conscious of d ie pow er of creating a practical 
and  econom ical v isual sym bol of subversion and of nationalism  [Tarlo 1986:83] -  " ... a 
visible m ark  of sw adesh i and  sw araj" [CWMG, vol. 21: 507] -  th a t could transcend 
peop le 's  differences (social and  economical) and obtain a level of v isual uniform ity  
[CWMG, vol. 20:386]. By the tim e India experienced the first non-cooperation  m ovem ent
53 Emma Tarlo [1096:82-83] reports a little-known conversation between Gandhi and his friend 
Kakasahib with regards to the necessity of finding a suitable national cap.
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[1920-1921] the G andhi cap had already becom e an essential part of the C ongress uniform  
[Cohn 1989:344]. It w as easily m ade and  ready available at all m ajor political m eetings, so 
m uch so that by "1920 substantial num bers of the Indian m ale population  w ere w earing 
it" [Tarlo 1996:84]. [Fig.10 and  Fig. 11]
Fig. 10 Fig. 10 Bharat Mat;
Blessing G andhi and  Khadi
Clothes objectify self and g roup identities. They are also m eans of integration as 
w earing a particu lar outfit signify un ity  also in the absence of consensus. In India, the 
sp inning  and  w earing of khadi and  of the G andhi cap beside sym bolising national identity 
and transm itting  the values and  beliefs of the nationalist m ovem ent w ere also a challenge 
to British au thority  w ho looked upon  these sym bols w ith  grow ing anxiety. Em ma Tarlo 
[1996] questions if G andhi rediscovered or invented a sym bolism  of cloth and dress and if 
the m eanings of this sym bolic reperto ire w ere fixed. G andhi d id  both, for as Sm ith has 
contended:
"w hat gives nationalism  its pow er are the m yths, m em ories, traditions, and 
sym bols of ethnic heritages and  the w ays in w hich a popu lar living past has 
been and  can be, rediscovered and rein terp reted  by m odem  nationalist 
intelligentsias. It is from these elem ents of m yth, m em ory, sym bols, and 
trad ition  that m odern  national identities are reconstitu ted  in each generation, 
as the nation becom es m ore inclusive and as its m em bers cope w ith new  
challenges." [Smith, 1999:9]
Fig. 11 Q uit India Procession
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This is w here G andh i's  s treng th  lay.
Public Ceremonies
D uring  the nationalist m ovem ent political struggle w as also fough t th rough  public
ceremonies: satyagrahas, boycotts, hartals, non-cooperation and  civil disobedience 
activities, bonfires of foreign cloths, funerals of nationalists heroes, public  processions and 
dem onstrations, the act of spinning, and  even G andhi's  daily  prayers. Indeed  the w hole 
nationalist m ovem ent w as bu ilt on rituals. In the p rev ious chap ter it w as no ted  tha t 
political ritua ls cover four m ajor functions [Kertzer, 1996:125]: they help  define the 
m ovem ent; confer political legitim acy on its sponsors and on its participan ts (while de- 
legitim ising the established political order), create solidarity  am ong the participants and 
lastly, encourage the construction  of a particu lar political reality. M ost im portan tly  rituals 
p layed  a significant role in  inform ing arid constructing a sense of collectivity [Edensor, 
2001:69] across boundaries irrespective of caste, class, reg ional and  religion divisions. 
Public cerem onies an d  ritua ls of any k ind  (religious, pagan , civic and  political) are 
pow erfu l in strum en ts of in tegration, dram atic expressions of the  values shared  by  the 
com m unity, and  form idable vehicles for the exercise of pow er. R ituals offer un ique 
occasions to assem ble large crow ds and  to rep resen t in  h ighly  com pelling d ram atic form  
the legitim ating ideas of p o w er [be it religious or political] th rough  the em ploym ent of 
pow erfu l sym bols. Flags w ere displayed, songs sung, slogans are raised, and  im ages of 
the leaders are paraded . M oreover, the perform ative po ten tia l of ritua l rests on their 
capacity to 'enact' the nation  as they allow  for statem ents about the  nation  to be p layed 
ou t in the nation-space [Kaur 1998:296].
Partly, nationalist public  cerem onies found  insp iration  in  In d ia 's  trad itional ritual 
culture. In India, trad itions of public cerem onies focussed on three m ain  areas: political, 
religious, and  civic [Freitag 2001]. Of these three, the first tw o h a d  a m ore elaborate ritual 
cu lture th an  tire th ird , w hich  gained  greater im portance only w ith  tire developm ent of 
Ind ia 's  civic society an d  the im pact of British rule. In India there  w as a com plex and 
varied  trad ition  of public  and  collective activities of all sorts. Freitag [1989]'s distinction 
am ong different types of collective activities can be he lp fu l here. Freitag [1989]
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distinguishes betw een  th ree  types of public activities: public  perform ances, usually  
cu ltu ral activities such  as street theatre, m usical perform ances, recitations, and  exegesis of 
religious texts; collective cerem onies, usually  religious processions; and  finally collective 
form s of protest. Collective public  cerem onies -  the  ones th a t in terest u s here  -  becam e 
ideal spaces for confrontation, com petition and  arenas for the  estab lishm ent of pow er 
relations.54 This w as due  to their intrinsic character of being sym bolic and  dram atic 
expression of pow er relations in the  com m unity  and  of com m unity  identity  and 
so lidarity55. It is from  this trad ition  th a t the  nationalist m ovem ent took inspiration.
Political ritua l cu lture found expression in an e laborated  Indo-Islam ic courtly 
cu lture w here
"[V]ision and  the exercise of the gaze becam e connected to royalty. [...] The 
exercise of vision [...] h a d  a transactional quality: p o w er w as bo th  reinforced 
and  acceded and, in the process, partak en  of; goods [...] w ere  exchanged; the 
exercise of the gaze becam e p a rt of an  in tegrative cerem onial process 
em bedded  w ith  m eaning" [Freitag, 2001:41].
Pow er too, w as rep resen ted  visually  th rough  the developm ent of elaborate 
architectural styles, the patronage of religious build ings and  o ther secular cerem onies, 
w hich becam e visual expressions of pow er in  them selves. Ind ian  ru lers of any period  
have alw ays unders to o d  the role and  die im portance of the ritua l and  established 
elaborated  cerem onies (such as durbars, coronations, and  so on) th a t becam e elaborate 
public expressions of p ow er and  displays of authority . For instance, d ie jharokha-i-darsan56,
54 Freitag calls them areas of re-negotiation of power, because it was in these public spaces that 
communities were redefined through collective activities [1989:6].
55 Freitag [1989] notes how Hindu and Muslim collective ceremonies although similar on the 
outlook, differed in several aspects. Hindu festivals were predominantly joyous, laud, colourful 
seasonal celebration overwhelmingly public in characters. On the other hand, Muslim ceremonies 
were mostly occasions for self-denial and mourning and in general private in nature expect for the 
public processional aspect of Muharram.
56 The jharokha-i-darshan was part of a very elaborated court ritual established by Akbar to improve 
the smooth running of the state. Accordingly, the emperor was to appear in public three times 
every day. The jharokha-i-darshan, performed usually in the morning after sunrise, was the ruler's 
first public appearance. This ceremony was both a performance of darsan in the strict Hindu 
ritualistic sense (i.e. whereby the emperor showed himself to his subject to be seen and to see) and
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institu ted  by A kbar him self, com bined state cerem onial w ith  the H in d u  religious ritual 
practice of darsan a im ing at constructing ritual-sym bolic idiom s th ro u g h  w hich and  w ith  
w hich M ughal ru lers could effectively rep resen t au thority  to the Indians.
Besides rituals of authority , religious practices and  relig ious festivals were 
possibly d ie  m ost p o p u lar form  of expression of culture and  identity . Then, as it is now , 
the year w as broken  by a string  of occasions for celebration. Religious and  p agan  festivals 
often took the form  of largely a ttended  public  affairs -  by  M uslim  and  H in d u  alike -  and  
in  general involved  all levels of the com m unity. The Ind ian  m asses w ere also accustom ed 
to a series of dram atic  and  sym bolic representations of die com m unity , of its values and 
belief system s via p o p u lar religious festivals, w hich used  an array  of v isual aids and 
stim uli and  w ere accom panied by otiier v isually  engaging cu ltural perform ances.
Indigenous political culture allow ed space for resistance of au tho rity  and  m ade the 
populace aw are of d iis pow er. M oreover, good com m unication in frastructu res ensured  
the free flow of inform ation. These elem ents (ways of expression of pow er, expressions of 
com m unity  so lidarity  and  identity , and  w ell-established com m unication infrastructures) 
becam e useful d u rin g  die nationalist m ovem ent no tw ith stand ing  die increasing pow er of 
m odern  m eans of com m unications and  die influence of m o d em  technologies and  w ays of 
th inking Tarlo [1996:86] describes G andhi as "die m aster of sym bolism " and  indeed  his 
political style relied  heavily  on die use of sym bolic and  ritua l activities. G andhi's  strength  
lay no t only on his personal charism a and  his capacity of p ioneering  new  ritua l and 
sym bolic system s of com m unication, b u t also on his ability of using  pre-existing symbolic 
constructions, and  em ploying  "a conceptual language w ith in  w h ich  m em bers of p re ­
existing ethnic, linguistic or political com m unities could express a sense of their collective 
being" [Cubitt, 1988:2]. W ith  G andhi, public m eetings resem bled religious congregations 
of p ilgrim s or believers and  w ere im bued  w ith  sacred sym bolism . O ften kirtans (hymns)
a form of open public durbar that allowed the people to have direct access to the ruler. In keeping 
with the Hindu ritual tradition, the emperor showed himself from the balcony or a window of his 
palace to "give darsan", to present himself to the subjects and also to give the public a chance to 
appear before him.
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w ritten  in  the style of trad itional devotional songs w ere sung  by  the a ttendees before the 
speeches w ere given w hile conch shells w ere b low n to call public  m eetings and  dem and 
the audience attention.
H ere, I w ou ld  like to d raw  once again on  G andhi's  sym bolic id iom  and show  how  
this language p rov ided  a p latfo rm  w here the nation  w as staged  an d  a sense of collectivity 
built. To illustrate  these points, I take into consideration G andh i's  salt m arch. O n  12 
M arch 1930 G andhi set off on  a 240-miles m arch w ith  the in ten tion  of m aking  salt from  
the sea on his arrival. The in ten tion  of h is m arch w as at the sam e tim e sim ple and 
ingenious. Tire British m onopoly  o n  tire salt tax in  India d ic ta ted  th a t the sale or 
p roduction  of salt by anyone b u t tire British governm ent w as a crim inal offence 
punishable  by law  [Ashe 1968:301], G andhi chose the salt tax as the focal po in t of his 
satyagraha because it w as a sym bol of British injustice and  because in  its sim plicity it w as 
also an item  to w hich anybody could relate. W ith  regard  to this, Tarlo [1996:85] poin ts ou t 
how  G andhi's  choice of 'innocen t objects' as political sym bols w as indeed  very  shrew d as 
this w ou ld  inevitably  po rtray  any a ttem pt by tire British au thorities to suppress them  
extrem ely d isproportionate , hr tire tw enty-three days th a t took G andhi and  his party  of 
tru sted  volunteers to go from  Sabarm ati to D andi, the m arch  s topped  at one village in the 
m orn ing  and  at ano ther in the evening. W henever he s topped , G andhi took the 
oppo rtun ity  to p reach  and  educated  the m asses on the m eaning  of satyagraha  and on the 
goal of the nationalist m ovem ent, sp read ing  tire m essage of szvaraj and  giving instructions 
for tire non-cooperation  cam paign  tha t he h ad  set in  m otion. C row ds th ronged  tire villages 
w here the m arch  stopped  and  lined  u p  the rou te  w here it passed  show ering tire 
satyagrahis w ith  flow ers, coins, currency notes, and kum hum57. W hen G andhi eventually  
reached  D andi, he  boiled  salt o u t of the seaw ater cerem onially b reak ing  tire salt law s, and 
exclaim ed: "W ith this, I am  shaking tire foundation  of the British Em pire". H e vigorously 
advised  people  to m ake salt freely as the  "ancestors used  to" an d  w hen  n o t engaged  in 
this w ork  to actively devote them selves to  a v igorous p ro p ag an d a  for the boycott of 
foreign cloth and  the use  of khadi. The day w hen  the salt law s w ere b roken  began a week
57 The Tribune, 14 March 1930
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of non-cooperation  and  civil disobedience th roughou t the country. Salt law s w ere broken 
by five m illion peop le  at over five thousand  m eetings. By tire end  of A pril the British had  
incarcerated over sixty thousands protesters. G andhi h im self w as eventually  arrested  on 4 
M ay.
G andhi's  salt m arch  w as a pow erfu l rite of resistance, w hich p rov ided  the basis for 
the delegitim ation of British colonial pow er. M oreover the m arch  w as an excellent m eans 
of m ass m obilisation. H is daily prayers and  m eetings, his in terv iew s w ith  the national 
p ress and  his w ritings for Young India and  N avajivan, w hich he com piled  regularly, 
con tribu ted  to m ake tire m asses aw are of swaraj, and  of tire goals of the nationalist 
m ovem ent. The D andi m arch  w as also particularly  effective in  creating a sense of 
collectivity and  solidarity. It d id  so in  tw o ways, hr a m ore superficial w ay, this w as 
achieved by tire participa tion  in  the m arch  by  a large num ber of peop le  th a t created the 
im pression of belonging to a larger com m unity. H ow ever, the  sam e effect w as 
accom plished by the organisation  of sim ultaneous rites of civil disobedience tha t w ere 
carried  ou t in  a num ber of places around  tire country. The participa tion  in  sim ilar acts of 
p ro test th ro u g h o u t the  country  a t the sam e tim e contribu ted  to the feeling of a sense of 
na tional un ity  and  of solidarity. D espite a lack of na tional coordination, scattered 
Congress p a rty  headquarte rs  still m anaged  to m ake Indians feel p a rt  of the sam e political 
force by the enactm ent of the sam e sym bolic actions w hich involved  dem onstrations, 
boycotts, salt-m aking, courting arrest, various m eans of non-v io len t p ro test and  w hich 
incorporated  com m on slogans, songs and uniform s. By staging sim ilar rituals at the sam e 
tim e "different g roups asserted  their iden tity  as p a rt of a larger association" [Kertzer 
1988:24].
G andhi w as n o t tire only one w ho m ade use of trad itional public  cerem onies and 
p ioneered  novel ritua l form s. Before him , Bal G angadhar Tilak, the leader of tire 
extrem ists, recognised the im portance of using  popular, fam iliar and  established 
cerem onies and  trad itions to in troduce political m essages to the m asses. H is intentions 
w ere to use  a p o p u lar religious festival for the dissem ination of political ideas am ong tire 
uneducated  u rb an  and  ru ra l m asses.
107
"W hy sh o u ld n 't w e convert the large religious festivals into m ass political 
rallies? W ill it n o t be possible for political activities to  en ter the hum blest 
cottages of die villages th rough  such m eans? W ill it n o t be possible to m ake 
available to ou r illiterate coun trym en  in  the villages the  m oral and  religious 
education  w hich  you  [the educated  people] have  obtained  after strenuous 
efforts" [Kesari, Septem ber 8,1896, cited in C ashm an 1975:79]
Tilak assiduously  cam paigned  for die revival of tw o im portan t festivals: the 
G anapati utsava  and  the Shivaji festival. In d ie Shivaji and  G anapati festivals case, Tilak 
surely  and  consciously picked tw o of the m ost popu lar characters, am ong the reservoir of 
shared  m yths and  sym bols, to bring  the people togetiier. Beside being  excellent vehicles 
for die d issem ination  of political ideas, it w as festivals like these th a t could "prove an 
incentive to the legitim ate am bitions of a people w ith  a great historic p a s t... They are an 
an tido te  to vague despair. They serve like m anure  to the seeds of en thusiasm  and  die 
sp irit of nationality" [Tilak quo ted  in  Ghose, 1922:70].
The politicisation of a religious festival and  of religious sym bols in  India w as quite 
problem atic as it could  exacerbate the delicate balance of in tercom m unal relations. 
A lthough  in  general nationalist leaders w ere com m itted  to secularism , "m any (...) 
believed drat religion could serve a political pu rpose" . [Cashm an, 1970:347]. The rationale 
beh ind  it w as drat trad ition  -  in  dris case H in d u  religious trad ition  -  could becom e an 
effective m eans for sp read ing  national cu lture and  create a sense of na tional identity, thus 
partly  encouraging  the p ropagation  of m odernity . O n the contrary, the use of the 
G anapati festival succeeded only to a certain  extent in sp read ing  the ideas of the 
Congress. By the tu rn  of the century, it certainly m anaged  to alienate o ther religious 
com m unities and  the secular-m inded  people [Basu e t al 1993:4 an d  C ashm an 1970]. Form s 
of p ro test of the Ind ian  nationalist m ovem ent w ere n o t only codified th rough  official 
cerem onies b u t w ere also enacted th rough  spontaneous public  rituals. Funerals of 
freedom  fighters w ere such rituals and  becam e pow erfu l political device of opposition. 
K ertzer invites u s  to see these form s of national p ro tes t n o t sim ply as a safety valve w hose 
perform ance w as allow ed by the regim e to allow  people to express tiieir anger. O n the 
contrary,
"[I]n the absence of pre-existing form s of national political organization, and
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given  the governm ent's  repression  of m ore direct a ttem pts to organize such 
national pro test, m uch  less revolt, the funerals allow  a national leadership  to 
arise, and  they  create a com m on identity , bu ild ing  a b ro ad e r an tigovernm ent 
solidarity . They also help create an  alternative conception of a fu tu re  political 
universe, and  they instil strong  em otions of resistance to the 
governm ent." [Kertzer 1988:171-172]
The public  funeral of Jatindra N ad i Das, one of B hagat S ingh 's com rades in  the 
Lahore C onspiracy case, w as such an occasion. Jatindra N ath  Das, w ho  had  joined Bhagat 
Singh in  h is h u n g er strike to dem and  better facilities in jail58, d ied  in  Septem ber 1929. 
U pon  his request59 h is body  w as p a rad ed  th rough  the streets of Lahore before being  taken 
back to Calcutta. The procession head ed  by  p rom inen t nationalist leaders, snaked  its w ay 
th rough  L ahore 's sym bolic centres -  Lytton Road, A narkali, Lahore Gate, P apar M andi, 
M acchi H atta , R ang M ahal, D abbi Bazar and  old Kotwali. It reached  D elhi Gate in the 
early evening and  d iere a w ell-a ttended  public m eeting w as he ld  w here rich tribu tes w ere 
pa id  in hon o u r of Das. The body  w as then  taken  to the N au lakha  police station w ere it 
w as p laced in  a coffin and  then  carried to die railw ay station -  w here  d iousands of people 
h ad  already gathered  -  for its last journey  to Calcutta60. A ltiiough being  an im prom ptu  
public ritual, D as' funeral w as neverdieless an im portan t public cerem ony of resistance to 
autiiority  and  a public  sta tem ent of national identity. Das w an ted  to die no t as a Bengali 
b u t as an Ind ian  [Deol 1969:65] and  his civic funeral cerem ony -  as a tem porary  takeover 
of the city of L ahore -  w as a sym bolical enactm ent of die Ind ian  nation.
In sum , public  rituals w ere pow erfu l sym bolic strategies of the  Ind ian  nationalist 
m ovem ent. W hilst in  their participative n a tu re  tiiey allow ed for a sp irit of un ity  and 
com m union  to arise, public  ritua ls w ere also form idable m eans of political agitation and
58 Bhagat Singh's demands were: "1. special diet (including milk, ghee, rice, curd, etc).2.No forcible 
labour. 3. Toilet requisites (soap, oil, shaving-kit etc). 4. Literature of all kinds (history, economics, 
political science, poetry, drama, fiction, newspapers, etc.)." [Home Department (Political), 
Government of India, 1930, File no. 244 K.W. 1959 and Imperial Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. IV, 
no. 9, Move for Adjournment Speech of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, page 3. Cited in Deol 
[1969].
59 Apparently before dying Dass expressed his desire that his funerals be not in the "orthodox 
Bengali fashion" [Deol 1969:65].
60 This account is based on Deol [1969].
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anti-colonial resistance.
Concluding Remarks
In  th is chapter, I focused on the sym bolic code of the nationalist m ovem ent in  p re ­
in dependen t India. It w as no ted  th a t the im portance of sym bolic constructs depended  
prim arily  on their being  necessary  m eans no t only for the  im agination  of the  nation  b u t 
also as in strum en ts of anti-colonial resistance and  m obilisation. The m ain  po in t arising 
from  this chap ter is th a t the appeal of the sym bolic id iom  of Ind ian  nationalism  h inged  on 
pre-existing m odes of expression and  of resistance to authority . A nother no tab le po in t 
that w as m ade and  w hich is strictly rela ted  to d ie prev ious one w as d iat this symbolic 
reperto ire w as also characterised by die presence of potentially  divisive sym bols. This 
tendency to divisiveness usually  on the lines of religious trad itions w as furtherm ore 
exacerbated by  die w idesp read  belief am ongst d ie leaders of the necessity of using  
religious sym bols to m obilise die m asses61. This instrum enta l theory  of nationalism  rests 
up o n  the belief tiiat ethnic and national identities are tools in  the h an d s  of the elites 
strugg ling  am ong each o thers for political pow er and  control of econom ic resources 
[Brass, 1991:15]. It w as eventually  established d ia t sym bolic na tional constructions are 
partly  retrieved  from  existing ethnic trad itions and  partly  fabricated, m an ipu la ted  or 
sim ply re-adap ted  by  d ie  nationalist elites.
O n die w hole die character of the nationalist sym bolism  w as m ostly  traditional: 
the nationalist m ovem en t em ployed  a fam iliar reperto ire  of im ages an d  of style of 
representations. H ow ever, w hile the form ats w ere traditional, d ie  conten t w as novel and 
the fam iliar im agery w as often charged w ith  new  m eanings. G andh i's  sym bolic idiom  
epitom ised this syndiesis. This v ib ran t and  lively tradition , w hich used  the vocabulary 
and  g ram m ar of p o p u lar idiom s, w as to be largely d iscarded  w ith  the com ing of 
independence. A  new  national sym bolic language, shorn  of its relig ious connotations and 
also of its vitality, w as to dom inate  Ind ia 's  post-colonial history.
61 With regards to Tilak's Ganapati utsav and Shivaji's festivals, Kaur [2003] contends that this 
tendency partly derived also from the necessity of propagating political ideas without incurring 
British censorship. Because of the British policy of non interference in religious affairs, such 
festivals were ideal means for the propagation of the nationalist cause.
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CHAPTER 3 
Creating Unity, Creating Indianness
The p rev ious chapter focussed on  the sym bolic constructions of the 
nationalist m ovem en t bo th  as tools for the im agination of the  em erging Indian  
nation  and  of resistance to authority . It w as no ted  how  the sym bolic reperto ire  that 
em erged  w as constitu ted  by  a fam iliar inventory  of im ages and  represen tations th a t 
rested  on pre-colonial ind igenous m odes of expression and  resistance and  w as 
steeped  in  dom inan t religious idiom s. This chapter w ill look at the w ays in  which, at 
the tim e of independence, the Ind ian  nation  w as m ade  visible th ro u g h  a sum  of new  
sym bolic form s and  official narratives, hr this chapter I w ill argue tha t 
independence  b ro u g h t a series of changes to the sym bolic articulations of the 
narra tives of na tional identity . First, the sym bolic reperto ire  of in d ep en d en t India 
w as no t an in strum en t of resistance to authority . O n the contrary, it w as a tool for 
the  su p p o rt of the existing regim e. Indeed, independence and, m ost im portan tly , the 
creation of a new  state requ ired  a consistent and  legitim ating sym bolical appara tus 
capable of instilling a feeling of un ity  and  of national identity . For tire first tim e, the 
state m ain ta ined  official control over the  im agery of na tionhood , w hich  resu lted  in  a 
m uch  m ore coord inated  and  bureaucratically  com plex p ro p ag a n d a 1 m achine. 
Secorrd, the sym bolic reperto ire  w as p a rt of a strategy aim ed at educating  the m asses 
in  their new  role as citizeirs of in dependen t India. The instructional p u rpose  of the 
reperto ire  w as a reflection of tire belief in tire task  of the political elites n o t ju st to 
adm in istra te  tire in d ep en d en t state  b u t also to educate. The need  to persuade  and  
m otivate, com m m ricate ideals, know ledge and skills w as a d irec t consequence of tire
1 Here propaganda is not intended as indoctrination and manipulation but it is primarily 
seen as a way of making people aware of the state and encouraging participation in the 
affairs of the nation. It is with these arguments and provisos in mind that I continue to use 
the term propaganda in this chapter as a convenient means with which to describe this type 
of state activity.
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first phase  of developm en t that saw  tire passage from  trad ition  to m odern ity  via 
industria lisa tion , u rban isa tion  and  w esternisation, w hen the em phasis w as on the 
need  for radical change of the social structure  and  on ind iv iduals ' a ttitudes and 
behaviour.
Them atically, the reperto ire  reflected the dom inan t ideology of post­
in d ep en d en t India. Them es of m odernisation, progress, industria lisa tion , reform , 
scientific advance, secularism , egalitarianism , and national self-reliance w ere all 
w ritten  in the v isual narrative of in dependen t India, By rep resen ting  reality as it 
w as and  hum an, ha rm ony  w ith  natu re , by  idealising com m on m en  and  w om en, 
w orkers and  peasants, iconographically the sym bolic reperto ire  of post­
independence Ind ia  w as rem iniscent of a type of socialist realism . In  particular, the 
sym bology of p o st-1947 India radically  differed from  the pre-independence 
repertoire. W hereas du ring  the nationalist m ovem ent trad itional idiom s perm eated  
the sym bolic language of pow er and  realism  w as seen as sign of W estern  
dom ination  [Pinney 1995], after independence w estern  iconographical elem ents 
w ere in teg rated  into a design that follow ed the rules of a m ore local v isual semiotic. 
O n the contrary, aesthetic realism  becom es a m ark  of m odern ity  and  a "cu ltu ral 
corollary of the N eh ruv ian  im petus to 'm odern ise ' the nation" [Sircar 1997:113]. 
M oreover, because, according to N ehru ism  -  the dom inan t ideology of the tim e -  
Ind ia  h a d  to  abandon  its parochial and  relig iously-restricted  loyalties, Ind ia 's  
official and  legitim ating sym bolic constructions w ere p a rtly  lifted from  their 
im m ediate  cu ltural environm ent. D espite that all na tionalist m ovem ents -  
N ehru ism  included  -  rely on trad itions to su p p o rt their claim  that tire m odem  
nation-sta te  is no  o ther th an  an ancient com m unity  th a t w as lost and  tha t needs to 
be regained, in  post-independence India a distinction w as m ade betw een bad  
(com m unalism , casteism , sati, bigotry, and  so on) and  good traditions. Shorn of 
cognitive and  em otive potentials, w ith  the passing of tim e, these sym bols w ere to 
becom e em pty  represen tations and  bare signs.
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To im prove our u n ders tand ing  of ho w  and  w hy  a particu lar sym bolic 
system  em erged  in  post-independen t India, this chapter begins by  focusing on tire 
historical background  of the foundation  of the new  republic. I then  assess the  
process of social engineering in itia ted  by  the Indian  state in  o rder to create un ity  
and  b ring  developm ent and  progress, analysing in particu la r the  p ropaganda  
strategies th a t susta ined  the post-independence sym bolic reperto ire. The next 
chapter p rov ides a critical evaluation  of the m yths, sym bols and  rituals of the post­
independence national iden tity  m rder tw o separate headings: state sym bolism  and 
sym bolism  p rom oted  by Ind ia 's  public institutions.
Nehru's Rise to Power
D espite m any  differences of opinions am ong the nationalist leaders, a t the
tim e of independence  according to Em bree [1980:134] there existed in India broad 
consensus on the character of a national ideology w hich w as based on four 
principles: nationality  unders tood  in  territorial term s, necessity of social change and 
the du ty  of the governm ent to prom ote it, m ulti-party  dem ocracy and  in ternational 
recognition. India, it w as generally agreed, w ould  be a liberal dem ocracy m odelled  
on W estm inster parliam entary  system  and  based on the p rincip les of equality  before 
the law , universal suffrage and  representative governm ent. This consensus 
no tw ithstand ing , before independence there still existed d iverg ing  visions of India. 
The C ongress itself w as n o t a pa rty  in  the strictest of senses b u t a "forum " w here 
d iverg ing  theories of nationalism  and  com peting m odels of na tionhood  and  identity  
w ere voiced. H ow ever, w ith  the com ing of independence, it w as N eh ru  w ho  in  the 
m ain, shaped  Ind ia 's  national ideology. Jaw aharlal N ehru , w ho before 
independence  w as only one of the m any  faces of the nationalist m ovem ent, becam e 
the first Prim e M inister of Ind ia  and  rem ained  in  office for seventeen  years, till his 
dea th  in  1964. It w as N eh ru 's  acquisition of the levers of pow er th a t fortuitously 
m ade N ehru ism  the w inn ing  ideology, ra ther th an  an ideological victory because 
there d id  n o t exist -  ever ~ b road  consensus over h is idea  of Ind ia  [Khilnani,
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1997:166]. Because pow er relations determ ine the creation of national sym bol, 
C ohen [1973] contends th a t sym bols are direct reflections of dom inan t ideological 
form ation. C onsequently , I w ou ld  argue tha t N ehru  becam e the 'signifying agent', 
or Y oung's term inology the 'cu ltu ra l en trep reneur' [Young 1976, quoted  in  San 
M artin  2002:99], w ho, selected and  articulated  Ind ia 's  cu ltu ral elem ents that defined 
the national identity .
Nehru's India
If constitu tions m ay be said  to  be autobiographical [H all and  Young 
1997:218], then  Ind ia 's  fundam en ta l values are m ost obviously  visible in  such 
docum ent. The w ord ing  of the  Pream ble of the Indian  C onstitu tion2, as w ell as the 
sections on  fundam en ta l rights and  directive princip les h igh ligh t som e of the 
fundam en ta l values and  gu id ing  principles th a t em erged as epitom es of Indianness 
and  of Ind ian  national identity . The Ind ian  C onstitu tion of 1950 proclaim s India as 
sovereign, socialist, secular, dem ocratic republic. The w ords 'socialist' and  'secular' 
w ere in troduced  in  the Pream ble by the controversial 42nd A m endm ent tha t was 
p u sh ed  th ro u g h  by Ind ira  G andhi in  1976. H ow ever, bo th  the colonial experience 
and  the nationalist m ovem ent reinforced the belief th a t the only effective system  of 
governm ent respond ing  w ell to tire Ind ian  needs w as a full democracy. 
N evertheless, Ind ia 's  features w ere believed to be natu ra lly  non-conducive to a 
stable dem ocracy: illiteracy, trad itional peasan t society, w id esp read  inequalities, 
low  socio-econom ic developm ent, extrem e sub-centralism s (regional, linguistic, 
religious and  ethnic) w ere all centrifugal forces th a t h a d  to be restrained. It w as 
believed th a t they could create cleavages that risked thw arting  In d ia 's  developm ent
2 The preamble of the Constitutions reads as follows:
"We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign, 
Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, 
economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of 
status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of 
the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; in our constituent assembly this 
twenty-sixth of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this 
Constitution."
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of a tru ly  com petitive regim e. Indeed , dem ocracy in  India is b u ilt on  tire value of 
non-d iscrim ination  [art. 15(1)] to dism antle  tire system  of d iscrim ination  of the caste- 
system  and  p re-em p t the  risk  of religious discrim ination after the  atrocious events 
of partition  of India and  Pakistan3.
Im portan t for ou r s tudy  is also the fact th a t the Ind ian  C onstitu tion  is a 
reflection of the ideology of territorial nationalism . Art. 5 of tire Ind ian  C onstitu tion 
clearly defines citizenship in  territorial term s and  states th a t "every  person  w ho has 
his dom icile in  the  territo ry  of India and  (a) w ho w as bo rn  in  the  territo ry  of India; 
or (b) either of w hose paren ts  w as bo rn  in the territory  of India; or (c) w ho has been 
o rd inarily  residen t in  the  territo ry  of India for no t less th an  five years im m ediately 
p reced ing  such com m encem ent, shall be a citizen of India ." This definition of 
c itizenship in  territo ria l term s successfully transcended  -  w hile recognising it -  the 
m ultid im ensional n a tu re  of Ind ian  cu lture and  created  a no tion  of citizenship w here 
the ind iv idual is linked directly to the state w ithou t the  m ed ia tion  of o ther types of 
associations [S ridharan 2000:314], The fram ers of the  C onstitu tion  w ere indeed  
concerned w ith  prescrib ing  general qualifications for citizenship. It is to the credit of 
the Ind ian  C onstitu tion  th a t Ind ia  does no t create d ifferent classes or categories of 
citizens.
A nother im p o rtan t feature  of independen t India w as the centralisation of 
pow er. D espite  be ing  a federation  of states, and  its com m itm ent to a com petitive 
regim e no tw ithstand ing , the central state w as allow ed to in tervene in  o rder to 
in troduce constitu tional provisions th a t overrode Ind ia 's  extrem e m ulti-p luralism  
and  k ep t in  check its centrifugal forces. The Congress elite led by  N eh ru  set u p  
h igh ly  centralised  state institu tions to ensure  that a strong  centralised  leadersh ip  
could gu ide  Ind ia  th rough  the process of m odernisation. In short, it w as this form  of 
nationalism  th a t guaran teed  the principles of p luralism . As Kaviraj argued:
3 See the Constituent Assembly Debates August 1945.
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"[S]ecularism  p ro v id ed  for a p lu ra lism  of relig ious practices; federalism  
encom passed the p lu ra lism  of regional cultures and  dem ocracy allow ed expression 
of p lu ra l political ideals" [Kaviraj 1995:119],
N eh ru  em braced the principles of civic nationalism  and  strongly  rejected 
religion as the basis for Ind ian  national identity  in  the belief th a t religious (and 
parochial iden tities in  general) stood in  the  w ay of Ind ia 's  fu tu re  developm ent and 
m odern isation . O nly the transcendence of territorial paroch ialism  and  ethnic and  
religious particu larism s could  yield  to som e m easure  of consensual acceptance of 
m em bersh ip  w ith in  the larger civic com m unity  of tire nation . A ccordingly, tire 
Ind ian  national iden tity  could  n o t be culturally  de term ined  as religion, caste, 
ethnicity, language and  cu lture could n o t p rov ide  the basis for tire com m onness of 
all Indians. H e obviously though t tha t Ind ia 's  centrifugal po ten tia ls h ad  to be kep t 
in  check by  the reinforcem ent of the fragile un ity  of India. N eh ru ism  m ade a v irtue 
o u t of a w eakness: extrem e fragm entation, lack of solidarity , and  absence of a 
univocal, political and  cu ltu ral un ity  w ere transform ed into the positive sym bol of 
tolerance and  pliability, as synthesised by the slogan u n ity  in d ive rs ity :
"There are enorm ous differences in  climate, in  w ays of living, and  to 
som e extent, am ong tire people  w ho live in  the n o rth e rn  regions of 
India. A nd  those w ho live in  the south, and  yet w e all know  th a t all 
those diversities and  varieties are ra ther superficial, and  tha t there 
has been, and  is, a very  fundam enta l u n ity  w hich  b inds us all 
together, and  this has n o t been  broken  in  the  p as t even w hen  there 
w ere political divisions in  India. [...] Ind ia  has p rogressed  in the past 
ages, w ith  this d iversity  and  at the sam e tim e w ith  th is fundam enta l 
un ity ."  [SWJN 7:391]
U nity  w as also unders tood  n o t ju st as an "essential deep  g round ing  [...] 
w hich basically has governed  Ind ia 's  outlook" [SWJN 7:391] b u t also as cooperation 
and  solidarity:
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"W e are a great country, a country  w ith  enorm ous variety , a variety 
th a t is good. [...] W e shou ld  keep the variety , b u t th a t varie ty  is only 
good w hen  w e are u n ited  and  there is an  essential u n ity  beh ind  it. 
[...] th a t u n ity  is essential. That u n ity  is n o t a superficial un ity  on the 
m ap  or of som e constitution, b u t the un ity  of h e a rt an d  m ind, w hich 
m akes us feel like a large family, w hich has to be defended, w hich 
has to be w orked  for and w hich w ill lead u s  to co-operate w ith  one 
ano ther."4
Besides subscrib ing to die principles of dem ocracy, state  in tervention, civic 
nationalism , secularism , and  cu ltu ral pluralism , N eh ru 's  idea of Ind ia  sough t to 
com bine values of m odern ity  and  progress. "Progress" -  in tended  bo th  as change 
and  developm en t in  its m ost technical significance an d  as "en ligh tenm ent" for the 
in d iv idual -  becam e of particu lar im portance to N ehruism . To N ehru , these values 
of progress, developm ent and  enlightenm ent becam e m ore im p o rtan t than  the shared  
experience of the past. The p ast w as seen as a starting  poin t, a m o m en t of 
in sp ira tio n  for the  p ro jec tion  of the  n a tio n  in to  the  fu tu re , b u t it w as the fu tu re  
th a t w as full of prom ises. A nd  it w as the shared  experiences of the  Ind ians to be and 
n o t d ie Indians th a t were, d ia t N ehru ism  stressed and  p rom oted . The p a s t w as 
n e v e r  rep re sen te d  as the  p a s t  for p a s t sake, or as an  a p p e a l fo r a re tu rn  to a 
fab led  g o ld en  age. The im p o rtan ce  of the p a s t re s id e d  s im p ly  in  its  re la tio n s  
w ith  the  d isco u rse  of n a tio n a l p ro g ress  an d  d ev e lo p m en t. T his a ttitu d e  to w ard s  
the  p a s t a n d  the  fu tu re  w as reflec ted  in  all c u ltu ra l e n te rp rise s  th a t d e a lt  w ith  
h isto ry : m u seu m s, art, a n d  archaeo logy . W hile on th e  one h a n d  th ey  exa lted  
In d ian  p a s t  h is to ry  a n d  cu ltu ra l tra d itio n s , they  d id  n o t do  it  s im p ly  to ed u cate  
th e  p eo p le  on  the  h is to ry  an d  c u ltu re  of th e ir ow n  c o u n try  b u t  also to in sp ire  
p ro g ress  a n d  in stil se lf-confidence  fo r th e  fu tu re . It w as o b v io u sly  a re te llin g  of 
the  p a s t th a t te n d e d  to w a rd s  the  fu tu re . Ind eed , N e h ru 's  fasc ination  w ith  the  
p a s t w as n o t in  " re a d in g  ab o u t o d d  ev en ts  th a t h a p p e n e d  in  th e  p a s t  b u t  ra th e r  
in  its re la tio n  to th e  th in g s  th a t  led  to the  p resen t. O nly  th en  it becom e [sic] alive
4 "A Broadcast to the Nation" 19 October 1963 in Gopal [1981:335-336].
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to m e". [G opal 1981:498].5 This is e v id e n t for in stance  fro m  th e  series en titled  
"B u ilders  of M o d e m  In d ia" , issu e d  by  one of the  m ed ia  u n its  of the  M in is try  of 
In fo rm a tio n  a n d  B roadcasting . In  its m y tho log ica l re te llin g  of the  b irth  of the  
n a tio n , in  its  n eg lec tin g  of an c ien t h is to ry  and  p red ilec tio n  fo r the  m ost recen t 
n a tio n a lis t m ov em en t, th is  series is ve ry  m u ch  p a r t  of N e h ru v ia n  ideology.
N eh ru  looked essentially to W estern visions of m o dern ity  and  progress. 
Essential p a rt of this vision w as the centrality  of the state in  b ring ing  about rap id  
progress. Being 'a lien ' in  origin, this m odel w as constrained  in  its im plem entation  
by  specific social settings th a t w ere n o t congruen t w ith  W estern  state  m odels. In 
particu lar, the great p lu ra lism  of Ind ia 's  society p layed  a decisive role in  ham pering  
N eh ru 's  vision. N ehru  felt th a t in  th is process the role of the state w as essential. 
Thus, to forge closer links betw een  the political estab lishm ent and  Ind ia 's  civil 
society, the Ind ian  state  h a d  to establish a structure  of obedience and  create a 
d istinct national identity  th ro u g h  the  patronage and  selections of m yths, sym bols, 
and  public  rituals. It is w ith in  this context tha t the Ind ian  state  em barked  on a self- 
conscious effort to construct and  p ropagate  an idea of India. Ind ianness becam e a 
pliable ta rge t of social engineering  gu ided  by a theory of progress.
The Pedagogic Role of the State and the 'Nationalisation of the 
Masses'
N ew  states em erging  from  the  break-up  of the British Em pire n o t only had  
to m anage tire task  of political and  econom ic reform s b u t n eed ed  to develop a 
su itab le na tional ideology capable of im aginatively su p p o rtin g  their achieved 
independence. In  In d ia  in  p a rticu la r, w ith  the decline of the  o lder socio-political 
values and  bonds th a t characterised the British Raj and  tire estab lishm ent of the 
republic, it becam e necessary to insp ire  new  form s of civic loyalty.
5 An Address at the Opening of the National Art Gallery, Madras, 27 November 1951.
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M oreover, the gaining of Independence in  South A sia w as m arked  by the 
terrible experience of Partition, w hen  Pakistan  and  Ind ia  w ere  carved  ou t British 
India. The com m unal rio ts w hich follow ed partition , in  add ition  to M ahatm a 
G andhi's assassination by the h a n d  of a H in d u  fanatic left deep  scars in  India 's early 
h istory, shattering  tire a lready  faltering d ream  of a uncom plicated  H indu/M uslim  
cohabitation, C om m unalism , provincialism , and  narrow -m indedness and  parochial 
attachm ents such  as tire fam ily, caste, or region seem ed to be the  salient shared  traits 
of in d ep en d en t India, none of w hich he lped  in tire process of nation-build ing .
The m ain  goal of Ind ia 's  post-independence policy w as obviously to foster 
industria l ag ricu ltu ral and  econom ic g row th  th rough  state in tervention . H ow ever, 
econom ic regeneration  could n o t be d ivorced from  social developm ent, hr m any 
occasions, N eh ru  m ade  it clear th a t national developm ent w as n o t sim ply  a question 
of econom ic g row th  b u t also of social transform ation  th a t d epended  on the 
developm ent of tire ind iv idual6. H ow ever, a t the tim e of Independence  Indians w ere 
for the  m ost p a rt illiterate peasan ts w ithou t the vote. H ow  could  -  the national elites 
argued  -  they  have a sense of loyalty to tire new ly created state  and  tow ards each 
other? Thus, tire sym bolic system  d rat w as created w as inscribed in  the program m e 
of social engineering, tha t a im ed to define, th rough  the p ropaga tion  of the national 
m yths and  its sym bols and  rituals, Ind ia 's  new  identity.
The m ain  strategy  for change w as identified  w idr education. The new  
education  policy rested  on  the belief th a t Indians could be g radua lly  transform ed -  
th ro u g h  state  in terven tion  -  from  "trad itional Ind ians" and  from  oppressed
6 See for instance: The New India, Progress Through Democracy, 1958:2. Nehru's ideas about 
development were quite common in post-colonial Africa and Asia. According to what 
became to be known as the developmentaiist theory, the pedagogical role of the state in the 
post-colonial world demairded that the state took direct responsibility for the social (as well 
as the economic) development of the nation through heavy investment in education
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subjects, in to  m o d em  citizens. In  this context, education  w as m ean t to be 
u nders to o d  in  its b roadest of m eanings. It m ean t n o t sim ply  schooling and literacy, 
b u t it a im ed a t the political and  civic education  of the m asses. For N eh ru  education 
w as to be considered  crucial in  the process of na tion-bu ild ing  an d  argued  tha t the 
people  of Ind ia  h a d  to becom e "m entally  strong  before [they] can th ink  of bu ild ing  a 
na tion" [SWJN, vol. 5:407]7. Indeed, according to him , the real change m u st have to 
com e "in  the m inds of m en "8 . H e also added:
"In  the p lans for the  rebu ild ing  of the nation , education  has an 
im p o rtan t place, because tha t is the basis for all o ther activities. [...] 
The younger generation  is our future. [...] The w ay their faculties are 
developed  and  m inds m ou lded  w ill m ake or m ar In d ia 's  destiny." 9
M oreover, a correlation w as established betw een  education  (years of 
schooling) and  developm ent -  here  understood  to be m ore th an  the m ere econom ic 
grow th. Therefore, education  could  contribute to increase w orkers ' productiv ity , 
raise farm  or industria l p roduction , popu lation  control, social equity  and  to 
inculcate ideology and  m oral values. The R eport of the E ducation  C om m ission 
(1964-1966) a rgued  th a t the  developm ent of physical resources w ould  no t be 
possible w ith o u t an adequate  developm ent of h u m an  resources w hich  involved 
"changes in  the  know ledge, skills, in terests and  values of the peop le  as a w hole". 
[Singh 1995:2].
The First Five Year P lan  v iew ed  education  essential for the  realization  of the  
general goals set by tire P lan itself. The satisfaction of cu ltu ral needs (in particu lar
7 Speech at the fourteenth Session of the Central Advisory Board of Education, New Delhi 13 
January 1948. From the Hindustan Times, 14 January 1948.
8 "An Address at the All-India Educational Conference", Baradari, 27 December 1939. In 
Gopal [1981:253]
9 "Discipline for Nation Building". Speech at the fourteenth session of the Central Advisory 
Board of Education, New Delhi 13 January 1948. From the Hindustan Times, 14 January 1948. 
In SWJN vol. 5:407
120
the "g row th  of the  creative faculties, increase the capacity  of enjoym ent, and  
develop a sp irit of critical appreciation  of arts, litera tu re  and  other creative 
activities"10) by  tire education  system  w as seen as the last priority . P rim arily  the 
education  system  w as considered im portan t for national developm ent in  tha t it 
determ ined  the quality  of the  h u m an  resources. Education w as m ean t to p repare  
experienced and  suitably  qualified citizens for the specific tasks w hich  the nation 
sets itself. E ducation  w as also considered to be im portan t for na tional developm ent 
in  th a t it p layed  a crucial role in  streng then ing  the dem ocratic system . The Plan 
a rgued  th a t for dem ocracy to function effectively it n eed ed  the "intelligent 
participation  of the  m asses in  the affairs of the coun try"11 w hich education  w as 
believed to bring. Education w as furtherm ore essential to developm en t because it 
increased the  sp irit of cooperation and  a sense of "d iscip lined  citizenship" am ong 
the people. Eventually, the  N ational In tegration Council he ld  in  Srinagar in  1968 
form ally w ou ld  recognise th a t the entire education  system  -  from  p rim ary  to post­
g radua te  level -  shou ld  serve the pu rp o se  of "creating a sense of Indianness, un ity  
and  solidarity , to inculcate faith in  the basic postu lates of Ind ian  dem ocracy and  to 
help  tire na tion  to create a m odern  society"12.
A ccord ing ly , p o s t- in d e p e n d e n t n a tio n a lism  h a d  to  b rin g  education , 
social a n d  econom ic w elfa re  to  th e  illite ra te  m asses. A t the  sam e tim e, it h a d  to 
foster a n d  in cu lca te  in  the  m in d s  of the  peop le  the n e w  id ea  of Ind ia , to p ro m o te  
a n ew  n a tio n a l cu ltu re  a n d  to encou rage  the  p o p u la tio n  to assum e th e ir  n ew  
social id en titie s  as c itizens (an d  n o t subjects) of a d em ocratic  sta te . F u rth e r, the 
s ta te  a im ed  to  in fo rm  the  p eo p le  of th e  e th ical an d  m o ra l v a lu es  it  a d o p te d  th u s
10 First Five Year Plan: 525.
11 Ibid
12 Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of 
Education Central Advisory Board of Education [CABE] 34th Session 1968. 
www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/12/5X/125X0201.htm accessed on 21/02/2006.
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m ak in g  th em  'f lu e n t ' in  the  n ew ly  es tab lished  'c iv il re lig io n '13, w ith  its lexicon, 
rites, an d  sym bols.
Thus, tire construction and  establishm ent of a post-independence  symbolic 
system  m u st be seen as p a rt  of a p rogram m e of nationalisation  of the m asses [Mosse 
1975]14. This p rogram m e of nationalisation  called for a w ell-devised strategy of 
inform ation, or for a strong  p ro p ag an d a  apparatus. N o t on ly  d id  the  sta te  take  
con tro l of the  official im agery  of the  n a tio n  b u t it  a lso so u g h t to  p lay  a la rger 
p a r t  in  reg u la tin g  ev ery d ay  life an d  in  m ak ing  m ore  d e m a n d s  on  p riv a te  
in d iv id u a ls  th an  it ever d id  b e fo re15.
Strategies of Nationalisation
"N ations spend  a great deal of m oney  on sym bols th a t 
are in tended  to  bu ild  m ass su p p o rt for the political 
com m unity, a d iffused su p p o rt expressed through  
national identification, patrio tism , and  pride. Flags, 
official un ifo rm s and  attire, na tiona l holidays, seals of
13 A civil religion is a common set of ideas, rituals and symbols "which relates a man's role as 
citizen and his society's place in space, time and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning" [Coleman: 1970:76]. In modern societies where the cohesive 
coefficient of religious beliefs has gone lost at the expenses of modernisation and 
secularisation, it is the 'cohesive force' that provides an 'overarching sense of unity' in a 
society [Novak 1974]. In modern societies political leaders are thus able to ensure social 
cohesion by establishing a "state-directed religion of good citizenship" based on the 
"dogmas of the existence of God, life after death, reward of just behaviour, punishment of 
transgression, and sanctity of the social contract and the law." [Gehrig 1979:5], The concept 
of civil religion can explain the failure of Nehruvian symbolic repertoire in becoming India's 
civil religion. On this, see Chapter 4.
14 This term was used by Hitler in Mein Kampf. For Hitler the nationalisation of the German 
masses was to be the primary task for the resurrection of the German state. According to 
Mosse [1975] Nazi public festivals, national monuments, political cults, symbols and myths 
were the main instruments for the nationalisation of the German masses and crucial 
elements for the participation of the population in politics. Here this term mainly refers to a 
programme by which the state engages in a process of strengthening of the national attitude 
of the masses through the usage of symbolic resources.
15 Embree [1980:134] identifies in this conviction of the responsibility of the post-colonial 
Government for the amelioration of the Indian masses the major difference between imperial 
and post-imperial rule.
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office, capitol build ings, courthouse, civics courses in 
schools, public cerem onies a n d  funerals -  all are 
sym bolic expression of the political com m unity" 
[N ovak 1974:85].
The aw ak en in g  of an  "aw aren ess  of n a tio n a l o n en ess"  an d  the 
en fo rcem en t of "m o ra l an d  social v a lu e s"16 w ere  at the  b asis  of the  p ro g ram m e 
of social en g in ee rin g  in itia ted  b y  the  In d ia n  sta te . S im ilarly , acco rd ing  to the  
five-year p la n s  -  w h ich  cam e to  successfu lly  ep itom ise  In d ia 's  d rive  to w a rd s  
p ro g re ss  a n d  d e v e lo p m en t -  d e v e lo p m en t w as m ad e  to  d e p e n d  on  the  
p ro m o tio n  of co o p e ra tio n  a n d  of a feeling  of u n ity  th ro u g h  the  fo ste ring  of a 
p ro g ra m m e  of n a tio n a l in teg ra tio n . The subject of th is  e n te rp ris e 17 w as Ind ia  
itself, or b e tte r  the  idea  of In d ia  th a t w as tak ing  sh ap e  in  the  f irs t years  after 
in d ep en d en ce . V alues of secu larism , dem ocracy , p ro g re ss  a n d  the  concep t of 
In d ian n ess  w ere  re p ro d u c e d  in  a v a rie ty  of sym bolic  rep re sen ta tio n s  and  
p rac tices. This sym bolic reperto ire  w as m ade u p  of its official em blem , national 
song and  hym n, flag, cerem onial calendar, m o n u m en ts , effig ies on  coins and  
no tes, a n d  stam ps.
In  assessing  the  sym bolic rep e rto ire  of in d e p e n d e n t In d ia , I w o u ld  like to 
m ake  an  ana ly tica l d is tin c tio n  b e tw e en  tw o  types of sym bolic  d iscou rses  and  
p rac tices  ab o u t the  n a tio n  th a t em erg ed  in  p o s t- in d ep e n d e n c e  In d ia . O n  the  one 
h a n d  w e fin d  a n a tio n a l in v en to ry  of sym bols w hose  re p e r to ire  (national flag, 
n a tio n a l an th em , n a tio n a l em blem , n a tio n a l ca len d ar of official r itu a ls  an d  so 
on) w as m ore  o r less fixed  by  the  en d  of the  50s. T hey  fo rm ed  a stock  of 
sym bolic  reso u rces  th a t  from  here  o n w a rd s  w o u ld  be re fe rre d  to  as s ta te  official
16 Third Five-Year Plan. Quoted in Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource 
Development, Department of Education Central Advisory Board of E d u c a te  [CABE] 34th 
Session 1968.
www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/12/5X/125X0201.htm accessed on 21/02/2006.
17 To denote this new concept and for want of a better term, the First Five Year Plan coined 
the new term 'social education'. [First Five Year Plan, Chapter 33]
123
sym bolic  cap ital. O n  the  o th e r h a n d  the  in s titu tio n a l p ro d u c tio n  of n a tio n a l 
n a rra tiv e s  c o n tr ib u te d  to the  c rea tio n  of In d ia 's  sym bolic  cap ita l. The m edia 
un its  of the  M inistry  of Inform ation and  Broadcasting becam e the m ost im portan t 
m outhpieces of the  state an d  its governm ent. But o ther state agencies and 
institu tions relayed  the ideals and  values of the N eh ruv ian  m odel of na tionhood 
and  their articulations of nationhood  p roduced  com pelling sym bolic vocabularies. 
These sym bolic representations taken  all together conjured u p  an  im age of India, 
w hich  w as the expression of the na tion 's  values, ideals and  w orldview .
In this context it w ou ld  be re levan t to note  that th is phenom enon  w as never 
seen as an excess of state au thority  and  as infringing in d iv id u a l freedom . In general, 
the approp ria tion  of the institu tions by an indigenous dem ocratically  elected elites 
w as seen as p a rt  of the process of independence. The passage from  the im perial- 
foreign control of the local institu tions to an ind igenous governm en t per se m ean t 
th a t the institu tions w ere at the  service of tine nation  and  "belonged" de facto to the 
people. Paradoxically, the official literature, w hile often recognising that, since 
independence, Ind ia  h ad  finally en tered  the age of people Raj, invariab ly  stressed the 
lead ing  role of tine state and  of its institu tions in  instructing  the m asses.
B ut if th e  p ro g ra m m e  w as th e  n a tio n a lisa tio n  of the  m asses, h o w  w ere  
these  sym bolic  co n stru c tio n s  b ro u g h t to  the  peop le?  The In d ia n  sta te  set in  
m o tio n  a p ro p a g a n d a  a p p a ra tu s , financing  a n d  en co u ra g in g  m an y  in stitu tio n s  
th a t d ea lt w ith  d iffe ren t aspec ts  of the  n a tio n a l c u ltu ra l life to  d issem in a te  and  
p o p u la rise  the  id ea ls  of n a tio n h o o d  a n d  of n a tio n a l id en tity . It im p lem en ted  a 
p ro g ra m m e  of activ ities b o th  a t the  cen tral an d  sta te  level. P a r t  of the  sta te  
reso u rces  w as d irec ted  to th e  im p ro v e m e n t of ed u c a tio n a l facilities a t all levels 
w ith  the  co n seq u en t p ro m o tio n  of courses in  In d ian  c iv ilisa tion , cu ltu re  a n d  the 
arts. The s ta te  s tre n g th e n e d  the  lib ra ry  system s an d  its  a rch ives an d  m useum s. 
It p ro m o te d  the  A rchaeo log ica l S urvey  of In d ia  a n d  the  m u ch  y o u n g e r
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A n th ro p o lo g y  S urvey  of Ind ia , w h ich  p lay ed  an  im p o r ta n t ro le  in  in d e p e n d e n t 
In d ia 's  a tte m p t to  co m p re h en d  an d  classify  its d e m o g ra p h ic  p rofile . It also 
es tab lish ed  th re e  n a tio n a l academ ies to  p ro m o te  the  a rts  an d  fac ilita te  d ia logues 
am ong  cu ltu res: S angee t N a tak  A kadem y  (for the  p e rfo rm in g  arts), Sahitya 
A k ad em y  (for lite ra tu re ), an d  L alita  K ala A kadem y  (for the  v isu a l A rts). In 
p a rtic u la r  it w as the  M in istry  of In fo rm a tio n  a n d  B ro ad castin g  w h ich  -  m ore  
th a n  any  o th e r  in s titu tio n  -  w as in v es ted  w ith  th e  ro le  of p ro m o tin g  the 
sym bolic  v o cab u la ry  w ith  w h ich  n o tio n s  of In d ian n ess  w ere  a rticu la ted . The 
Inform ation arid B roadcasting M inistry 's p o s te rs  p u b lic is in g  s ta te  e n te rp rises  
d o tte d  the u rb a n  landscape; n ew sree ls  an d  s lid esh o w s re p o rtin g  abou t n a tio n a l 
an d  in te rn a tio n a l c u rre n t affa irs w ere  b ro ad cas ted  before  fea tu re  film s in  all 
c inem a ha lls  of Ind ia ; v an  u n its  trav e lled  from  v illage  to  v illage  to  in fo rm  the 
ru ra l p o p u la tio n  ab o u t h e a lth  issues a n d  p ro m o te  a g ric u ltu ra l deve lopm en t; 
books an d  p a m p h le ts  w ere  p u b lish e d  a t a ffo rdab le  p rices a n d  p r in te d  in  severa l 
lan g u ag es, w h ile  a d v e rtisem en ts  a p p e a re d  in  the  n a tio n a l a n d  in  the  v e rn acu la r 
p ress. W ith  tim e, all these  p ro p a g a n d a  activ ities -  th is  ev e ry d a y  'f lag g in g s  of 
n a tio n h o o d ' [Billig 1995] -  becam e a co n stan t fea tu re  in  th e  life of o rd in a ry  
Ind ian s . In  sho rt, m ass m ed ia  p lay e d  a crucial ro le  in  th e  p ro g ra m m e  of 
n a tio n a lisa tio n  of the  m asses.
Mass Media and Nation-Building
In  o rd e r  to  d iscuss  th e  p a rtic u la r  ro le of the  M in is try  of In fo rm atio n  and
B roadcasting  in  the  n a tio n a lisa tio n  of In d ian  m asses, it is necessa ry  to consider 
the  ro le  of m ass m ed ia  in  the  post-co lon ia l w orld . In the  1950s, m ass m ed ia , 
besides  be in g  a u se fu l e d u ca tio n a l tool, w ere  be lieved  to p lay  an  essen tia l p a r t  
fo r th e  social an d  econom ic d e v e lo p m en t of th e  na tio n . T he basic p u rpose  of the 
national m edia  w as to p rom ote  national developm ent and  na tiona l integration. This 
basic idea of m edia  as an effective tool to educate the m asses, to create solidarity  
and  forge national iden tity  found  its orig in  in  W orld W ar II an d  the audio-visual 
p ro p ag an d a  for the  m obilisation for the  w ar developed  by  the British and  the
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A m ericans, and  from  the exam ple of nationalist p ro p ag an d a  in  G erm any u n d e r 
N azism  an d  in  Soviet Russia, A ll these events contribu ted  to su p p o rt the  idea that 
m ass com m unication  w as crucial in  the process of creation of a feeling of nationness 
and  national integration. These beliefs w ere also influenced  by  theories of m ass 
com m unication th a t p revailed  at the time. A ccording to Schram m  [1963], one of the 
m ost in fluential m ed ia  theorists of the tim e, in  the develop ing  w orld  m ass m edia 
had  six essential functions: 1. To contribute to the  feeling of nation-ness; 2. To be the 
voice of na tional p lanning; 3. To help  teach necessary skills; 4. To help  to extend the 
effective m arket; 5. To p rep are  people to  p lay their new  parts; 6. To p repare  the 
peop le  to  p lay  their role as a n a tio n  am ong nations. [1963:38-42]
Till the  1970s developm ent com m unications occupied an im portan t place in 
developm ental policies in  the  th ird  w orld . The belief w as strong  th a t inform ation 
m ade available th ro u g h  the use of m ass m edia  could p rom ote  change. Exposure to 
m ass m ed ia  and  to n ew  w ays of th ink ing  w ould  be enough  to generate changes 
necessary for developm ent. In addition, m ass m edia w ou ld  be crucial in p rom oting  
com m unication  betw een the n ew  state and  the citizens, con tribu ting  to the process 
of institu tions bu ild ing . Ignoring  structu ra l factors of u n derdeve lopm en t such as 
social and  institu tional factors, the developm ent com m unication  theory  identified 
the locus of change in  the ind iv idual, w ho  w as therefore believed  to  be ignoran t and  
trad itional and  w ho  -  it w as assum ed -  w ou ld  n o t m eekly  subm it to radical 
changes. The task to persuade, m otivate, inform , com m unicate ideals, know ledge 
and  skills an d  enlist su p p o rt for the m odern isation  an d  industrialisation  
p rogram m e w as thus en tru sted  to the m ass m edia.
T hus, a link  w as e s tab lish ed  b e tw een  d e v e lo p m en t a n d  com m unication , 
to the  e x ten t th a t  it  w as a ssu m ed  the  m o st ad v an ced  an d  w id e sp re a d  the  m edia , 
the  fas te r the  d ev e lo p m en t. The cen tra lity  of the  ro le  of m ass com m un ica tion  
w as fu rth e rm o re  co n so lid a ted  by  o ther d e v e lo p m en t th eo ries  so m u ch  so th a t
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d u rin g  the  1960s, U N ESC O  se t specific  p a ra m ete rs  to  gau g e  m ed ia  s tru c tu re s  in  
dev e lo p in g  coun tries . It com p iled  d e ta iled  rep o rts  on  th e  s ta te  of m ass  m ed ia  in  
d ev e lo p in g  coun tries , in  w h ich  it w as im p lied  th a t  those  c o u n trie s  th a t d id  n o t 
fu lfil the  se t p a ra m e te rs  w ere  b e liev ed  to be u n d e rd e v e lo p e d . M oreover, th is 
d e v e lo p m en ta l th eo ry  en ta iled  th e  n o tio n  th a t m ass m ed ia  w ere  o r sh o u ld  hav e  
been  p rim a rily  a p ub lic  serv ice  ra th e r  th an  a com m erc ial en te rp rise , in  w h ich  
the  exam ple  of the  BBC p la y e d  a c rucial p a rt. T here  w as also  a firm  belief th a t 
the  c u ltu ra l tra n sfo rm a tio n  a n d  d e v e lo p m en t of a co u n try  w as a p rocess th a t 
w as p ro ce e d in g  from  the  top  dow n . A ccord ing ly , m ass m ed ia  h a d  p e r  force to 
be u n d e r  d irec t con tro l of cen tra l g overnm en ts. A lth o u g h  in d iv id u a l en te rp rises  
w ere  e n c o u rag ed  an d  s tim u la ted , th ey  still h a d  to confo rm  w ith  the  b ro ad e r  
fram ew o rk  of n a tio n a l d ev e lo p m en t an d  w ith  the  p ro m o tio n  the  n a tio n a l cause. 
As a re su lt  of th is  a p p ro a c h  the  s ta te  becam e the su p rem e  co n tro lle r  of all m ed ia  
p ro d u c tio n s . A lth o u g h  the  a im  w as to increase  d em o cra tic  su p p o rt for the  
d ev e lo p m en t pro ject, the  m ean s w ere  basica lly  'u n d e rm o c ra tic ' an d  n ea r 
m onopo listic .
In  Ind ia , the  im p o rtan ce  of b o th  m ass  co m m u n ica tio n  for the 
d e v e lo p m en t p ro jec t an d  of s ta te  in te rv en tio n  in  m ed ia  d e v e lo p m en t itse lf w ere  
a lread y  ack n o w led g ed  in  the  F irst F ive-Y ear P lan . The n ecessity  to p lan  for the 
d e v e lo p m en t of co m m u n ica tio n  arose n o t s im p ly  fro m  th e  belief in  the  
cen tra lity  of m ass  m ed ia  as a ca ta ly st for d ev e lo p m en t, b u t  also from  the 
in te n tio n  to p ro d u c e  the  r ig h t k in d  of com m un ica tion  d ev e lo p m en t. T herefore, 
w h ile  its s tra teg ies  an d  p ro g ram m es w ere  m ain ly  a im ed  a t p eo p le 's  
d e v e lo p m en t th ro u g h  ed u ca tio n a l p rog ram m es, the F irst Five-Y ear p lan  also 
im p lied  the  d e v e lo p m en t of the  com m un ica tion  in fra s tru c tu re s  to su p p o rt 
d e v e lo p m en t in  o th e r  secto r of the  econom y18. S ignificantly , the  m ajor th ru s t  of
18 The enthusiasm deriving from the belief in the centrality of the mass media within the 
developmental project were still alive in the eighth Five-Year Plan. However, here a radical
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th e  P lan  w ith  reg a rd s  to co m m un ica tion  an d  m ed ia  d e v e lo p m e n t w ere  to  raise  
the  level of p e o p le ’s consciousness an d  s tep p in g  u p  the  pace  of d eve lopm en t. 
In d eed , m ass  m ed ia  w ere  n o t s im ply  m ean t to  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  genera l 
e d u ca tio n  of th e  illite ra te  m asses on  m atte rs  of ag ricu ltu re , health , fam ily  
p lan n in g , b u t f irs t a n d  fo rem o st to  en ligh ten  the  p eo p le  a b o u t issues th a t w ere  
key  concern  of the  g o v ern m en t, a n d  to  p ro m o te  n a tio n a l in teg ra tio n .
State sponsored  publicity  covered a w ide range of them es and  issues: 
com m unal harm ony, national un ity , ru ra l developm ent, w om en  em pow erm ent, 
erad ication  of un touchability , agriculture, and  cottage industries; h istory, culture, 
con tem porary  events (political and  economical) and  all official governm ent reports 
on its activities and  program m es. In a way, because of the  vastness of the 
subcontinent it w as considered  im portan t to m ake peop le  (also those educated  ones) 
aw are of In d ia 's  regional diversities and  inform  them  abou t the progress of the 
country  and  abou t governm ent's  activities19. M edia  w ere  u se d  to  p ro m o te  In d ia n  
cu ltu re  a n d  crea te  a sense of po litical, c u ltu ra l an d  social u n ity  am ong  the  
n a tio n 's  d isp a ra te  com m unities . A t the  sam e tim e, m ass m ed ia  w ere  u se d  to 
sp eed  u p  the  p ro jec t of n a tio n a l d e v e lo p m en t an d  d ecrease  reg io n a l and  
lin g u is tic  d isc repanc ies, th u s  h o p in g  to  lessen  p a ro ch ia l a ttach m en ts .
shift had occurred. For the first time mass media were specifically designated as promoters 
of human resource development: mass media was not intended anymore for the betterment 
of material welfare, eradication of illiteracy, poverty, diseases and the growth of material 
and agricultural production, but expressively for the growth of human capabilities.
19 R R Diwakar, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, in The Second Year, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Publication Division 1949:121.
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"It is no  good m y com plaining, because it is ou r fau lt if w e 
cannot p u t across to our peop le  the m agn itude  of the w ork  
th a t is being  done in  India a t p r e s e n t ... I am  anxious tha t 
w e shou ld  reach ou r people in  the  villages as w ell as in  the 
tow ns w ith  som e k ind  of a record  of the w ork  that has been 
done and  th a t is going to be done ... I have  come to feel 
m ore and  m ore th a t th a t approach  shou ld  be v isual and 
th ro u g h  docum entary  films. These w ill go fu rther and  w ill 
create a m uch m ore vivid im pression  on  ou r people than  
pam phle ts  and  the like [...] I th ink  o u r Film  D ivision of the 
C entral G overnm ent, our P lann ing  C om m ission and  our 
State G overnm ents, should  co-operate in  pu tting  abou t the 
num erous developm ental activities th a t are going on all 
over the country. This will include n o t only g rea t w orks like 
the D am odar Valley, Bhakra N angal, K irakud, etc., b u t also 
the com m unity  projects and  the n u m ero u s sm aller projects 
and  instances of vo lun tary  labour and  the like in  bu ild ing  
canals, wells, roads, etc. It is n o t enough  to give ju st a 
glim pse of som eth ing  being  done. It shou ld  be a longer and  
m ore educative p icture and it shou ld  be taken  in m obile 
vans to rem ote villages. Of course, it shou ld  be show n in 
ou r cinem as also, b u t I attach m ore im portance to the 
approach  to the  villages. W e shou ld  definitely  aim  now  at 
educating  our village folk th ro u g h  films. By th is m eans also, 
w e shall p roduce  that u n d ers tan d in g  and  en thusiasm  th a t 
we w ish  to develop and, a t the sam e tim e, a certain  u n ity  of
outlook in  ou r na tional p lanning".
[N ehru  1987:251-252]
B orn o u t of the  d e fu n c t D e p a rtm en t of In fo rm a tio n  an d  B roadcasting  of 
the  G o v ern m en t of Ind ia  th a t w as set u p  d u rin g  the  Second W orld  W ar, the 
M in istry  of In fo rm a tio n  an d  B roadcasting  becam e th e  m ain  o rg an  for the  
p ro m o tio n  of g o v e rn m e n t's  ac tiv ities a n d  p lans . The M in is try  of In fo rm atio n  
an d  B ro ad cas tin g 's  m a in  functions  -  as req u ired  by  the  G o v ern m en t of Ind ia  -
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w ere  to  pu b lic ise  G o v ern m en t po lic ies and  ac tiv ities a n d  to  p ro m o te  
in fo rm a tio n  for th e  a d v an cem en t of the  ru ra l  -  m ostly  illite ra te  -  m asses sp read  
over la rge  d istances . The M in istry  took  charge  of the  p ro d u c tio n  and  
d is tr ib u tio n  of d o c u m e n ta ry  film s a n d  new sree ls , of b ro ad cas tin g , of the  
reg is tra tio n  o f n e w sp a p e rs  a n d  of the  ap p ro v a l of film s for exh ib ition20. It 
co m p rised  a n u m b e r  of c o n s titu e n t un its: th e  F ilm  D iv ision  (FD); the
D irec to ra te  of A d v e rtis in g  a n d  V isual P ub lic ity  (DAVP); th e  P ress In fo rm ation  
B ureau  (PIB), the  P u b lica tio n  D iv ision  (PD), the Song a n d  D ram a  D ivision , the  
P ho to  D iv ision , th e  D irec to ra te  of F ield  Pub lic ity , A ll In d ia  R ad io  (AIR), an d  
su b seq u e n tly  D o o rd a rsh an , the  n a tio n a l TV channel.
A w are  of the  lim its  p o sed  by  the  co u n try 's  sheer v as tn ess  an d  m ass 
illite racy  a n d  p o v e rty , com m un ica tion  w as p ro m o ted  w ith  a large  selec tion  of 
m ass m edia : rad io , sh o rt film s an d  new sree l, a d v e rtisem en t, p rin t, and  
exh ib itions, in  a v a rie ty  of lan g u ag es, b o th  n a tio n a l an d  reg io n a l. The fo rm at 
v a ried  from  au d io -v isu a l p u b lic ity  p ro g ram m es, to  th e  less soph is tica ted  
book lets, leafle ts, poste rs , h o a rd in g , ca lendars, p ic tu re  p o s tc a rd s , an d  p ress  
ad v e rtisem en ts . D ue to  the  large  ra te  of illite racy  in  the  co u n try , v isu a l pu b lic ity  
in  the  fo rm  of p r in t  a d v e rtisem en ts  a n d  the  b ro a d c a s t of sh o rt film s an d  
n ew sree ls  becam e th e  m o st sp re a d  m eans of g o v e rn m e n t p u b lic ity  befo re  the 
d iffu sio n  o f te lev ision . It is ca lcu la ted  th a t d u rin g  the  firs t 20 yea rs  of In d ia n  
in d ep e n d e n c e  g o v e rn m e n t a d v e rtis in g  in  In d ia  g rew  by  90%21.
The serv ices of the  In fo rm atio n  an d  B roadcasting  m ed ia  u n its  w ere  re n d e re d  to 
the  v a rio u s  M in istries  an d  D e p a rtm en t of the  C en tra l G overnm en t. A t first, th is  
m ate ria l w as m ain ly  p ro d u c e d  in  E nglish  and  H ind i, b u t  e ffo rts  w ere  m ad e  to 
tra n s la te  it  in  severa l m ajor reg io n a l languages. The publication  of the
20 The Organisation of the Government of India 1958: 296.
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p ro p ag an d a  m ateria l w as und ertak en  by  tire Publication D ivision, w hich p roduced  
(and still does) an  im pressive am oun t of books, pam phlets, an d  journals on behalf of 
various m inistries, in  o rder to p rov ide  reliable inform ation abou t India, its people, 
and  culture, abou t the activities of tire governm ent and  tire p rogress of developm ent 
program m es. The Film s D iv ision  w as in  charge of p ro d u c in g  c inem a slides, 
sho rts , d o cu m en ta ries  a n d  the  w eek ly  new sree ls  re q u ire d  by  the  g o v e rn m en t of 
In d ia  for p u b lic  in fo rm a tio n  a n d  fo r in s tru c tio n a l a n d  c u ltu ra l p u rp o se s . D u rin g  
the  firs t th ree  yea rs  of in d ep en d en ce , the  Film  D iv ision  h a d  p ro d u c e d  over 89 
d o cu m en ta ries  a n d  148 n ew sree ls  in  five lan g u ag es  -  E ng lish , H in d i, Bengali, 
Tam il, a n d  T elugu  -  w h ich  w ere  d is tr ib u te d  th ro u g h  136 c ircu its  to cover 3,000 
c inem as22. P h o to s  w ere  su p p lie d  to all the  M in istries  for th e ir  in te rn a l and  
ex te rn a l p u b lic ity  by  the  P ho to  D iv ision , ano the r in d e p e n d e n t u n it  of the  
M in is try  of In fo rm a tio n  a n d  B roadcasting . The P ho to  D iv ision  also p ro v id e d  
p h o to s  for exh ib ition  a n d  p r in te d  pub lica tion . A n o th e r crucial u n it  of the  
M in is try  w as the  Five-Y ear P lan  P u b lic ity 23. E stab lished  in  1953, it w as the 
la rg e s t ru ra l-o rie n te d  u n it  of the  M in istry  of In fo rm a tio n  a n d  B roadcasting  
w h ich  w o rk ed  as a tw o -w ay  com m un ica tion  m e d iu m  n o t on ly  b rin g in g  
in fo rm a tio n  ab o u t the  p ro g ram m es an d  polic ies of the  g o v e rn m e n t to the  
m asses, m o b ilis in g  p ub lic  o p in io n  an d  ed u ca tin g  the  p eo p le  ab o u t the  v a lu es  of 
secu larism , dem ocracy  an d  dev e lo p m en t, b u t  also k e e p in g  th e  g o v e rn m en t 
in fo rm ed  ab o u t the p e o p le 's  reac tio n  to  its p ro g ram m es a n d  po lic ies  an d  their 
im p lem en ta tio n . As w ith  o th er G o v ern m en t p u b lic ity  en te rp rises , the  Five-Y ear 
P lan  P ub lic ity  u n it  w as c rea ted  on the  a ck n o w led g m en t th a t  "success of the  
P lan  d e p e n d s  to a large  ex ten t on  the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  co o p era tio n  in  its 
im p lem e n ta tio n  sh o w n  by  the  peo p le  [...] U nless a d e q u a te  co o p era tio n  and  
effo rt is fo rth co m in g  the  success of the  P lan  is u n c e rta in  an d  hen ce  the need  for
^Parliamentary Debates, vol. iii, n.4,18th March 1950.
23 In 1959 the organisation was renamed Directorate of Field Publicity.
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specia l p u b lic ity  for the  P lan  an d  its  ob jectives"24. A Song a n d  D ram a D iv ision  
w as c rea ted  in  1954 w ith  th e  specific objective to  ca rry  o u t p la n  p u b lic ity  w ith  
the  u se  of tra d itio n a l an d  folk  form s.
A ll th ese  m ed ia  u n its  p ro d u c e d  an incred ib le  a m o u n t of pub lic ity  
m ate ria l. N ev erth e less , it w as the  DAVP, the  p ro m o tio n a l b ran c h  of the  
In fo rm a tio n  a n d  B roadcasting  M in istry , th a t becam e one  of th e  m o st crucial 
o rg an s for the  d e v e lo p m en t p ro jec t an d  that, m ore  th a n  any  o th er u n it, 
c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  p o p u la r isa tio n  a n d  d issem in a tio n  of th e  id ea ls  a n d  m odels  of 
n a tio n h o o d , tra n s la tin g  th e  G o v ern m en t v iew s an d  goals in  a com pelling  v isu a l 
lan g u ag e . Its m a in  functions in c luded : release  of d isp la y  an d  classified  
ad v e rtisem en ts , p ro d u c tio n  an d  d is tr ib u tio n  of p o s te rs , b ro ad sh e e t, fo lders, 
p a m p h le ts , ca lendars , enam el b o a rd s  a n d  cinem a slides. The D A V P w as also  in 
charge  of th e  p ro d u c tio n  of m o st of th e  m ate ria l re q u ire d  b y  th e  T o u ris t B oard, 
an d  a d v ised  th e  la tte r  re g a rd in g  the  issues to be a d v e rtise d  in  In d ia  an d  ab road . 
In  o th e r w o rd s , the  DA VP w as in  charge  of the  p ro d u c tio n  of th e  im age of Ind ia  
for b o th  in te rn a l a n d  ex te rn a l co nsum ption . By the  en d  of the  '70s the  DAVP 
becam e the  la rg es t ad v e rtis in g  agency  in  the  coun try . A dvertisem ents n o t only 
m ade the p o p u la tio n  aw are of state policies and  goals, b u t augm en ted  p roductiv ity  
w hich  in  tu rn  he lp ed  tire state tow ards developm ent25. The task  of the DAVP in 
prom oting  social and  econom ical change w as particu larly  difficult, as the DAVP 
w as engaged  in  the  p rom otion  of ideas and  services an d  n o t of products. As the 
1964 V idyalankar C om m ittee no ted  this w as "the m ost difficult area of 
com m unication as it deals w ith  attitudes, beliefs, and  values to  bring abou t
24 The Organisation of the Government of India, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 
Bombay, 1958: 305-306.
25 Ibid. See also, page 56: "advertising in our country has been a better catalyst of social and 
economic changes."
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behav ioural changes in  people, 70% of w hom  are un lettered  and  resistan t to any 
c h a n g e /'26
In the  years , the  DA VP h a n d le d  a v a rie ty  of p u b lic ity  cam paigns in  
co nnection  w ith  fam ily  p lan n in g , ru ra l d ev e lo p m en t p ro g ram m es, food  
p ub lic ity , n a tio n a l in te g ra tio n  an d  co m m unal h a rm o n y , defence, econom ic 
policy , en v iro n m en t, literacy , em p lo y m en t, an d  h ea lth . Till the  1970s the DAVP 
w as the only agency in  India equ ipped  w ith  a na tion-w ide  n e tw o rk  of un its  and  
ou tdoor advertising  facilities and  its cam paigns reached m illion  of people th rough  
all m edia. The D A V P u se d  d iffe ren t channels  of co m m u n ica tio n  for its p u rp o ses: 
ad v ertis in g , exh ib ition , o u td o o r p u b lic ity  (d isp lay  of h o a rd in g , k iosks, b u s  
pan e ls , w all p a in tin g s , c inem a slides, a n d  banners), p r in te d  p u b lic ity  (booklets, 
fo lders, p o ste rs , leafle ts, ca lendars, an d  d iaries), a u d io  a n d  v isu a l p ub lic ity  
(spots, qu ick ies, jing les, sp o n so red  p ro g ram m es, sh o rt film s, and  
d o cu m en taries), a n d  m ailin g  of p u b lic ity  m ateria l.
D espite tire crucial role p layed  by tire DAVP, w ith  tire expansion  of radio  
netw orks an d  transm itters, All Ind ia Radio quickly becam e ano ther suitable m eans 
to u sher social change, econom ic uplift, educational p rogress and  cultural 
transform ation27. The rad io  w as seen as suitable to Ind ia  for tire cheap cost of sets 
and  relatively  low  investm ents for p roduction  and  transm ission  of program m es. All 
Ind ia  Radio s ta rted  to b roadcast in  1948. By 1950, AIR ne tw ork  consisted of tw enty- 
one b roadcasting  stations th a t covered a large portion  of India. In  the sam e period, 
the  num ber of dom estic rad io  sets w itnessed  a three-fold  increase. C om m unity  
rad io  sets in ru ra l and  industria l areas and  in  schools num b ered  five thousand  by 
the end  of 1950. Program m es broadcast by  AIR ranged  from  new s reporting, 
educational p rogram m es and  special p rogram m es b roadcasted  for the ru ra l and
26 M inistry of Information and Broadcasting. 1978. Mass Media in India: 114.
27 Parliamentary Debates, vol. iii, n.4,18th March 1950.
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industria l w orkers. P rogram m es tha t offered opportunities to appreciate the cultural 
trad itions of different regions, such as tire very p o p u lar m usical Round-U ps, were 
also strongly  supported . N ew s bulletins w ere broadcast in  tw enty-three different 
languages and  "im portan t events such  as convocations, m ushairas, kavi sammelan, 
openings of exhibitions, independence D ay celebrations" w ere covered regularly  by 
the rad io28.
The Fam ily P lanning Cam paign
A n exam ple of one of the governm ent cam paign can be illustrative here. The 
case stu d y  chosen is the Fam ily P lanning  C am paign launched  in  1968. A lthough  it 
w as launched  several years after N eh ru 's  death29, the Fam ily P lann ing  C am paign is 
still a rem arkable illustration  of the w ays in  w hich m ass m ed ia  w ere considered at 
the service of the developm ent and  m odern isation  p rogram m e in India and  of the 
usage of particu lar sym bols as com m unication tools. M oreover, this cam paign is 
also im portan t for ou r study  in  th a t it show s how  the 'm o d ern ' m essage of the 
Fam ily P lann ing  C am paign  could n o t depend  on trad itional sym bolic 
representations w hich w ere snubbed in  favour of sym bols th a t w ere instead created 
ad  hoc and  tha t conform ed to a particu lar aesthetic style of representation .
The overall objective of the cam paign w as to reduce the b irth  ra te  to 23% by 
1978. The p rog ram m e relied on a diffuse organisational set-up. H ow ever, in  o rder to 
involve tire m asses to participate  to this program m e it w as decided  that it w as 
necessary to launch  a sophisticated publicity  cam paign. Tire m ass com m unication
28 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 1951. Since Independence. August 15, 1947 to 
August 15, 1951:125. Later on television will supplant the radio in this educational role. 
However, although programmes started in Delhi in 1959, there was hardly any progress in 
terms of hardware development and software production for the next twelve years. It is in 
1972 that the inauguration of the second station in Bombay took place. But it is only with the 
advent of colour on the occasion of the Asian Games, that television expansion became 
remarkable.
29 Nehru died on 27 May 1964.
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cam paign  for th is p rogram m e th a t w as eventually  devised  h a d  to take into 
consideration  several things. First, to be effective, it h a d  to take into consideration 
its target audience: the rural, alm ost totally illiterate popu lation . Second, due  to the 
lack of adequate  infrastructures, it  w as decided no t to rely  on the use  of the 
"m o d em  m edia" (press, radio, cinem a slides, films, m obile vans and p rin ted  
m aterial in  general30), b u t to conduct the cam paign using  "older, existing m ed ia"31. 
This m ean t to em ploy  ou tdoor publicity  a t its fullest: b illboards, posters, handou ts, 
m atchboxes, banners, shopp ing  bags, m agazines and  new spapers, pocket calendars, 
official civil registers, buses, rickshaw s, large enam elled signs for steam  locom otive 
and  railroad  crossing th ro u g h o u t India, and  m urals w ere all selected to carry the 
m essage of the  fam ily p lann ing  cam paign. It w as decided  to use  a consistent 
m essage: a d irect exhorta tion  to have a specific num ber of ch ildren  ("£/c, do, tin  -  
bas/" "One, tw o, three, th a t's  enough"), and  to p resen t th is m essage in  the  sam e 
form  to all m ed ia  for consistency, to keep the m essage alw ays sim ple an d  n o t -  
in terestingly  -  to pub lish  anyth ing  in  English. Thus, v isually  the  basic m essage 
p resen ted  the sty lised  front-view  faces of a sm iling m other and  father, a son and  a 
daughter. The m essage, in  w ords th a t no  Indian could  fail to un d ers tan d , said 
sim ply: 'T w o or three ch ildren  are enough '. This caption  w as transla ted  separately 
in  13 languages. M oreover, to give consistency to tire v isual m essage it w as decided 
th a t the colours shou ld  alw ays be the sam e -  b righ t and  attractive -  and  the faces 
d raw n  alw ays in  tire sam e style32.
A song w as also w ritten  by  a p o p u lar songw riter and  sung by a voice 
recognisable by  m ost Indians. A  new  sym bol w as created th a t could  easily identify  
the fam ily p lann ing  program m e, the place and fam ily p lann ing  w orkers. The 
sym bol w as a red  equilateral triangle w ith  the po in t facing d ow nw ard . Tire selection
30 It was estimated that these media would only reach 20% of the entire population, usually 
urban or semi urban, where the need for intensive campaign was less felt.
31 Yojana, September 15,1968 page:18.
32 Yojana, September 15, 1968, p.19.
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of a sym bol for the  fam ily p lann ing  cam paign w as arduous. The cam paigners had  to 
find  a sign th a t h ad  no  other p rio r associated m eanings and  connotations, so th a t it 
could quickly be invested  its distinctive new  m eaning -  th a t one of fam ily p lann ing  
and  possibly the w hole concept of lim iting ch ildren  to tw o or three. The search w as 
for a sign w ith  such  a design  to m ake it capable to convey d ie  m ean ing  by itself -  
like the Red Cross -  and  th a t it could  be w ithou t associations w ith  any religious or 
regional traditions. The red  triangle w as though  to be an excellent device to 
visualise and  rep resen t no th ing  except the issue it m ean t to be associated w ith  in  the 
public  eye: fam ily p lanning . The problem s faced by  the DAVP in  its search for an 
effective sym bol to associate w ith  the Fam ily P lanning  C am paign  partly  recalls die 
experience of the Election Com m ission in  d raw ing  u p  the  list of app roved  electoral 
sym bols. F rank W ilder, the Ford Foundation  C onsultan t to the  G overnm ent of India 
in  M ass C om m unication  for Fam ily Planning, aptly  no ted  in  develop ing  countries a 
sym bol h a d  to satisfy certain requirem ents: it h a d  to be distinctive, easily 
reproducib le  and  m ost im portan tly  open  to  be verbalised in  various lan g u a g e s33.
Sim ilarly, artists w orking for the DAVP w ho designed  the cam paign 
advertisem ents, w ere encouraged  to p roduce  a very  sim ple m essage. This w as 
usually  obtained  by  d raw ing  in  m in im um  lines, avoid ing  too m any  details and  any 
distinct regional touch. Indeed, the  narra tive  in tent of this sym bolism  (its concern 
w ith  legibility and  clarity of v isual com prehension, and  its g rea t stereo typisation  to 
p resen t the  objects by  their m ore easily recognisable aspect) is characteristic of 
N eh ruv ian  im agery. Even a cursory  look at several pub lished  m aterial, 
governm enta l advertisem ents, election sym bols, and  o ther decorative im ages in 
official publications, show s a rem arkable sim ilarity in  style. D raw ings w ere 
supposed  to be sim ple characterised by few  strokes and  sim plicity  of lines. It w as 
agreed  th a t “colours shou ld  be b righ t and  m essage in  sans serif. Excessive variations 
of tone and  too m uch  delicacy of pa tte rn  should  be avoided. S tra ight horizontal
33 Yojana, September 15,1968:20-22.
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le ttering  is best. A cartoon type  illustration  using  lines and  m asses of colour w ill be 
m uch  m ore satisfactorily rep roduced  than  a full colour realist h u m an  face.'"34
Stylistically the new  sym bolic capital of the N eh ruv ian  state  to w hich the 
sym bols of the Fam ily P lanning  C am paign can be said  to be illustrative exam ples, 
strived  to efface tradition . R ather than  follow ing the ru les of a localised visual 
sem iotics, the v isual language of post-colonial state com m unication  system  
in teg rated  w estern  conventional iconographic elem ents. M oreover, the refusal to 
use regionally  specific v isual id iom s shou ld  also po in t to the fact th a t the Ind ian  
state n o t m erely  w an ted  to be understood , b u t also to im pose on all Ind ians a 
un iform  national p a tte rn  of v isualizing the subject. The cam paign 's  objective w as 
n o t m erely  intelligibility b u t also pedagogical.
C oncluding Remarks
This chap ter focussed on the process of na tion-m aking  in  post-colonial India.
It show ed  how  Ind ia 's  postcolonial state undertook  in earnest the w ork  of 
p roducing  and  fostering a sense of national consciousness an d  sen tim ent th rough  
im ages and  sym bols of na tionhood. The chapter also analysed  the  w ays in  w hich 
these im ages and  ideals of na tionhood  w ere com m unicated, d issem inated  and  
im plem ented  th rough  a varie ty  of discursive and non-d iscursive practices. N ation- 
m aking  and  the p roduction  of a sense of national iden tity  in  India w ere expression 
of N eh ruv ian  nationalism . The discourse of identity  accordingly sough t to g round  
the concept of na tionhood  in  a discourse of developm ent, m odern ity  and  progress 
and  p u t the in d iv id u al a t the  centre of this developm ent strategy. In o ther w ords, 
nation-m aking  in  Ind ia  becam e a p rogram m e of social engineering.
S trong sym bolic constructions -  capable of generating  a feeling of un ity  and  
iden tity  w ith  the new  entity  of the nation  and  to keep in check Ind ia 's  centrifugal
34 Mass Media in India 1978:50
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potentials, fissiparous tendencies, and  strong  sub-culturalism s -  becam e p a rt of 
In d ia 's  sym bolic reperto ire. This sym bolic reperto ire  w as p a rt of a legitim ating 
discourse, w hich  depicted  the nation, its leaders, its people, and  its fu ture. It 
rep licated  die official narratives on the basis of w hich die na tion  m ade  its claims to 
legitim acy, and  exhorted  the peop le  to com ply, aim ing at shap ing  their behav iour 
and  tastes. It also p rov ided  Ind ia  w ith  a new  national im age th a t reinforced die 
coun try 's  self-respect and  d ie un ity  am ong its people. It is th ro u g h  the analysis of 
these sym bolic constructions tha t w e m ay u n d ers tan d  how  the nadonal elites 
perceived  the nation , as w ell as how  diey w ished odiers to perceive it. This is die 
topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Dams, Cogwheels and Kisans
"[...] w e shou ld  rem em ber th a t Ind ia does no t 
belong  to any one p a rty  or g roup  of people or caste. 
It does n o t belong to the fo llow ers of any  particu lar 
religion. It is the country  of all, of every religion and 
creed. We have repeated ly  defined  the type of 
freedom  w e desire. In  the  first resolution, w hich I 
m oved  earlier, it has been  said  th a t our freedom  is 
to be shared  equally  by  every  Indian. All Ind ians 
shall have  equal rights, an d  each one of them  is to 
partake  equally  in  th a t freedom . W e shall proceed 
like that. A nd w hosoever tries to be aggressive will 
be  checked by  us. If anyone is oppressed  we shall 
stand  by his side. If w e follow  this p a th  then  we 
shall be able to solve b ig  problem s, b u t if w e 
becom e narrow -m inded  w e shall n o t be able to 
solve them ."1
N ehruv ian  ideology w as based  on  a com bination of nationalism , progress, 
u tilita rian  rationalism  and  m odern ism . These shared collective ideals and  political 
values th a t becam e constituent p a rts  of Ind ia 's  post-colonial na tional identity  w ere 
transla ted  in  a large reperto ire  of sym bols and  sym bolic resources, som e of w hich 
becam e very  popu lar. The im age of India as an im aginative construct [Foster 1997] that 
em erged  w as of an  extrem ely variegated  nation  w hich despite  its inheren t diversities 
w as also u n ited  in  the p u rsu it of progress and  developm ent. This conceptual 
fram ew ork  w as transla ted  in  discursive and  non-discursive practices. The verbal and  
v isual id iom  em ployed  by  the N ehruv ian  state w as ep itom ised  by  im ages of dam s, 
electric pylons, and  heavy industry  w hile w ords such  as progress, developm ent, and  
the adjectives m odern , scientific and  new  dom inated  its rhetoric. As for the im agined
1 Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates 14 August 1947..
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com m unity  of nationals, Ind ians w ere represen ted  as citizens w hereby  com m on 
political participa tion  -  ra ther than  ethnicity or religiosity -  w as the basis of their 
rela tionship  to the state. Because of the  singular pow er of the  state, m uch of this 
d iscourse on nationalism  w as official. State agencies w ere invo lved  in  the p roduction  
of th is particu la r im aginative construct, as the preferred  agents of this discourse.
The p rev ious chap ter exam ined the w ays in  w hich  state  d issem inated  im ages 
and  ideals of nationhood . This chapter instead  focuses on the  h o w  the m eanings and  
values th a t becam e associated w ith  the nation  and  w ith  the claim s about national 
identity  -  th a t w ere articu lated  in  the p ropaganda  activity of the governm ent -  w ere 
transla ted  in to  sym bols of nationalism . In the next section, I w ill first look at the sta te 's 
official sym bolism , to then  tu rn  to assess the sym bolism  p ro m o ted  by  Ind ia 's  m ajor 
institu tions reflecting the analytical distinction m ade  in  die p rev ious chapter betw een 
tw o  types  of co m p lem en tary  sym bolic d iscou rses an d  p rac tices  ab o u t th e  n a tio n  
th a t em erg ed  in  p o s t- in d ep e n d e n c e  Ind ia .
India's O fficial Sym bolism
"O n the day  w hen  peace w as signed  a t Versailles after 
the last w ar, I happened  to be in  Paris. There w as g rea t 
rejoicing everyw here and flags of all nations decorated  
the O pera H ouse. There cam e on  die p latfo rm  a fam ous 
actress w ith  a beautifu l voice, for w hom  die proceedings 
w ere in te rrup ted  w hile she w ra p p e d  ro u n d  herself die 
flag of France. The entire audience rose as one m an  and 
sang w ith  her d ie N ational A ntiiem  of France -  the 
M arseillaise. A n Ind ian  n ea r m e w ith  tears in  his eyes 
tu rned  to m e and  said 'W hen  shall w e have ou r ow n 
Flag?' 'The tim e w ill soon com e', I answ ered, 'W hen  we 
shall have  our ow n Flag and  o u r ow n  A n th e m /"2
Q u o tin g  E aston  [1965] a n d  A lm ond  an d  V erba  [1963], E lder an d  C obb 
[1983] d is tin g u ish  b e tw e en  d iffe ren t categories of p o litica l sym bols. They classify
2 Sarojini Naidu; Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IV, 22 July 1947
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p o litica l sym bols acco rd in g  to  th e  d e fin in g  p ro p e rtie s  of the  p o litica l sy stem  they  
b e long  to. T hey  d is tin g u ish  b e tw een  th ree  categories of sym bols: those  p e rta in in g  
to the  p o litica l com m unity ; sym bols associa ted  w ith  reg im e n o rm s, s tru c tu re s  an d  
roles; a n d  s itu a tio n a l sym bols re la tin g  to  c u rre n t au th o ritie s , n o n -g o v ern m en ta l 
p o litica l ac to rs  an d  po lic ies  an d  po licy  issues [E lder a n d  C obb 1983:36]. The 
ty p o lo g y  th ey  p re se n t is a loosely  h iera rch ica l one. T hus, sym bo ls b e lo n g in g  to the 
p o litica l co m m u n ity  are be liev ed  to  be m ore  inc lu sive  an d  en d u rin g , w hile  
s itu a tio n a l sym bols are  to  be u n d e rs to o d  as be ing  m ore  specific  an d  tra n s ie n t ones. 
The m ore  inc lu sive  the  po litica l sym bols, the h ig h er th e ir  'sym bo lic  w e ig h t'. A 
sy m b o l's  w e ig h t d e p e n d s  on  the  in te n s ity  of its affective o r em o tio n a l com ponen t. 
T hus, those  sym bols b e lo n g in g  to the po litica l co m m u n ity  ten d  to p ossess the  
g rea tes t affective com ponen t. T hese are  w h a t E lder a n d  C obb [1983] call h igher- 
o rd e r  sym bols. S tud ies show  th a t  basic  id en tifica tio n  an d  affective o rien ta tio n s  
to w a rd s  to  su ch  p ro m in e n t sym bols are n o rm ally  acq u ired  early  in  ch ild h o o d  
[E lder an d  C obb 1983:39]. Later, an  in d iv id u a l w ill ten d  to  g ive a d eep er cogn itive  
o rie n ta tio n  to  h is  o r h e r  sym bolic  a ttachm en ts , b u t th e  basic  d isp o s itio n  acqu ired  
in  ch ild h o o d  te n d  to  p e rs is t. T herefore, h ig h er-o rd e r  sym bo ls ten d  to be m ore  
e n d u rin g  th a n  lo w e r-o rd e r  ones. H ow ever, g iven  th a t sym bolic  rep e rto ire s  are 
specific to a po litica l cu ltu re  a t a p a rticu la r  tim e, th is does n o t m ean  th a t over tim e 
lo w e r-o rd er  sym bols can n o t becom e h ig h e r-o rd e r  ones3.
In  th is  section , the  objects of o u r analysis  w ill be  In d ia 's  h ig h e r-o rd e r  
sym bols: its  flag , n a tio n a l em blem  an d  the  cerem o n ia l c a le n d a r  of n a tio n a l 
h o lid ay s  th a t p ro v id e d  occasions to rev ive  In d ia 's  sym bolic  id e n tity  a n d  revam p  
p e o p le 's  sense  of a tta ch m e n t an d  be lo n g in g  to the  n a tio n  th ro u g h  r itu a l action. 
This official sym bolic  a p p a ra tu s  has  -  fo r the  m o st p a r t  -  rem a in e d  u n ch a llen g ed  
d esp ite  the  changes in  In d ia 's  p o litica l p an o ram a . Partly , th is  sym bolic  cap ita l w as
3 Elder and Cobb [1983:40] use the example of situational symbols of authority figures 
(Washington and Lincoln) in America that with time have become higher-order symbols.
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a ca rry o v er fro m  the  p re -in d ep e n d e n c e  p e rio d . H o w ev er, w ith  the  com ing  of 
in d ep e n d e n c e  th is sym bolic rep e rto ire  n e e d ed  to be a lte red  an d  ex p an d ed . A new  
n a tio n a l em blem , flag, a n d  ca len d ar of n a tio n a l h o lid ay s  n e e d e d  to  be qu ick ly  
d ev ised  an d  im p lem en ted . This u rg en cy  can be rea d ily  ap p re c ia te d  if one 
considers  th a t  in  the  im m ed ia te  p o s t- in d ep en d en ce  p e r io d  b a n k n o te s  w ith  the  
im age  of K ing  G eorge VI w ere  still c ircu la tin g 4 an d  th e re  w as  con fusion  as to w h a t 
a n th em  sh o u ld  be  p lay e d  ab ro a d 5 [Fig 1 an d  2].
For those new  nations em erging from  the colonial experience, w ithou t a form er, 
shared  no tion  of na tional identity , it w as difficult to transla te  the  abstract idea of the 
nation  into a sym bolically alive reality. O ften in these cases, pow erfu l sym bolism  and 
rituals w ere p rov ided  by tire religious establishm ent and  its trad itions. But in  societies 
characterised  by  religious p lu ra lism  and  m ulticu lturalism  like Ind ia  w here no  church 
or credo could furn ish  the basic sym bolism  for the na tional com m unity, the 
equivalence of one particu lar religion w ith  civic sym bols and  rites risked  becom ing a 
factor of social division. To create solidarity  and  collective ideals w here com m on 
beliefs or creeds d id  n o t exist, the Ind ian  state h ad  to search for appropria te  symbolic 
s tructu res th a t could  be both  m eaningfu l and  acceptable to m ost of tire Ind ian  
population . In d ia 's  national sym bolism  w as devised in tire years tha t im m ediately
4 While the transition of currency m anagement from colonial to independent India was 
fairly smooth, India retained the m onetary system and the currency and coinage of the 
earlier period till 1950. During this period of transition (1947-1950) the King's portrait and 
the image of a tiger kept to be reproduced on the 1 Rupee coin as well as on banknotes 
[Fig. 1]. However, the incorporation of symbols of sovereignty and indigenous motifs had 
to be chosen. The new design for the 1 Rupee banknote -  which still largely replicated the 
previous ones -  prom inently displayed the Lion Capital of Sarnath, the national emblem of 
India. This emblem was also reproduced on the coins issued on 15th August 1950. 
Significantly, on the reverse of the 1 Rupee coin a sheaf of wheat replaced the Tiger thus 
symbolising not just rural India but a focus on progress and prosperity.
5 On the confusion over the national anthem, see Circular to Governors, 7 March 1948 [SWJN 
5:455], Note to Cabinet, 21 May 1948 [SWJN 6:277], Note to Cabinet 23 May 1948 [SWJN 6:281] 
and Letter to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee 21 June 1948 [SWJN 6:284].
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followed independence and  by the end of 1950s Ind ia 's  sym bolic appara tu s w as all in 
place.
Fig. 1 Rs. 5 and 10 Banknotes w ith King G eorge VI
Fig.2 1949 Rs. 1 Banknote w ith Asoka Capital
Fig. 3 Asoka Capital
The choice of the Sarnath C apital as India 's national em blem  illustrates this 
po in t qu ite  clearly [Fig. 3]. Ind ia 's  national em blem  is the rep roduction  of the Sarnath
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capital of one A soka 's m ost fam ous p illars6. It consists of four (but only three are 
visible) lions seated  back to back on  an  abacus, at the centre of w hich  there is a w heel 
w ith  tw enty-four spokes, w ith  a bu ll on  the righ t and  a horse  on  the left (in reality, the 
anim als are four. In  add ition  to horse  an d  the bull, a lion and  an  e lephan t are also 
depicted  a lte rna ted  w ith  the  24-spoked wheel). The abacus rests on  a lotus-vase. The 
w ords 'Satyam  Eva Jayate' -  T ru th  alone T rium phs, the open ing  w ords of a verse 
extracted  from  the  M undaka  U pan ishad  (III.1.6) -  are inscribed  below  the national 
em blem  in  D evanagari script. Its sym bolism  is quite com plex and  it is bo th  religious 
and  secular. A ccording to  the  religious in terp re ta tion  of its sym bolism , the  four 
anim als are believed  to sym bolise four different periods of the  life of B uddha. The four 
lions su rm oun ting  the  capital instead  rep resen t B u d d h a 's  k ingship  over the four 
w orlds (the lions sym bolising tire four directions: north , south, east and  west). In tire 
secular read ing  of the Sarnath  Capital, the four anim als w ou ld  rep resen t the four 
territories su rro u n d in g  A soka's em pire (the lion is the north , tire e lephan t is the east, 
the bu ll is the  sou th  and  the horse  is tire west). The four lions instead sym bolise 
A soka's ru le  over the four directions. Tire 24-spoked w heel is -  according to this 
in terp re ta tion  -  n o t tire w heel of D harm a b u t the sym bol of ju s t rule.
Indeed , the  choice of the Ind ian  national em blem s is a typical exam ple of a 
m ulticu ltu ra l state  strugg ling  to sym bolically define its new ly  acquired national 
identity . In choosing tire sym bol of tire state, the leaders of Ind ia  tu rn ed  to B uddhist
6 Asoka [273-232 BC] was the emperor of the Mauryan empire. Under his rule, the empire 
stretched from Afghanistan to Bengal and as far south as modern-day Mysore. In later life, 
Asoka converted to Buddhism out of remorse after the battle of Kalinga [254-265 BC] where 
about 100,000 people perished, 150,000 were deported and many more died of other causes. He 
spent the remaining portion of his reign preaching Buddhism and pursuing the policy of non­
violence.
Asoka is credited with having erected a series of columns that have become famous as pillars of 
Asoka. These pillars were dispersed throughout the empire and were carved with 
proclamations of Buddhist teachings, also known as edicts of Asoka, The Sarnath Pillar is 
probably one of the most famous ones. Sarnath is in Uttar Pradesh, north of Varanasi. It was in 
Sarnath that Buddha preached his first sermon in 528 BC after he reached enlightenment.
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sym bolism , ra th e r than  resorting  to the h igh ly  'conflictful' [M ckim M arrio tt 1963], bu t 
very  evocative, H in d u  and  M uslim  cu ltu ral trad itions and  found  insp iration  in the 
B uddh ist em peror Asoka. The decision of using  A soka's em blem s w as n o t entirely 
accidental. They consciously chose the B uddhist em peror A soka m ainly  for his 
characteristics of being  "a m ajor ind igenous ru le r of sp iritua l p retensions w ho 
belonged  to no  caste, n o  em battled  region and  no th rea ten ing  or th rea tened  religion" 
[M ckim M arrio tt 1963:35]7.
It is possible th a t the  Ind ian  intelligentsia of the 1950s app rop ria ted  A soka's 
sym bols of p ow er in  an a ttem pt to find  legitim ation for the n ew  state bo th  in the 
M aurya and  British p ast by  associating India w ith  p rev ious prestig ious leaders and 
historical eras, as "[t]he fact th a t the original lion capital [...] w as erected by Em peror 
A soka (...), invests the Em blem  w ith  h istorical and  sp iritua l significance"8. But A sokan 
sym bolism  w as also em ployed  for the design of the national flag. A  rep roduction  of the 
w heel appearing  on A soka 's Sarnath  C apital is depicted  at the centre of the w hite band  
of the Ind ian  flag rep lacing  the chnrkha of the  p re-independence flag9. The lure of A soka 
as Ind ia 's  "p rem ier na tional hero" and  of its related  B uddh ist influence w as all- 
inclusive: even  N eh ru 's  foreign policy found  insp iration  in  B uddh ism  and in  the  Punch 
Sheeln, the Five Principles, B uddhist ph ilosophy  of peacefu l coexistence. B uddhist 
m otives and  o rnam en ta tion  also insp ired  m odern  architecture (M ckim M arrio tt 1963), 
as the A soka chain of hotels.
A s ta te 's  ce rem on ia l ca len d ar of n a tio n a l h o lid a y s  a lso  p ro v id e s  occasions 
to a rticu la te  the  n a tio n 's  sym bolic id en tity  a n d  fo ste r its p e o p le 's  sense  of
7Of notice is the fact that for the British studying Indian art -  and indeed up to the 1970s circa -  
only the earliest forms of Indian art and in particular Buddhist art were considered worthy of 
appreciation, as, after the decline of Buddhism, Indian art entered a long phase of decadence 
that presumably extended till the modern era.
8 India 1954. A  Reference Annual,1954:40.
9 On the symbolism of the wheel in the national flag see Chapter 1.
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a tta ch m e n t a n d  b e lo n g in g  to  the  n a tio n  th ro u g h  r itu a l action . C erem onies and  
p rocessions w h ile  b e in g  obv ious rite s  of in te g ra tio n  p ro v id e  a sym bolic  d e fin ition  
of id e n tity  an d  d e lim ita tio n  of o n e 's  com m unity . N ational official ho lidays are 
im portan t features in  the life of a nation. They are a recognition and  celebration of the 
nation 's  cu ltu ral trad ition  and  m ost im portan tly  "the m ost obvious and  recognisable 
w ays in  w hich  national iden tity  is perfo rm ed  [...] w h en  the n a tio n  and  its sym bolic 
a ttribu tes are elevated  in  public  d isplay" [Edensor 2002:72], Public national holidays 
rep resen t critical m om ents in  w hich the people celebrate the  n a tion  and  them selves. 
M oreover, na tiona l ho lidays are pow erfu l tools to b ind  the people  together and  to 
m ake them  feel p a rt  of the sam e entity  of the state. H ie  s im ultaneous celebration of the 
sam e festival or state  ho liday  erases regional, linguistic, and  sectarian differences 
instilling a sense of oneness am ong the population . S tudy ing  A m erican civic rituals, 
the  sociologist R obert Bellah [1967] claim ed tha t these ritua l p ractices w ere instances of 
a w ell-institu tionalised  civil religion of w orsh ip  of d ie A m erican  state. A ccording to 
him , M em orial Day, T hanksgiving Day, F ourth  of July, the  celebrations of Veterans 
D ay an d  of the  b ird idays of W ashington and  Lincoln are instances in  the A m erica's 
annual ritua l calendar w hen  d ie  sym bolism  of the nation  gets dram atically  enacted. In 
the w ords of L loyd W arner, diese civic rituals "allow  A m ericans to express com m on 
sentim ents about them selves and  share dieir feelings w id i o thers on set days pre- 
established by  die society for diis very  purpose." [W arner 1974:90].
In  N ovem ber 1952, a C alendar Reform  C om m ittee w as set u p  to create 
un ifo rm ity  am ong the diverse ind igenous lu n ar and  solar calendars. U p to then, in 
Ind ia  there w ere n o t less than  d iirty  calendars differing in  the  era beginning, year- 
beginn ing  and  to som e extent also in  the  m ediod  of tim e reckoning. Som e of the 
calendars w ere  relig ious (Gregorian, Hejira), w hile others w ere  civil b u t of ind igenous 
origin. Because of th is diversity, it w as quite com m on to find  th a t som e of the festivals 
th a t w ere observed  th roughou t the coun try  w ere celebrated in  fact, on  different days
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d epend ing  on alm anacs based  on different m ethods of tim e-calculation. Obviously, 
this d iversity  created a great deal of confusion.
For adm in istra tive pu rposes  and  obvious p ragm atic  reasons, the  Ind ian  state 
requ ired  a un ifo rm  calendric system . M ost im portan tly  though , th is m ultip licity  of 
calendars resu lted  in  inconvenience for die process of un ify ing  the nation. 
A cknow ledging die im p o rtan t role p layed  by public cerem onies to forge a national 
identity , the  C alendar R eform  C om m ittee greeted the creation of a un ifo rm  national 
calendar tiiat w ou ld , "by acting as a social cem enting force, u sh e r  a new  elem ent of 
un ity  in  Ind ia  w hich has becom e politically un ited  after d ie  adven t of independence"10. 
In carrying ou t its task, the C alendar Reform  Com m ittee w as faced by  a significant 
problem : die n ew  calendric system  h ad  to respect, and  equally  rep resen t all different 
religious trad itions of India, w hile avoiding, a t the sam e tim e, the  celebration of one 
particu lar faith  against the  others. The com m ittee subm itted  its rep o rt to the 
G overnm ent of Ind ia  in 1955 and  in  1957 the G overnm ent of Ind ia  eventually  decided 
to adopt, together w itii the  official civic national G regorian  calendar, an all-India 
N ational C alendar based  on the calendar used  by the Saka kings of Ujjain around  the 
tim e of C hrist11.
The C alendar Reform  C om m ittee recognised several types of public holidays. 
There are "G eneral H olidays" (i.e. secular state holidays), H in d u  Religious Festivals, 
C hristian  Religious Festivals and M oham m edan Religious Festivals. W hile these last
10 Calendar Reform - Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Government of India. 1957:5-6.
11 According to this calendar, the year 0 roughly begins on the vernal equinox of 78 AD, dating 
the beginning of the Saka dynasty of Ujjain.
In addition to the Gregorian and Saka calendars, the Calendar Reform Committee also adopted 
a religious calendar called Rashtriya Panchang. This is a luni-solar calendar based on the 
Suryasiddhanta (the first Indian astronomical treatise written around 400 AD). The Rashtriya 
Panchang was established to bring uniformity to the various religious calendar and almanacs 
that -  due to difference in astronomical computations -  could diverge on festival dates even by 
as much as a month.
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th ree categories are self-explanatory, the General H olidays section includes days such 
as N ew  Year's D ay (according to the G regorian C alendar), Ind ian  N ew  Year's Day 
(corresponding to the Spring equinox), and  the four state public  holidays: Republic 
D ay (26 January), M artyrs ' D ay (30 January), Independence  D ay (15 A ugust) and 
M ahatm a G andhi's B irthday (2 October). The fact th a t the Ind ian  state chose three days 
for national celebration is very  significant. A lthough respectful of the need  of tire 
different religious com m unities and  traditions, tire state recognised  the im portance of 
setting  som e days w hen  it w ould  celebrate itself. Indeed, this w as a recognition that 
w hile fixing tire da te  for the celebration of religious festivals such  as H oli o r M uharram  
on a national level m ade it possible to observe these ho lidays sim ultaneously  
th ro u g h o u t tire country  thus instilling a sense of unity , these festive occasions w ere 
indeed  lim ited  to a single religious com m unity. Therefore, w hile  the sim ultaneity  of 
the celebration con tribu ted  to the creation of a feeling of u n ity  -  and  a t the sam e tim e 
encouraged also all to see separate religious g roups as being  p a rt of a single nation  -  
on  the o ther h a n d  it risked  celebrating one religious com m unity  and  n o t the nation. 
Som etim es, it happens th a t even civil cerem onies still bear som e religious flavour or 
are accom panied by  religious celebrations that contribute to tire rooting  of the tem poral 
celebrations w ith in  the age-old trad ition  system . O n tire contrary, the public holidays 
in troduced  by the Ind ian  state  are devoid  of any religious conten t and  are n o t set ou t to 
rival any religious holidays. Therefore, in  India state and  religious holidays are 
separated , b u t n o t m u tually  exclusive. H ow ever, this also m ean t th a t the in troduction  
of new  national custom s, w hich w ere n o t p a rt of the custom ary  public  celebrations and 
religious ritua l traditions, dem anded  special efforts for tire transform ation  of these 
cerem onies from  sterile state rites into deeply felt national celebrations. A nd  for 
In dependen t India this em otional garb w as p rov ided  by  tire sym bolical reperto ire  of 
the nationalist m ovem ent. These Ind ian  public ho lidays all celebrate tire nationalist 
m ovem ent, its m arty rs  and  its u ltim ate  goal: tire Ind ian  state itself.
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National Ceremonies: Republic Day and Independence Day
A brief look a t tw o of In d ia 's  national ho lidays as collective rituals of national
iden tity  is appropria te  here. It is th rough  these rituals th a t w e m ay  u n d ers tan d  how  
national elites and  citizens perceived the nation, as w ell as h o w  they w ished  others to 
perceive it. N ational rites are indeed  im portan t vehicles by  w hich  the state suggests 
and  reinforces its ow n  particu lar version of political reality, w hile  re-affirm ing, in a 
dram atic  form , the im ages and  sym bols that are p a rt of a sta te 's  w orldview . By 
show ing the crow ds the great sym bols of the  nation  (the flag, the national em blem , the 
arm y, its children, its different cultural heritages) and  by creating tire opportun ity  for a 
large crow d to gather, this type of cerem ony usually  has a strong  em otional im pact on 
the people w ho take p a rt in  it, increasing the sense of belonging  and  of identification of 
the ind iv idual to tire g ro u p 12. Public national cerem onies are h igh ly  sym bolical actions 
w here no th ing  is left to tire case: the date, the location, tire sequence of the events and 
the n a tu re  of tire events are all carefully selected and bear g rea t sym bolical w eight.
A brief account of Ind ia 's  first Republic Day opened  this thesis. There tire aim  
w as p rim arily  to focus the a tten tion  on the significance of sym bolic representations in 
politics. H ere, I w ou ld  like to d raw  the a ttention on tire specifics of this particu lar 
public festival and  its role in  the construction of the  sym bolic capital of post-colonial 
India. Ind ia 's  Republic D ay is celebrated on 26 January. It w as on th a t day  in  1950 th a t 
Ind ia  adop ted  tire C onstitu tion  and  becam e de facto  a sovereign dem ocratic Republic. 
The 26th January  also com m em orates another event. It w as on 26th of January  1930 
th a t the people  of India, represen ted  by  the Indian N ational C ongress, took a p ledge to 
w ork  tow ards independence from  tire British and  for estab lishm ent of a sovereign 
republic. Besides pay ing  sym bolic hom age to the C onstitu tion  an d  to the  ideals and  
values it enshrines, the celebration of the Republic Day is also an occasion in  w hich tire 
state d raw s atten tion  to itself and  to its achievem ents.
12 Republic Day Parade broadcasts on All India Radio first and on Doordarshan later became 
particularly popular contributing to the promotion of this feeling of solidarity.
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The Republic D ay national cerem ony w ith  its p a rad e  an d  pagean ts w as b o m  
o u t an in itiative of N eh ru  h im self13, w ith  the aim  of b ring ing  together the g rea t tribal 
an d  ru ra l heritage of India in  N ew  Delhi, to  stress the  them e of u n ity  in  d iversity  and 
to streng then  a sense of na tional identity . A g rand  cerem onial parad e  th a t passes 
th ro u g h  Rajpath, an  im m ensely b road  road  th a t links R ash trapati Bhavan (the 
P residential Palace) to Ind ia  Gate. The m ain  function features an im pressive m ilitary 
p arade  w here all the  various arm y corps are rep resen ted  (the paratroopers, the 
E lephant Corps, the N avy, and  the A ir Force w ith  a spectacular flypast w ith  aircraft in 
various form ations). Tableaux represen ting  the Ind ian  cu ltu ral d iversity  and  India 's 
p rogress and  achievem ents in  various fields follow the m ilitary  parade. These floats 
come from  the d ifferen t regions of India and  every year there is an overarching cultural 
them e th a t d ictates the  style of the floats' displays.
The very  first Republic Day celebrations d id  n o t include a pageant. H ow ever, as 
a publication  of the tim e noted , the inclusion of the cu ltu ral p ag ean t in  the Republic 
D ay procession w as im portan t to p rom ote  and  display Ind ia 's  g rea t cultural w ealth  b u t 
also feelings of belonging and  the them e of un ity  in  diversity:
"so  th a t foreigners and  Indians alike, get an idea of the diverse features of 
Ind ia  and  the unfathom able w ealth  cultivated  and  p reserved  in  the old 
trad itions (...) N o t only th rough  folk dances, b u t as p a rt  of the pagean t of 
India, theses g roups enliven the Republic day  festivities (...) But the 
essential m otive in  this and  all o ther activities p lan n ed  as p a rt of the 
Republic day  rejoicing is to stress the them e of u n ity  desp ite  the  d iversity  as 
the g rea t heritage of India from  tim e im m em orial."14
Besides the  specificities of its ritua l practices, w h a t it also im portan t abou t the 
Republic D ay celebrations is the locale of tire celebrations. W hat is sym bolically
13 Republic of India, 26 fan 1958:27.
14 Ibid.
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significant abou t the  site of this public ritua l is that the Republic D ay takes place in  an 
area of D elhi w hich  w as originally  the site of British pow er in  India. Rajpath is p a rt of 
the  m uch  larger arch itectural com plex th a t is still kn o w n  now ad ay s as L utyens' D elhi15. 
A lthough  the bu ild ings of L utyens' D elhi are sp read  on a vast site, originally this open 
space w as n o t designed  to accom m odate large crow ds for state  cerem onies or 
pageants. L utyens' im pressive architectural com plex could  indeed  have p rov ided  an 
ideal setting  for solem n celebrations, b u t it w as h a rd ly  an  "inclusive" space. O n  the 
contrary, it w as a site of differentiation, w hose p rim ary  function  w as to house pow er, 
and  to instil aw e and  respect. The distance from  the p rev ious sites of M ughal pow er 
and  the a ttem p t to verticality  and  h ierarchy  represen ted  by Raisina H ill w ere in tended  
as m eans to achieve prom inence and  com m and a tte n tio n 16. Significantly, after 
independence, w ith  the transfer of pow er, cam e the 'n a tionalisation ' of th is British site 
of pow er. It w as w ith in  this sp irit of re-appropria tion  of the sites of pow er tha t 
a ttem pts w ere m ade to p rov ide  L utyens' N ew  Delhi w ith sym bols of identification 
w ith  the n ew  national body politics. The nam es of the streets and  of som e of the 
bu ild ings w ere changed  w ith  denom inations that w ere m ean ingfu l to the Delhites.
13 When in 1911 the British announced their intention to transfer the capital from Calcutta to 
Delhi, it was decided to build the new governmental buildings on the virgin grounds south of
the Mughal citadel. Before, the British settlements were located immediately north of Old Delhi 
in what still goes under the name of Civil Lines. New Delhi was therefore designed to celebrate 
the British Empire despite the fact that by the time of its completion (1930s circa) the Empire 
was already challenged by a strong Nationalist movement, which, not content anymore with 
parliamentary reforms, was asking for complete independence.
Lutyens' New Delhi consists of Rajpath (formerly called Kingsway) flanked on either side by 
ornamental ponds, at whose western end lies Rashtrapati Bhavan and the two large Secretariat 
Buildings. Rashtrapati Bhavan and the two Secretariats sit upon a small rise known as Raisina 
Hill. Rashtrapati Bhavan is the centrepiece of New Delhi and was the former residence of the 
Viceroy. It combines Mughal and western architectural styles. On the eastern end lies India 
Gate, a 42-metre high stone arch of triumph.
16 The whole complex of Lutyens' New Delhi is in stark contrast with Mughal Old Delhi, built 
along the river, with its maze of narrow streets and bazaars. In fact, New Delhi was purposely 
built as the imperial site of power and did not intend to fulfil the civic role of a city, as it was 
made clear by the Delhi Town-planning Committee, appointed in 1912 to select a site for the 
new Imperial City. On this, see First Report of the Delhi Toiun Planning Committee on the Choice of a 
Site for the New Imperial Capital, 1913 and the Second Report of the Delhi Town Planning Committee 
on the Choice of a Site for the New Imperial Capital, 1913.
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Thus K ingsw ay becam e Rajpath; the Viceroy Palace, R ash trapati Bhavan; and  so on. 
A ttem pts w ere also m ade  to encourage the use of the vast space for public activities, 
the Republic D ay pa rad e  being one of these17. Thus, R epublic D ay besides being  a 
r itu a l of na tional in tegration  and  a sym bol of dem ocracy, w ith  its cerem onial and 
physical app rop ria tion  of erstw hile British sites of pow er, celebrates also the defeat of 
the  British, and  the triu m p h  of freedom , w hile com m em orating  the victory of the 
peop le  in  establishing a dem ocratic ru le  vis-a-vis the undem ocratic  colonial regim e.
The other national public ho liday  of great sym bolical in terest is Independence 
Day, the  sole Ind ian  festivity  th a t comes close to a celebration of a m ilitary  victory. It is 
celebrated on 15th A ugust, the day  tha t m arked  the end  of the British Em pire and  the 
d ep artu re  of the  British from  the subcontinent. This public  ho liday  is celebrated 
th ro u g h o u t the coun try  but, again, it is in D elhi tha t the  action takes place. The 
Independence  D ay cerem ony is m uch  sim pler than  the Republic D ay Parade and  it 
extends to only one day. N ow adays, on this occasion the P rim e M inister visits the 
sam adhis18 of G andhi, N eh ru  and  Ind ira  G andhi, and, after hav in g  pa id  hom age to 
these leaders for their contribution to the nationalist struggle  and  for their roles in 
in d ependen t India, the  Prim e M inister delivers an  address from  the  ram parts  of the 
Red Fort w here die national flag is raised. If, to a large extent, Republic Day is a 
celebration of the  C onstitu tion and  of the  basic values w hich m ake u p  the foundations 
of die Ind ian  nation  thus requ iring  m ore elaborate rituals, Independence Day 
com m em orates the nationalist m ovem ent, h i its ritua l sequences, it  is a re-enactm ent of 
the  first Independence Day w hen, from  die ram part of die Red Fort, Jaw aharlal N ehru,
17 Even now, the lawns along Rajpath and around India Gate are an elected place of leisure for 
those civil servants seeking refugee from the heat and at sunset by all the Delhites enjoying an 
evening promenade. The area nearest to the Houses of Parliament, known as the Boat Club, has 
since become the elected locus of political activity and of public demonstrations and 
processions [Gupta 1994:264].
18 Samadhi is the place of a funeral pyre.
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after th a t h u n d red s  of U nion Jacks w ere low ered the n igh t before, un fu rled  the Ind ian  
tricolour.
As w ith  the Republic D ay parade, the locale of the  Independence  D ay 
cerem ony is rich  in  sym bolical m eanings and connotations. Both L utyens' D elhi and 
the Red Fort -  once sym bols of im perial subjugation -  have becom e p rim ary  sym bols 
of na tional iden tity  dem arcating  Ind ia 's  nation  space. The Red Fort is located in  the 
h ea rt of O ld D elhi and  it is indeed  tire perfect place from  w hich  to address the crowds: 
it is im posing  in  its architectural struc tu re  and p rov ides an  ideal place for a large 
crow d to gather. But its com plex and  m ultip le  connotations are p erhaps m ore 
em bedded  in  tire h istoric p ast of tire Red Fort than  in its arch itectural structure. Tire 
Fort is associated w ith  tire M ughal p ast and  therefore w ith  an  ind igenous em pire and  
g randeur. This association becam e a source of legitim acy for tire new  nation, a 
legitim acy th a t w as n o t deriv ing  from  the m ore recent British p as t (as for the Republic 
D ay Parade), b u t from  autoch thonous history. The Red Fort h ad  stronger connotations 
em bedded  in  the h isto ry  of the M utiny  and  of the  na tionalis t m ovem ent. A fter the 
M utiny  of 1857, the  British occupied the Fort and  re-inscribed the  site w ith  new  pow er 
sym bols, transform ing  it in to  arm y barracks. They destroyed  m ost of the original 
build ings, rich gardens and  m arble pavilions. H ie  laird scape w as reshaped  (English 
law ns in place of luxurious M ughal gardens) so th a t the  p lace could resem ble a 
nostalgic im age of E ngland19. It w as in  tire Red Fort as the H eadquarte rs  of the British 
A rm y th a t tire trials of the  Ind ian  N ational A rm y officers w ere conducted20. W ith 
Independence, this d isfigured  sym bol of M ughal pow er becam e revitalised  and
19 By razing to the ground and plundering the Fort, the British were to symbolically signify a 
recrudescence of their rule which was de facto sanctioned by the dissolution of the East India 
Company and the transfer of the Indian possessions directly under the British Crown.
20 According to a former freedom fighter C V Varad it was Subhas Chandra Bose's famous call 
to arms (Chalo Delhi Lai Kiln -  Lai Kila Lenge, Tiranga Leherayenge. Quoted in Masselos 1990: 46), 
which prompted the Bombay Provincial Congress Conference to move a resolution on 3 August 
1947 according to which the main independence day celebration be held at the Red Fort (Times 
O f India, 16 August 1987:p.8).
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reconverted  as a tou ris t attraction  and  n o t as a site of p ow er a lthough, in  A ugust 1947, 
N eh ru  sta ted  the in ten tion  to redress the balance by  announcing  th a t " the  historic Red 
Fort w ou ld  be the official H eadquarters  for the N ew  Ind ian  A rm y"21. Thus the Red Fort 
becam e a sym bol of Ind ia 's  g ran d eu r and of its nationalist m ovem en t -  bo th  as the site 
of the M utiny  rebellion and  of d ie Ind ian  N ational A rm y trials. The Red Fort becam e 
p a rt of a w ider post-colonial na tional narra tive  of syncretic nationalism , w hich 
regarded  d ie  M ughal period  as d ie "second Classical Age" in  Ind ian  h istory  (K undra 
and  Bawa 1991: 135). In diis w ay, the Fort established con tinu ity  w ith  die Ind ian  past, 
defin ing the  British Raj as a paren thesis w ith in  the m uch  larger span  of Ind ian  history.
These ritu a l practices articulate the fundam enta l political m y th  detailing the 
origins and  the consecrated political norm s of in d ep en d en t India. The nationalist 
struggle for independence  (dram atically  epitom ised by the physical 'occupation ' of die 
British sites of p ow er -  L utyens' D elhi in  d ie Republic D ay P arade  and  Red Fort on 
Independence Day), dem ocracy, independence, G andhi, u n ity  and  diversity  are som e 
of the sym bols d ia t form  the fabric of Ind ia 's  political m yd i and  th a t -  as K ertzer justly  
notes -  "p rov ide  a w ay to u n d e rs tan d  such abstract political entities as the nation  and  a 
m eans (indeed  the com pulsion) of identify ing w id i them ." [Kertzer 1988:13]. Indeed, 
d ie  d ram atic character of these celebrations contributes to d ie  em otional participation 
of the peop le  and  to d ie galvanisation  of tiieir su p p o rt of the legitim acy of the na tion ­
state. M oreover, tem poral synchronicity  and  them atic un ifo rm ity  of these ritua l 
practices furtiier p rom ote  national un ity  -  a po in t stressed b y  the C alendar Reform  
C om m ittee. Partic ipation  in  the sam e ritua l action at exact the sam e tim e in cities 
th ro u g h o u t the country  gives people the im pression of belonging  to the larger political 
en tity  of the nation.
21 Circular Information and Broadcasting Department, GI, 2 August 1947 in IOR, L/P & J/ 10/136, 
f207.
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Lower-order Sym bols
H igher-order sym bols w ere the  focus of the p rev ious section. H ere, I w ill look
at w h a t E lder and  Cobb [1983] define low er-order sym bols: sym bols perta in ing  to 
regim e norm s, struc tu res and  roles and  som e situational sym bols such as policy and 
policy issues and  governm ental authorities. Low er-order sym bols are less durab le  and 
inclusive th an  h igher-o rder ones and  their sym bolic w eigh t is also considered lighter. 
Therefore low er-order sym bols are the  objects of less in tensive affective orientations 
[Elder and  Cobb 1983:39],
The Ind ian  electoral system  w ith  its choice of system  of voting  and 
estab lishm ent of an  app roved  list of electoral sym bols p rov ides a good exam ple of 
political sym bols of the regim e22. Ind ia 's  electoral system  is an o u tw ard  m anifestation 
of the  com m itm ent of the Ind ian  state to the dem ocratic and  secular principles and  
ideals enshrined  in  the  C onstitu tion. A fter an Election C om m ission w as established in 
1950 for die "superin tendence, d irection  and  control of elections"23, India, like in  m any 
other dem ocratic countries, adop ted  the sym bol system  as its system  of voting. 
H ow ever the sim ilarities w ith  o ther dem ocracies ended  there as Ind ia 's  system  of 
voting  w as characterised  by tw o distinctive features: first, Ind ian  political parties w ere 
n o t entirely  free to choose their electoral sym bols; and  second -  a t least in theory  -  
Ind ian  electoral sym bols w ere n o t m ean t to be represen ta tions of parties ' ideologies. 
O n d ie contrary , according to Ind ia 's  electoral system , electoral sym bols w ere assigned 
to parties and  cand idates from  an  official list d rafted  by  d ie  Election C om m ission itself. 
It appears th a t tiiis id iosyncrasy of d ie Ind ian  electoral system  w as d icta ted  by a 
necessity of the Ind ian  state to in tervene in h is pedagogic  role and  in troduce
22 For a deeper analysis of India's electoral symbols, see Vittorini [2003].
23 See Article 324(1) of the Constitution. The Election Commission of India is responsible for 
regulating the procedures for delimiting electoral constituencies, making electoral rolls, 
appointing returning officers, and devising rules for the nomination of candidates, the conduct 
of the polls and counting of votes and last but not least to supervise the allotment of electoral 
symbols.
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constitu tional provisions to ensure  th a t the electoral m echan ism  -  a fu lfilm ent of 
Ind ia 's  dem ocratic ideals -  w as efficient and  free from  abuse an d  corruption .
In tire beginning, tire Election C om m ission stated  th a t electoral sym bols could 
no t have controversial political or religious significance. Therefore, the Election 
C om m ission d rafted  a list of uncontroversial official signs, from  w hich  em blem s that 
m ay have been  reg ard ed  as overtly  religious or political w ere  system atically  excluded. 
Sym bols em ploying  the  Ind ian  flag, tire na tional colours, the  cow, the  im age of G andhi 
or the  charkha, tire cross, the triden t, tire m onkey, the B uddha, tire swastika  and  the O m  
w ere all ru led  out.
In carrying o u t its task  of regu lating  the uses of electoral sym bols, tw o m ajor 
concerns p reoccup ied  the Election Com m ission: the electoral sym bols to be adop ted  by 
the political parties of Ind ia  h a d  to be of such shape and  fo rm  as to be able to 
contribu te  to the  project of m aking  the election process sim ple for the m asses and  to  be 
uncon troversial and  relatively  free from  em otional significance as to m irro r Ind ia 's  
com m itm ent to tire dem ocratic principles and ideals expressed  in  the Ind ian  
C onstitu tion. The underly ing  ideas b eh ind  this choice w ere th a t the  Ind ian  m asses 
w ere n o t considered  politically m atu re  and  tha t consequently  correct political decisions 
w ere to be m ade only by  rational and  n o t em otional appeal. Thus, the Election 
C om m ission scrupu lously  selected objects that could be intelligible as w ell as 
sym bolically neu tra l to the  m ajority of the population . G iven In d ia 's  dom inating  v isual 
d im ension, w hich  is nonetheless culturally  and m ore specifically religiously-bound, 
the Election C om m ission h a d  to fall back on tire selection of p o p u lar item s and  
creatures. The bicycle, the clock, the elephant, the um brella , the lam p, the star and so 
on becam e com m on electoral and  p a rty  sym bols [Fig 4 -  F irst List of Symbols].
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LIST OF ELECTORAL SYMBOLS USED IN 
THIRD LOK SABHA ELECTIONS -  1961
Fig. 4. 1961 List of Electoral Sym bols
It is clear that a concern for the correct functioning of electoral procedures 
d irected the choice of the Election Com m ission. The aim  of the electoral sym bols w as 
not to 'sym bolise ' the ideology of the candidate  or the party  they w ere representing, 
bu t to sim plify voting procedures for the illiterate m asses. These im ages w ere not 
elem ents for the synthetic evocation of broad  belief system s and  of political doctrines. 
If anything, being bare m arkers, at least in the first years of Ind ia 's  independence, they 
w ere aim ed at m aking a good im pression on the people in o rder to w in their suppo rt 
and sym pathies. That is w hy their intelligibility w as considered param ount. A nd that 
is also the reason w hy in a country  like India, which is still p redom inan tly  agricultural, 
the m ajority of the pictorial representations listed by the Election Com m ission are 
derived  from  the agricultural w orld, especially in the first app roved  list. The two
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yoked bullocks, the  shaft of w hea t and  sickle, the cu ltivator w innow ing  grain, the hu t, 
the p itcher, the cock, the  spade and  stoker, the  cam el and  the e lephan t w ere all objects 
and  creatures th a t p lay  a significant role in the life of the m ajority  of the Indian  
popu lation  in their day-to-day w ork  in  the fields.
Also, the sym bols system  of voting guaran teed  the partic ipa tion  of all sections 
of society in  the dem ocratic process, thus m irroring  the coun try 's  com m itm ent to the 
dem ocratic and  secular ideals expressed in  the pream ble of the Constitution. 
A dherence to these obligations, m ean t tha t the use of religious sym bolism  had  to be 
abandoned  n o t sim ply  as an endorsem ent of Ind ia 's  p ledge  to the  principle of 
secularism  b u t also as dem onstra tion  of the belief tha t trad itional an d  religious cu ltu ral 
alliances stood in  d ie w ay of the coun try 's  advancem ent. The choice of bare  pictorial 
represen tations of everyday  objects devoid  of any em otional significance becam e the 
only available option.
In d ia 's  electoral system  is only one of m any low er-order sym bols of Ind ia 's  
political system . O diers w ill be briefly  considered. Concepts of progress, developm ent, 
m odern ity , dem ocracy and  secularism  w ere also tran sm itted  by a w hole set of state 
institu tions and  policies. For instance, the  Ind ian  A rm y becam e another im portan t 
carrier of N eh ruv ian  ideology. Indeed, N eh ru  w as aw are th a t the  Ind ian  arm y w as 
m oved  by  strong  feelings of com radeship , w here parochial attachm ents to caste, credo 
or fam ily w ere belittled  w hen  confronted to d ie vow  to serve die n a tion  first24. Thus, in 
in dependen t India, die arm y becam e a breeding  g round  for national integration, 
tu rn ing  in to  a visible, living sym bol of w h a t India shou ld  be like: strong, disciplined, 
u n ited  and  in tegrated . Its p rom inen t role in  Ind ia 's  forem ost na tional public ritual -  
Republic D ay P arade  -  fu rther dem onstrates this.
24 Constituent Assembly Debates, 22 July 1947.
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The im agined  nation  w as also sym bolised by  In d ia 's  econom ic planning. The 
Five-Year P lans becam e the sym bol of Ind ia 's  collective endeavour, of progress, 
m odern isation , scientific advancem ent and developm ent. In  particu lar, economic 
p lanning, em phasising  a com m on econom ic life offered the basis for societal unity . 
Econom y has alw ays featured  prom inen tly  in  Ind ia 's  na tionalist discourse perhaps due 
to colonial exploitation. In C hapter 2 it w as show n how , d u rin g  the anti-colonial 
m ovem ent, khadi acquired  an iconic status exposing underly ing  concepts of 
indigenousness, trad itional heritage and  regional diversity. Sim ilarly, the Five-Year 
P lans becam e core sym bols of N ehruv ian  nationalism . The ex ten t of the influence of 
the sym bol of pi a im ed econom y in  independen t India can be appreciated  if one looks 
a t how , for instance, the idiom atic language of econom ic p lan n in g  perm eated  official 
and  com m ercial advertisem ents in  d ie  1950s and  1960s [see later for m ore details].
Econom ic achievem ents and  developing in frastructu res are consistent and  
regu lar features of N ehruv ian  iconography. As D eans argues, exam ining the 
iconography of Taiw anese stam ps:
"These im ages serve to prom ote both  a particu lar v ision of die p ast and  
the fu tu re  w ith  a view  to shap ing  iden tity  as w ell as celebrating the 
success and  v irtue of die leadership , thereby p rom oting  its legitim acy. 
(...) d ie  im pression  carried  is clearly one celebrating (...) m odern ity  and  
technological sophistication" [Deans 2005:25].
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Fig. 5 Indian Post Office Pubblicity for N ational Integration
The use of this im agery both as a vehicle for identity-build ing  and as a 
m echanism  of legitim ation becom es particularly  ev iden t if one analyses the 
com m em orative set of stam ps issued by the Indian Post Office in 195525. The Five-Year
25 Incidentally, the Indian Post Office itself can be reckoned among India's political symbols of 
the regime. As many other national institutions, the Indian Post Office became a symbol of 
national unity [Fig. 5] and a mark of modernity and sovereignity. This marked a change from 
the previous period, as in colonial India the stamps issued by the British Government of India 
could only be a symbol of unity within the British Empire and only for the provinces under 
direct British rule. In fact, the princely states retained the power to issue their own stamps. At 
the same time, the stamps issued by the Indian Post Office framed an image of national identity 
that was effectively relayed to the Indian public and to the outside world.
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Plan Series, issued  w hen  the F irst Five-Year P lan w as d raw ing  to  a close and  released 
on the 26th of January  1955 -  the fifth anniversary  of the  found ing  of the  Ind ian  
Republic -  celebrates Ind ia  as an econom ic nation. The Five-Year P lan Series featu red  a 
nu m b er of engraved  im ages of Ind ia 's  m ost p rom inen t econom ic successes bo th  in  the 
industria l and  the agricu ltural sector and  ranged  from  the H in d u stan  A ircraft Factory 
to the  im age of an  unspecified  pow er loom . The eight anna s tam p  bears a p ictu re  of tire 
engine being  b u ilt a t the C hittaran jan  Locom otive w orks [Fig. 6], w hile tire five rupees 
one carries a p ictu re  of the  fertiliser factory a t Sindri, the  first public  sector enterprise 
com pleted  by  the new ly  in d ep en d en t state and the largest of its k ind  in  Asia, 
in augu ra ted  by N eh ru  h im self in  1952 [N ehru 1986:571] [Fig.7]. The S indri fertiliser 
factory becam e a very  p o p u lar sign of Ind ia 's  developm ent, so p o p u lar that, as a 
com m entator p u t  it, 'i t  looked as if a n ew  India w as tak ing  shape, and S indri w as 
p rov id ing  a m odel for it' (Roy, 2003). A nother rem arkable sym bol of Ind ia 's  economic 
developm en t w as the Tilaiya dam 26, rep roduced  on the one anna s tam p  [Fig. 8]. Indeed, 
dam s becam e one of the  m ost iconic signs in  the N eh ruv ian  sym bolic reperto ire [on 
this, see m ore later]. As it w ill be show n in  the follow ing section, the Ind ian  Post Office 
significantly con tribu ted  to the  process of nation  build ing . Besides help ing  defining 
Ind ia 's  na tional identity , the stam ps issued  by tire Ind ian  Post Office in  the first years 
of Ind ia 's  independence also becam e vehicles for the transm ission  of nationalism . 
S tam ps iconography  can easily transm it the values of official nationalism  creating and 
enforcing im ages of the nation . Indeed, posta l stam ps -  as w ell as banknotes and  coins 
-  are particu larly  good m edia  for tine transm ission of 'b ana l na tionalism ' [Billig 1995]
26 The Tilaiya Dam, which is 30 metres high and 366 metres long, has 14 lock gates a capacity of 
storing 394.74 million cubic metres. It is the first project that was undertaken by the Damodar 
Valley Corporation across the Barakar river. The construction of the dam began in January 1950 
and was completed in February 1953. The dam also houses a hydroelectric power station. A 
tourist complex has been built around the Dam, with a Whispering Island in the lake, a 
crocodile project, and a deer park. The Whispering Island, which is a picnic spot, has been 
renamed as Chacha Nehru Island after the Jawaharlal Nehru.
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on account of their being item s of everyday use by all sections of the population27. 
A w are of the stam ps' crucial role in the program m e of nation  bu ild ing  as vehicles for 
identity  creation and  propagation, N ehru  declared that stam ps "should  not only be 
artistic in design bu t m ust also represen t the history and character of the people. They 
should  be beautifu l sym bols of a na tion 's  em otions and asp irations" [SWJN 5:412].
F O S T A O t
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Fig. 6 C hittaranjan Stam p Fig. 7 Sindri Stam p Fig. 8 Tilaya Stam p
A nother rem arkable sign of N ehruvian  nationalism  w as the program m e of 
Indianisation or nationalisation  of the national landscape: that is, the efforts of the post­
independen t state to inscribe the national landscape w ith  sym bols transm itting  
N ehruv ian  them es of developm ent, m odernity , unity, secularism , national self-reliance 
and so on. This p rogram m e of nationalisation of the Indian  landscape w as 
im plem ented m ainly in three ways: by the sym bolic re-appropriation  and de­
colonisation of the national territory; by the establishm ent of key heavy industries, in 
keeping w ith  the dom inan t developm ent paradigm  of the time; and lastly, by the 
creation of a large num ber of new  tow ns that was dictated by a new  spatial pa ttern  of 
investm ent.
W hile in the existing Indian  cities, squares and  streets nam es w ere being 
nationalised  and  sta tues and  m onum ents in honour of British royals and  viceroys were
27 Despite a general neglect among the academic community of the study of postage stamps, 
several works have been published on stamps as vehicles for national identity-building and as 
mechanisms of regime legitimation. For a review of these works, see East Asia Special Number 
Summer 2005.
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rem oved28, and  tow ering  dam s, im posing  factories and  o ther im pressive engineering 
structu res soon do tted  the national landscape as p e rp e tu a l rem inders of N ehruv ian  
parad igm s. The foundation  of new  cities w as possib ly  the m ost ou tstand ing  
u n dertak ing  in  the nationalisation  of the Ind ian  landscape. As the British chose tire 
cities to functions as visible signs of the Raj and  as sites of pow er to instil g randeur, so 
the post-colonial in telligentsia chose the city as the sym bol of the  n ew  India, pu lsa ting  
m onum en ts to m odern ity . There w ere  tow ns bu ilt for the rehab ilita tion  of d isplaced 
persons (Faridabad, N olokheri, Rajpura, Kalyani), adm inistra tive capitals (C handigarh, 
B hubaneshw ar and  Bilaspur, G andhinagar, and TT N agar), steel tow ns (Rourkela, 
Bhilai, D u rg ap u r and  Bhadravati, Bokaro), other industria l tow ns (Chittaranjan, 
N angal, M ithapur, D andeli, Ranchi, Pim pri, Jagam rath N agar and  D eorvani Nagar), 
com pany tow ns: M odinagar, Neyveli, K agaznagar, Sindri, Kotalr, Baroda), oil tow ns 
and  p o rt tow ns (Baramri and  K andla). W hile the m ain  drive beh ind  this program m e 
of intense u rban isa tion  w as to decentralise industria l developm en t o u t of the 
trad itional m etropo litan  regions -  especially in  backw ard  areas -  it also becam e a 
strong  sym bol n o t only of developm ent b u t also of the princip le  of national unity , as 
regional inequality  w as perceived as a serious threat to Ind ian  unity .
As the spatia l categories identified  by die post-independence  tow n planners, 
and by  die Public W ork D epartm en t "p rov ided  a m echanism  for d ie  elim ination of old 
as w ell as the construction of new  identities" [King 1994:280], so o ther low er-order 
sym bols of the N ehruv ian  political system  contributed to the defin ition  of Ind ia 's  post­
colonial iden tity  and  to the process of nation-build ing.
Miranda of Nehruism
In  die belief th a t im ages can be m ore effective th an  w ords and  in  o rder to clear
the hu rd les of illiteracy, a large num ber of im ages and  aud iov isual form ats of publicity  
(m urals, posters, hoard ings, p ress advertisem ents, kiosks, m eans of transports,
28 For a detailed account of the nationalisation of Lutyens' Delhi, see Gupta [1994]
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m atchboxes and  photos, cartoons, m aps, d raw ings, g raphs, charts, sketches) w ere 
regu larly  em ployed  to b ring  education  and  'en ligh tenm en t' and  to m otivate the 
people. The search for a v isual id iom  th a t could w ork  also w ith o u t w ords w as ev iden t 
from  the fam ily p lann ing  cam paign and  tire choice of electoral sym bols analysed 
earlier on. In the follow ing section, I exam ine the official v isual vocabulary  that 
dom inated  In d ia 's  discourse on  the nation. The m ajority  of the  data  s tud ied  in  this 
section w as pub lished  by the un its  of tire Inform ation and  B roadcasting M inistry, often 
on  behalf of o ther governm ent departm en ts  and  m inistries. H ow ever, this da ta  w ill be 
com plem ented  by  an  analysis of the v isual language em ployed  by  the Ind ian  Post 
Office and  by  a s tu d y  of the iconography of Ind ian  banknotes and  coins.
In  general, illustrations can be bo th  didactic and  explicative of tire text they 
accom pany. Because in  illustrating  a text ~ w ith  pho tographs, cartoons, d raw ings and 
even w ith  m oving  im ages -  there is alw ays a large nu m b er of p ictu res one can op t for, 
the  selection of a particu lar set of illustrations instead  of ano ther can be extrem ely 
significant as it could  p rov ide  insight into tire im age of Ind ia  th a t these publications 
a im ed to project. In the  1950s and  1960s m any  publications issued  by M inistry  of 
Inform ation  and  Broadcasting w ere equ ipped  w ith  illustrations. These types of 
illustrated  texts becam e very  po p u lar and  w ere often called p ictorial surveys. Pictorial 
surveys often w ere p rin ted  on  glossy paper, b u t they  rarely  u se d  colour photographs. 
Like o ther sim ilar governm ent publications, the illustrations selected for this type of 
titles w ere characterised  by an  underly ing  in ten tion  to show  the new  Ind ia  in fieri. 
O ften the titles of these publications evoked ideas of change, progress and  of 
m ovem ent forw ard .
The illustrations seem  to fall into a set num ber of categories th a t are typical of 
this N eh ruv ian  im agery. To the first category belong those im ages -  pho tographs or 
illustrations -  w hose in ten t w as to rep resen t Ind ia 's  in d u stria l achievem ents and 
engineering successes. Im ages of dam s -  either a lready  operational o r u nder
164
construction, of hydroelectric and  pow er stations, and pictures of factories, of factory 
w orkers h appy  in their new  occupation (presum ably hap p y  for their contribution to 
Ind ia 's  resurgence and  developm ent) abound in all governm en t official publicity 
m aterial and  are probably  the m ost popu lar ones. The Bhakra D am  project becam e 
perhaps one of the m ost com m on im ages of its k ind [Fig 9].
Fig. 9 Bhakra N angal
This project w as p a rt of a m ulti-purpose plan being und ertak en  by the state for
the im provem ent of irrigation facilities and to supp ly  pow er to industries, while
prov id ing  a reliable flood control system . The Bhakra D am  w as the first of its k ind29
and w as usually  w idely  d isp layed  in this genre of handbooks of India. Dam s becam e a
particu larly  pow erfu l sym bol of the project of m odern isation  and  developm ent and
icons of scientific progress. Inaugurating  the Bhakra N angal w orks, N ehru [1980:214]
likened this feat of engineering to
"the  biggest tem ples and m osque and g u ru d w ara  [...] w here  m an w orks for 
the good of m ankind", and w ondered , "[W ]hich place can be greater than 
this, this Bhakra N angal, w here thousands and  lakhs of m en have w orked, 
have shed  their blood and sw eat and laid dow n  their lives as well? W here 
can be a greater and  holier place than this, w hich we can regard  as higher?"
29 Other projects include the Hirakud, the Tilaiya, the Tungabhadra and the Damodar Valley.
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Such w as their sym bolism  that the 100 Rupees note issued betw een 1962 and 
1967 carrying a picture of the Bhakra N angal on the reverse [Fig 10]30. In the 1960s the 
DA VP p roduced  a large num ber of docum entary  films on Ind ia 's  hydroelectric and 
irrigation projects.
Fig. 10 Rs. 100 Banknote 1962-1967
Films such as Temples of Tomorrow  [1961] and Sym bol o f Progress [1961] and 
Sym bol o f Prosperity  [1961] "evoking the faith and devotion of m illions w ho are w orking 
on these dam s to harness the bounties of na tu re  and  ensu re  a better fu ture  for the 
people of this coun try"31 are typical exam ples of this. D am s of m odern  India becam e 
em blem s of econom ic accom plishm ent obtained th rough  collective sacrifice and 
cooperation, and  therefore sym bols of societal unity . A significant advertisem ent 
issued by the governm ent and published  in India: A  Reference A nnual 1953 explains 
how  large engineering  projects like the great dam s are hotbed for national integration 
and unity . In this advertisem ent, entitled  "O ne country  O ne People Together they
30 An advertisement issued by the DAVP in 1961 invited Indian citizens to write to the Punjab 
Government Tourist Bureau to get help with the planning of a visit to this contemporary 'place 
of pilgrimage in the era of Reconstruction' [India: A Reference Annual 1961].
31 Films Division Films Division Catalogue of Films 1949-1972:198.
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W ork" a sketch of a m anual w orker is p ictured beside a pho tog raph  of a large bridge 
bu ild ing  site [Fig. 11].
ONE COUNTRY,ONE PEOPLE
in a construction  ~
Chkjju w ork* on th i  b r ld f lr  atong v lth  h i t  w lf# tn d  *on. He w orks 
w ith  many o th# r«—l*bour#rt Hk# him ovrr*##r con tra c to r, truck  
# tfrlvor and so on.
Thry *11 com # from  d lf f tro n t S t» te i *o-<» from  N sjss th tn  som o from  
H try tn o . *om# from  B#ng#l and o n t  from  A ndhra. They speak 
d ifferen t languages a t home
Bui at tha  ana th ty  apaak on# la n g u ag t— tha  langvaga of w ork.
Work* know# no harrier.
| »ii »oiu«« nn MOrtu or rxt ipu)| hmlp romovo thorn
Fig. 11 O ne C ountry  O ne People
The m u ltitudes of people seen at w ork in the pho tog raph  and  the caption that 
stress the im portance of labour, intend to show  how  w orking together for the national 
project creates unity , as it helps rem oving barriers. Beside being im ages of societal 
un ity  and national integration, for Khilnani:
"these dam s -  like the gleam ing steel and pow er p lan ts a t Bokaro and Bhilai 
w hich the Soviets, G erm ans and British w ere all c row ding  in to help  build  -  
em bodied the vision of m odern ity  to w hich India had  com m itted itself. 
They w ere the spectacular facades, luxurious in their very austerity, upon 
w hich the nation w atched expectantly as the im age of its fu ture  was 
projected. It w as a big, audacious image. India, it prom ised , w ould  become 
an industria l giant." [1997:62]
A gricultural developm ent and m odernisation is ano ther m ajor category of the 
nationalist im agery of N ehruv ian  India. Illustrations belonging to this category show  
im ages of p lan ts and  crops obtained thanks to the use of fertilisers, to the
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m echanisation of agriculture, and  to irrigation program m es. In o ther w ords, these 
im ages visually represent the m odern isation  of Indian agriculture. W hile photographs 
such as Power on the Farm [Fig 12] are im ages that a llude to the  b lend  of m odern ity  and 
trad ition  that characterised N eh ru 's  India (show ing how  the B hakra-N angal system  
p rov ided  "pow er for this Punjabi farm er to pum p well w ater for field irrigation. H is 
old Persian w heel (..) once tu rned  by bullocks, m ay also be pow er-d riven"32), another 
recurren t im age in this category is that one of the farm er looking p roud ly  at his 
b um per crop or contem plating  the better quality of cotton or w heat obtained thanks to 
the m echanisation and m odern isation  of agriculture. A pho tog raph  show s a farm er 
p roud ly  looking at a shaft of w heat w ith  the caption: "(...) [A] no rth  Indian farm er 
p roud ly  d isp lays the prize w heat crop he obtained by using  better seeds and 
fertilisers"33 [Fig.13].
P O W E R  O N  T H E  F A R M :  T h e  R h a k m - N . u i ^ l  s y s t e m  s u p p l i e s  p o w e r  f o r  t h i s  
P u n j a b i  f a n n e r  t o  p u m p  w e l l  w a t e r  f o r  f i e l d  i r r i g a t i o n .  I l i s  o l d  P e r s i a n  w h e e l  
( r i g h t ) ,  ( i m c  t u r n e d  b s  iM ilkw ks, u i a s  a b o  \k  p o u e r d i i s c u .
Fig. 12 Pow er on the Farm
32 In The Neio India- Progress Through Democracy, Planning Commission, Government of India, 
1958: 24
33 Facts About India. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Government of India. New Delhi: 
Publication Division 1957:35
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Fig. 13 P roud Farm er w ith bum per crop
A nother publication called Era o f Rapid Change 1947-1967  show s sim ilar im ages 
accom panied by the following caption: "A veritable revolution has been w rough t in 
the field of agriculture. M odern farm ing practices have been rap id ly  and extensively 
adop ted . A farm er uses chem ical fertilizer to speed the g row th  and increase the 
p roductiv ity  of his rice padd ies". Photographs of the large Sindri fertiliser factory [Fig 
14] w ere also ubiquitous, and  w ere reproduced  on the set of stam ps that celebrated the 
First Five-Year P lan as it w as show n above.
Fig. 14 Sindri Fertiliser Factory
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The typical iconography of the  content farm er -  b u t th is argum en t could also 
easily app ly  to o ther im ages and  pho tographs w here Ind ians are their subjects -  
conjures im ages of bucolic idyllic cooperation w here no  h in t to hard sh ip  is done. 
Rather, w orking  for in d ep en d en t Ind ia  an d  for the p lan n ed  econom y is show n  to be 
joyful and  inspiring. O ften  faces glow  w ith  p ride  and  nationalis t fervour. This 
iconography brings to m ind  N eh ru 's  follow ing rem arks m ade  in  praising  of the 
accom plishm ents of com m unity  projects:
"A part from  die practical results w hich have been  achieved, (...) there  is 
som eth ing  even m ore im portan t (...). This (...) factor is the  sp irit of the 
people, die rem oval of inertia  in drought and  action, the  developm ent of a 
team  sp irit in national w ork  and  die sense of p a rtn e rsh ip  of the people in 
g rea t undertak ings. This represen ts the new  dynam ism  w hich is so essential 
to all progress. It m eans a social revolu tion  in  ou r w ays of life and  w ork 
w hich is creeping g radually  b u t surely over the vast land  of India. It is 
because of this d ia t the  C om m unity  Projects and  the N ational Extension 
Service have  becom e, m ore th an  anything else, the  sym bols of the resu rgen t 
sp irit of In d ia " 34
The Ind ian  Republic Series of stam ps issued  in  1950 to celebrate the 
inaugu ra tion  of the Ind ian  Republic and  die new  C onstitu tion  uses th is iconographic 
language. Portraits of the Ind ian  com m on m an  and  w om an are show n looking 
optim istically  in to  the fu tu re  w hile the im ages d raw n  in the background  pay  hom age 
to Ind ia 's  cu lture  (ink, w ell and  verse), agricultural trad itions (sheaf of w heat and  
plough), cottage industries (spinning w heel and cloth) and to the  n a tion  itself (rejoicing 
crow ds) [Fig 15]. Incidentally, the  ear of corn or sheaf of w hea t becam e another 
im portan t sym bol of Independen t India. Besides figuring p rom inen tly  in  the  4 A nna  
Ind ian  Republic Series com m em orative stam ps, it w as also engraved  on the reverse of 
the 1 Rupee and  half R upee coins issued in  1950 [Fig. 16].
34 Jawaharlal Nehru, to the Fourth Development Commissioners' Conference, Simla, May 1955. 
Quoted in The Neiv India.. .1958:179.
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R E P U B L I C  O F  I N D I A
INAUGURATION JAN 26J9S0INAUGURATION JAN ? A1950
Fig.15 1950 Inauguration  of Ind ia 's  Republic C om m em orative Stam ps
Fig. 16 1950 Rs. Vi and 1 Coins
The sheaf of w heat is a sym bol of harvest signifying prosperity  and 
representing  Ind ia 's  farm ing traditions. W ith tim e it w as w idely  reproduced  on 
com m ercial advertisem ents publicising items directed at Ind ia 's  farm ing com m unity. 
Typical advertisem ents of this kind w ould  em ploy the iconography of the content 
farm er d iscussed above, this tim e prom oting  along w ith  the ideals of progress, 
developm ent and  m odern isation  a particu lar p roduct (D unlop pneum atic  tyres, Ajeet 
Oil Engine, and  M cCorm ick tractors) [Fig 17].
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F o r  b ig g e r  an d  b e t te r  c r o p s  th a t  
s p e l l  a g r ic u ltu r a l  p r o s p e r i t y -  1 
th e  w o r ld - fa m o u s  3 5  h .p . m c C O R i v i i c k  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
B - 2 7 5  T R A C T O R
Non) made in India
VOLT AS LIMllTeO
AgrtMnJuuiUI Product* DKMm , 
Bombay. CtkiKU, Madia*.
N»» Baagalor*. l.ucfcuow.
Cochi*. N**p»ir. A Imm*  bad. 
Sctondf (abad. PttM. Jaipwi. 
CtlM»4i|*<h. HancM. Iamifcldp«r. 
Marsao. BM>p*l
Ajeet 
for a 
New Life 
into the land
braaking new g ro u n d ... 
Dunlop it at the root 
of this modem agriculture
Ki*«n't head Is full with |oy; as 
Mfd-giving wai«r go t*  courting thiough 
’.ho field t. Tho ttoody throb 
of Ajoof lg irucic to Ma mkb.
' a i#ot' h a t tlw ayt baekod h it otTo •.» 
working tide by aide to mako him 
and tho Nation BHf-aufTicionl.
AJEET oil E n g in e
Fig. 17 A dvertisem ents for M cCormick Tractors, Ajeet Oil and  D unlop India
A nother po p u lar category of im ages depicts the developm ent of transport
industries. Im ages show ing road construction works, launching of ships, locom otives,
airplanes, car factories, all belong to this group. A very popu lar p icture in these early
governm ent publications is the one depicting the launching of sh ips at V isakhapatnam ,
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[fig 18] one of Ind ia 's  largest sh ipyards and the launching of Jala Usha, Ind ia 's  first 
Ind ian  bu ilt m odern  vessel35. The C hittaranjan locom otive w orks of W est Bengal [Fig 
19] com pleted  du ring  the first Five Year Plan w as often used  to epitom ise progress in 
the transport sector. Indian infant autom obile industry  -  usually  represented  w ith 
im ages of its assem bly chain -  and the H industan  A ircraft factory of Bangalore w ere 
popularly  rep roduced  as well. The latter w ere also reproduced  in the First Five-Year 
Plan com m em orative stam ps.
Fig. 18 Launching of Ship at V isakhapatnam
Fig. 19 C hittaran jan  Locom otive W orks
35 The Second Year, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publication Division 1949.
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Im ages of rural developm ent belong to another po p u lar category. Photographs 
of villages w ith  extensive drainage system s, im ages of ru ral vaccination program m es 
for people and  livestock; illustrations of construction of new  wells, roads and  schools; 
pictures of artisans engaged in their arts -  as part of the encouragem ent of cottage and 
sm all scale industries -  or stills of m obile m edical centres, w ere all m ean t to visually 
represent im provem ents in the life of Ind ia 's  villages [Fig 20]. Education w as also the 
focus of special attention: village schools for children and  adults; universities and 
research institu tes w ere w idely reproduced . This type of illustrations, despite  no t being 
one of the largest categories, w as a sym bol of the changing face of India, encapsulating 
the N ehruv ian  faith in rationalism  and in scientific know ledge. Typically, illustrations 
belonging to this category w ould  include pho tographs of studen ts  w orking at 
m icroscopes or engineers at w ork at industrial plants. Young girls and  fem ale studen ts 
w ere often included in this category sym bolising not only the sp read  of education but 
also its role for the em ancipation of wom en.
Fig. 20 C om m unity  Officers a t w ork
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The peop le  rep resen ted  in  these pho tographs are usua lly  young  m ales36. Their 
outlook -  w ith  the exception of those pho tographs of the  countryside -  is totally 
m odern  an d  there  is no th ing  th a t d istinguishes them  from  their contem poraries in 
o ther p a rts  of the developed  w orld. These are the new  Indians: upbeat, hardw ork ing , 
enthusiastic  and  w holly  m odem . W ith them  the coun try  w ill surely  m ove forw ard, 
seem s to be the u n w ritten  caption to these types of im ages. W hile on the contrary, the 
country  folk are still traditional-looking in  their dresses, outlook an d  lifestyles, they are 
as crucial to In d ia 's  developm ent as the m odern  city folk and  they often are the m ain 
subject m atter of the illustrations. D espite their trad itional outlook, the  ru ra l m asses -  
often ep itom ised  by tire im age of the agricultural labourer -  are depicted  participating  
to the p rogram m e of na tional developm ent in great earnest. The com m on m an  and 
w om an  thus becom e the unexpected  heroes of this N ehruv ian  sym bolic system .
There is how ever another hero  of N ehruism  w ho is often po rtrayed  in a large 
num ber of official publications: the technocrat, or the  ex tended  com m unity  officer37 -  
as the governm ent publications u sed  to call them . O ften these p ictures portrayed  
ex tended  officers d iscussing developm ent p rogram m es w ith  tire farm ers, the w orkers, 
and  w ith  the representatives of panchayati raj. But besides being  tire personification of 
the governm en t and  of its developm ent policies, these technocrats w ere also the 
personifications of the  institu tions of tire post-colonial state and  of its reach in to  the 
deepest corners of India. M oreover, the contrast betw een the ex tended  officers and  the 
ru ra l folks -  sym bolised p rim arily  by their respective clothing and  their body-language
36 The image of the young person is a symbol of the rejuvenation and rebirth of India. 
Elaborating on the symbolism of youth, Nehru is quoted to have said, commenting on 
community development programs: "Something life-giving went to them ... A process of 
rejuvenation set in" [Neia India 1958:175]. The same book also says, "Many villagers have been 
heard to say 'We were dead, and now we are live (sic)'"[ibid].
37 Discussing community development programmes, New India says: "The key agent at the 
village level is the multi-purpose village worker, a young male, usually with high-school 
education or better, who has been especially trained in rural extension work. Young women are 
beginning to be used to do home extension work with farm wives and families" [Nezo India 
1958:170]
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(the ex tended  officer gesticulating and  explaining, the  p easan t usually  still and  
listening) -  connoted  a set of dichotom ies (u rban/rural, educated /illiterate, and  
m odern /trad itional) w hose com bination w as at the core of N e h ru 's  Ind ia  [Fig. 20].
A nother featu re  of the N eh ruv ian  sym bolic reperto ire  w as the continuation  of 
the p re-independence  practice of sacralisation of na tionalist heroes and  m arty rs  that 
w as d iscussed  in  C hap ter 2. W ith  independence  the p an th eo n  of nationalist m arty rs 
w as expanded  an d  institu tiona lised . Publications such as B uilders o f M odern India -  a 
very  p o p u la r series pub lished  by  the Publication D ivision of the M inistry  of 
Inform ation  and  B roadcasting -  and  those DAVP film s ded ica ted  to Ind ia 's  freedom  
fighters and  na tiona l leaders con tribu ted  to tire iconisation of these heroes. As the R R 
D iw akar, d ie  general ed ito r of the series, claim ed in  the preface, Builders of M odern India 
w as bo rn  "to  record, for the  p resen t and  fu tu re  generations, the  sto ry  of the struggles 
and  achievem ents of d ie em inen t sons and  daugh ters of Ind ia  w ho  have been m ainly  
in strum en ta l in  ou r na tional renaissance and  the a tta inm en t of independence".
There w ere m any  heroes38 b u t only  one fadier of the  nation: G andhi. G andhi's  
po rtra its  g raced  n o t only the C ongress p a rty  section h ead q u arte rs  th ro u g h o u t d ie 
coun try  b u t his w as the very  first pa in ting  to be h u n g  in  the C en tra l H all of Parliam ent. 
Such w as h is iconic sta tus th a t a po rtra it of G andhi w as considered  to replace the 
im age of K ing G eorge VI from  Ind ia 's  banknotes in  the first years after independence 
and  p relim inary  sketches w ere also p rep ared  to th a t effect39. In  the end, the Sarnath  
C apital w as chosen as die sym bol to be rep roduced  on  In d ia 's  banknotes [see Fig. 1 
and  2]. B ut a com m em orative series w as eventually  issued to celebrate G andhi's  b irth  
centenary  in  1969. H ere G andh i w as p ictu red  seated  w id i the  Sevagram  A shram  in  the 
background . The apotheosis of G andhi on Ind ia 's  banknotes w as finally reached  w hen
38 Wyatt [n.d.] pointedly argues that a number of industrialists were also celebrated as national 
heroes. He notes how for instance Jamsetji Tata -  the founder of the Tata Corporation -  was 
commemorated on stamps in 1958 and in 1965.
39 http://www.rbi.org.in/currency/museum/p-rep.html accessed on 5 March 2006.
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n ew  M ahatm a G andh i Series w as issued  in  1996. H is frontal p o rtra it is rep roduced  on 
all the  banknote  denom inations and  has in  the end superseded  the  A sokan Lion capital 
as the  central sym bol on  In d ia 's  banknotes.
G andhi w as also the first Ind ian  to be celebrated on  posta l stam ps. A set of 
com m em orative stam ps w as issued  in  h is honou r in  1948 after h is  death , ha fact, the 
idea of issu ing  a set of four G andhi stam ps w as originally  agreed  im m ediately  after 
independence. Trial copies w ere also subm itted . But w ith  G andh i's  su d d en  death  the 
sketches h a d  to  be changed  and  the design for four m ourn ing  stam ps w as p repared . 
O n  N eh ru 's  suggestion, the w ord  'B apu ' w as included  b o th  in  H in d u  and  in  U rdu , a 
sym bolic gesture  tow ards com m unal h a rm o n y 40 [Fig. 21]. h i  1969, G andhi's  b irth  
centenary, ano ther series of com m em orative stam ps, postcards, and  postal stationery  
w as issued. F irst day  covers w ere issued  w ith  a special charkha cancellation [Fig. 22] 
and  special in land  letters carried a p icture of the M ahatm a and  the un touchability  
slogan in H ind i and  English "U ntouchability  is a crim e against god and  m an". A 
special G andhi an d  N eh ru  series of stam ps w as then  issued  in  1973. From  then  
onw ards, G andhi w ill regu larly  appear on Ind ia 's  stam ps: to celebrate the  In ternational 
Year of C hild  [1979], the 50lh anniversary  of die Salt M arch [1980], the 50th anniversary  
of the Q u it Ind ia  R esolution [1992], on  G andh i's  125th b ird i ann iversary  [1994], on  his 
50th dea th  ann iversary  [1998], for the  50th anniversary  of d ie Republic [2000] and  finally 
in 2001 to celebrate G andhi as die m an  of die m illennium . The celebration of G andhi's 
b irth d ay  (2 October) becam e die only Ind ian  secular ho liday  ded ica ted  to a personality  
to be included  in  the official calendar of national holidays.
40 http://www.stampsofindia.com/readroom/b013.htm accessed on 5 March 2006.
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Fig. 21 1948 G andhi's  com m em orative stam ps
Fig. 22 1969 G andh i's  Birth C entenary  First Day C over w ith  special Chakra
cancellation
G andhi had  already becom e an im portan t sym bol of the identity  of an ti­
colonial m ovem ent and of Ind ia 's  national unity  in life. W ith his sudden  death  
threaten ing  the unity  of India, to keep this sym bolism  alive, G andh i's  samadhi becam e 
Ind ia 's  forem ost national m onum ent to w hich national and foreign dignitaries pay 
their respects in highly sym bolic cerem onies and occasions. Indeed, according to 
K ertzer [1988] the sym bolic identification of the nation  w ith  a heroic figure is m ore 
com m on and im portan t in new  postcolonial regim es dom inated  by a single party. 
Because
"the  creation of a new  nation requires a m assive effort at sym bolic 
construction [and] give the difficulty people w ith  no prev ious conception of 
national identity  have in m aking the notion sym bolically real to them selves, 
it is no t su rp rising  that such efforts often involve creation of personified 
im ages of the state". [Kertzer 1988:178]
Thus, illustrations w ere projecting recurren t them es of developm ent, progress, 
and  m odern ity  revealing  Ind ia 's  fundam en ta l character. A ural, v isual and  verbal 
stim uli concurred  to create a pervasive idea of progress and  developm ent, and  to 
depict a glorious im age of the fu ture. H ow ever, the concept of u n ity  in d iversity  w as 
ano ther im p o rtan t feature com m on to a great deal of these publications and  also of 
docum entaries, an d  rad io  show s.
Representing the concept of Unity in Diversity through words and images
The slogan "U nity  in  D iversity" becam e the m ost p o p u la r sym bol of N ehruism .
A variety  of publications -  w here im ages of the various regions and  people of India 
w ere copiously rep roduced  -  gave shape to this concept. Because according to 
N ehruism , u n ity  in  Ind ia  w as n o t equivalen t to hom ogeneity , b u t w as based  on a 
com m on culture, itself com posed by the different elem ents of Ind ia 's  social and 
cu ltu ral trad itions, these publications obviously aim ed a t p o rtray ing  the different 
people, cu ltures and  regions of Ind ia  as legitim ately belonging  to the  basic fabric of 
India111 and  are an  excellent illustrative exam ple of the adherence to a concept of 
territorial nationalism  and  of the  sta te 's  effort in  p ropaga ting  a particu lar k ind  of 
national identity .
A ccording to these publications Ind ia 's  national iden tity  is com posite, as "India, 
like m any  other countries, is a m osaic of m any  races and  cu ltu res"42. By presen ting  a 
pano ram a of d ifferent races and  costum es, these publications a im ed a t stressing India 's 
u n ity  in d iversity  ra th e r than  an  im aginary  cultural un iform ity . Typical pho tographs 
and  illustrations belonging  to this category po rtrayed  In d ia 's  n a tu ra l features and its 
people. Publications such as India in M aps and  India -  a Pictorial S u rvey  are illustrative
41 This was indeed the title of one of the publications released by the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting.
42 Introduction, Facts About India. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Government of 
India. New Delhi: Publication Division.1957.
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of this and aim ed at becom ing "w hat every Indian should  be p roud  to ow n"43. Aerial 
pho tographs of the H im alayas and  of the sou thernm ost corner Kanya Kum ari, p lus a 
selection of faces that ranged  from "A typical Peasant in Bihar, a C ultivator from 
H aryana, A saucy girl from Kerala, a Sikkim ese Belle, a rural couple from Rajastan, an 
A nglo-Indian, a landless labourer (who has now  been saved from  the clutches of 
m oney-lenders and  given land to cultivate and a loan to bu ilt h is house)"44 aim ed at 
show ing Ind ia 's  d iversities w hile stressing their integration w ith in  the folds of Ind ia 's  
national life.
The m ap of independen t India w as a pow erful graphic sym bolic m arker of 
Indianness and  of the concept of unity  in d iversity  and  w as w idely  reproduced  in a 
large num ber of governm ent publications. O ften these m aps d id  not include internal 
boundaries b u t only its in ternational borders thus proclaim ing the fundam ental and 
endu ring  unity  of India. In 1957 the Indian Post Office issued a M ap of India Series of 
stam ps. This series carried the p icture of the geographical m ap of India sketching its 
m ain m ounta in  ranges and river system s w ith a decorative m otive on the left-hand 
side [Fig.23].
Fig. 23 1957 Stam p M ap of India Series
Being such a pow erful sym bol of the nation, it is su rp rising  -  as W yatt [2005] 
rightly  observes -  that it took independen t India ten years to issue this stam p series.
43 From advertising in Yojana, 1968.
44 Facts About India. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Government of India. New Delhi: 
Publication Division. 1957.
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This is even m ore rem arkable if one considers that w ith partition  the m ap of India that 
had  becom e po p u lar du ring  the nationalist m ovem ent (as it w as show n in C hap ter 2) 
had  dram atically  changed  its outline. The tw o w ings of the state of Pakistan w ere 
literally carved ou t of the seam less territo ry  of pre-partition  India.
D espite this shortcom ing, the Indian  Post Office had  a lready  contributed to the 
prom otion  of the ideal of un ity  in d iversity  by issuing the A rchaeological Series of 
S tam ps on 15 A ugust 1949, the second anniversary  of Ind ia 's  independence. The 16 
stam ps of d ifferent denom inations carried engraved im ages of Ind ia 's  m ost im portan t 
sites of historic heritage [Fig. 24].
N E W  I N D I A N  S T A M P S
i N r n  j \
Fig. 24 1948 Stam ps Archaeological Series
In a m ulticu ltu ral and  plurirelig ious country  like India it is the selection of 
im ages that is m ost significant. M onum ents belonging to Ind ia 's  m ajor denom inations
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and civilisations w ere chosen. Viewed all together in an im aginary  journey across 
Ind ia 's  geography and  history, these stam ps told the story of Ind ia 's  civilisation. Thus, 
by portray ing  the singu lar contributions of H indu, Islamic, Sikh, B uddhist and Jain 
cu ltures and  civilisations to the m ake-up of m odem  India, this series of stam ps 
portrayed  an im age of India as a m ulticultural and m ulti-relig ious nation.
O ther v isual devices w ere used to represen t un ity  in diversity. An 
advertisem ent issued by the DAVP carries an im age of a com posite earthen  lam p [Fig.
The earthen  lam p (a traditional and  fam iliar Indian object) in the shape of a tree 
is m ade up  by m any distinct lam ps thus signifying oneness and distinctiveness at the 
sam e time. A nother pictorial device sym bolising unity  in d iversity  is p ictured on the 
righ t-hand side. A num ber of hands create a circle. W ithin the circle is inscribed the 
m otto 'U nity  bu ilds the N ation '. If the pictorial devices w ere no t e loquent enough, the 
captions accom pany the visuals fu rther corroborate those claims.
25].
W e celebrate the eighteenth yov of our Republic 
to-djy. Wc t o u r  priOa end our Uilh m 
Our greet country. As wc usher In the new year
Urn our strength and it is only through Cfcuty 
that we can achieve our cherished goal of 
peace and prosperity. 
All together, let us rcdrdicate ourselves 
to  the task ahead, to be
One Greet Country, One Great People
BUILDS
THE
N A T IO N
Fig. 25 DAVP A dvertisem ent C elebrating U nity
182
The Indian  Railways, too, contribu ted  to the p rom otion  of un ity  in diversity. An 
advert issued by the DAVP carries a picture of an eight-spokes w heel w ithin w hose 
segm ents are inserted  the portra its of som e of Ind ia 's  d iverse ethnic g roups p ictured 
dressed in their trad itional clothes [Fig. 26].
RAILWAYS PROMOTE
A N D  N A T I O N A L  
I N T E G R A T I O NUNITY
X N  D I  A  N  
R  A  I L .W A Y S  
I I I  YtAftS OLD N O W
Fig. 26 DAVP A dvertisem ent for Indian  Railw ays
The connotations triggered by this sym bolic im age are m anifold. The w heel that 
occupies the m ain  portion  of the advert on one level is a sym bol of the railw ays w hose 
w heels are crossing and linking the w hole nation. O n ano ther level, the w heel is also a 
reproduction  of the A sokan w heel that features prom inen tly  both  in the centre of 
Ind ia 's  national flag and on its national em blem . As it w as no ted  above, the w heel w as 
central e lem ent of A sokan sym bolism . Asoka was know n by the ep ithet chakravartin  
the all-conquering m onarch 'w hose  wheels are rolling everyw here w ithout 
obstruction '. Thus, in this context the w heel sym bolises unity, just rule, m ovem ent and, 
by extension, progress.
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The A sokan w heel also appears in the last advert exam ined here. The advert 
w as issued on M ahatm a G andh i's  b irth  centenary and  bore the caption 'O ne Nation: 
O ne People' [Fig.27].
O n e  N a t i o n :
O n e  P e o p l e
Fig. 27 A dvertisem ent C om m em orating G andh i's  Birth C entenary
The A sokan w heel here is faithfully reproduced  and  it is used as a fancy
inverted  com m a for one G andh i's  quote which significantly reads:
"There is so m uch in com m on betw een people in the sam e State, u n d er the 
sam e flag and  ow ing und iv ided  allegiance to it [...] the state of our 
conception m ust be a secular, dem ocratic state, hav ing  perfect harm ony 
betw een different units."
Commercial Advertisement
The use of such nationalist narratives w as not just confined to governm ent
propaganda. Indeed, they even influenced the language (visual and  verbal) of popu lar 
cinem a and com m ercial advertisem ents that appeared  both  in the national press and  in 
several governm ental publications too. In the 1950s and  1960s governm ent and 
com m ercial advertisem ents w ere rem arkably  sim ilar, w ith  com m ercial advertisem ent
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adop ting  the verbal and  v isual idiom atic language of developm ent, progress, and 
m odern isa tion  of governm en t publicity. These advertisem ents tended  tow ards a 
celebration of Ind ia  and  of her achievem ents. Publicising a varie ty  of d isparate  
com m odities, they  p ro v id ed  a p rom ising  p icture of In d ia 's  p resen t developm ent, 
fu tu re  industria lisa tion  and  her drive tow ards m odernisation.
Verbally, advertisem ents of the  period  w ere liberally em ploy ing  key w ords tha t 
epitom ised developm ent and  encapsulated  the concept of m odern isa tion  W ords such 
as developm ent, progress, m odern , industria l strength , ahead, new , tom orrow , five- 
year plans, na tional and  self-sufficiency w ere com m on. These concepts w ere then  
v isually  transla ted  in  im ages of progress. This w as u sually  done by  depicting 
industria l m achinery, tractors, cogwheels, dam s, electricity pylons, m odern  m eans of 
transport, and  factories. As it w as po in ted  ou t above, b o th  these registers (the verbal 
and  the visual) w ere a com m on feature of tire official N eh ruv ian  language and  w ere 
clearly derived  from  it. A lthough prim a facie these sim ilarities seem  quite unexpected, 
they becom e less so if one considers th a t advertisem ent -  e ither governm ental or 
p riva te  -  in  a developing  country  such  as India w as in tended  to p lay  tire sam e decisive 
role
"(...)  in  m otivating  peop le  tow ards greater achievem ents in  all fields of life 
and  in  bring ing  abou t desirable changes in  their behav iour, attitudes and 
norm s, (...) (A )dvertising has to help  increase p roduction , p rom ote  new  
ideas and  practices conducive to progress and  b ring  abou t econom ic and 
social transform ation ."45
Take for instance the publicity  for A C C . The Cem ent M arketing Com pany o f India 
L td46 w here  p ictu res of the  sym bolic landm arks of N eh ruv ian  Ind ia  d iscussed above
45 M inistry of Information and Broadcasting. Mass Media in India. Research and Reference 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. New Delhi: 
Publication Division, 1980: 63-64
46 India a Reference Annual 1953
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such as the B hakra-N angal Dam , the Sindri Fertiliser Factory help  p rom oting  ACC 
C em ent [Fig.28].
Fig. 28 ACC C em ent M arketing C om pany  of India
In a sim ilar fashion, L ipton -  the tea com pany -  pub lished  an advertisem ent to 
celebrate Ind ia 's  fourth  Independence Day [Fig 29].
Lipton Limited
Independence Day 1954
Fig. 29 L ipton Tea A dvertisem ent C elebrating Ind ia 's  Independence Day
The p icture  carried  a com posite representation  of m o d em  India tha t com bined 
in one represen tational p lane different pictures of ru ra l and  industria l India. An im age
of a dam  (Bhakran-N angal?) dom inates the foreground along w ith  the p icture of a
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chem ical engineer, of a factory and  of a high-rise building. The m idd le  part of the 
p icture is dom inated  by an im age of a village school. In the background, tw o yoked 
bullocks p lough a field w hile several w om en harvest a w heat crop47.
T.I. Cycles o f India Lim ited, of M adras, described itself as "The Progressive 
N ational Bicycle industry  in South India". N ew  India A ssurance Co. L td  stated  "N ow , for 
the first tim e in this country  in troducing M achinery and Erection Insurance, to protect 
the N ation 's  industria l Assets". Sen Raleigh Industries o f India L im ited  another bicycle 
factory, had a central caption to its advertisem ent stating: "Fulfilling a N ational N eed". 
The caption in the A utom obile Products o f India L td  advert read: "In the forefront of 
India 's tran spo rt developm ent. (...) A utom obile P roducts of India. An Indian 
Enterprise Forging Ahead".
Fig. 30 C alendar Poster
47 A popular poster of the time uses a similar synthetic visual language to picture on the same 
representational level agricultural and industrial development [Fig. 30]
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N ot surprising ly , advertisem ents for tractors, fertilisers, and m achinery 
dom inated  the publicity landscape. The exam ples are m ultip le. Kam ani Engineering  
Corporation L im ited  had  the caption "In the service of industria l India" inscribed in a 
banner across the advertising  space [Fig. 31].
Fig. 31 Kam ani A dvertisem ent
The advert show ed im ages of presum ably  the K am ani headquarters, a 
V ictorian-G othic looking build ing, inscribed in a cim ade u p  by a shaft of w heat and 
half a cogw heel. A bolt, sym bol of electricity is p ictured  on the righ t-hand side of the 
cogw heel. A tractor p loughing  the field and a pow er station  su rm oun ted  by an 
electrical pylon com plem ent the visual language again com bining im ages of rural and 
industria l India. This synchretic iconography w as em ployed in Nicco Cables and W ires 
advertisem ent in a novel way. Instead of juxtaposing im ages of industria l and rural 
India to represen t the interaction of m odern  industry  and  trad itional agriculture, this 
advert ingeniously represen ts this topic w ith the im age of a young  farm er holding a 
bunch of N icco's w ires w ith  a shaft of w heat [Fig.32].
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Fig. 32 Nicco Calbes and W ires
The caption "Raising a N ew  C rop for N ew  India" clearly m irrored  not just the 
N ehruv ian  idiom  and bu t prom oted  also ideals of m odern ity , developm ent and 
change. The text that followed the caption further elaborated: "N icco claim s w ith  pride 
that it has m ade its due  contribution to Ind ia 's  "P roduce or Perish48" cam paign by 
supp ly ing  Cables & W ires for electrical developm ent in the country".
The Tata Iron & Steel Com pany Ltd  publicity figured im ages of rail carriages, 
dam s, m odern  build ings, ships, and  parts of engine -  thus epitom ising TATA 
participation  in India 's developm ental program m es. O ther advertisem ents prom oted 
the new  Ind ianness either by p rovid ing  a syncretic vision of India and an im aginary 
consum er landscape or by inviting consum ers to use and  invest on  Indian and local 
produces. In this, these types of advertisem ents w ere in keeping  w ith  N eh ru 's  view  of 
India.
48 "Produce or Perish" was the title of a series of AIR programs.
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Som etim es advertisem ents featured g raphs usually  depicting  a soaring curve 
(Kassels Fans) or p roduction  charts (H ind Cycles Lim ited). The latter can be taken as an 
exam ple [Fig.33].
The text reproduced  beside the p roduction  chart show ing  a visible increase in 
p roduction  for H ind Cycles L im ited  from  1947 to 1951, read as follow:
"Self-sufficiency in Cycles. In 1952, H ind  Cycles have produces 1,30,000 
cycles -  one cycle every tw o m inutes. This is no m ean achievem ent and we 
have every reason to be p roud  of it. But d u ring  the next five years, w ith 
progress in very field, India w ould  need m any m ore cycles. That is w hy we 
have geared our factory to still h igher production  -  o u r target for 1953 is 
1,20,000 and from  1954 onw ards 2,00,000 cycles per year."
This advertisem ent em ployed a vocabulary that w as optim istic; it prom oted 
the developm ent of the nation, em bracing radical p rogress and faith in 
industria lisa tion  and  m odernisation. The use of a technical language th rough  the large 
use of num bers and  graphs, a lluded  to scientific rationalism , w hile the w ording 
recalled the one em ployed  in the Five Year Plans. Besides p rom oting  developm ent, the 
underly ing  m eaning  of the advertisem ent w as to show  that a p rivate  com pany could 
be devoted  to the w elfare of the w hole Indian nation as the governm ent of India itself.
SE&l^StSTCffaiSIIEKI&Sr 
in Ctfvies
H I N D  CYCLES LI MI TED
th t  b igg tA  <yc/« m anu fac tu rtrt In India.
Fig. 33 H ind  Cycles Ltd
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In  o ther w ords, H in d  Cycles L im ited  d id  n o t p roduce  m ore bicycles for their ow n profit; 
b u t their increased  p roduction  w as in  the public  in terest of the  w hole nation. The 
conten t of th is advertisem en t seem s to stress the concept th a t p riva te  in terest w as 
subo rd ina ted  to the  com m on w elfare of the country  as a w hole, and  th a t p rivate  and  
public  en terprises could  w ork  together in  the nation  bu ild ing  process. Similarly, by 
rep roducing  the iconic im age of the  p ro u d  farm er po rtrayed  w ith  a shaft of w hea t and 
the sickle -  a tradem ark  of N ehru ism  -  in  a variety  of advertisem ents, o ther com panies 
a im ed at convey this particu la r m essage.
The language of com m ercial advertisem ent w as positive, un-am biguous, 
convincing (it d id  n o t raise any doubts in  those w ho  looked  or listened) and  
rem iniscent of the  language of m odern ity  and  progress em ployed  in  governm ent 
publicity. The com pany, tine nation, and  the people of Ind ia  w ere all equally  celebrated 
for their achievem ents. O n the w hole, this im agery, as w ell as N eh ru 's  idiom , 
p resen ted  an  ideal v iew  of in d ep en d en t India, ra ther th an  ju st be ing  an  im age of ho w  
India was. This stra tegy  of p ic tu ring  tine ideal Ind ia  characterised  also a particu lar 
genre of the H ind i cinem a of the 1950s, variously  called na tiona lis t or idealistic cinema. 
O riginally  the  Ind ian  state d id  n o t in tegrate the  cinem a in d u stry  in  the nationalist 
p lann ing  fram e because according to the governm ent, com m ercial cinem a w as n o t 
considered  prestig ious enough. But a lready  in 1950, the  G overnm ent established a Film 
Enquiry C om m ittee to "enable film  in Ind ia  to develop into an effective in strum en t for 
the p rom otion  of na tional culture, education  and  healthy  en te rta inm en t"49. Thus, even 
com m ercial film s w ere  encouraged  to p lay  a decisive role in  the articulation of 
na tionhood  despite  the reluctance of the  film  in d u stry  to co m p ly 50. Eventually,
49 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Mass Media in htdia. Research and Reference 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. New Delhi: 
Publication Division. 1978:66.
50 In its report, the 1951 Patil Film Enquiry Committee noted not only a reluctance in the 
industry to produce such films but also the prevalence of the belief that "duties of a public 
nature are the exclusive province of the state and private individuals and bodies have no
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com m ercial cinem a w as linked to the state and its developm en t project th rough  a series
of ties: film  policy, finance and  subsidy  policies, censorship, taxation, licensing
regulations, aw ards, an d  film  festivals follow ing the belief of the  tim e that:
"[A] film  w hile it is en terta in ing  (...) can help  re-ad justing  attitudes, the 
rela tionship  betw een  different m em bers of a fam ily u n it or of different 
com m unities in  society and  prom ote idealism  or som e ideology. It can 
develop  ethical ideas, fairness and  tolerance and  even  p roduce  selflessness 
and  sacrifice. (...) A film  enlivens w hile it en tertains, it teaches w hile it 
am uses, and  it creates a w orld  of im pressions and  ideas in  w hich hum an ity  
at tim es seeks refuge from  frustration, d isconten t and  the h a rd  realities of 
existence"51.
H ow ever, som e director, insp ired  by Italian neo-realism , w an ted  to docum ent 
w ith  their film s Ind ia 's  social reality  at this m om ent of transition . Film s belonging  to 
th is genre depicted  the lives of the com m on people, the prob lem s of m igration  and  
urban isation , an d  the d isorien tation  and  bew ilderm ent of the  coun try  folk at their 
arrival in  the  great Ind ian  m etropolis52. B ut besides rep resen ting  an objective rendering  
of con tem porary  Ind ia  focusing on the existential p roblem s of the m asses and  the 
im pact tha t m odern ity  and  developm ent w as hav ing  on them , the Ind ian  nationalist 
cinem a p rov ided  the audiences w ith  possible solutions to their p roblem s and  m oral 
dilem m as. M oreover, by  focusing on the everyday vicissitudes of the com m on people, 
the nationalist cinem a contribu ted  to the articulation of an  ideal m odel of the  Indian  
nation. It also a im ed at inculcating values of citizenship, obeisance to the law s of the 
state, rejection of caste and  religious prejudices, w hile p rom oting  the ideal of personal 
sacrifice for the com m on good.
responsibility or part to play". [Report of the Film Enquiry Committee 1951:43]. Commercial films 
of the 1950s and 1960s often reflected this Nehruvian vision.
51 Report of the Film Enquiry Committee 1951:42.
52 The city, in particular Bombay, become the privileged site of modernity, a place where 
traditional loyalties towards the family and the caste were shifted towards the less specific but 
more inclusive community of the nation, or towards even the more anonymous concept of the 
state, with its implacable laws in contrast with the conventions of tradition.
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The open ing  scenes of possibly one of the m ost in fluential and  typical film 
belonging  to this gen re53, M other India, replicated  the v isual id iom  of N ehruv ian  
progressive m odern isa tion  tha t appeared  on all governm en t pub lic ity  m aterial. W hile 
the opening  credits are rolling on, the cam era sw eeps on large construction w orks 
w here large earth  m oving  m achines are a t work. Electric pylons, cem ented roads, 
tractors and  cars crow d these opening  scenes. The scene th en  sw itches to R adha, the 
hero ine of the  film, w ho, desp ite  her personal tragedies, m ade  enorm ous sacrifices for 
the advancem ent of the com m on good. It w ill be her, ideal citizen of m o d em  India, 
w ho  w ill inaugu ra te  the irrigation  w orks that have finally b ro u g h t w ater to her village. 
A ll the  tradem ark  icons of the N eh ruv ian  visual id iom  so far d iscussed  feature in  these 
opening  scenes: the dam , the electric pylons and pow er station, heavy  m achinery, cars, 
tractors, and  a snapsho t of trad itional ru ra l life. Later on, in  one of the singing scenes 
(there are only a few  in th is film) the hero ine persuades h e r village folks n o t to 
abandon  the flooded fields b u t to w ork  together to im prove the land. She calls upon  
feelings of self-sacrifice and  cooperation. Further, a sequence show ing  a m ap  of India 
superim posed  by the im ages of a m ultitude  of peasan t w ork ing  the land  significantly 
transla te  in  an  engaging v isual language the m uch-valued  p rincip les of the tim e tha t 
only th ro u g h  h a rd  w ork, self-sacrifice and  cooperation for the  w ell being  of the w hole 
nation  th a t Ind ia  can succeed. This N ehruv ian  iconic language dom inated  Ind ia 's  
public  cu ltu re  and  established the criteria th a t governed  w h a t w as pub lished  in  the 
press, seen in  film s and  o ther electronic m edia, publicly  d isp layed  in  p o pu lar posters 
[Fig. 31, 34 and  35] or even h ea rd  on the radio. It becam e tru ly  hegem onic.
53This cinematic genre produced a large number of outstanding pictures. However, due to the 
strictures of space, the analysis here has been necessarily brief. For a comprehensive account on 
this genre see: Chakravarty [1993].
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Fig. 34 'M odern  Age'. 1947 ca. C alendar Poster
Fig. 35 Mid-50s C alendar Poster
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Demise of Nehru's Vision
D espite a strong  com m itm ent tow ards m odern isa tion  an d  progress and
secularism , a very  specific m ix tu re  of m odern  and trad itional ideas form ed the basis of 
N eh ru 's  political ideology. N ehru ism  tried  both  to efface trad ition  from  the self­
representations of the  state  an d  to conjoin m otifs tha t signified  continuity  w ith  the past. 
In  a w ay, ind igenous trad itions w ere only partly  m arginalized . The adop tion  of 
A soka's sym bolism  for tire na tional em blem  and  the national flag, the choice of tire Red 
Fort as the site of official celebration of tire nation, the choice of a suitable form al dress 
(black achkan and  w hite churidar pyjam as) for am bassadors and  o ther state personalities 
for cerem onies and  o ther state  functions [C houdhary  1984-1995: vol. 12, p .16] or tire 
in troduction  of trad itional elem ents in the official rituals drat accom panied dre transfer 
of p ow er in  1947 -  such  as "the singing of songs associated w ith  the freedom  
m ovem ents (...) dre sound ing  n o t of the brass w in d  in strum en ts beloved in  British 
cerem onials b u t conch shells w hich rela ted  the event to Ind ian  trad itions" [M asselos 
1990:40] -  the  su p p o rt of khadi and  handicrafts industries, the use  of dre B uddhist 
concept of Panchsheela as the  basis of Ind ia 's  foreign policy, the  design of the electoral 
sym bols -  dre m ajority  of w hich w ere originally derived  from  In d ia 's  ru ra l trad itions -  
and  even  the p rom otion  of Ind ia 's  cu ltural heritage all p o in t to th is direction. The 
w idely  he ld  v iew  of N ehru ism  as an enem y of trad itions com es from  tire confusion 
betw een trad ition  and  religion. N eh ru  w as a staunch  secularist b u t h is critique d id  no t 
ex tend  to trad ition  in  general. O n  the contrary, N eh ru  v iew ed  trad itions as partly  
p rov id ing  tire basis for change. In in dependen t India, trad itions could  change from  
being in strum en ts of oppression  into agents of progress, econom ic developm ent and 
social change. A ccording to K otari [1970:284], in  post-in d ep en d en t Ind ia  trad itional 
sym bols w ere used  to legitim ise changes. O n tire contrary, n e w  sym bols w ere 
em ployed  to legitim ise a reo rdering  of trad itional relations.
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Indeed , N ehru ism  w as successful (m ainly th ro u g h  N e h ru 's  steadfast vigilance 
and  strong  com m itm ent to the  principles u p o n  w hich India, its iden tity  and  m odel of 
na tionhood  w ere  fashioned)54 in  th a t it m ade its basic values an d  tenets n orm ative . It 
s tigm atised  the opposites of its basic principles -  such  as com m unalism , religion, 
parochialism , trad itionalism  -  so m uch  so tha t it transfo rm ed  them  into political 
taboos. For a w hile  (definitely till N eh ru  w as alive) the  grip  of the values of h is political 
cu lture  w as so com pelling, th a t hav ing  the values of N eh ru ism  becom e norm ative, 
being  non-secular, or even hav ing  a different socio-econom ic p rogram m e equalled  
being  anti-national. But in the end, N ehruism , how ever pervasive d u rin g  his tenure  as 
Prim e M inister of India, w as unable  to create a long lasting n a tiona l sym bolic system  
th a t rep resen ted  pow er, the n a tion  and  the people of India.
To a degree, it could be argued  tha t the bankrup tcy  of N eh ruv ian  sym bolism  
w as due  to its being  unintelligible to the Ind ian  m asses. It is often  stated  th a t Ind ia 's  
post-colonial secular elites -  of w hich N ehru  w as the forem ost rep resen ta tive  -  tried  to 
im pose a secular ideology on their country  that m ade little sense to m ost Indians. 
Accordingly, for D eshpande [2003], N eh ru 's  sym bolic reperto ire  w as com pletely 
d ivorced from  In d ia 's  cu ltu ral traditions. N ehruv ian  developm entalism , m odern ism  
and  scientific progress reduced  the Ind ian  nation  to a space of production : "The nation  
[wa]s figured  p rim arily  as an  econom ic space" and  "v isualized  specifically as a 
com m unity  of patrio tic  p roducers". Thus, w hile N ehru ism  ap p eared  to be extrem ely 
inclusive, Ind ian  ind iv iduals  h ad  no  particu lar cu ltural iden tity  [D eshpande 2000:185].
54 Accordingly, political movements and ideologies based on ethnic values were repeatedly 
isolated. "As long as I am the Prime Minister of India, I shall fight them (Ram Rajiya Parishad, 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh and RSS) with all my strength. They have no policy, no object, no 
principles. I shall not allow them to lift up their heads" [Nehru on The Statesman, 24 November 
1961]. The Congress System itself -  which allowed different political factions -  such as the 
socialist and even the Hindu nationalist -  to be represented into its folds (under its umbrella) 
reinforced Nehruism.
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The decline of N eh ru 's  v ision of m o d em  India w as also a victim  of the  changes 
th a t occurred in  the political panoram a in  India and  of the failure of h is economic 
p rogram m e. C ontrary  to N eh ru 's  expectations, p lan n ed  developm ent and 
industria lisa tion  d id  n o t reinforce a sense of national identity ; ne ither d id  they w eaken 
parochial loyalties in itiating  a secularisation of Ind ia 's  society. Because the ideal w orld  
described by  N eh ruv ian  ideology never m aterialised, and  its institu tions, a p ro d u c t of 
the ideology, d id  no t w ork, th a t ideology becam e less credible. Similarly, N ehruv ian  
sym bolic constructions -  based  on the values of developm ent, m odernism , and 
secularism  -  w ere g radually  discredited.
N e h ru 's  failure to legitim ise h is b ran d  of 'civil relig ion ' can also be a ttribu ted  to 
the fact th a t according to Bellah a civil religion "can foster in teg ration  only u nder the 
conditions of lim ited  com petition  from  alternative theological and  ideological system s" 
[Bellah 1976a: 155], In m o d em  differentiated, com plex and  m ulti-relig ious societies like 
India, a nu m b er of system s of legitim isation com pete to p rov ide  the u ltim ate 
explanation  and  justification of the nation-state. In Ind ia  it w as th o u g h t that 
m odern isa tion  a n d  the secularisation of the state w ou ld  transfer p eop le 's  loyalties from  
the tem ples to  the nation  and  drat education, state p ro p ag an d a  and  the m ass m edia 
w ou ld  accelerate th is process of conversion. H ow ever, the  dogm as of Ind ia 's  civil 
religion w ere e laborated  by a sm all educated  elite. A m ong tire m asses the  new  dogm as, 
tire n ew  sym bols an d  rituals rem ained  overw helm ingly  alien. A gainst this failure of 
the secularisation of politics, a new  discourse em erged th a t h inged  on tire resurgence 
and  rev ival of a religious language and  th a t veered increasingly tow ards the cultural 
id iom  of the m ajoritarian  H in d u  com m unity.
It w as u n d e r these circum stances tha t Ind ian  political elites first tu rned  tow ards 
popu lism  as a m eans to m ain ta in  pow er (but n o t to challenge N eh ruv ian  legitim ate 
norm s) and  later, w ith  tire escalation of tire process of de leg itim ation  of N ehruism , they  
increasingly con tribu ted  to tire establishm ent of com m unal id iom s and  to the  ethnic
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outlook of In d ia 's  political discourse. Political leaders s ta rted  to use religious arenas to 
m ake p ronouncem en ts on sp irituality  and  national un ity  on  behalf of the nation-state. 
Parties, includ ing  the ru ling  Congress, m anoeuvred  to take advan tage  of the situation 
tarn ish ing  "w h a t rem ained  of its secular credentials and  p rov id ing  am m unition  for the 
force of H indutva"  [Sherlock 1994:161], show ing "little concern w ith  political or public  
m orality  in  tire p u rsu it of w h a t A dam  Sm ith called 'collective goods'"  [Malik and 
Singh 1992:321]. These m anoeuvres aim ed at cap tu ring  votes and  ensuring  electoral 
success by  m an ipu la ting  vote banks show ed the effectiveness of in tertw in ing  
nationalism  w ith  relig ious iden tity  and that the elusive H in d u  vote (that the Jana 
Sangh first and  the BJP later h ad  been chasing since independence) w as in  fact in  the 
m aking  [M alik and  Singh 1992].
A ttacks to N ehru ism  cam e from  different quarters n o t m u ch  long after N eh ru 's  
death  in  1964. In ter cine conflicts w ith in  Congress for the  estab lishm ent of a new  
leadersh ip  w eakened  its s truc tu re  and  its system  thus m aking  the pa rty  less reliable as 
the uph o ld er of N eh ruv ian  principles. W ar w ith  China in  1962 w as a fu rther blow  of 
destab ilisation  to N ehru ism  and  its policy of non-alignm ent an d  non-in tervention. 
H ow ever, w hen  Ind ira  G andhi becam e Congress p residen t in  1966, N eh ru 's  em phasis 
on  socio-econom ic developm ent, secularism , industria lisa tion , p rog ress still dom inated  
the tone of the political debate. A t the end  of tire 1960s the C ongress system 55 becam e 
m ore fragile [M anor 1990:67]. W ith the 1967 election and  the g row th  of political 
com petition  the  C ongress lost pow er in  several states and  for the  first tim e oppositional 
parties form ed coalition governm ents. The Congress sp lit in  1969, and  the follow ing 
1971 election w ere characterised by increased confrontation  and  in ter-party  
com petition. This new  situation  led Ind ira  G andhi to  ad o p t a m ore confrontational 
postu re  tow ards the opposition. She also centralised decision m aking  process w ith in  
Congress, abolishing in tra-party  election, significantly alienating and  disaffecting the
55 For a comprehensive description of the Congress System, see Rajni Kothari [1964], W H 
Morris-Jones [1978] and Manor [1990]
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base from  the central leadership , and severing the contacts w ith  regional and  local 
pa rty  bosses and  pow er bases56.
In the 1970s N eh ruv ian  principles w ere still considered fundam en ta l norm s of 
In d ia 's  political system  th a t could  n o t be challenged and  Ind ira  G andhi show ed 
particu lar firm ness in  uph o ld in g  these principles. In particu lar in  the  first years of her 
tenure, she insisted  on p ro m p t firm  action against com m unalism  especially against 
H in d u  nationalism . In a series of h igh ly  sym bolical m anoeuvres she w as exceptionally 
tough  in denuncia ting  Jana Sangh 's b ran d  of fascism  [Jaffrelot 1996:239], and, while 
th rea ten ing  to ban  the RSS again, im plem ented  a tw o-m onths ban  of the  shakns' 
activities. In  add ition  to all that, in  1972 the governm en t passed  a C rim inal Law 
(am endm ent) Bill th a t gave the G overnm ent new  m eans to figh t com m unalism  and 
param ilita ry  organisations.
H ow ever, centralisation of pow er w ith in  the governm en t and  the Congress 
p a rty  itself, die transform ation  of the Congress s truc tu re  an d  the decline of the 
C ongress system  eventually  h ad  serious consequences for In d ia 's  political m ake-up. 
Slowly b u t system atically, C ongress' pow er base w as e roded  w hich  w as reflected in  a 
general decay of political institu tions [M anor 1990:72] and  die decline in  confidence in 
the state as an agency of social change, h i add ition  to tiiat, d u rin g  the 1970s the Indian  
peop le  becam e m ore politicised and  "increasingly aw are of the  logic of electoral 
politics, of the  secrecy of d ie  ballot, and  of the notion  tiia t p arties  and  leaders should  
respond  to those w hom  they  represen t"  [M anor 1990:72]. A ll this resu lted  in  die 
em ergence of m ass politics and  popu lism  w hich perversely  encouraged  Congress to 
em ploy  direct appeals to the m asses in  o rder to obtain the votes th a t the  pa rty  w as no t 
able to obtain d iro u g h  its u sua l channels, due  to the  centralisation of p ow er and  end  of
56 This process of centralisation of power in "a pyramidical decision-making structure" 
[Kochanek 1976:104] marked the end of intra-party democracy and seriously damaged the 
Congress organisation which lost contact with its power base.
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in tra -party  dem ocracy. This decline of Ind ia 's  political system  w as also accom panied 
by d ie  em ergence of new  form s of nationalism  heigh tened  by  the 1971 condict w ith  
Pakistan, from  w hich  In d ia 's  sense of patriotic p ride  w as heigh tened  [N andy, 
1980:113]. The im position  of the Em ergency in  1975 an d  the follow ing spell of Janata 
P arty  governm ent w ere sym ptom s of die changed political system . Tlie state becam e 
less assiduous in  u p ho ld ing  In d ia 's  u nw ritten  political norm s. W hen 1980s arrived, 
and  Congress cam e back to pow er, the governm ent even tually  uncerem oniously  
abandoned  program m es of social and  economic developm ent [M anor 1990:85-86]. In 
the  sam e period , in stead  of condem ning  the use of relig ion in  politics, d ie  state th rough  
the C ongress and  its P rim e M inister u sed  religion as an extrem e m easure  to hang  on to 
pow er.
A lready  in  the im m ediate  afterm adi of the triu m p h an t w ar w ith  Pakistan  in 
1971, Ind ira  G andh i encouraged  the cultivation of her im age as M odier India, w hen  
she "found  her strengtii in  ind igenous cultural term s, n o t by  espousing  m odern  
fem inism , b u t as a w om an  m obilizing the reservoir of trad itional sym bols of fem ale 
pow er"  [O ldenburg  1990]. Like M odier India she w as p ic tu red  em erg ing  from  the m ap 
of India. She appeared  in  po p u lar Ind ian  political posters as the invincible H indu  
goddess D urga, u n d e r  the caption  "Ind ira  is India and Ind ia  is Ind ira" [O ldenburg 
1990]. This passage from  a language of secularism  and  progress, to a language of 
religious trad ition  w as fu rtherm ore  stressed by a series of sym bolic acts. T ow ards die 
end  of h e r political career, Ind ira  G andhi openly flirted  w id i the H in d u  vote. D uring 
the first p a rt of 1980s, in  A ssam , Jam m u & K ashm ir, and  Punjab Ind ira  G andhi tried  to 
w eaken  her political rivals by  resorting  to specifically H in d u  them es and  appealing to 
the  H in d u  com m unity . In K ashm ir she d iv ided  the electorate of the H in d u  Jam m u and  
M uslim  valley by  using  a com m unal language. In Punjab, Ind ira  chose G iani Zail Singh 
as her p a rty 's  p residen tial candidate  du ring  the Em ergency, w ho, w hen  chief M inister 
of Pmijab, u sed  to place p laques w ith  the sayings of G uru  N anak  on Punjab 's roads 
[C hakravarty  1994:17]. In die sam e period, Ind ira  G andhi publicly  v isited  a large
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num ber of tem ples and  religious celebrations. She pa id  a public  v isit to D evraha Baba 
of V rindavan . In  1983 Ind ira  G andhi also partic ipa ted  in  the inaugu ra tion  of 
Satyam itranand  G iri's  B harat M ata M andir a t H ard  w ar and  to centennial celebrations 
of the A rya Samaj [Jaffrelot 1996:330], She also encouraged  a "delegation  led by Mr 
Shalw ale of the  A rya Samaj to launch  a cam paign against the  conversions of a few  
H arijans to Islam " [Engineer 1989:9] and she w as show n  w earing  a saffron petticoat 
u n d e r  her sari w h en  visiting religious sites and  leaders [M anchanda 1990:34 quo ted  in 
H ocking 1994:161].
In  the years th a t follow ed Ind ira  G andh i's  assassination, the  Congress u n d e r 
the inexperienced leadersh ip  of h e r o lder son Rajiv tried  to use  the transform ed 
political system  to h is advantage. But to ru n  w ith  the hare  an d  h u n t w ith  the ho u n d s 
m ean t n o t only th a t the Ind ian  governm ent w as no t above relig ion  anym ore, b u t also 
th a t use  of religions id iom s finally go t legitim ised. D uring  h is tenu re  as Prim e M inister, 
on  different occasions Rajiv G andhi w as accused of p lay ing  the com m unal card for 
electoral pu rposes alternatively  appealing  to Ind ia 's  tw o m ajor com m unities, the 
H in d u  and  M uslim . The 1984 C ongress electoral cam paign  w as very aggressive. 
O pposition  forces w ere  dep icted  as antinational, b reed ing  feelings of insecurity  and  of 
anxiety abou t na tional u n ity  [M anor 1990:86], The Shah Bano case, the 1986 unlocking 
of the gates of tire Babri M asjid to allow  H in d u  w orship , and  h is sta tem ent on the Babri 
M asjid/R am jam nabhoom i controversy  follow ing the laying of the  foundation  stone of 
the Ram  tem ple in  A yodhya on 9 N ovem ber 1989 w ere all h igh ly  sym bolic activities 
a im ed at ingra tia ting  bo th  com m unities in  view  of tire forthcom ing elections and  w ere 
reg ard ed  as dangerous tu rn ing  po in ts in  the h istory  of in d ep en d en t India [Nugent: 
1990:160]. Even the im m ensely  p o p u lar television series Ram ayana  received the blessing 
of Rajiv G andhi57.
57 Sagar -  the director of the popular series -  praised Rajiv Gandhi's role who "had always 
wanted a programme based on Ramayan to be made". [Organiser, 20 Nov. 1987, p,12]
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All these factors contribu ted  to the transform ation  of Ind ia 's  political 
panoram a, the w ay elections w ere w on  and  lost and  votes obtained. Thus, the state 
started  to speak  a d ifferent language, a com im m alist idiom , signalling a passage from  a 
language of developm ent, p rogress and  m odernity , to a language of devotionalism , 
trad itionalism  and  recovery of the past. W hile the state  p rom o ted  m ixed m essages, 
fluctuating betw een  extrem es, its official symbolic reperto ire  becam e void of m eanings. 
This created an ideological (but also symbolical) vacuum , of w hich the new ly 
restruc tu red  forces of H in d u  nationalism  p rom ptly  took advantage.
Concluding Remarks
In  th is chapter I exam ined the sym bolic represen tations of the nation  and  of
national iden tity  of the N eh ruv ian  period. It w as observed  th a t because state 
p ro p ag an d a  and  civic education  orig inated  from  a strong  centralised  decision-m aking 
authority , it w as able to p roduce  consistent m essages th ro u g h o u t its structure. This 
sym bol-system  w as rep roduced  in  a variety  of m edia: in  tire publicity  cam paigns and 
new sreels issued  by  the M inistry of Informatioxr and  Broadcasting; in the official 
sym bolism  and  cerem onials of the state; in  the electoral system  and  in tire Ind ian  
N ational A rm y; and  also in  stam ps and  banknotes w hich announced  the new  political 
o rder rep roducing  the new  national em blem s, sym bols and  iconographical styles. The 
im age of India th a t em erged  w as of a progressive, m o d ern  yet traditional, 
industria lised , m u lticu ltu ra l and  secular nation. Tractors, dam s, cogwheels, electric 
pylons, factories, and  tire sheaf of w heat becam e tire ub iqu itous sym bols of m odem  
India.
The follow ing chapters explore how , despite  the resistance of the  original 
constitu tional v ision of India, since the 1980s alternative visions have em erged that 
have p rom oted  concepts of iden tity  based no m ore on the nation  b u t on the com m unity 
(religious, regional, and  linguistic). A departu re  from  tire practices of N ehruism
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inevitably  m ean t a reshap ing  of the political scene and  changes of the values and  
legitim ate no rm s of nationhood . U sing Elder and C obb's [1983] term inology, I exam ine 
ho w  a new  political system  em erged  w hich attem pted  to elevate low er-order sym bols 
(m ostly situational) to the  sta tus of h igher-o rder sym bols. The focus w ill be on 
H indu tva , tire n ew  dom inan t national narrative. The next chapters a ttem p t to explore 
the role p layed  by tire H in d u  religious trad ition  in shap ing  tire contours of Ind ia 's  
na tional iden tity  p rom oting  at the sam e tim e "the sup rem e v irtues of a pow erful, 
d iscip lined and  disciplining nation-state, peop led  by a cu ltu rally  and  socially unified  
com m unity  of sp iritua l H indus"  [C hakravarty and G ooptu  2000:92] and  a m ythical 
H in d u  go lden  age. In particular, I analyse the role of p re-m odern  sym bols, m yths and  
trad itions in  the  process of construction of nationhood, try ing  to investigate the reasons 
for tire politicisation of tire H in d u  religion and the sacralisation of Ind ian  politics.
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CHAPTER 5 
The Sun Will Rise and the Lotus Shall Bloom1
In the afterm ath  of the dem olition  of the Babri M asjid, in  1993 Jasw ant Singh, a
BJP m em ber of tire Lok Sabha, in  an article pub lished  o n  the RSS m outhpiece The
O rganiser explicitly spoke of the em ergence of a new  India:
"It is a g rea t sorrow  to m e that this transition  from  the old  o rder tow ards an 
em erg ing  Ind ia  [...] h a d  to occur accom panied by  violence. But it  is w ithou t 
d o u b t a transition  from  tire old to the new ."2
Indeed , in  India, du ring  the  1980s, tire erosion of tire N eh ruv ian  ideological 
v ision of tire na tion  created the discursive space for tire renego tia tion  and  tire 
articulation of n ew  concepts of na tionhood  and  national iden tity  [A ssayag 1998:143], In 
particu lar, the  end  of tire preoccupations th a t characterised the  post-colonial set-up and  
established tire role of the nation-state, along w ith  tire em ergence of a m ore open 
m arket econom y as the  "m otor of m odern isation  and  developm ent" [C hakravarty  and 
G ooptu  2000:91] con tribu ted  to the developm ent of new  im aginations of the nation  and 
alternative national identities. The rise of these com petitive nationalist ideologies, of 
w hich H in d u tv a  is tire m ost p rom inen t one, have "raised  questions about the validity  
of the secular nationalist ideology w hich has been the fo u n dation  of the Ind ian  state 
since its independence  [and] abou t tire na tu re  and  function of the  Ind ian  state as well 
as the basis of Ind ian  national identity ." [Malik and  Singh 1992:1].
The em ergence of H in d u  nationalism  and  tire affirm ation of its national 
sym bolic reperto ire  are explored in  the next tw o chapters. Beside assessing and 
exam ining the m yths, sym bols and  rituals of the nation  p rom o ted  by  tire H in d u  right, 
these chapters also offer an analysis of tire relationship  be tw een  nationalism  and 
religion in a transitional society such  as India, as the chapters a ttem p t to explain the
11980 Vajpayee's BJP Presidential Speech; quoted in 'BJP Can Move Mountains: Advanji'. BJP 
Today, 16-31 January 2006, vol. 15 (2).
2 Jaswant Singh. Organiser, 11. Apr, 1993. Quoted in Jaffrelot [1996:475].
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role of relig ion in  the  processes of evolu tion  of Ind ian  na tiona l iden tity  at the  end  of the 
tw entie th  century . The critical exchange here  is w ith  Brass and  Sm ith 's w orks in 
rela tion  to the role of religion in  ethno-national identifications in  the  m o d em  w orld , 
and  the role of religious sym bols in  m aking  ethnicity  a m ean ingfu l cu ltu ral and 
political category.
This chap ter is d iv ided  in  tw o parts. In  the first part, I w ill p rov ide  a brief 
historical account of H in d u  nationalism , presenting  also an assessm ent of its electoral 
perform ance. The second p a rt is instead  devoted  to d ie analysis of H indu tva 's  
strategies for nation-build ing . A n exam ination of H in d u tv a 's  sym bolic reperto ire  is 
instead  die focus of d ie follow ing chapter. We can anticipate here  tha t H in d u tv a 's  
sym bolic reperto ire  is m ade  u p  of sym bols of consensus an d  differentiation in  that 
these sym bols "index different social identifications an d  sum m arize  d ifferent pa tterns 
of tastes, m oralities, and  general life-styles" [Elder and  Cobb 1983:122 quo ting  Gusfield 
1963:172] thus  d istingu ish ing  am ong different categories of citizens.
W hile d ie sym bolic inven tory  of N ehruv ian  Ind ia  w as m ad e  u p  of sym bols of 
the regim e and  die political com m unity, H in d u tv a 's  sym bols are for the m ajor p a rt 
situational sym bols. This particu lar feature typical of H in d u tv a 's  sym bolic reperto ire  is 
extrem ely significant and  po in ts to a very  in teresting  fact. R ather than  com pletely 
replacing h igher-o rder sym bols of the regim e and the political com m unity  (a 
particu larly  d ifficult task  tiiat only  rad ical political m ovem ents such as revolutions 
have p roved  capable of doing), H in d u tv a  has adop ted  a tw o-p ronged  strategy. O n the 
one hand , it has app rop ria ted  h igher-o rder sym bols b y  attach ing  n ew  m eanings to 
them . O n the other, it  has aim ed a t transform ing  situational low er-order sym bols into 
h igher-o rder ones. Tlius, by  bu ild ing  die legitim acy of H in d u tv a 's  political sym bol and  
heigh ten ing  its sym bolic w eigh t first ra ther tiian im posing  a new  sym bolic order, 
H in d u tv a  h o p ed  to eventually  change the stockpile of In d ia 's  basic nationalist 
sym bolic reperto ire  w ithou t d irectly  attacking the pre-existing sym bolic order.
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H in d u  nationalism  has alw ays been an im p o rtan t com ponent of Ind ia 's  
freedom  m ovem en t and  a considerable force in Ind ian  politics p lay ing  a crucial role 
also in the life of the Congress. A rticu lated  at the beg inn ing  of the tw entie th  century  
and  roo ted  bo th  in  the  h istory  of the Ind ian  national m ovem en t itself and  in the  socio­
religious reform  and  revivalist m ovem ents of the late n ineteen th  century, it w as born  
as a reaction to the im pact of m odern  w estern  th o u g h t w hich w as u shered  in by 
colonial rule. The influence of E uropean  though t and  ideologies of nationalism  instilled 
a sense of insecurity  and  inadequacy  am ongst certain  w estern ised  H in d u  elites w ho 
w ere pu sh ed  to  refo rm  or revive their trad itions in  o rder to  gain  self-respect, to defend 
their iden tity  and  to m eet the challenges posed  by the W est. Indeed , tire m eeting  w ith  
o ther cu ltu res triggered  a process of conscious ideologisation of cu ltu ral practices. In 
its m ost e lem entary  form , H in d u  nationalism  p ro p o u n d ed  a form  of ethnic 
nationalism , w hich  identified  the essence of the em erging  In d ian  national iden tity  in  
Ind ia 's  sp irituality  and  in  the H indus its "recognisable cu ltu ral u n it"  [Jaffrelot 1996:12 
quo ting  Sm ith  1971:217] of India. A  form  of p rim ord ia l na tionalism  and  the concept of 
A ryanism  perm eated  early  H in d u  nationalist though t [Bhatt 2001]. A ccording to this 
fram e of though t, the Ind ian  state, its social form ation and  civil society shou ld  be 
reorgan ized  entirely  along H in d u  principles and  doctrine. D espite this, H indu  
nationalism  w as n o t a hom ogeneous m ovem ent and  included  bo th  those w ho w anted  
to preserve  H in d u  trad itional social o rder and  those w ho w an ted  to reform  H indu  
trad ition  to s treng then  Ind ia 's  na tional unity . Both how ever, a im ed a t recovering a 
H in d u  national iden tity  by  going back to the fundam en ta l tru th s  of H induism . 
Inevitably, the  political character of H in d u  nationalism  w as couched in  religious term s.
Sw am i V ivekananda (1863-1902), A urobindo G hose (1872-1950) and  Bal 
G angadhar Tilak (1856-1920) w ere som e of the  m ajor exponen ts of this doctrine. 
H ow ever, fu n d am en ta l to the  political ideology of con tem porary  H in d u  nationalism  
w as Veer Savarkar's Essentials o f H indutva! W ho is a H indu?  w hich  m ade the term  
H in d u tv a  the foundational concept of m odern  H in d u  nationalis t ideology and
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pro v id ed  an  elaborate and, for the  first tim e, distinct defin ition  of Indianness [Bhatt 
2001]. Savarkar's defin ition  of Indianness w as insp ired  by w estern  nationalist thought 
w hich  iden tified  in  the u n ity  of land, people and cu lture  (the latter u nders tood  either 
as language, religion, custom s and  traditions) the basic essence of every  nation. Indeed, 
for Savarkar the  defin ition  of H indu tva , or H indunness, is n o t necessarily  based  on 
religion, b u t on territory , b lood and  even culture: rashtra, ja ti and  sam skriti. Even if the 
three elem ents identified  as constituent of Ind ian  iden tity  are equally  im portan t and  
essential, it is sam skriti -  w hich Savarkar in tended  as cu lture  and  civilization -  th a t w as 
crucial for the defin ition  of Indianness. In Savarkar's term s, cu ltu re  and  civilization are 
strictly linked  to  religion and  they include the "com m on law s and  rites" [1969:92]. 
Thus, central to this b ran d  of cu ltu ral nationalism  is the idea  th a t India is n o t a 
com posite cu ltu re  born  o u t of the in term ingling  of d ifferent cu ltu ral traditions. O n the 
contrary, according to H in d u tv a 's  ideologue, Ind ia is basically  H indu . A series of 
foreign invasions gave the im pression  th a t Ind ia possessed a com posite culture, w hen 
in  reality, the  a rgum en t goes, all o ther cultures 'h in d u iz e d ' them selves w hen  they 
cam e in contact w ith  H indu ism  [Basu et al. 1993: 37]. In  Savarkar's  ow n w ords, a 
H in d u  "m eans person  w ho regards the land  of B haratvarsha from  the Indus to the  seas 
as h is Fatherland , as w ell as his H oly  lan d  -  tha t is the cradle lan d  of his religion". 
Thus, H indu ism  becam e "the p illar of a nativ ized  version  of nationalism  bu ild  in 
opposition  to the liberal secular m odel" [N andy 1995:57].
H in d u  nationalism  w as also based  on die reform  of H in d u ism  w hich w as thus 
transform ed  in to  a hom ogeneous pan -Ind ian  religion by  dow np lay ing  caste and  sect 
differences, identify ing  a com m on ritua l practice and  a com m on ho ly  book. Because 
the aspects -  as w ell as the h istories and  m yths -  w hich w ere generally  created or 
selected to ascertain  certain  aspects of the national life m irro red  the asp iration  of die 
dom inan t elites, this reform ed H indu ism  incorporated  m ainly  Brahm inic and  Vedic 
trad itions w hile rejecting H in d u ism 's  sm all tra d itio n s 3 . Besides hom ogenising
3 A series of factors determined this predilection for high culture. First, the early stalwarts of 
Hindutva were naturally culturally alienated from India's forms of vernacular Hinduism. 
Second, the re-discovery of classical Hinduism by European sympathetic scholars and their 
reconstruction of Hinduism influenced the Indian reformers. Lastly, under the influence of
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trad itions of H indu ism , H in d u  nationalism  pushed  to "m asculin ize and  m artialize" 
[N andy 1995:60] the  H in d u  com m unity, w hich they considered  heavily  fem inised and  
w eakened  by  the O rientalist discourse. In H in d u  nationalism  there  is indeed  a likeness 
to " the  rom antic ist vision of recuperation  of p ast glory and  la ten t sp irituality  of India 
th ro u g h  em ploym en t of m o d em  techniques of scholarship, m o d ern  organization, 
discipline and  collective w ill in  o rder to overcom e the hum ilia tion  inflicted by  colonial 
ru le" [H ansen 1999:43]. H isto ry  -  as the collective m em ory  of the  nation  -  becam e the 
central p illar in  the process of bu ild ing  a cu ltural identity , the fundam en ta l tool for 
legitim ising Ind ia 's  p resen t actions. This p rom p ted  a selection of the  past, and  a search 
for local heroes and  patrio tic  figures w ho sym bolically resisted  foreign pow er (like the 
eigh teen th  century  M aharatta  ru le r Shivaji w ho fought against the  M uslim s rulers), 
focusing on the h istories of those th a t the British identified as In d ia 's  m artial castes (tire 
Rajputs an d  M aratthas) and  transform ing  the h istory of Ind ia  in to  a p e rp e tu a l struggle 
against foreign (in particu la r M uslim ) invaders.
D isillusioned by  C ongress politics and  deeply  influenced  by  Savarkar, a 
M aharash trian  Brahm in, D r K eshav Baliram  H edge w ar, fo u n d ed  the Rashtriya 
Sw ayam sevak Sangh [RSS] in  1925. It w as the collapse of tire nationalist cooperation 
m ovem en t and  of H indu-M uslim  jo in t political action, accom panied by  the em ergence 
of the  anti-caste m ovem ent (w hich w as probably  perceived  as a th rea t to tire 
em ergence of a un ified  H in d u  nation) th a t p rom pted  H edgew ar to find an alternative 
nationalist m odel to the one p roposed  by the Congress. A dop ting  tire essence of 
Savarkar's H in d u tv a  as its ideological p lank, the  RSS w as bo rn  w ith  tire aim  of 
bu ild ing  a H in d u  nation  to safeguard  H in d u  dharma an d  its culture. D espite p ledging  
to w ork  for the  liberation of the H in d u  nation, at the beginning , the RSS focused on 
recru iting  and  tra in ing  young  boys to serve tire cause of H in d u  nationalism  and  tire 
H in d u  nation, ra th e r th an  searching for direct invo lvem ent in  politics. The RSS w as 
conceived as an  au thoritarian , h igh ly  centralised, hierarchical and  param ilitary  
organisation. G reat im portance w as given to character-build ing  of its m em bers 
(swayam sevak) th ro u g h  the inculcation of discipline, and  the ideal of service for the
evangelical Christianity, India's little traditions were systematically devalued and became 
indices of India's backwardness.
208
H in d u  nation. The call for discipline and  physical tra in ing  derived  from  the belief that
the H indus, after a p rosperous golden  age, h ad  becom e com placent and  d iv ided  and
easy p rey  for successive M uslim  invasions and  British dom ination . Thus, in  order to
bu ild  a strong  H in d u  nation, according to G olw alkar, ano ther M aharash trian  Brahm in
w ho succeeded H edgew ar a t the helm  of the RSS:
"[T]here is only one remedy. To reawaken in ourselves (...) our own national 
consciousness penetrating deep into the soil. (...) It is only (...) an organisation of 
the type of the [RSS], capable of embracing all of our people in a loving and eternal 
brotherhood and making them intensely conscious of their national destiny that can 
effectively check the present rot of selfishness, dissensions, and vulgar 
imitations” [Golwalkar 1966:228].
Idolised  as 'G uru ji', G olw alkar is considered another im portan t figure in  the
developm ent of H in d u tv a  ideology. Like Savarkar's, h is social and  political ph ilosophy
w as dom inated  by  the question  of national identity . A ccording to G olw alkar, Ind ian
iden tity  is exclusively H indu . It w as H indu ism  that shaped  tire na tion  and  resisted  the
assault of heterogeneous cu ltu ral system s. Because d iversity  challenged th is rig id
definition of Indianness, H in d u tv a  w as natu ra lly  less to leran t th an  other ideologies
tow ards m inorities, w hich  are seen "a sign of backw ardness or of national betrayal"
[N andy 1995:80]. G olw alkar, strongly  rejected m ulticu ltu ra lism  and  in a fam ous
passage, s ta ted  that:
"[T]he foreign races in  H in d u sth an  m u st e ither ad o p t the  H in d u  culture 
and  language, m u st learn  to respect and  hold  in  reverence H in d u  religion, 
m u st en terta in  no  ideas b u t those of glorification of the H in d u  race and  
cu lture  [...] or m ay stay in  the country ,w holly  su bo rd ina ted  to the H indu  
nation , claim ing nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential 
trea tm en t -  no t even citizen 's rights" [Golw alkar 1939:62]4.
Taking as a m odel G erm any u n d e r N azism , G olw alkar p ro v id ed  a definition of 
the H in d u  na tion  as basically opposite  to the  idea of com posite nationalism . G olw alkar 
offered a very  exclusivist definition of Indianness. In  this sense, H indu , w hich for 
Savarkar d id  n o t necessarily  refer to a specific religious identity , w ith  G olw alkar is 
identified  w ith  H indu ism . Indeed, for G olw alkar nationhood  w as based  on the un ity  of 
country, race, religion, culture and  language.
4 Note though, that both Savarkar and Golwalkar were more interested in cultural uniformity 
rather than racial homogeneity.
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The RSS gained  significant popu larity  d u ring  Partition  w hen  its m em bers d id  
considerable relief w ork  w ith  an d  for the H in d u  refugees. In the  afterm ath  of its ban  
follow ing the assassination of M ahatm a G andhi in  1948, the RSS realised that, being 
prim arily  a cu ltu ral and  social organisation, it n eeded  to be able to influence politics. 
Refusing to convert into a political party , in  1951 the RSS fo u n d ed  tire Bharatiya Jana 
Sangh [BJS], a political party  sym pathetic  to its ideology. C u ltu ra l nationalism  and 
'in teg ral hum an ism ' w ere the central ideological p lanks of the Jana Sangh. Integral 
hum an ism  w as defined  by D eendayal U padhyaya, an RSS m em ber and  founder of the 
Jana Sangh. Liberally using  a large num ber of trad itional H in d u  tropes, U padhyaya 
identified  the ideal social o rder in  an organic Ind ian  un ity  based  on ektamata (oneness) 
and  regu la ted  by  dharma (duty) understood  as "those e ternal princip les th a t sustain  an 
entity  -  in d iv id u a l or corporate -  and  abiding by w hich, th a t en tity  can achieve 
m ateria l p rosperity  in  this w orld  and  sp iritual salvation in  the  next" [quoted in  M alik 
and  Singh 1994:17], In tegral hum an ism  w as also tire base for the  form ulation  of an 
alternative m odel of econom ic developm ent respectful of ind igenous ethos and  
cu lture5.
A fter found ing  tire Jana Sangh, tire RSS sough t to expand  its base by creating in 
1964 the V ishw a H in d u  P arishad  [VHP] w ith  the in ten t to ionite the various H in d u  
religious leadersh ips and  sects. T hrough the p rom otion  of a p rogram m e of socio­
cu ltu ral reform s and  ethno-relig ious m obilising cam paigns, the V H P has since becom e 
an  effective agent of H indu tva 's  strategy. The VH P's activity  m ainly  aim s a t the 
uplifting  of a religious consciousxress th rough  vast scale p rogram s of ritua l 
perform ances and  d issem ination  of teachings about H induism . O ther organisations -  
of w hich the trade  un ions [Bharatiya M azdoor Sangh -  BMS], the strong  N orth  Ind ian  
s tu d en t m ovem en t [Akhil B haratiya V idyarth i P arishad  -  ABVP] an d  the you th  w ing 
of the  VH P [Bajrang Dal] are tire m ost p rom inen t -  have since jo ined  w h a t has becom e 
to be kn o w n  as the Sangh P arivar (literally, tire fam ily of organisations).
5 On the electoral politics of the BJS see later.
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Ill th is na tiona l narrative, it is this supposed  p rim acy  of H in d u  cu lture tha t is
p rom o ted  to coun ter successfully the  perceived th rea t from  W estern  culture, w hile the
invention  of a m ythical p as t of unity , harm ony  and  p rosperity  he lps creating the idea
of hom ogeneous genuine com m unity . H in d u tv a 's  v ision  for Ind ia  is deliberately
defined against N eh ru 's  ow n version. The nation  is based  on  a supposed  com m on
ethnicity  and  consists of a com m on language, culture an d  som etim es race. C itizenship
and partic ipa tion  to the  n a tion  are no t defined by the C onstitu tion  b u t by cu ltural
p aram eters  and  ethnic loyalties. If N eh ru 's  m odel of na tionhood  g u aran teed  pluralism ,
H in d u tv a 's  denies it or subsum es it u n d e r  the m ajoritarian  tolerant6 H in d u  identity.
W hile N eh ru 's  Ind ianness w as a reflection of an all-inclusive territo ria l nationalism
and  found  expression in  the  C onstitu tion  and in  tire 1955 C itizen Act, H in d u tv a 's  ideal
of a H in d u  nation  is exclusivist. If according to the C onstitu tion  an Ind ian  is anyone
w ho is b o rn  w ith in  the coun try 's  borders, for the Sangh P arivar a true  Ind ian  is he/she
w ho regards Ind ia  no t only as h is/her fatherland  b u t also as h is/her holy  land.
Rejecting the universalistic  and  territo ria l quality  of nationalism , Savarkar specified the
ethnic and  racial character of the H in d u tv a  b rand  of na tionalism  a lthough  rejecting the
concept of racial purity :
"The H in d u s  are n o t m erely  the citizens of the In d ian  state  because they  are 
u n ited  n o t only by  the bonds of the love they b ear to  a com m on m otherland  
b u t also by  tire bonds of a com m on blood. U rey  are n o t only a na tion  b u t a 
rece-jati. The w o rd  jati, derived  from  the roo t Jan, to p roduce, m eans a 
b ro therhood , a race de term ined  by a com m on origin, possessing  a com m on 
b lood. All H in d u s  claim  to have in their veins the  b lood  of the m igh t race 
inco rporated  w ith  an d  descended  from  the  Vedic fathers." 
[Savarkarl969:84-85]
H ow ever, H in d u tv a  and  the political culture w ith  it associated does n o t sim ply 
reject N eh ruv ian  values and  sym bols. On the contrary, it re -app rop ria ted  som e of tire 
h igher-o rder sym bols of N eh ruv ian  Ind ia  to su it the  Sangh P ariv a r 's  ideology. Pandey  
[1993:265] regard s  the "ability  of H in d u  discourse to ap p ro p ria te  for itself the language 
of the  'tru ly ' na tional"  a factor th a t u ltim ately  w orks in  favou r of H indu tva. Even 
though  d u rin g  the 1980s follow ing tire dem ise of N eh ruv ian  sym bolism , the Sangh 
P arivar b ro u g h t on  the political arena a great novelty , vehem ently  resuscitating a
6 On Hindutva's notion of tolerance see below.
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sym bolic trad ition , tire Sangh P arivar's  ideology is no t obscuran tist or revolutionary. 
Indeed, H in d u  nationalism  albeit rev ivalist in nature, and  opposed  to  civic nationalism  
is n o t s tra igh tfo rw ard ly  anti-dem ocratic and  does n o t p u rp o rt the estab lishm ent of an 
au tho rita rian  state7. H in d u  nationalism  and  secular na tionalism  b o th  aspire to m ake 
India a m o d ern  n a tion  w ith in  a dem ocratic fram ew ork. The Sangh Parivar H in d u  
nationalist ideology is still based  on values of dem ocracy, liberalism  and  m odern ism . It 
is the m odel of nationhood  drat they  propose and  the concept of w h a t constitutes 
iden tity  tirat drey differ w ith  the N ehruv ian  m odel:
"Their challenge does n o t involve a dism issal of 'secularism ', and  an 
advocacy of a 'com m unal' form  of nationalism . R ather it involves a struggle 
over the very  term s them selves. P ost-independence C ongress governm ents 
are labelled  'p seudo-secu lar', and  accused of p an d erin g  to dre 'm inorities '. 
Such 'm inority ism ', it is argued , underm ines 't ru e ' secularism  and  is in  
effect com m uiral" [Hocking 1994:162],
Indeed , Ind ia  m igh t be in  danger of comm mralisiirg its cu ltu ral outlook, b u t no t 
of losing its dem ocracy in favour of air autocratic regim e. For H ocking [1994:162-163] 
H indu tva  is essentially  anti-Congress, "a critique of dre C ongress version of secular 
nationalism ". Indeed , desp ite  invoking different sets of va lues in  their definition of 
na tional identities, botir N eh ruv ian  nationalism  and  H in d u tv a  em ploy  a " 'concep t of 
the  state th a t w as a m inor varia tion  of tire post seventeentir cen tu ry  E uropean  concept 
of N ation  state '. Botir g roups utilize the sam e h igher-o rder sym bols and slogans to 
create a sense of cohesion am ong different g roups an d  seek to m obilise people 
belonging  to d ifferent com m unities for political pu rposes" . [M alik and  Singh 1992:21 
quo ting  N an d y  1989],
Concepts of secularism , nationalism , patrio tism  and  of national integration, 
developm en t and  m odern isa tion  are still the sym bolic p illars of India. But it is their 
contents tirat vary  significantly and  their role in  the  defin ition  of nationalism  and  of 
na tional identity , w hose essential m eanings d ep a rt drastically  from  tire prev ious ones.
7 This has not always been so. According to Chandra the Jana Sangh had repeatedly shown its 
ill-disguised opposition to democracy for it could not implement its communal agenda without 
"strengthening the reactionary, exploitative elements of the economy" ['Jan Sangh: the BJP's 
Predecessor'. Chandra, Bipan. The Hindu 11 May 1998].
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Those h igher-o rder sym bols of the political com m unity  and  the regim e that 
characterised N eh ru 's  v ision of ind ep en d en t India are still s tanding . For instance, the 
Sangh P arivar attacks n o t the  idea  of secularism  -per se b u t the version  of it p ropaga ted  
by  the Congress. They labelled it pseudo-secularism , accusing C ongress leaders and  
generally  the  left, of pand erin g  to the m inorities (or the non-H indu-Indians) accusing 
them  of hav ing  thus em braced a W estern-type of nationalism . Suggesting tha t 
N eh ruv ian  secularism  is trite  an d  has no  roots in  the  In d ian  soil, H indu tva  aim s at 
replacing the W estern  concept of secularism  w ith  an ind igenously  developed  b ran d  of 
secularism  w hich  is roo ted  in  H indu  traditions. The logic beh in d  this a rgum en t is 
sim ple. It ho lds th a t H indu ism  is by  n a tu re  flexible and  to leran t and  th a t on the base of 
this it is possib le to bu ild  a secular polity  w ithou t dissociating tire state from  
H induism , Ind ia 's  dom inan t culture. India is a deep religious land , therefore the state 
cannot keep aw ay from  religious m atters and  should  actively p rom ote  religious life. 
The argum en t goes th a t H indu ism  being tire m ajority religion in  the  subcontinent, tire 
state shou ld  su p p o rt and  favour H indu ism  over o ther religious creeds. It is in this light 
tirat N ehruv ism  is accused of m isunderstand ing  the real n a tu re  of India in denying its 
deep religiosity botir in  a cu ltural and  practical sense.
The concept of tolerance in  H in d u tv a 's  discourse is based  on  the un ique  H in d u  
ph ilosophical notioxr of sarva dharma sama bhava (equal respect for all religions). 
H ow ever, as Tairika Sarkar perceptively  notes, this "very p lu ra lism  and  tolerance (...) 
is taken to characterize a single national ethos w hich is essentially  H indu , and  to w hich 
all im m igran t religions in to  Ind ia  have adap ted  them selves."[1993:33]. Indeed , in  
H in d u tv a 's  discourse "H in d u  tolerance is alw ays coun terposed  against supposed  
M uslim  intolerance and  fanaticism ." [Basu et al 1993: 4]. The Sangh Parivar w ou ld  like 
to assert tirat the  H in d u  nation  they  p u t forth  w ill be "a safe repose for all creeds and 
sects" [ibid] as opposed  to the cu rren t secular state in  w hich  -  they w ould  argue -  
H indus are trea ted  as second class citizens as evidenced by instances such as the Babri 
M asjid m osque w hich  tire governm ent allow ed to exist u p o n  tire b irthp lace of Ram  for 
an ex tended  period . A ccording to Basu et al. [1993] to ensu re  tolerance of all 
th ro u g h o u t the  state, H in d u tv a  forces argue tha t "toleration, to be secure, m u st then 
stam p ou t all tirat is n o t H in d u  [i.e. M uslim], for w h a t is n o t H in d u  is alw ays
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in to leran t/'[B asu  e t A1.75] Thus, w hile notionally  ascribing the princip le  of secularism  
as a fundam en ta l value of in d ep en d en t India, the Sangh P arivar prom otes a strictly 
H indu tva-flavored  version  of tolerance. Indeed, according to Em bree [1990] w h a t is 
usually  m istaken  for H in d u  tolerance is in  fact a process of 'encapsu la tion ' of external 
religious trad itions in to  the folds of H in d u  thought. By tak ing  in to  consideration the 
fact tirat Ind ian  though t is characterized by  a belief tha t there  are m any  different levels 
of tru th  to m any  different people, Em bree goes on to conclude that it is this 
characteristic of H in d u  religious though t th a t is often confused w ith  H in d u  religious 
tolerance. Em bree then  argues tirat "all tru ths, all social practices, can be encapsulated  
w ith  tire society as long as there  is w illingness to  accept tire p rem ise  on w hich the 
encapsulation  is based" [1990:30],
The aim  of tire Sangh Parivar is n o t sim ply to obtain  political pow er b u t also to 
transform  society. This p rogram m e of social engineering recalls tire one launched  by 
N ehru . H ow ever, un like N erh u 's  program m e, the  Sangh P ariva r 's  is a p rogram m e of 
cu ltu ral aw akening  (jagaran) of Ind ia 's  H in d u  sentim ents an d  of na tionalisation  of all 
non -H indus "by inculcating in  them  the ideal of B haratiya cu ltu re"8. O bviously this is 
also air em inently  political program m e, because the  goal is the  even tual creation of a 
hom ogeneous H in d u  nation. Because its am bition is to reform  society and  "to 
pene trate  tire w hole of society th rough  its ne tw ork  of shakhas”, H in d u tv a  has taken on 
"the form  of a long-term  project" [Jaffrelot 1996:77], The success of the H indu  
nationalist m ovem en t has d epended  on a com bination of several factors, four of w hich 
are w orth  of m en tion  here. The first tw o of these factors are external and  depend  on the 
socio-political and  econom ic context, w hile the o ther tw o are d irect a resu lt of the 
Sangh P arivar 's  stra tegy  to secure access to political pow er. First, the  political context 
has so far p layed  a decisive role in  creating favourable conditions for the  expansion of 
the m ovem ent. It w as the sta te 's  faltering in its com m itm ent tow ards N ehruv ian  
principles and  norm ative  ru les and  the decline of the C ongress p a rty  th a t w ere critical 
to the Sangh P arivar 's  ideological and  political success. Indeed , according to Jaffrelot:
8 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee quoted in 'Jan Sangh: the BJP's Predecessor'. Chandra, Bipan. The 
Hindu 11 May 1998.
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"[T]he com m unalisation  of politics tended  therefore to rem ove the restrain ts 
w hich  the governm en t's  p rom otion  of secularism  -  com bined w ith  threats 
of repression  -  h ad  h itherto  im posed on the H in d u  nationalists ' 
in strum en ta lis t strategy" [Jaffrelot 1996:336].
Secondly, tire slow  b u t constan t liberalisation of the econom y of 1990s had  been 
responsible for tire rise of an expanding  m iddle-class d isenchan ted  w ith  tire old 
political system  and  eager to em brace a m ore exclusivist na tionalis t ideology. Third, 
grassroots penetration , thanks to the unflagging  w ork  of the RSS accom panied by a 
stra tegy  of m obilisation  along ethno-religious lines carried  o u t by  the VHP, increased 
the popu larity  of tire m ovem ent. A nd finally, a series of tactic alliances w ith  several 
regional and  national parties has been a contributing factor to the electoral success of 
the  political spearhead  of the  m ovem ent.
Indeed , the  m ovem ent has alw ays oscillated betw een  a stra tegy  of in tegration  -  
an d  therefore d ilu tion  of its m ost s triden t H in d u  nationalist ideology -  and  one of 
aggressive ethno-m obilisation. H ocking argues that because H in d u tv a  created a space 
in  w hich
"tire key concepts of Ind ian  nationalist discourse [...] are available for 
re in terp re ta tion  and  articulation" there rem ains "a good deal of scope [...] 
to shape  their political m essage according to the  specific contingencies of a 
situation" [Hocking 1994:163].
The end  of the 1960s saw  for instance the dom inance of the  strategy of e thno­
religious m obilisation (epitom ised by  the cow pro tection  m ovem en t of those years), 
w hile in  the  follow ing decade tire Sangh Parivar op ted  for a stra tegy  of am algam ation 
by  allow ing its political spearhead , the Jana Sangh, to be in teg rated  w ith  the Janata 
Party  m ovem ent and  to participate  in  the Janata Party  governm en t9 th a t w on  the 1977 
elections he ld  a t tire end  of the Em ergency. Since then  the Sangh P arivar has re tu rned  
to a stra tegy  of ethno-relig ious m obilisation and  dre m ovem en t has g row n stronger: the 
VH P and  RSS ne tw orks have g row n larger and  the Bharatiya Janata Party  [BJP] -  b o m  
from  dre ashes of the defunct Janata Party  in 1980 -  has no w  becom e Ind ia 's  strongest
9 The Janata Party coalition, which formed the first non-Congress government of independent 
India, included the Congress (O), the Socialist Party, the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the Congress for 
Democracy and the Jana Sangh.
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and  largest p a rty  w h ich  has governed  for a considerable tim e b o th  a t the centre and  in 
several states in  coalition w ith  o ther national or regional parties. A t the end  of the 
p rev ious chapter, I exam ined the political context th a t w as in strum en ta l to the Sangh 
P arivar 's  g row th. H ere, in  the nex t p a rt  of the chapter, I first p ro v id e  a brief overview  
of the  Jana Sangh and  the Bharatiya Janata Party  electoral perform ance, follow ed by a 
consideration  of the  Sangh P arivar strategies of ethno-relig ious m obilisation.
Electoral Success
O ne of tire com m ents th a t w ere usually  m ade abou t the  BJP in  the late 1990s
w as th a t it h a d  experienced an  exponential g row th  of its pa rliam en ta ry  seats and  its 
vote share. A lthough  these observations w ere true, H in d u  N ationalist parties have 
alw ays been  im p o rtan t com ponents of In d ia 's  electoral system . A fter independence, 
H in d u  nationalism  -  till then  a v ib ran t com ponent of the nationalist m ovem ent -  
alm ost d isappeared  from  tire Ind ian  political spectrum . Partition , the assassination of 
M ahatm a G andh i by N a tu ram  G odse -  a m em ber of the a H in d u  M ahasabha -  w hich 
w as fo llow ed by the bann ing  of com m unalist o rganisations and  of the RSS, 
accom panied by  tire S tate 's strong  com m itm ent to secularism , p u sh e d  the m ovem ent to 
a position  of political un touchability . But, w hen  by the late 1960s-early 1970s the Ind ian  
political elites faltered  in  their com m itm ent to N eh ruv ian  no rm ative  rules, H indu tva  
forces em erged  in  opposition  to the C ongress system . It w as in  the fluctuating 
ideological context of those years th a t H in d u  nationalism  rose again  to prom inence. 
From  an  electoral p o in t of view , the political front of the Sangh P arivar experienced 
m ixed  resu lts  a t the  national level. Before it am algam ated  in to  tire Janata Party  in  1977, 
the Jana Sangh h a d  susta ined  a slow  b u t consistent grow th. A fter independence, it 
passed  from  a m ere  3 seats in  tire Lok Sabha (corresponding  to  3.1% of votes) in 1952 to 
a m axim um  of 35 seats (9.4%) in  1967. In  the follow ing elections (1971) dre party  
reduced  its vo te  share, obtain ing only 7.4% of the votes and  22 seats in  parliam ent. It 
w as d u rin g  the Janata Party  experim ent that dre Jana Sangh vote share dram atically  
increased becom ing -  w ith  93 parliam en tary  seats -  tire largest com ponent hr tire Janata 
alliance. Significantly, th ree Jana Sangh m em bers becam e p a rt of M oraji D esai's
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governm en t10. In tire follow ing assem bly elections he ld  in  June 1977, the pa rty  ru led  
th ree states (H im achal Pradesh, M adhya P radesh  and  Rajasthan) and  one un ion  
territo ry  (Delhi) w hile several o ther m em bers of the  Jana Sangh w ere p a rt of tire 
governm ent of o ther states w ere the Janata Party  w on m ajorities.
D uring  the Janata experim ent n o t ju st tire party , b u t  the  w hole Sangh Parivar 
g rew  considerably. Tire RSS reported  a significant surge in  m em bersh ip . The num ber 
of shnkhas g rew  from  8,500 in  1975 to 17,000 in  1981, thanks m ostly  to tire RSS rap id  
expansion  in  the four sou thern  states of Kerala, K arnataka, Tam il N ad u  and  A ndhra  
P radesh . O ther RSS affiliates experienced sim ilar grow th. Tire BMS passed  from  1.2 
m illion  m em bers in  1977 to 1.8 m illion in  1980 becom ing tire second largest national 
trade  union , second only to the Ind ian  T rade U nion Congress. Its s tu d en t affiliate, the 
ABVP saw  its m em bersh ip  increasing from  170,000 in  1977 to 250,000 in  1982 
streng then ing  its position  as the strongest national s tu d e n t union. [A nderson and  
Dam le, 1987:215]. H ow ever, w hen  in  1980 after the d isso lu tion  of the  Janata Party  the 
ex-Jana Sanghis fo unded  the Bharatiya Janata Party, the party  ob tained  only tw o seats 
in  tire 1984 Lok Sabha elections w ith  a dism al 7.4% of votes. But at the 1989 
parliam en tary  elections, the BJP passed  from  a m ere tw o seats in  the  Lok Sabha to 86 
w ith  a 11,5% of votes polled, and  in  1991 con tinued  to  grow  w inning  120 
parliam en tary  seats and  enjoying a w hopp ing  20% of the vote-share. Since then  tire 
pa rty  h a d  becom e particu larly  pow erfu l in  the  trad itional H in d u  nationalist stronghold  
(U ttar P radesh , M adhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and  Delhi) w hich on their ow n 
con tribu ted  to roughly  four-fifths of all parliam entary  seats w on. The pa rty  continued 
to grow  in the follow ing parliam entary  elections passing  from  160 parliam entary  seats 
in  1996, to 180 in  1998, 182 in  199911. A t the state level the  p ic tu re  is obviously m ore 
complex. Both tire Jana Sangh and  tire BJP have been m ain ly  successful in  tire no rthern  
H ind i-speak ing  states, especially U ttar Pradesh, M adhya P radesh  and  the un ion  
territo ry  of Delhi. But pa rty  perform ance during  the years show s th a t even there its
10 Atal Behari Vajpayee was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lai Krishan Advani was Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting and Brij Lai Varma was Minister of Industry.
11 In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections the BJP obtained only 138 parliamentary seats and its vote 
share dropped from 23.75% (1999) to 21.48% (2004). Its National Democratic Alliance [NDA] 
coalition was defeated by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance [UPA],
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pow er base has recently sh ifted  considerably  m ostly  due  to the  em ergence of strong 
reg ional or caste-based parties. The BJP has ru led  alone or in  coalition a num ber of 
states (Gujarat, M adhya P radesh , the u n ion  territo ry  of Delhi) and  from  1999 to 2004 it 
also ru led  the coun try  at the helm  of the 24-party strong  N ational D em ocratic Alliance 
[ND A] coalition governm ent, w hen  Sangh Parivar key M Ps occupied  crucial m inistries 
such  as the  Education  and  the  Inform ation and Broadcasting M inistries. Besides having  
becom e the  largest all-India party , the crucial th ing  about the  BJP electoral success is 
th a t its access to political pow er has guaran teed  the H in d u  nationalists access to 
national and  state institu tions.
W hereas in  th is section I have  discussed the electoral perform ance of the Sangh 
P arivar's  political vanguard , in  the follow ing section I exam ine the Sangh P arivar's  
stra tegy  of na tion -bu ild ing  and  their use of sym bols and  sym bolic activities. H ie  Sangh 
P arivar's  sym bolic reperto ire  w ill be the topic of the fo llow ing chapter.
The Sangh Parivar's Strategies of Nation Building
The long-term  goal of the Sangh Parivar is to m ake Ind ia  H indu , to create an
Ind ian  iden tity  w hich w ill privilege the H in d u  cu ltural trad ition , ra th e r th an  appealing  
to civic values of N eh ruv ian  nationalism . Thus, w hile u n d e r N ehruv ism  Ind ia 's  
na tional iden tity  w as dep rived  of cu ltural m arkers (the Ind ian  popu la tion  w as 
im agined  hom ogeneous as a class of patrio tic  p roducers [D eshpande 2000:185], bu t 
culturally , religiously, linguistically and  ethnically heterogeneous -  "a conglom eration 
of peop le  w ho rep resen ted  difference" [Nag, 2001:4760]) u n d e r  the  influence of the 
Sangh P arivar's  dom inan t cu ltu ral politics and  political ideology, w hich resu lted  in the 
conversion of religious iden tity  in to  a political identity , the n ew  Ind ian  iden tity  is 
strongly  culturally  defined. This is an  endless source of p reoccupation  for Ind ia 's  
secularists and  num erous religious, regional and  linguistic m inorities.
The Sangh Parivar -  either th rough  its political outfits or its cu ltu ral affiliates -  
has im plem ented  a stra tegy  of transform ation  of In d ia 's  na tiona l iden tity  th rough  the 
m an ipu la tion  of its sym bolic order. C onsonant w ith  the Sangh P arivar's  ideology of 
H in d u  nationalism , this transform ation  is m ainly  im p lem en ted  th rough  the
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appropria tion  of H in d u  cu ltu ral practices. T raditions -  created, inven ted  or 
red iscovered  -  are all p a rt  of the process of nation  bu ild ing  [M alik and  Singh 1994:216]. 
Indeed , sym bols, m yths and  rituals help  to consolidate collective identities. In 
particu lar H in d u tv a 's  forces use those sym bols, practices an d  discursive form ations 
th a t are rem iniscent or derived  from  pre-existing cu ltu ral form s or traditions. The use 
of h istorically  o lder narratives, sym bols and  practices is n o t a n eu tra l practice b u t it 
obviously involves a process of selection, re-in terpreta tion  and  appropriation . Thus, 
the Sangh P arivar 's  sym bolic reperto ire  -  a lthough derived  from  the  H indu  cu ltu ral 
traditions -  is nevertheless novel in its com position an d  character. Significant 
m anifestations of these sym bolical appropriations and  continuities can be seen for 
instance in  tire Sangh P arivar's  organisational structure  itself, w here  often relations 
am ong its different m em bers recall tire trad itional typical guru-sishya  relationship. As it 
w ill be show n, its v isual language and  strategies of m obilisation also replicate H indu  
cu ltu ral trad itions.
H ow ever, som e of the practices and  sym bols are also inven ted  or re-in terp reted  
w ith  an ev iden t appeal to w h a t Jaffrelot [1996:338] calls "nationalist devotionalism ". 
The Sangh P arivar developed  a stra tegy  tirat saw  to com bine the basic values of the 
Ind ian  nation  w ith  o ther sets of values this tim e d raw n  from  the  religious repertoire, 
thus attaching fresh  ideological m ean ing  to those h igher-o rder sym bols [Elder and 
Cobb 1983] of N eh ruv ian  Ind ia  such as swadeshi, G andhism , secularism , m odernity , 
pa trio tism  and  nationalism . It is by  em ploying sym bols endow ed  w ith  a h igh  em otive 
content -  "effective triggers of associated sentim ents" [Elder and  Cobb 1983:39] -  tirat 
the Sangh Parivar has a im ed at cap tu ring  the im agination of the Ind ian  electorate.
Thus, the  Sangh Parivar's  sym bolic reperto ire becom es very  com pelling, being 
a re in terp re ta tion  of Ind ia 's  trad itional w ays of represen ta tion  and  of com m unication. 
The use of a political idiom  steeped  in the religious trad ition  of H indu ism  has b rough t 
to the  fore a language th a t lay do rm an t and at the periphery  of the official political 
id iom  d u rin g  the N ehruviair years. I shall re tu rn  to H in d u tv a 's  sym bolism  in  details in 
the follow ing chapter. H ere I briefly  in troduce it to p rov ide  a be tter u n d ers tan d in g  to 
the Sangh P arivar's  nation-bu ild ing  techniques. H in d u tv a 's  sym bolic reperto ire  is
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quin tessentially  H indu . The Sangh P arivar's  sym bolic reperto ire  differs significantly 
from  N eh ru 's  id iom  based  on scientific objectivity and  rationality  th a t w as popu lated  
by v isual an d  verbal im ages of progress, industria l deve lopm en t and  national 
achievem ents. Because H in d u tv a  w as bo rn  as a reaction against the instabilities 
p ro d u ced  by  m odern isation , it obviously does n o t look tow ards tire fu tu re  for 
in sp iration  in  the sam e w ay th a t N ehruv ism  did. O n the contrary , a t the core of tire 
Sangh P ariva r 's  language there is an overw helm ing  archaism  characterised by  a 
circular v iew  of h isto ry  and  rebirths and  by the concept of a lo st go lden  age. W hile 
N ehruv ism  w as projected tow ards tire fu tu re  and rested  firm ly  on  m odern ism  w ith  its 
pow erfu l im ages of progress, H indu tva  im agery and  sym bolism  -  insp ired  by a 
nostalgic allegory of a go lden  age -  dw ells on tire past. Their sym bolic constructions 
m ake use of archetypal im ages and  iconographic styles, hr an  a ttem pt to create 
continuity  w ith  this "chosen" golden  past. It is a rejection of realism  as an  expression of 
the p resen t and  of rationalism , in favour of em otion. T hrough  this device, H indu tva  
sym bolism  seeks to evoke eternal values and  tru ths.
The sym bols of fam ily and  tire com m unity  have  becom e m etonym ic of tire 
nation, w hile farm ers and w orkers, once the m ainstay  of N eh ru 's  v ision  for India, have 
been  p u sh e d  into the background. Instead, m artyrs, saints, gu rus, gods and  goddesses 
take tire p lace of the N eh ruv ian  com m on m en  and  w om en. B harata M ata, G au M ata, 
G anga M ata, Ram  and Sita, H anum an, Shivaji and  the Sangh Parivar's  gu rus -  
Savarkar, H edgew ar an d  G olw alkar -  are the n ew  p ro tagon ists  of dre H in d u tv a 's  
sym bolic reperto ire. M ost recently, dre Sangh Parivar -  by  com bining a m ilitary  and 
relig ious im agery  -  has m ade use of the sym bolism  of m arty rd o m  and  personal 
sacrifice th ro u g h  the projection of dre m arty rs  of A yodhya and  of Kargil w ho have 
since becom e the new  Ind ian  com m on m en. In con trast to N ehruv ism , the com m on 
m en  drat p o pu la te  Sangh Parivar's  pandreon  are n o t represen ta tions of the perfect 
citizen. O n  the contrary , they  are the personification of a relig ious ideal and  of dre 
perfect 'believer'. Significantly, the un ity  of people is rep resen ted  differently in the tw o 
ideologies. For N eh ru  -  according to w hom  national cooperation  w ere essential 
p rerequ isites for the developm ent of Ind ia  -  un ity  w as expressed  by show ing im ages 
of dre people  w ork ing  together either in  a factory, in  dre fields, in  laboratories, in
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universities and  a t schools or by po rtray ing  tire crow ds a t m ass events such  as 
Republic D ay P arade  [see for instance fig. 11 in  C hap ter 4], For the Sangh Parivar -  
w hich  u n d ers tan d s  the concept of un ity  as signifying a hom ogeneous H in d u  block -  
un ity  is expressed either by recurren t appeals to Ind ia 's  sacred  geography  th rough  the 
d isplay of the ub iqu itous m ap  of u n d iv id ed  India or by  im ages of m ass worship  -  like 
those po rtray ing  the kar sewaks at A yodhya, or the crow ds partic ipa ting  to the Sangh 
P arivar's  yatras and  o ther p rocessual [Assayag 1998] ritua l activities.
In its b id  to redefine the parad igm s of Ind ia 's  na tional im agination  and 
replacing die ideological foundation  of Ind ia 's  N ehruv ian  nationalism  w ith  H indu tva, 
the Sangh Parivar has created  a very  com pelling sym bolic language d ia t m akes use of 
fam iliar concepts th a t are also represen ted  in fam iliar iconographic m odes. This 
sym bolic inven tory  is im plem ented  th rough  the application of a th ree-pronged  
strategy. F irst -  as I have  already  m entioned  -  the Sangh P arivar appropria tes  higher- 
o rder sym bols of the political com m unity  and the regim e, w hile  elevating situational, 
low er-order sym bols to h igher-o rder status. Secondly, H in d u tv a  forces significantly 
over-w rite  existing trad itional cerem onies an d  sym bols w ith  fresh  m eanings. A nd 
lastly, their m odus operandi p o in t to a process of transference w hereby  pa rtisan  sym bols 
are transform ed  in to  national ones. Since H indu tva  forces have  gained  access to pow er 
eitirer in die states or at die national level, there has been the inevitable b lu rring  of the 
spheres of action of die Sangh P arivar w ith  d ia t one of the Ind ian  state, bu ild ing  a link 
betw een  d ie  political and  the religious sphere, die state an d  die com m unity. The Sangh 
P arivar has alw ays em ployed  ethno-religious sym bols and  p rocessual ritua l actions 
even before gain ing  political pow er. N onetiieless, those sym bols and  rituals tha t before 
w ere clearly b ran d ed  as belonging  to a specific H in d u  nationalist o rganisation  (be it the 
RSS or the  VHP), have recently  acquired  a new  legitim acy being  perfo rm ed  and 
w ie lded  u n d e r the  aegis of the  nation-state. This is particu larly  re levan t to som e public 
cerem onies th a t w ill be exam ined  in  the next chapter. Because the boundaries 
separa ting  the public  cerem onies p rom oted  and  staged  by die state and those ones 
sponsored  by the  Sangh Parivar are m ore and  m ore fuzzy, m ass celebrations tha t in die 
p ast w ou ld  have  been clearly w ritten  off as H in d u tv a  have  no w  becom e less 
d istinguishable  from  other national official cerem onies. This w as particu larly  ev iden t
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du rin g  the 2002 G ujarat state elections. In  the sam e period  tw o apparen tly  independen t 
processual actions took place: the  Chief M inister M odi's G aurav Yatra  (Days of Pride) 
and  die H in d u  Pad Padshahi. These rituals w ere o rganised  respectively  by the BJP and  
the VHP. The p rom otion  of M odi's  official state yatra  becam e en tang led  w ith  the Pad  
Padshahi, the V H P's m ass contact p rogram m e for H in d u  aw akening. Indeed, the V H P's 
H in d u  Pad Padshahi w as explicitly set u p  to reach those areas n o t covered by  M odi's 
G aurav Yatra. The Sindhu D arsan A bhiyan  -  w hich w ill be d iscussed  in  the follow ing 
chapter -  is ano ther rem arkable exam ple of tire Sangh P arivar 's  m odus operandi.
This th ree-p ronged  stra tegy  of appropria tion  of h igher-o rder sym bols, over­
w riting  of estab lished  cerem onies, and  of transference is im plem ented  th rough  three 
im portan t practices: the  estab lishm ent of a calendar of official celebration, the 
in troduction  of an  ever-expanding  num ber of new ly  inven ted  rituals and  the 
im position  of an alternative pan theon  of national icons.
Days to Remember: the Sangh Parivar's Ritual calendar
In  the p rev ious chapter I d iscussed how  state cerem onies and  ritua ls allow  the
perform ance of na tional identity . O n th a t occasion I argued  how , Ind ia 's  post-colonial 
governm ent estab lished  an official calendar of na tional celebrations to p rom ote  a 
feeling of so lidarity  and  heighten  a sense of belonging an d  na tiona l identification. The 
official na tional calendar included  H indu , C hristian and  M uslim  religious festivals. 
H ow ever, w hile  pay ing  hom age to Ind ia 's  m ajor relig ious trad itions, it w as the secular 
na tional ho lidays (in particu lar Independence Day and  Republic Day) that becam e the 
priv ileged  sites for d ie celebration of die Ind ian  nation. If na tiona l ritua ls  are im portan t 
sym bolic activities for die affirm ation of na tionalist ideology an d  the p rom otion  of a 
sense of belonging, it is n o t su rprising  then  tha t often, w hen  a new  regim e replaces an 
old one, the  estab lishm ent of innovative national cerem onies becom es crucial for die 
redefin ition  of the  political space. As it  w as suggested  in  the p rev ious pages, ra ther 
than  substitu ting  Ind ia 's  official calendar of national celebrations, the Sangh Parivar 
has in stitu ted  a new  "calendar of rearranged  festivals" [A ssayag 1998:142], carving out 
a cerem onial space a t the fringes of official state activity. These ritu a l occasions do no t 
in tend  to be directly antagonistic to d ie  sta te 's  cerem onial calendar. Indeed , cerem onies
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are h e ld  on d ifferen t days and  tend  to celebrate d ifferen t anniversaries, peoples and  
ideals.
The Sangh P arivar insists on hav ing  every event by  them  organised to coincide 
w ith  re levan t an d  im portan t dates. C om m em oration of anniversaries is obviously a 
vehicle for the  leadersh ip  to com m unicate w ith  the m asses. A ccording to K ertzer 
anniversaries and  special dates are sym bolic m arkers th a t p rov ide  "a ritua l rationale 
for developm ent and  com m unication of the m yths th a t com pose the p a rty 's  version  of 
h istory" [Kertzer 1996:19], The sym bolic linkage of any Sangh P arivar's  even t to events 
h ap p en ed  in  the p as t is m ean t no t only to p rom ote "a certain  v iew  of the past"  b u t also 
to legitim ise H in d u tv a  and  "its actions and leadersh ip  in the  p resent" [Kertzer 
1996:20]. H ie  infam ous large scale processions, organised  by  the V H P since 1980s, 
aim ed at ju st that: nam ely  at creating alternative occasions to celebrate the nation  and 
the people of India according to H in d u tv a 's  na tionalist ideology. Indeed, inasm uch as 
the new  rituals are expression of H in d u tv a  ideology, they can be seen as antagonistic 
to the state. It is the  im age of na tion  and  the concept and  m odel of na tionhood  tha t 
they  p ro p o u n d  th a t is fundam entally  different from  the N eh ru v ian  m odel, w hich still 
insp ires -  a t least form ally -  Ind ia 's  na tional calendar.
Thus, a host of special one-off celebrations have been  regu larly  and  gradually  
in troduced  across India. M ay 11, the anniversary  of the nuclear explosions a t Pokhran  
of 1998, has been  since celebrated as N ational Technology D ay and  -  significantly -  as 
R esurgent Ind ian  Day. D ecem ber 6 -  anniversary  of the destruction  of the m osque of 
A yodhya -  has been  observed as Shaurya D ivas (Days of V alour) since 199312. From  
2003, February  11 w as to be celebrated every  year all over Ind ia  as the Samarpan D iw as  
to com m em orate the death  anniversary  of D eendayal U p ad h ay a13, Significantly, on 
o ther occasions, the Sangh Parivar has he ld  public cerem onies on dates already  set 
aside for the celebration of o ther cerem onies -  religious or otherw ise. This practice of
12 Shaurya Divas is celebrated yearly. On the same day the Babri Masjid Action Committee 
celebrates the same events as Kalank Divas, Days of Shame. [See Frontline 5-18 December 1998 
for the 1998 event.]
13 BJP Today. 1-15 March 2003. Vol. 12, No. 05.
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staging public  cerem onies on  days th a t are associated w ith  o ther festivities no t only 
legitim ises the n ew  holiday, b u t it also increases its em otional appeal and  its 
m obilisation potential. O ften  Sangh P arivar's  public  cerem onies are celebrated (or 
com m ence or finish) on particu lar days w hich also com m em orate  the Sangh P arivar's  
father figures or significant events of the  Sangh P arivar's  h istory . Thus, 18 M arch 1999 
w as celebrated as U gadi (Tamil N ew  Year), the beginning  of the  H in d u  new  century  of 
the K aliyuga an d  as H edgew ar's  b irthday .
Significantly, the celebration of H edgew ar's  b irthday  is also p a rt of the official 
cerem onial annua l calendar of the RSS. The cerem ony of Varsh Pratipad -  th a t is 
celebrated in  the sp ring  to com m em orate the tim e w hen  Y udhish tira  and  V ikram aditya 
sta rted  the old calendar year and  Ram a w as crow ned k ing  -  is one of the RSS m ajor 
rituals and  coincides w ith  H edgew ar's  b irthday  being  som etim es observed as 
F ounder's  Day. The RSS' rich festive calendar includes five o ther im portan t festivals 
tha t are regu larly  observed  th roughou t India. H indu Sam rajya D ivo tsav  is usually  
observed  in  M ay to celebrate Shivaji's coronation and  his victory over the M ughals. 
Rakshabandhan -  a p o p u lar N orth  Ind ian  ritua l of b ro therly  friendship  -  is also 
celebrated by  the RSS to rem ind  swayam sevaks of their d u ty  to sacrifice their lives. 
A nother im p o rtan t festivals is Guru Dakshina w hen  the RSS saffron  flag (bhagwa dhwaf) 
-  w hich  is also revered  as the gu ru  -  is w orsh ipped  and  donations taken. This festival is 
follow ed by Dasara, one of the Ind ia 's  m ost po p u lar H in d u 's  festivals tha t m arks tire 
victory of Ram  over Ravana. In the  RSS version how ever, w eapons (associated w ith  
Shivaji) are w orsh ipped , shakas take o u t processions and  sw ayam sevaks dem onstrate 
their m artia l skills. It is M akar sankranti tliat closes the RSS ritu a l year. C elebrating the 
w in ter solstice, it is observed to foster those traits d ia t are considered  crucial for die 
RSS: persona l sacrifice and  service to die na tion  [A ndersen an d  Dam le: 1987:92-93]. For 
the RSS diese festivals are m ean t to  shape the sp irit of the group. W hile a p a rt  of die 
RSS festivals coincides w ith  already  established and  w ell-a ttended  H in d u  rituals (like 
Rakshabandhan and  Dasera), die rest of the festivals in troduced  by  d ie  RSS w ere created 
ex-novo. H ow ever, even  if the  festivals m igh t seem  at a first sigh t d istinct from  
ord inary  H in d u  religious celebrations, the RSS' festivals closely follow  ritual form ats 
derived  from  d ie  H in d u  trad itions. This appropria tion  and  overw riting  of H indu
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trad itional ritua l heritage  is n o t ju st a prerogative of the RSS b u t applies to all Sangh 
P arivar's  sym bolic activities. It is a phenom enon  of g rea t political significance w hich 
has resu lted  w ith  H indu ism  being  'na tionalized ' and  the n a tion  H in d u ized  [Basu et 
al.1993:40].
Ritual Construction of the Nation
This pen ch an t for public  cerem onies obviously reflects the  role a ttribu ted  to
rituals b y  the Sangh Parivar. Indeed , the  VH P w as partly  created  in  1964 by  the RSS 
w ith  the scope of p rom oting  H indu ism  th rough  the staging of public cerem onies. 
Being the chosen loci "for the  transm ission of national iden tity  and  ideology" [Edensor 
2002:74], na tiona l rituals p rov ide  the social ideals and  conventions they  contribu te to 
articu late [Edensor 2002:74 quo ting  G eertz 1993]. Spectacular exam ples of th is frenetic 
activity are the m any  processions and  large-scale festivals and  rituals -  yatrns 
(processions) and  yagnas (ritual public  sacrifices) -  th a t have  characterised  the recent 
h istory  of Ind ia  to arouse H in d u  m ilitancy and  carry d ie H in d u tv a  m essage across 
India, in every  tow n  and  village. Between 1981 and  1983 the Sangh P arivar organised a 
h uge  num ber of m ass m eetings loosely based  on relig ious cerem onies d ia t w as aim ed 
at the  celebration of the sp irit of un ity  am ong H indus and  a t p rom oting  a H in d u  
resurgence. It w as die m ass conversion of D alits to Islam  in 1981 in  Tam il N adu  -  
encouraged  also by  sh rew d  speculations released by d ie  n a tiona l p ress w hich  claim ed 
th a t H in d u s (w hich m ake u p  over 80% of all Ind ia 's  popu lation) w ou ld  becom e a 
m inority  by  the tw enty-d iird  century  [Jaffrelot 1996:342] -  th a t instilled a sense of 
insecurity  and  vulnerab ility  in  the H in d u  com m unity. In  1983 the  V H P launched  the 
Ekatmata Yajna (Sacrifice for U nanim ity), one of the first successful a ttem pts a t defining 
Ind ian  n a tion  th ro u g h  die use of processional ritua l action as a site for the legitim ation 
of m ean ings an d  social values of the H indu tva. This yajna  w as follow ed in  quick 
succession by  d ie  Sri Ram  janm abhoom i M u k ti Yajna, (m ore details on  tiiis later on) a 
gigantic opera tion  d ia t officially opened  the cam paign for the liberation of the 
b ird ip lace of Ram  at A yodhya, and  d u ring  w hich sta tues of Ram  and  Sita w ere p laced 
on lorries and  carried  in  procession across the country . The political 
in strum en ta lisa tion  of relig ious rituals w en t on a crescendo in  the subsequen t years. The 
Ram  Shila Pujans of 1989 m arked  another step in  this process of creation of national
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rituals. A dvan i's  Rath Yatra  of 199014 w as possibly the m ost p o p u la r  an d  successful one, 
a lthough  n o t the  last one. The Ekta Yatra, Janadesh Yatra, Suraj Yatra  and  S w a rm  Jayanti 
Rath Yatra all took place in  the  1990s.
A ccording to G olw alkar [1966:335], "[W ]ithout a su itab le  technique no  ideal, 
how ever great, can be realized." This technique consisted  of a d iscip lined ritual 
practice. A lw ays aw are of the necessity  of creating hom ogeneity  am ong H indu , the 
RSS saw  to it to  set u p  a rigorous daily  practice, includ ing  a set of daily  rituals and 
drills (including the chanting  of few  Sanskrit m an tras and  the  h y m n  Vande M ataram ) 
th a t w ou ld  be observed  sim ultaneously  in  all its shakas across the coun try  to strengthen  
a feeling of un ify  and  b u ild  discipline. It also devised an em blem  (the bagwa dhwaj, the 
saffron flag) and  a un ifo rm  consisting in  the  khaki shorts, w h ite  shirt, and  black forage 
cap. The fact th a t the sam e ritua ls  are perfo rm ed  on a daily  basis in  all tire RSS 
branches across Ind ia  gives a sense of sim ultaneity  and  helps creating  hom ogeneity  
am ong the participants. The RSS em phasis on discipline, its un iform s, and  the m artial 
character of m any  of its processions and  rituals (such as its ow n  version  of Dasara) all 
carry  strong  m ilitary  connotations arguably  aim ed a t stressing  the v igour and  
m anliness of the  Ind ian  nation.
Savarkar h im self h ad  acknow ledged  tire im portance of rites and  rituals bo th  as 
cu ltu ral m arkers (sam skriti, H in d u tv a 's  th ird  essential feature, includes samksaras, those 
"rites and  rituals cerem onies and  sacram ents that m akes a lan d  a H oly land" [Savarkar 
1942:95]) and  as occasions tha t p rom ote  social cohesion and  a shared  sense of identity. 
D uring  h is you th , Savarkar took p a rt in the organisation  of those festivals, such as 
Shivaji U tsav  a n d  Ganesh U tsav  w hose celebration w as orig inally  p rom oted  by the 
rad ical C ongress leader Tilak. Even in  London, Savarkar organ ised  the celebration of 
Rakshbandh an d  Guru Gobind Singh Jayanti festivals for the  expatria te  com m unity. 
Significantly, it  w as n o t ju st the shared  sense of iden tity  th a t w as being  celebrated by 
such  rituals. Rather, it w as the corporate character of it th a t these public  festivals m ean t 
to com m em orate. As he  noted , "[T]he quain t custom s and  cerem onies and  sacram ents
14 25 September 1990 -  30 October 1990.
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they involve, observed by som e as a religious duty , by  o thers as social am enities, 
im press u p o n  each ind iv idual th a t he can live best only th ro u g h  the com m on and  
corporate life of the  H in d u  race" [Savarkar 1942:80-81]. In  the  nex t chapter it w ill be 
show n how , according to the Sangh Parivar, the H in d u  com m unity  -  and  by extension 
the ideal Ind ian  nation  -  is po rtray ed  as an organic u n ity  w here the ind iv idual is 
subm erged  into larger en tity  of the com m unity. Collectivism  ra th e r th an  ind iv idualism  
is the  fundam en ta l u n it of their im agined  nation.
The Sangh P arivar's  rituals are innovative for th ree m ajor reasons. First, they
are new  in th a t desp ite  being  insp ired  by existing H in d u  ritua l practices, they  d id  no t
exist before as such. A lthough  in  India the ritual calendar is very  vast and  diverse,
there never existed  before an Ektamata Yajna, or a Sindhu D arsan A bhiyan . Also, as we
have ju s t seen, these festivals are original in  content, com bining in  novel form ats
different ritu a l elem ents bo rrow ed  from  w ell-established H in d u  custom ary traditions.
But m ost im portan tly , they  are innovative in  scope. T raditionally  th is type of
celebrations and  rituals is u sually  carried  o u t and  perfo rm ed  by ind iv iduals to obtain
personal m erit for one 's self or for one 's  family. A lternatively , people undertake
pilgrim ages and  participa te  to m ass celebrations to fulfil their personal vow s and
religious rites. O n  the contrary, the  ritua ls in troduced  by  the Sangh P arivar have a
different purpose . As one of the Sangh Parivar leaders read ily  acknow ledged, their
m ain  " th ru s t is tow ards giving a social and  national d irection  to the  peop le 's
devotion." [Seshadri 1984:174], It is their samajik (social) an d  rashtriya  (national)
character th a t is innovative. These rituals are perform ed n o t for personal salvation b u t
for the  a tta inm en t of a corporate  good. Indeed, despite  their alleged antiquity , the
Sangh Parivar celebrates ya tras  as tools for the prom otion  of na tiona l in tegration  and  of
na tional identity , as yatras
"ensu red  the surv ival of Ind ian  civilization, he lp ing  it to  preserve its 
continuity  in  tim e and  its capacity to w eave u n ity  in  all its seem ingly 
m ad d en in g  diversity. [...] It w as one of the devices w hich  the leaders of our 
society u sed  to keep this national aw areness alive generation after 
generation" [K ulkam i 1997:8].
M oreover, it  is indeed  the pedagogic character of ya tra  as a "conscious m ed ium
of p eop le 's  education  an d  m obilization" [ibid:9] ra ther th an  a personal religious
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obligation th a t is dearest to the Sangh Parivar. M oreover, the Sangh P arivar's  yatras  
beside being  a m eans of political aw akening, na tional in tegration  and  people 's 
education  and  m obilisation, reinforce the established link  be tw een  religion and  politics
-  because these cerem onies partly  reproduce  religious festivals. Their im pact on  the 
Ind ian  m asses has  been g rea t and  dem onstration  of relig ious fervour and  m ilitancy has 
since becom e o rd inary  m atter. As a result, the H in d u  na tionalis t m ovem en t has been 
able to exploit devotional rituals to w hich  they attached fresh  ideological m eanings.
A nother im portan t novelty  in troduced  by  the Sangh P arivar p rocessual activity 
is th a t w hile on other occasions, ritual celebrations tend  to be linked  to either a 
particu lar reg ion  or religious sect, the Sangh P arivar's  jagarans, in  their being 
perfo rm ed  for tire a tta inm ent of a social and  national m erit, transcend  caste, sect and 
regional differences. Indeed , H in d u tv a 's  processual activity being  triggered  by m ass 
conversions of Dalits to Islam , w as originally in tended  a t celebrating tire hypothetical 
un ity  of tire H in d u 's  com m unity. U nity  is n o t only  signified by  p rom oting  sym bols 
com m on to all H in d u s  (such as the cow and  the river G anges for instance) or by 
em ploying  processual strategies th a t touch  and  sym bolically link  the different com ers 
of the country, b u t also by  creating and  p rom oting  rituals th a t are n o t a prerogative of 
one particu lar sect or caste b u t th a t can be associated to the H in d u  com m unity  a t large. 
A nd  finally, it is tire culm ination of th is process of transfo rm ation  of ritua l activity 
from  tire p u re ly  religious to the m ore overtly political th a t p ro d u ced  yatras such  as the 
1990 A dvan i's  Rath Yatra  w here a t last the political becam e so explicit so as to com pete 
w ith  and  som etim es overshadow  tire religious aspect of it.
T hat ritua l action is considered p a ram o u n t by the Sangh Parivar is also 
ind icated  by tire fact th a t tire VH P has established a H indu  Parva Sam nvaya  -  a 
departm en t for the coord ination  of the  H in d u  festivals -  an d  o ther n u m erous societies
-  H indu Sam nvaya Sam iti -  in  a variety  of places w ith  tire pu rpose , and  w ith  tire 
u ltim ate  goal of re-aw akening  and  p rom oting  patriotic fervour b y  m eans of festivals. It 
is believed th a t it is th ro u g h  the p rom otion  of patrio tic  festivals fashioned alongside 
established relig ious cerem onies th a t the w eakness in  the H in d u  society ~ w hich is 
th o u g h t to be a t the h ea rt of Ind ia 's  subjection to foreign invasions -  can be elim inated.
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But for the V H P the festivals need  to be reform ed. It is only  th ro u g h  the reorien tation  
of r itu a l practices, th ro u g h  standard isa tion  and  coordination, and  the p rom otion  of 
'un iversa l p rac tices '15 th a t th is ritua l activity can tru ly  becom e national -  Rashtriya  
Tyohar -  an d  fulfil its function as vehicle for the p rom otion  of H in d u  u n ity  and  
renaissance [Jaffrelot 1995:208]. Thus the V H P's H indu Parva Sam nvaya  and  H indu  
Sam nvaya Sam iti are engaged  in  the s tandard isa tion  of all m ajor H in d u  festivals and  
rituals, to m ake them  national and  to ensure tha t all H in d u s  celebrate all festivals in 
unison.
H ie  m odel according to w hich  the VHP cadre asp ired  to reform  H in d u  rituals 
and  festivals found insp iration  from  the namaz, the collective M uslim  prayer. Indeed, it 
is th rough  nam az th a t one is able to see Islam: by seeing thousand  of believers th a t rise 
and  b en d  in  un ison  at die tim e of prayer. It is diis lack of sim ultaneity  and uniform ity  
of d ie  act of faidi d ia t m ake H indu ism  and  the H in d u  iden tity  n o iw is ib le  [Jaffrelot 
1996:Ibid]. The sam e can also be said  abou t the lack am ong the H in d u s of a com m on 
m eeting  place, w here die H indus could  "vividly  v isualise and  im bibe die feeling of 
oneness an d  die iden tity  of th en  social and  religious in terests" [Moonje 1923:24 quo ted  
in  Jafhelo t 1996:22]. This necessity to endow  H indu ism  w id i hom ogeneity  and  un ity  
w as a lready  alive am ong the Sangh P arivar early ideologues. The call for reform was so 
intensely felt that some called for the rewriting of a new sm irti [Jaffrelot 1996:23], a new code 
of Hindu practices and cultural tradition. Sw am i S h raddhananda  developed  an action p lan  
originally in tended  for die H in d u  M ahasabha in  w hich he p roposed  to bu ild  H in d u  
R ashtra M andir in  every  im portan t city and  tow n th a t cou ld  accom m odate large 
crow ds [Jaffrelot 1996:22] and  in  w hich recitation of the B hagavadgita, the U panishads, 
the R am ayana and  the M ahabharata  w ou ld  be held . Besides ind icating  the necessity of
15www.vhp.org/englishsite/d.Diniensions of VHP/hHindu%20Parv%20Samanvya/festivalforna 
tionalintegration.htm Accessed on 23 November 2006.
The reorientation of festival practices consists primarily in the promotion of mutual 
participation in rituals and festivals belonging to different sects (the VHP mentions Budh and 
Mahavir Jayanti: respectively a Buddhist and Jain festival) and the widening of participation to 
festivals observed by Harijans and Girijans (Dalits and tribals). Tilak dharana, cow worship, 
hoisting of om and bhagava flags are enumerated among the universal practices to be promoted. 
While these symbols have been displayed regularly at VHP and other Sangh Parivar events, the 
promotion of Ganesh Navaratri and Nimajjan in Hyderabad, and of Valmiki Mahavir, Ram Lila and 
Ram Navami in Delhi are instances of the workings of several Hindu Samnvaya Samiti [ibid].
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erecting com m on places of prayers, and  of establishing a com m on liturgy, 
S h raddananda  also envisaged the need  to dedicate these tem ples to three m other 
deities equally  w orsh ipped  by all H indus: G au M ata, Sarasw ati M ata and  Bhoom i 
M a ta 16. A tem ple w as eventually  erected in  1936 near the H in d u  M ahasabha's 
h eadquarte rs  in  D elhi w ith  d ie  financial help  of Jugal K ishor Birla. A nother one w as 
constructed  u n d e r Savarkar's directions in  Ratnagiri in 1931 [Jaffrelot 1996:22]. But die 
effort ended  there. A ccording to  Bhatt [2001] in m ost recent tim es, trad itional form s of 
devotions, such  as d ie  practice of aarti a t m ass public ritua ls  sponsored  by the Sangh 
P arivar have  been  u sed  to directly  confront M uslim s a t F riday  p rayers and  C hristians 
and  m ark  a "strategically  provocative, violence-oriented transform ation  of the peaceful 
practice of offering devotion  to and  receiving blessing from  the deities." [Bhatt 
2001:190].
The yajnas and  yatras th a t have  criss-crossed die coun try  on several occasions 
are n o t die sole exam ples of this strategy  of ethno-relig ious m obilisation and 
innovative ritua l activity. The Sangh Parivar is also w ork ing  to p ropagate  a specific 
form  of H in d u ism  codified in six religious activities - die w orsh ip  of the sun  each 
m orning, w earing  of the O m  sym bol around  the  neck, the  inscrip tion  of O m  on  visiting 
cards, letterheads, keeping  an im age of the fam ily deity  in  the hom e an d  daily w orsh ip  
of it, the cultivation of d ie  tu lsi p lan t and  regu lar attendance at a centre of faith. VHP 
leaders even u rg ed  tha t every H in d u  househo ld  shou ld  fly a saffron flag [Jaffrelot 
1996:348]. The saffron flag is one of the m ost po ten t sym bols of the RSS w hich 
w orsh ips it as the  guru. For G olw alkar the flag w as a sym bol of dharma, culture, 
trad ition  and  ideal: a gu id ing  star and an em blem  of self-sacrifice and  of know ledge 
[G olw alkar 1966:335-336]. Indeed, d u ring  H in d u tv a 's  celebrations saffron flags are 
m e air t  to be flow n on  top of bu ild ings, houses, shops, m eans of tran spo rt and  so on. 
These flags are very  im portan t because besides donning  a celebratory  look to the  locale 
rem iniscent of H in d u  religious holidays, drey also visibly signify air ideological 
occupation  of a public  space -  albeit only a tem porary  one. This could be even m ore so, 
if one considers drat, un til recently, according to dre Flag C ode of Ind ia  (w hich defines
16 Shraddhananda Sanyasi, Hindu Sangatan -  Saviour of the Dying Race, Delhi, Arjun Press, 
1926:140-141 quoted in Jaffrelot 1996:22
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the use  and  d isp lay  of tire national flag) p rivate  citizens w ere n o t entitled  to fly the 
national flag except on occasions specified by the G overnm ent: Republic D ay and 
Independence D ay17. It could  be argued  th a t tire flying of the  saffron  flag is som ew hat 
done antagonistically  to the national flag. Indeed, the  m em bers of tire Sangh Parivar 
ow e their p rim ary  loyalty  n o t to tire national flag b u t to the  RSS's saffron flag. Indeed, 
for years the  RSS rejected Ind ia 's  tricolour because of the  use  of the colour green 
(in terp reted  as a sym bol of Islam) and  of the A sokan w heel (a B uddhist symbol) 
[Bidwai 2004],
D espite  being  'in v en ted ', these rituals are also deep ly  trad itional and  are 
celebrated rep roducing  the form ats of fam iliar H in d u  public  cerem onies and  m ass 
gatherings, h r this process three elem ents are particu larly  im portan t: tire locale, tire 
decorations, and  the program m e. It is by  looking at these elem ents th a t the jagaran  
recall H in d u  religious celebrations. Rituals and  processions are staged  in  sites rich in 
sym bolic m eanings an d  m ore often th an  not, the locations are im portan t H in d u  holy 
sites and  p ilgrim age centres. As w e have already  occasion to illustrate, tire loci chosen 
to perfo rm  these public  cerem onies are usually  sites linked  to H in d u  religious 
traditions: e ither p ilgrim age centres or holy places. For instance, A dvan i's  1990 Rath  
Yatra  s ta rted  from  the holy  city of Som natlr (the day  of D eendayal U padhyaya 's  b irth  
anniversary) and  ended  in  A yodhya, bo th  im portan t p ilgrim age centres. Sim ilarly, the 
V H P's huge  procession Ekatmata Yatra  of 1983 touched  som e of In d ia 's  m ost im portan t 
H in d u  religious sites, such as: N agpur, Somnatlr, H ardw ar, and  R am esw aram  [Fig. 1]. 
By celebrating their m ass rites in  such sites already p reg n an t w ith  strong religious 
sen tim ents and  associations, a link  is established betw een the  relig ious and  the political 
dom ain. Also, because H in d u tv a 's  m odus operandi du tifu lly  replicates religious form ats 
of m ass ritua ls  (yatras and  yajnas are typical form s of H in d u  religious public 
cerem onies) this link becom es even m ore com pelling. Second, the lay sites w here  the 
celebrations are he ld  are decorated  w ith  flow ers (m arigolds) an d  archw ays as it w ou ld  
be in  any other relig ious festive occasion.
17 The Flag Code was however recently amended on the 53rd anniversary of the Indian Republic 
in 2002 removing the restrictions which only allowed government offices and higher 
functionaries of government to fly the Indian flag freely.
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Fig. 1 Ekatmata Yatra Route
H ow ever, it is the cerem onial p rogram m e of the Sangh Parivar's  public 
celebrations that confers a H indu  flavour to them . Because the Sangh Parivar's 
calendar of ritual activities is very vast, obviously cerem onial p rogram m es vary 
betw een one event and  the other. H ow ever, there are a few elem ents that are com m on 
to m any of them . In m any cases these public festivals involve cerem onial processions. 
These can be very  local affairs, sm all parades along the m ain  road, or larger yatras  
linking different tow ns, regions of a state or of the w hole country . These processions 
are usually  characterised  by a parade  of chariots carrying im ages of various gods and 
goddesses, tableaux depicting different significant events of Ind ia 's  history, life-size 
portra its  of saints and  sadhus, freedom  fighters, revolutionaries, m arty rs and political 
leaders "w ho  laid dow n their lives for the sake of szvadesh and  swadharma" [Seshadri 
1984:1411. O ften the processions are accom panied by the chanting  of O m , of Vedic 
m antras and  of bhajans, w hile conch-shells m ight be blow n to w elcom e the cavalcades 
[Seshadri 1984:153,168]. Slogans h in ting  at the unity  of all Ind ians or H indus such as 
H indu-H indu Ek Rahe, Ham sab H indu hai, and H indu sanghatam  zindabad. [Seshadri 
1984:150] are also chanted. Yatras of this kind have alw ays existed in India. Deities are 
carried in processions in m any parts of the country  on m any occasions du ring  the
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course of the  year and  yatras covering the C hatu rdham s18 in  the  four directions are 
regu larly  perform ed. Therefore the Sangh P arivar's  p rocessual activity is m odelled  
along a w ell-established and  fam iliar form at of H indu  ritua l trad ition . W hat is how ever 
significant is the  m ore overtly  political m eaning  th a t is associated to these ritual 
activities.
T hus the  Sangh Parivar h as  set u p  a calendar of ritu a l action th a t reproduces 
culturally  em bedded  processual traditions. They have crea ted  new  rituals that, 
b lu rring  the distinction betw een  the religious and the political dom ain, are a im ed at 
p rom oting  H in d u  unity . To do so, H in d u tv a 's  ritua l action w orks th rough  a strategy  
th a t d raw s in ternal and  external boundaries to define w ho is in  and  w ho  is ou t of the 
com m unity  of Indians. Indeed , H in d u tv a 's  processional ritu a l action has set the 
m in im um  com m on denom inator of belonging an d  affiliation to the H in d u  fold, 
neglecting obvious trad itional divisions w hile stigm atising the others. A nd it is thanks 
to the rituals ' sym bolic po ten tia l that they becom e the p riv ileged  loci and  m ore likely 
vehicles for the articu lation  of the Sangh P arivar's  strategy  for H in d u  unity .
H indutva's Hagiolatry
A nother technique for the  definition of the p a rad ig m s of Ind ia 's  national
identity  and  the rep lacem ent of Ind ia 's  ideological foundation  w ith  H in d u tv a  is to 
change or app rop ria te  the pan theon  of father figures and  na tiona l icons. Founding  
fathers, those ideological figures of na tional inspiration, are constituen t elem ents of the 
m y th  of the  b irth  of the nation. These national icons are in d eed  im portan t as they 
sym bolically em body  the  values and  ideals of the nation. D uring  N ehruv ism  it w as 
m ostly  nationalist leaders (am ong w hich G andhi and  N eh ru  dom ina ted  all tire others 
in  term s of popu larity ), the w orkers, governm ent bureaucrats, the  soldiers, and  the 
com m on m en and  w om en that acquired  iconic status. Instead, the Sangh Parivar's  
pan th eo n  of insp irational figures includes gods and  goddesses (Ram, H anum an  and 
G anga M ata am ong others), h istorical figures like Shivaji, ideologues and nationalists 
such  as Tilak, V ivekananda, A urobindo, A m bedkar, Bose, an d  H in d u tv a 's  founding
18 The Chaturdhams are where the gods are believed to reside and are located across the 
subcontinent at the four cardinal points: Badrinath in the north, Puri in the east, Rameshwaram 
in south and Dvaraka in the west.
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fathers: Savarkar, G ow alkar, H edgew ar, and D eendayal. A ccord ing  to Basu e t al the 
Sangh Parivar, ra ther than  hav ing  created  a fixed and  d istinct intellectual lineage, is 
establishing an  ever expanding  "kinship  netw ork  w hich  stops only at the M uslim s, the 
C hristians and  the 'secu lar', som etim es including figures th a t are also antagonistic." 
[Basu et al 1993:59]
In tliis process of redefin ition  of the param eters of nationalism  th rough  the 
p rom otion  of its father figures, the Sangh Parivar em ploys a d u a l strategy. O n the one 
h a n d  it m u st transform  its pan theon  of iconic figures from  being  sectarian and  partisan  
into national icons. Significantly, the Sangh P arivar's  na tiona l ritua l actions and 
m obilisation cam paigns often coincide w ith  the b irth  or dea th  anniversary  of its ow n 
leaders an d  iconic figures. This is a very  effective strategy  th a t encourages the  grow th  
in  po p u larity  of these iconic figures at the  all-India level (som etim es these personalities 
are only w ell-know n am ong the Sangh P arivar's  supporte rs  or in  specific regions or 
states b u t m arg inal to or u n h ea rd  of by the general public), s treng then ing  their status 
as national leaders and  also contribu ting  to p rov id ing  them  w ith  a sacred aura, in 
particu lar on those occasions w hen  -  as it h appens -  these celebrations replicate and 
evoke relig ious rituals. The m ain  stages of the long Swarna Jay anti Rath Yatra  (that w as 
d ubbed  Rashtra Bhakti K i Teerth Yatra  -  Patriotic P ilgrim age [K ulkam i 1997]) th a t took 
place in  1997 coincided w ith  im portan t religious o r o ther celebrations and  'centres of 
patrio tic  p ilg rim age' [ ib id :ll] . For instance, the Yatra w as s ta rted  in  M um bai on M ay 17 
and  -  after hav ing  tou red  sou th  India -  it reached P o rt Blair in the  A ndam an  Islands on 
the very  day  of the b irth  ann iversary  of Savarkar [M ay 28]. It w as on June 23, 
ann iversary  of the "m arty rdom  day" [K ulkam i 1997:56] of M ookerjee, th a t the Yatra  
reached  Kolkatta. From  there, the Yatra travelled across n o rth  India touching m any  
religious centres, finally reaching Jam m u on July 10, the b irth  ann iversary  of M ookerjee 
[see Fig. 2],
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Fig. 2 M ap of A dvan i's  Sw am a Jayanti Rath Yatra
O n the o ther hand , the Sangh Parivar m akes every effort to re-appropriate  
already established personalities and  national icons. This has been particularly  relevant 
in the case of A m bedkar and  of another popu lar nationalist hero, Subhas C handra 
Bose. N ow adays, A m bedkar figures prom inently  in the Sangh P arivar's  pantheon. On 
the first ann iversary  of the destruction of A yodhya, A m bedkar's  po rtra it ado rned  the 
Sangh Parivar dais along w ith o ther H indu  deities. The resort to A m bedkar in 1993 
w as not an isolated instance. In 1997 a picture of A m bedkar w as included in the panel 
decorating  A dvan i's  Swarna Jayanti Rath Yatra chariot [FIG.4]. Since then, A m bedkar 
has becom e a p rom inen t figure in the Sangh Parivar's  pan theon  and has been 
repeated ly  evoked on o ther ritual occasions. In 2000, on occasion of A m bedkar's  birth  
anniversary , K hushau  Thakre, BJP president, launched a Tw o-D ay Am bedkar Rath Yatra 
around  Delhi. Significantly, in the sam e year, Bangar Laxm an -  an untouchable -  w as 
elected p residen t of the BJP19. In D ecem ber 2002 the U ttar P radesh  BJP president, Vinay 
Katiyar, launched a 12-day A m bedkar Yatra as p a rt of a cam paign  to prom ote cultural 
nationalism . Significantly, K atiyar portrayed  A m bedkar as a suppo rte r of cultural
19 He would resign only sometime later having got involved in a bribe scandal. Before his 
resignation, in a speech done at the BJP National Council in Nagpur, he almost equated 
Ambedkar with Hedgewar.
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nationalism . A llegedly quo ting  from  A m bedkar's  w ritings, K atiyar claim ed that
A m bedkar questioned  the patrio tism  of the M uslim s and  that he had  strongly opposed
the partition  of India [Singh 2002]. Signs of the 'ap p ro p ria tio n ' of A m bedkar were
already ev iden t in the 1980s. The Bhnrata Ektamata Stotrn- one of the RSS daily  prayers -
w as com posed in its p resen t form  in 1980s20. A hym n to Bharat M ata, the prayer is an
"eulogy of Bharat M ata -  a com pilation of the nam es, w orthy  to be ever- 
rem em bered, of the invaluable natu ral endow m ents and  entities of our 
cu ltu ral heritage as also ou r national heroes rep resen ting  our past and 
p resen t ascendance in various fields" 21
Fig. 3 A dvan i's  Rath
Fig. 4 Left panel w ith nationalist heroes
20 It was approved by Akhil Bharatiya Pratidini Sabha of the RSS in 1985.
21 The Integral Spirit of Bharat. An Eulogy: 7.
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A m bedkar is listed  am ong the "galaxy of m en w ho set the  h ighest standards in 
every  sphere  of h u m an  excellence"22. H ere A m bedkar is p ra ised  for hav ing  converted 
to an  ind igenous relig ion (B uddhism 23) -  and  therefore, n o t to Islam  or Christianity, 
bo th  considered  foreign -  and  for his contribution to H in d u  u n ity  for hav ing  accepted 
the Poona Pact and  renounced  separate  electorates for the un touchable, thus saving 
"the H in d u  society from  division into the so called h igh  castes (Savarna) and  H arijans 
(low castes)"24.
In  a sim ilar strategy  the Sangh Parivar has recently  in itia ted  a process of re- 
appropria tion  of Subhas C handra  Bose. Bose w as incorporated  in  tire Sangh P arivar's  
pan theon  officially in  1996. H e w as hailed  as a p ro p o n en t of cu ltu ral nationalism . His 
w riting  taken  o u t of context seem ed to conform  to BJP's political agenda: to reform  
society "according to our ow n ideals, to eradicate poverty  an d  illiteracy, safeguard  
security  and  have a strong  central governm ent" [G upta 1996]. C ooptation of Bose w as 
later on reinforced w hen  celebrating tire nuclear explosion at P okhran  du ring  the 
Bose's centenary  anniversary , hr bo th  cases, the recent em phasis on A m bedkar and  the 
approp ria tion  of na tionalist leaders such as Bose, are w holly  political activities. Besides 
being  instances of transference (transference of sym bols of one particu la r ideology to a 
na tional level) these tactics betray  the desire of the overtly u p p e r caste Sangh Parivar to 
lend  a h a n d  tow ards the Dalits and  the B uddhists in  air a ttem p t to restore harm ony  
w ith in  H indu ism  and  create a u n ited  H in d u  front [A ssayag 1998:132] w hile also 
approp ria ting  the nationalist trad ition  as its own.
22 Ibid: 5.
23 The Sangh Parivar considers Buddhism as being a sort of a sect of Hinduism and Buddha as 
one of the Dashavatar of Hinduism. L K Advani -  in 1998, attending an international conference 
on Buddhism at Sarnath -  argued:
"Buddha did not announce any new religion. He was only restating with new 
emphasis the ancient ideals of the Hindu-Aryan civilisation. He cleansed the faith 
and the customs that were prevalent then of the dust that had accumulated, and 
focused on the essential ideals of Dharma." [Bharatiya Janata Party. 1999. Secularism. 
Rooted in India's Culture and Traditions. New Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party 
Publications, page. 6].
24 Ibid:120.
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Fig. 5 G andh i's  D andi M arch: M ural, BJP's D elhi's H eadquarters
In this respect, and in the w ider context of H in d u tv a 's  father figures, the 
controversy  regard ing  the installation of a picture of Savarkar in the Central Hall of the 
Indian Parliam ent, directly  opposite  a portra it of G andhi, w ho  is usually  regarded  as 
the father of the Indian nation, is illustrative of this process of transference (from 
partisan  to national) and  re-appropriation  of the history  of nationalist m ovem ent rather 
than  just of one of its leaders. O n 26 February 2003 -  the date  com m em orating 
Savarkar's death  -  accom panied by the chanting of Sw atantryaveer Savarkar A m ar Rahe 
(Long Live the brave freedom -fighter Savarkar) and Jab tak Suraj Chand rahega, Savarkar 
tera naam rahega (Your nam e will be w ith  us till the Sun and  the M oon will exist)25, the 
Indian p residen t A P J A bdul Kalam  unveiled  a portra it of Savarkar in the Central Hall 
of Parliam ent26. A n exhibition on the life and w ork of Savarkar w as also held in the 
C entral H all27. Beside the President, A bdul Kalam, the V ice-President, Bhairon Singh 
Shekhaw at, the Prim e M inister, A.B. Vajpayee, the D eputy  Prim e M inister, L.K. 
A dvani, the Lok Sabha Speaker, M anohar Joshi, and the H ealth  M inister, Sushm a 
Swaraj participated  to the cerem ony28. Clearly, the installation of the po rtra it w as a
25 'President unveils Savarkar portrait in Parliament'. 26 February 2003 
www.rediff.com/news/2003/feb/26prez.htm Accessed on 23 November 2006.
26 The portrait was a present from Swatantryaveer Savarkar Seva Kendra and Swatantryaveer 
Savarkar Smarak Samiti of Mumbai and was drawn by Chandrakala Kumar Kadam [ibid].
27 For the occasion the Lok Sabha secretariat released a booklet eulogising Savarkar. ['Out of 
Kala Pani, Again', Saba Naqvi Bhaumik and Smruti Koppikar Outlook, 6 September 2004].
28 The unveiling ceremony was boycotted en masse by the opposition, though the decision to 
hang the portrait was earlier ratified by an all-party committee of Parliament, which included 
Congress and Left leaders.
238
sym bolic event. N o t only w as the p o rtra it as w ell as the  locale h igh ly  symbolic. But the 
unveiling  of Savarkar's  p o rtra it in  P arliam ent w as also sym bolic for another set of 
reasons. F irst of all, Savarkar is n o t strictly a national icon b u t a father figure of only 
one particu lar ideology. By v irtue  of th is only, the  in sta lm en t of his po rtra it if no t 
offensive w as a t least very  partisan . Secondly, Savarkar is the ideologue of H indu tva  
w hich  argues in  favour of the creation of an H in d u  nation. It is therefore a sym bol of 
exclusion and  of d iscrim ination. By installing  a po rtra it of Savarkar in  the  Central H all 
of P arliam ent the BJP-led N ational D em ocratic A lliance governm en t m ade  a sta tem ent 
against the p lu ra lis t no tion  of Ind ian  nationalism  and  the found ing  principles of the 
Ind ian  nation. A fter all, Savarkar is the  m ost im portan t ideologue of the Sangh Parivar 
and  his w ritings form  the core of their political agenda. T hirdly, because Savarkar w as 
allegedly involved  in  the assassination of M ahatm a G andhi, d ie installation of the 
p o rtra it is also a sym bolic attack on  die values arid on the inheritance of the nationalist 
m ovem ent. M oreover, Savarkar's p o rtra it executed according to the aestiietic 
principles th a t characterises H indu tva  iconography, m akes the C entral H all of 
P arliam ent -  and  m etonym ically  Parliam ent itself and  therefore Ind ia 's  political 
institu tions and  its fabric -  resem ble any Sangh P arivar 's  headquarte rs , m aking the 
occupation and  app rop ria tion  of the ideological space of die freedom  m ovem ent by the 
Sangh Parivar even  m ore dram atic.
O n  die o ther hand , the sym bology of die locale is im p o rtan t too and  it relates to 
d ie question  of the sacralisation of space. A ccording to Kertzer:
"[E ]ndow ing certain spaces w itii sacrality is un iversa l in  the struggle for 
pow er, as it is in  governance. Space is m arked  off in  aw ay th a t no t only 
b rings to m in d  a certain  v iew  of h istory  b u t also links those in  the p resen t to 
th a t sacred past" . [Kertzer 1996:25]
This stra tegy  of sacralisation of space involves no t only the selection of special 
hallow ed  sites for die celebration of special cerem onies b u t also the p reven tion  of any 
ritua l po llu tion  of these spaces (as in the case of A yodhya). The C entral H all of the 
Ind ian  P arliam ent is the equivalen t of Ind ia 's  secular tem ple of the nation29, w here
29 On the symbolic value of Parliament see Chapter 4
239
portra its  of the m ost significant figures of the nationalist m ovem ent are hung. The Hall, 
and indeed the w hole of Ind ia 's  Parliam ent H ouse Estate is a v isual com m em oration of 
the nationalist m ovem ent, of its m artyrs, its legacy and  of the principles that form  the 
foundation  of the Indian  nation  and one of the m ost revered national m onum ents. The 
selection of portra its  is in itself symbolic, representing  th rough  the im ages of these 
iconic figures of the nationalist m ovem ent by association those im portan t values such 
as non-violence, p luralism , secularism  on w hich the Ind ian  nation  rests. It is these 
founding  principles that are challenged by the installation of the po rtra it of an icon of 
the political project for a H indu  nation. Indeed, the insta lm ent of Savarkar's portra it in 
the C entral Hall of Parliam ent w hich host portraits of o ther nationalist w as a challenge 
to founding  values of the Indian  nation30.
Fig. 6 RSS N ew  Year Card 1993ca
The approp ria tion  of the h istory  of the nationalist m ovem ent by the Sangh 
Parivar in this case w as realized by re-inventing Savarkar as a nationalist and  national 
hero. To be fair, in his youth  Savarkar w as a patriot. Insp ired  by M azzini, he founded 
A bhinav Bharat Society, a revolu tionary  terrorist g roup  w hich organized  attacks on 
British authorities. H ow ever, his patriotic credentials w ere seriously  discredited  after
30 For a list of the paintings hung in Central Hall see Chapter 4
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his arrest in  1911 for the  m u rd e r of the Collector of Nasik. Savarkar repeated ly  begged 
the British au thorities for his release on  condition of h is abandonm en t of political 
activity. It w as on  these term s th a t he  w as eventually  released  in  from  A ndam an  prison  
in  1924. H ow ever, as soon as the British G overnm ent revoked  these conditions in  1937, 
Savarkar im m ediately  resum ed  h is political activities. H e w as elected p residen t of the 
H in d u  M ahasabha and  from  then  onw ards, Savarkar w orked  against the Congress-led 
nationalist m ovem ent. H e repeated ly  offered his loyal collaboration w ith  the British 
G overnm ent to suppress the nationalist m ovem ent and  p rom ised  to m ake the 
M ontague-C helm sford  reform  of 1919 successful. D uring  the  Civil D isobedience 
m ovem ent carried  o u t by the Congress in  1940-1941 and  in  1942, after the launch  of tire 
Q uit Ind ia  m ovem en t w hen  u n d e r Congress instructions Ind ian  politicians w ere 
inv ited  n o t to cooperate w ith  British authorities and  resign  from  their governm ental 
posts in p ro test, Savarkar, as leader of the H in d u  M ahasabha, instructed  the 
Sanghatanists "ho ld ing  any post or position  of vantage in  the  governm ent services, [to] 
stick to them  and  continue to perfo rm  their regu lar du ties" [N oorani, 1995]. The H indu  
M ahasabha's leader, Shyam a P rasad  M ookerjee, even served  as Finance M inister in 
Fazl u l H aq 's C abinet in the  Bengal Presidency un til February  1943. Since his release 
from  jail he also advocated  the im possibility  of H indus and  M uslim s to live together 
and  subscribed  to the tw o-nation  theory  in  1937 (even before Jinnah  d id  in  1940) in his 
p residen tial add ress to tire H in d u  M ahasabha session. Such is the "fierce nationalistic 
sp irit th a t con tribu ted  to Ind ia 's  liberation" [N oorani 2003:36, quo ting  A dvani] th a t is 
celebrated w ith  the reinven tion  of Savarkar as a na tiona lis t hero. Indeed , the 
reinven tion  of Savarkar as a national hero, on the sam e league of those w ho fought -  
n o t p leaded  w ith  -  the British authorities, is a challenge to tire p lu ra lis t and  ideological 
legacy of tire na tionalis t m ovem en t an d  to tire secular and  constitu tional fram ew ork of 
ind ep en d en t India.
H onouring  Savarkar is ano ther instance of tire process of establishing a new  
sym bolic o rder for Ind ia  th a t is th reaten ing  the foundations of the old Ind ian  republic 
based  on  the ideals of inclusion, tolerance and  secularism . T hat this w as the case, is 
clear from  a sta tem ent release by N arend ra  M odi, G ujarat's  Chief M inister w hen  a 
po rtra it of Savarkar w as installed  in the N ational A ssem bly V idhan  Sabha, only three
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m onths after the  unveiling  of a sim ilar po rtra it in  Delhi, on  28 M ay and  on the occasion 
of Savarkar's 120th b irthday . Q uite openly, (and oblivious to the  rio ts tha t only recently 
h ad  inflam ed the state) Chief M inister N arendra  M odi p ra ised  Savarkar's contribution 
in  identify ing  Ind ia  as a 'H indu  R ashtra '31.
Indeed, the unveiling  of Savarkar's po rtra it is only the  cu lm ination  of a process 
of iconisation in itia ted  by the Sangh Parivar som e tim e before. Since the late 1990s tire 
Sangh Parivar has launched  a system atic -  and controversial -  cam paign to give 
Savarkar respectability  and  anoin t h im  a national hero. The year 2001 saw  the release 
of a film  dedicate entirely  to Savarkar. This film  -  en titled  sim ply  Veer Savarkar32 ~  is the 
Sangh P arivar 's  first cinem atic ven ture  to give p o p u lar exposure  to  its ideology and 
political philosophy. This film  w as alm ost entirely  fu n d ed  by  the Savarkar D arsan  
T rust and  Savarkar Film  F undraising  C om m ittee33. S udhir P hadke -  the film  m usic 
director, also know n  as of Babuji w ho h a d  lobbied for this film  for over a decade -  
tou red  the w orld  to appeal to the Ind ian  d iaspora to dona te  for tire realisation of this 
film. A ccording to tire film 's d irector -  Ved Ralri -  this w as the first film  "totally  
funded  b y  the peop le"34. H ow ever, despite being  'a  film  of tire peop le  for tire peop le ' -  
as tire film  slogan claim ed -  considerable funds w ere also d onated  by  the G overnm ent 
/  of M aharash tra  (w hich doirated 5 m illion Rupees), and  tire then  Prim e M inister 
Vajpayee, w ho  n o t only con tribu ted  to the collection of 5 m illion  R upees d u ring  his 
A m erican tour, b u t also donated  15 m illion Rupees to go tow ards tire film  publicity  
cam paign. Tire influence of the Sangh Parivar -  w hose leaders (am ong w hich Bal 
Thackeray, Vajpayee and  A dvairi) w ere invited  to special screenings arranged  before 
the film  w en t o n  general release -  w as visibly m anifest desp ite  claim s that the film  was 
a faithful h istorical reconstruction of Savarkar's life. Indeed , the film  w as another
31 http://news.indiainfo.com 28 May 2003. Accessed 30 May 2003.
32 The film, which cost over six Crores Rupees, was granted entertainment-tax exemption. This 
is measure -  that brings the price of tickets down -  is usually taken by the state to encourage 
viewers to see films that are considered important. Another film Asoka, released a year later, 
enjoyed the same exemption.
33 'Vajpayeeji helped me make this film', Rediff on Net. November 27, 2001, 
www.hvk.org/articles/1101 /253.htm 1 Accessed on 23 November 2006.
34 Ibid.
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attem p t of the  Sangh P arivar to place the controversial character of Savarkar on the 
sam e level of o ther revered  nationalist heroes.
O nly  six m o n th  after the  release of Veer Savarkar an d  ten  m onths before the 
unveiling  of Savarkar's po rtra it in  the C entral H all of Parliam ent, A dvan i v isited  P ort 
Blair the capital of the A ndam an  Island. A dvan i w as there  in  h is capacity of U nion 
H om e M inister to participate  in  a cerem ony hailing  the inaugu ra tion  of P ort Blair's 
new  ex tended  airport. D uring  tire cerem ony Port Blair a irp o rt w as renam ed  Veer 
Savarkar A irp o rt35. The event w as h igh ly  publicised and  several national dailies 
p ub lished  half-page advertisem ents of the e v e n t36. Forty-eight journalists from  
M um bai, K olkata and  N ew  D elhi w ere officially inv ited  to  th e  cerem ony. Savarkar's 
ow n son, V ishw as Savarkar, and  o ther fam ily m em bers along w ith  S udhir Phadke, Veer 
Savarkar's m usic director, w ere also invited. Few days before A dvan i's  visit, a p laque 
w as installed  in  w h a t w as Savarkar's cell in the infam ous Kalapani jail. The p laque quite 
openly  celebrated Savarkar as tine leader w ho  gave the coun try  "m antra  of H indu tva, 
equality  am ong H indus, H in d u  nationhood, A khand  B harat"37. To leave none in  doub t 
th a t the celebration of Savarkar w as p a rt of the stra tegy  th a t sough t to replace the 
inclusive concept of Ind ian  nationalism  espoused  by the  Ind ian  national m ovem ent 
w ith  the m ore narrow , exclusivist concept of H indu tva, A dvan i on  th a t occasion hailed  
Savarkar as tire u n su n g  hero  of Ind ian  nationalism . A cknow ledg ing  his ideological
35 Besides Port Blair Airport, the name of the park outside the Andaman's jail Kalapmti, was 
changed from Shaheed Park to Savarkar Park. The Andaman Airport was not the only one that 
was renamed during the NDA government. In December 2001 Vajpayee renamed the Airport 
Terminal Civil Enclave of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh, 'Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia', after the 
late BJP senior politician and Vice President (1980-1998) who was a passionate hardliner of 
Hindutva and who played a key role in propagating the BJP's Ayodhya campaign. In April 
2002, Bhopal Airport was renamed 'Raja Bhoj Airport', after the 11th century king of Malwa. 
While the renaming of Gwalior Airport can be seen as a commemorative gesture towards a 
supporter of Hindutva, the renaming of Bhopal can be instead framed within the Sangh 
Parivar's attempt at recovering and honouring pre-Moghul Indian history. Despite legends 
suggesting that Bhopal was erected on the site where Raja Bhoj built a dam (pal) -  hence the 
name — Bhopal s history is undeniably linked to Mughal rule, as Bhopal modern city was 
developed by Dost Mohammed Khan, an Afghan chief that ruled during Aurangzeb times. 
Hence the desire by the Sangh Parivar to change the connotation.
36 'The Savarkar Story: Putting the Facts Straight'. People's Democracy Vol. XXVI, no. 21, 2 June 
2002. http://pd.cpim.org/2002/iune02/060220Q2 savarkar story.htm Accessed on 23 November 
2006.
37 Hindustan Times, 5 May 2002.
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deb t to Savarkar and  to H indu tva, A dvani, in h is speech delivered  at the nam ing  
cerem ony, also ad d ed  -  u sing  a language rich in  religious connotations -  th a t Ind ia 's  
true  p a trio t shou ld  consider A ndam an 's  Cellular Jail their th irthshtan  [pilgrim age site] 
an d  "v isit the place as often as they can"38.
A nother instance of this relentless strategy of g radua l legitim isation of Sangh 
P arivar's  icons an d  appropria tion  of the nationalist m ovem en t is p ro v id ed  by  A dvan i's  
participation  in  a public cerem ony in  D elh i39 to renam e a p a rk  in  D elhi in  Lodhi 
Colony. The D epu ty  Prim e M inister inaugu ra ted  the V eer Savarkar P a rk 40 and  
unveiled  the sta tue of Savarkar "to  rem em ber tire national hero , freedom  fighter, air 
ageless th inker an d  a devou t na tionalist"41. O n  th a t occasion, A dvan i suggested  tha t 
the N ew  D elhi M unicipal C orporation  shou ld  organise air essay com petition  on the life
38 'Emotional Advani renames airport after Vir Savarkar', Ajay Suri, The Indian ExpressL 5 May
2002. A further step in the Sangh Parivar's campaign for the rehabilitation of Savarkar was 
taken by the BJP-led NDA government through Ram Naik, the then Union Petroleum Minister, 
who commissioned the instalment of a statue accompanied by several plaques carrying 
quotations of Savarkar, Madanlal Dhingra (a Savarkar acolyte who assassinated a British 
officer), Bhagat Singh and Subhash Chandra Bose, inside Anandman Cellular jail. The statue 
was only ready in May 2004 when the NDA had been defeated in the 14th Lok Sabha Elections. 
Ram Naik's successor, Mani Shankar Aiyer, ordered the plaque bearing Savarkar's quote to be 
removed and replaced it with Mahatma Gandhi's words before the inauguration ceremony held 
9 August 2004, thus raising considerable controversy. In September 2004, the BJP has urged 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to restore the plaque. In the same period, the party launched a 
day-long 'satyagraha' to be held in Port Blair on September 22, when about 125 BJP MPs were 
led in a procession along the busy streets of Port Blair by Sushma Swaraj behind a portrait of 
Savakar, demanding the restoration of the plaque. In Mumbai, the capital of the state of 
Maharashtra where elections were to be held shortly thereafter, the controversy was quickly 
transformed into an electoral issue. ['Real politik: Advani to take Savarkar issue national' Times 
of India, 20 September, 2004.]
39 August 10 2002.
40 Mumbai has the most famous public place erected in honour of Savarkar: Swatantryaveer 
Savarkar Smarak. This seaside memorial erected on a plot of 6,650 sq meters provided by 
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has a 20000-sq.ft plaza where a life size statue of 
Veer Savarkar is standing surrounded by a garden and two fountains giving the whole 
surrounding an impressive look. The Samarak has a National Museum of Revolutionaries, and 
Auditorium, Research and Reference library, Military training Centre, yogic and Physical 
Training Centre, Medical Centre and Mobile Hospital and also a Book Trust. The Samarak hosts 
several clubs: a boxing club, a rifle dub, a mountaineering club, plus a Savarkar School of 
Martial Art. Interestingly the activities organised by these clubs are all geared towards the 
development of strength, physical or otherwise, in line with Savarkar's/Sangh Parivar's desire 
to create a muscular nation,
41 'Advani Inaugurates Savarkar Park'. Tribune News Service 10 August, 2002.
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of Savarkar for the school s tuden ts  so th a t Ind ian  ch ildren  w o u ld  acquain t them selves 
w ith  the life h isto ry  of Savarkar to get insp iration  from  these "freedom  fighters".
In terestingly, the  renam ing  of the  capital's pa rk  w as n o t an  isolated issue. 
Previously, d ie  Sarojini N agar M arket h a d  been renam ed  after D r K eshav Baliram  
H edgew ar an d  his sta tue h ad  been installed. O bviously d ie  approp ria tion  of public 
places encourages practices of public  d isplay  of p rom inen t H in d u /H in d u tv a  sym bols. 
M oreover, th is process of approp ria tion  and  renam ing  of public  places -  airports, 
squares, and  so on -  concerns also die trend  of changing of city 's nam es d ia t have 
recently  sw ep t the country. The changing of city nam es is considered  im portan t by the 
Sangh Parivar leadersh ip . V ernacular toponym ies are p referred  to those of foreign 
derivation. Bom bay has becom e M um bai; Calcutta, Kolkata; M adras is now  Chennai; 
Baroda, V arodara; C aw npur -  K anpur, ju st to nam e a few. O f a d ifferen t k ind  are die 
a ttem pts of the BJP-led U P governm ent a t die beginning  of the 1990s to change M uslim  
city nam es in to  H in d u  nam es: A llahabad to Prayagraj, M ughal Sarai to D eendayal 
N agar, G aizabad to Saket and  Lucknow  to L akshim ipur [M alik and  Singh 233], In 
February  2004, die BJP M adhya P radesh  Chief M inister, U m a Bharati expressed her 
in ten tion  to renam e the state capital Bhopal Bhojapal, in  h o n o u r of its legendary  king 
Raja Bhoj. She is cred ited  to have said  th a t this m ove w as in ten d ed  "to  give d ie city a 
d istinct iden tity "42.
Savarkar is obviously  n o t the only one w ho is being  celebrated  by the Sangh 
Parivar. O n 31st M arch 1999 die Prim e M inister V ajpayee took p a rt to a celebration to 
com m em orate ano ther im p o rtan t icon of d ie Sangh P arivar pantheon: the M aharatta  
ru ler Shivaji. The occasion w as the 319th dea th  anniversary  of Shivaji43. O n  th a t occasion 
the p rim e m inister pa id  hom age to Shivaji garland ing  a sta tue  raised  in his honou r at 
Fort Raigad. H e add ressed  die crow ds assem bled for die even t from  a dais erected in 
the spo t from  w here Shivaji allegedly used  to add ress his follow ers and  then
42 'Bhopal to be renamed Bhojapal?' Sify Nezus. 3 February 2004. Available on 
http://sify.com/news/fullstorv.php?id=13378554. Accessed 23 November 2006.
43 The anniversary of Shivaji's coronation was held on 6th June. Significantly, on that day the 
Indian Government issued a special currency coin in honour of Shivaji. ['PM Urges People to 
Emulate Shivaji'. The Hindu, 1 April 1999].
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proceeded  to perfo rm  pooja at the nearby  Jagadishw ar M andir. It is understood  that 
p rim e m inisters have to a ttend  a varie ty  of official cerem onies and  V ajpayee's 
partic ipa tion  in this so rt of com m em oration m igh t n o t be significant pe r se. Yet, Shivaji, 
and  in  particu lar the anniversary  of Shivaji's death, are very  significant for the Sangh 
P arivar and  the official participation  of the Prim e M inister in  such  a celebration is 
especially no tew orthy44. The first reason th a t m akes the occasion m eaningfu l is that 
Shivaji is a central character and  one of the forem ost icons of the  H in d u tv a 's  pantheon. 
Shivaji's coronation  is one of the six fundam en ta l rituals observed  yearly  by  the RSS. 
The M ahara ta  H in d u  nationalist pa rty  Shiv Sena obviously  takes insp iration  from  
Shivaji. C elebration of Shivaji w ith in  the RSS is n o t ju st once-a-year affair. A slogan 
sung  at end  of every  RSS shako, after the H ind i/M arath i p ray er -  Rashtra guru  Samarth  
Ram das hi ja i -  is sung  in  h onou r of Ram das, Shivaji's g u ru  [Basu et al. 1993:18]. 
Celebration of Shivaji dates back to the late n ineteen th  century. It w as the 
M aharash trian  social reform er M G R anade who, w ith  h is 1894 N otes on the G rowth of  
M arathi Literature, began  the cult of Shivaji. R anade chose Shivaji as a representative of 
a 17th cen tury  rev ival in terp re ted  as a k ind  of p ro testan t m ovem en t tha t transcended  
caste differences. Bankim  Chatterjee also re in terp re ted  Shivaji as an ideal m an, cultural 
hero  and  n a tion  bu ilder. W ith tim e, and  u n d e r the patronage of rad ical Ind ians such as 
Tilak, tire revival of Shivaji the  M aratha w arrior-k ing  now  revered  as the conqueror of 
the M ughals becam e m ore  p rom inent. Tilak took u p  the cult of Shivaji em phasizing  the 
role of h is g u ru  R am das as an  apostle of H in d u  m ilitancy. The P rim e M inister's public 
partic ipa tion  to  this celebration n o t only lifts the occasion from  a relatively local affair 
circum scribed to the ritua l trad ition  of one of Ind ia 's  countless associations, to one 
event of na tional im portance. But also, by  doing so, he con tribu ted  to b lu r the 
boundaries be tw een  tire Sangh Parivar's  cu ltural and  ritua l m ake-up  and  the one of tire 
nation.
The o ther reason d rat m erits discussion regards the sym bolic significance that 
such  an even t entails. Shivaji is n o t ju st a M aharatta  ruler. H e is a sym bol of m artial 
H indu ism  and  stands for H in d u  resurgence against M uslim  rulers. Indeed, pay ing  his
44 Significantly, only one other Prime Minister has visited the Raigad Fort before. Indira Gandhi 
attended the celebrations to mark Shivaji's 300th death anniversary in 1980.
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tribu tes to Shivaji, the Prim e M inister exhorted  the crow d assem bled to em ulate Shivaji 
and  said  th a t Shivaji w as a "m aster of social and  cu ltu ral up liftm en t". H e said tha t 
Shivaji stood for un ity , harm ony, dem ocracy and  swavalam ban  (self-reliance). Vajpayee 
also took advan tage  of the occasion to load the  even t w ith  patrio tic  fervour. 
A nnouncing  a g ran t of 1 crore Rupees to be devoted to the m ain tenance of the Raigad 
Fort the P rim e M inister claim ed that all Ind ia 's  h istoric forts are  sym bolical '"K irti 
S tum bhas' (pillars of pride) of the nation  and  source of patrio tic  insp iration  for the 
people  [...] for bu ild ing  a strong  and  p rosperous Ind ia"45.
The Sangh P arivar's  pan theon  of iconic figures is a reflection of die exclusivist 
character of their b ran d  of nationalism . The historical figures, d ie  ideologues and  the 
nationalists th a t are curren tly  revered, n o t to m ention  the m ydiological figures such as 
B harat M ata, Ram, K rishna and  H an u m an  are sym bols and  expressions of an ideology 
th a t priv ileges H in d u  cu ltural trad itions. Besides, som e of the  Sangh P arivar's  iconic 
figures (its ideologues w ho elaborated  die ph ilosophy of H in d u  nationalism , Ind ia 's  
h istorical leaders and  god and  goddesses) are also sym bols of a H in d u  resurgence 
against M uslim  oppression. A ppropria tion  and  cooptation of these figures is therefore 
h igh ly  sym bolical in  tha t it streng thens a Ind ian /H indu  na tiona l identity . M oreover, by 
co-opting figures w ho do n o t necessarily  belong to the H in d u  nationalis t etiios such as 
G andhi, A m bedkar and  Bose, d ie Sangh Parivar aim s at ap p rop ria ting  die nationalist 
m ovem ent and  die nationalist p ast -  w hich both  p layed  a crucial ro le in  post-colonial 
im agination  of India. This is particu larly  obvious w ith  regard s to the  m ost im portan t 
icon of the H indu tva  m ovem ent: the god Ram  w ho, along w ith  tile epic poem  the 
R am ayana, has by now  com e to rep resen t bo th  the golden  age of the  H in d u  nation  and 
an  aggressive type of H indu ism . A ll this w ill be discussed in d ie  nex t chapter.
45 'For a Strong and Prosperous India' had been the BJP slogan for some time. Earlier, on the 
same day, the Prime Minister took part to another public ceremony. This time Vajpayee was in 
Mumbai to rename Mumbai international airport as Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport. 
The renaming of Mumbai's international airport was preceded by often-violent agitations 
organised by the local Marathi party Shiv Sena. The Shiv Sena leadership is not unusual in 
organising this sort of agitation for the promotion of a Marathi identity. Not only the name of 
the city of Bombay has since changed its original name, becoming Mumbai, but shopkeepers 
were also forced to rewrite the names of their shops in Marathi [Sardesai 1999].
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Concluding Remarks
The prev ious chapter established tha t the sym bolic capital th a t em erged  after
independence  w as characterised by im ages of m odern ity , industria lisa tion , and  
developm ent. It rep resen ted  Ind ia  as a country  on the m ove, steeped  in  trad ition  yet 
boldly  facing the challenges of the tw entieth  century. If Ind ians w ere  deprived  of their 
cu ltu ral m arkers they  w ere rep resen ted  as indefatigable w orkers engaged  in the project 
of na tion  bu ild ing  and  labouring  for the well-being of the w hole  nation. Values of 
secularism , dem ocracy and  m odern ity  constitu ted  the foundation  of this particu lar 
im agination. The state im plem ented  this im agined Ind ia  th ro u g h  a w ell-articulated 
p rogram m e of social engineering  ep itom ised  by  a concerted state p ro p ag an d a  activity 
th a t a im ed at transform ing  Ind ia  and  facilitating the  passage to m odern ity  and  hence 
encouraging  peop le  to ad a p t to the  n ew  needs of the m odern  state. A ccordingly, a t the 
base of this p ro p ag an d a  activity w as the belief tha t m odern ity  w as a social changer. 
Thus, state  activity w as m ain ly  aim ed a t educating the peop le  and  accelerating the 
transform ation  b ro u g h t along by m odern ity , follow ing the assum ption  that Ind ian  
m asses w ere fundam en ta lly  backw ard  and  n o t able to u n d e rs ta n d  m odern ity  and 
change their behav iour accordingly and  therefore necessitating the in terventions of a 
benevo len t state.
O n  the contrary , the Sangh Parivar p ro p o u n d s a form  of cu ltu ral nationalism  
and  it answ ers to questions of nation, na tionhood and  national iden tity  by using  
sym bols and  sym bolic constructions clearly derived  from  the H in d u  heritage. Because 
in  general these sym bols are steeped  in  trad itions and  a lready  p o p u la r currencies of 
com m unication the H in d u tv a 's  id iom  is a h igh ly  em otionally  charged  and  very  
effective language. In  this chapter we looked at the Sangh P ariva r 's  h igh ly  diversified 
stra tegy  of sym bolic com m unication. The m ethods u sed  to p ropaga te  their im agined 
India are of tw o kinds. O n  the one h an d  the Sangh Parivar m akes use of the state 
com m unication m achinery  bo th  at the national and  a t the sta te  level by prom oting  
cu ltural p rog ram m es celebrating its iconic figures and  historical events b u t also by 
issu ing  com m em orative stam ps, renam ing  public spaces, erecting statues and 
installing  po rtra its  of its leaders and  heroes. O n the o ther han d , the  Sangh P arivar's  
com m unication strategy  is su ppo rted  by a series of sym bolic activities of e thno­
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religious m obilisation th a t usually  e lude the sphere of official state activity. These 
sym bolic public  perform ances are by  an d  large organised an d  carried  o u t u n d e r the 
aegis of various Sangh P arivar's  organisations and  affiliates. But as N ehru  w as 
engaged  in  a p rogram m e of social engineering, so is the  Sangh P arivar w ho aim s at 
creating a H indu Rashtra  based  on  a hom ogenised H in d u  trad ition , organised  a round  
principles of dharma and  Sam skriti, or in  A ssayag 's w ords, "to reconfigure religion on a 
political base, or politics on  a religious one, so as to deconstruct the national 
inheritance." [A ssayag 1998:141]. The Sangh Parivar's doub le-edged  strategy has the 
advan tage of encouraging  the im position  of a particu lar ideology w ith  its sym bols, 
m yths and  ritua ls onto to the w hole national territory. By do ing  so, it obviously 
encourages the b lu rring  of the  distinction betw een w hat is specific to a particu lar 
ideology and  w h a t is national, so th a t as to suggest a correspondence betw een H indu  
and  Indian, the  Sangh P arivar and  the N ation. H aving  estab lished  in  this chapter the 
strategies of d issem ination  of the Sangh Parivar's idea of India, in  the follow ing 
chap ter I explore the sym bolism  w ith  it associated.
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CHAPTER 6 
One Country, One People, One Culture
H av ing  analysed  H in d u tv a 's  strategies to dissem inate H in d u  nationalism , I w ill 
n o w  exam ine the Sangh P arivar's  sym bolic capital. Specifically, I w ill identify  the 
cu ltu ral b u ild ing  blocks of H in d u  nationalism , the m yths, m em ories and  sym bols of 
H in d u  iden tity  th a t have  been  institu tionalised , popu larised  and  canonised  u n d e r the 
aegis of the  Sangh P arivar's  affiliates and  m ore recently  of the  BJP-led state  and  
national governm ents. This chapter is d iv ided  into four sections. The first one 
addresses w ith  ho w  the Sangh Parivar im agines the Ind ian  nation . H in d u  nationalists 
filter their rep resen ta tion  of the  nation  th rough  the concepts of sacred geography and  
u n d iv id ed  India, or A khand Bharat. They em ploy a w ide range of sym bols to  convey 
these tw o  fundam en ta l no tions of pa tria  according to H in d u tv a , such  as the sym bolic 
p a rad ig m  of a gendered  personification of the nation  (Bharat M ata), and  the use of 
rivers sacred to  H in d u ism  as m etonym ic represen tations of the nation. Section tw o 
considers the w ays in w hich d ie  Ind ian  state, its n a tu re  and  role tow ards the ind iv idual 
and  Ind ia 's  com m unities is perceived. Q uestions of m ajoritarian ism  and  organicity 
form  the basis of this ideal state and  are articu lated  th rough  bo th  the concept of H indu  
Rashtra and  the h ierarch ical o rgan isation  of society rep resen ted  in  the  sym bolism  of the 
m ythological V irat-Purusha .
The tiiird  section exam ines a ttribu tes of Ind ian  iden tity  and  those sym bols 
selected to articulate it. This identity , w hich coincides w id i Savarkar's concepts of 
H in d u  identity , is n o t based  on  civic principles of nationality , b u t is ethnically and  
culturally  defined. C ultu ral sym bols such  as the cow, the H in d i language, and  less 
definable com m on practices and  attribu tes tha t are deem ed  to be inheren t to the 
In d ian /H in d u  character and  ethos (e.g., strength , m asculin ity , tolerance) construct 
concepts of na tional identity . Sym bols of streng th  as in  the case of the nuclear 
explosions at P okh ran  and  the  construct of the p roud , confident Ind ian  signify 
m asculinity . A  process of o thering  also defines the In d ian /H in d u  self. The issue of 
'n a tu ra l bo rn  Ind ians ' raised  d u rin g  the 1999 electoral cam paign  highlights the
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tendency  to define Indianness along cu ltural and  ethnical lines. The renew ed  concern 
for those w h o  are com m only called Persons of Ind ian  O rigin  [PIOs] and  N on-R esident 
Ind ians [NRIs] is also illustrative of the  em phasis on the ethnic factors of Ind ian  
nationality . Closely re la ted  to this argum en t are a ttem pts to secure in ternational 
legitim acy th ro u g h  using  sym bols p rom oting  im ages of na tiona l p ride , streng th  and 
m ilitarism  th a t converge to  establish a novel im age of India. The show  Satyam ev Jayate 
thus  serves as a p la tfo rm  devised  to show case Ind ia 's  new  sta tu re  in  the  in ternational 
arena. The BJP's m anifesto  For a Proud and Prosperous India, the N ational Dem ocratic 
A lliance G overnm ent's  nuclear and  aggressive defence p rog ram m e and  its diplom atic 
m ission all undersco re  the desire to "regain  a place of h o n o u r in  tire com ity of great 
nations" [Vajpayee 1999]. The fou rth  and concluding section analyses the H in d u  god 
Ram. Tire im agery  associated w ith  Ram  projects a h igh ly  versatile  and  nrulti-layered 
sym bol th a t encapsulates and conveys the com plex no tions of nationalism  and 
na tionhood  delineated  in the three preceding  sections.
Bharat, not India
"The countless spots of p ilgrim ages, tem ples and  
A shram as, w hich have been  till no w  looked upon  
m ainly  as sym bols of o u r P unya Bhoomi -  a holy  
laird -  have now  acquired a new  an vital em phasis; 
they are sym bols of a com m on M atru  Bhoomi as
well"
[Seshadri 1984:174]
H in d u tv a  nationalism  is based  on a territorial and  cu ltu ral definition of tire 
nation, hr tire Sangh P arivar 's  speeches, publications, and  pub lic ity  m aterial, India is 
variously  rep resen ted  as a m ap, as Akhand Bharat (literally, u n d iv id ed  India), as Bharat 
M ata  (M other India), or bo th  and  is m etonym ically  ep itom ised  b y  its m oun ta in  ranges 
and  great rivers. A ccording to Edensor the conception of the n a tion  in  spatial term s is a 
com plex process th a t includes several
"national form s of spatialisation  w hich in terw eave w ith  each other to 
consolidate a strong  cognitive, sensual, hab itua l an d  affective sense of 
n a tiona l identity , p rov id ing  a com m on-sense spatia l m atrix  w hich d raw s 
peop le  and  places together". [Edensor 2002:37]
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The in terp lay  am ong these distinct form s is ev iden t in  the im age of Bharat M ata  
superim posed  on  a p re-partition  m ap  of the subcontinent, a n d  in  the p rom inen t 
features (sacred rivers, m ountains, p ilgrim age sites, tirthas an d  dhams) m arked  on a 
physical m ap  of p re-partition  India.
Mapping the Nation
C artographic  represen tations are the m ost im m ediate  and  visible sym bols of
the n a tion1. Pow erfu l graphic sym bolic m arkers of Indianness, m aps w ere w idely used  
and  rep roduced  du ring  the N ehru  years in  official publications and  o ther p ropaganda  
m aterials. In line w ith  N eh ruv ian  notions of civic nationalism , the  m ap w as a 
referential signifier, p re-em inently  identify ing a b o unded  adm in istra tive territo ry  as 
the space of p rim ary  belonging [Edensor 2002:39]. The Sangh Parivar also uses 
cartographic represen ta tions of India. In  this case, how ever, m aps ind iv iduate  a 
national territory , w hich is prim arily  cultural. In d isaccord w ith  the defin ition  of India 
as a bounded  adm in istra tive space, H in d u tv a 's  cartographic represen tations of India 
ten d  to rep roduce  'g ran d  landscapes' [Edensor 2002:37] and  are significantly devoid  of 
visible political borders. Borders, how ever, facilitate locating the Ind ian  com m unity  in 
tim e and  space [Smith 1991:16], and  for tire Sangh P arivar it is specific geographical 
features th a t p rov ide  sym bolic and  political boundaries. As E densor as argued, it is 
"n atu ra l bo rders  form ed by  seas, rivers, and  m ountains, th a t forestall invasion and 
contain  cu lture  and  history , susta in ing  m ythical continuities" [Edensor 2002:40].
In d ia 's  geographical and  physical features constitute the basis of H indu tva 's  
ideology. A ccording to Savarkar, Ind ia 's  topography  is central to defining the 
H in du /Ind ian  nation. The w ord  H in d u  itself -  w hich Savarkar considers equivalen t to 
the adjective Indian, ra ther th an  a m arker of religious o rien tation  -  identifies tire 
Indians in  those peop le  inhabiting  tire laird on the eastern  side of the river Sindhus, 
thus  bestow ing  a geographical boundary  to the Indian  nation . A ccording to Balraj 
M adhok [1982] it w as specifically tire H in d u  trad ition  th a t h ad  allow ed for an
1 See Assayag [1998:128-129] and Ramaswamy [2003] on the popular use of the map of India in 
political literature and publicity material. Both mention the 1989 electoral campaign centred 
around images of the map of India. According to Assayag, this was a obvious example of the 
use of the map as logo [Anderson 1983:175].
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unpreceden ted  aw areness of the geographical and territorial un ity  of India am ong the 
com m on peop le2. The seven holy rivers and m ountains, and  the large num ber of 
ashrams and pilgrim age centres had  given consciousness of the size and the 
geographical landm arks of the nation. In particular, Ind ia 's  physical features had been 
constant rem inders no t sim ply of the territorial un ity  of the Indian  nation bu t also -  
and  m ost im portan tly  -  of its cultural un ity  [M adhok 1982:13].
P ictures 1-3 well illustrate this point. Figure 1 is a rep roduction  of a poster 
issued by the Sangh Parivar representing  India as a sacred geography. Here, Ind ia 's 
na tu ra l features sacred to the H indus and  religious landm arks are only show n. These 
are Ind ia 's  "endless hollow ed spots of pilgrim age and M elas" tha t have acted as 
"bu lw arks for preserv ing  the nation 's  psyche rich w ith the sp irit of cultural and 
sp iritual oneness."3
Fig. 1
2 For Madhok [1982] this is something that it is understood by everybody (that is everybody 
who partakes of the Hindu religious traditions): rich and poor, literate and illiterate.
3 The Integral Spirit of Bharat A.
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Sim ilarly, Figure 2 and  34 p resen t an im age of India as a sacred geography. In 
Fig. 2, only Ind ia 's  sacred rivers [or Lok M atas -  "m otherly  stream s n u rtu ring  and 
nourish ing  ou r people for countless generations [...] sym bolis[ing] the unend ing  flow 
of ou r national life"5] and m ountains are depicted.
Fig. 2
In Fig. 3, on a blank and borderless territory (bounded  only by the H im alayas 
and  the Ind ian  ocean) 18 sites are selected as tools of orien tation  [Brosious 2005] for 
national identification: A yodhya, M athura, H aridw ar, Kashi, Kanchi, Ujjayini, Vaishali, 
D varika, Jagannathapuri, Takshashila, Gaya, Prayag (A llahabad), Patna, Vijayanagar, 
Ind rap rastha  (Delhi), Som nath and A m ristar. Significantly the p icture  reproduces som e 
historical heritages and  som e m odern  signs of Indianness. A longside im ages of the 
Narasimha Tem ple of V ijayanagar and  of A m ritsar's G olden tem ple, the illustration 
includes p ictures of the A shokan Capital, of the rebuilt Som nath  Tem ple and of the 
not-yet bu ilt tem ple in A yodhya. Thus, this illustration -  and  by extension the Ekatmata 
Stotra  itself -  by including m arkers that refer directly to India as a m odern  nation-state 
such as the A shoka 's C apital (India 's national em blem ) a ttem pts to root m odem  India 
in a m ythological H indu  past, w hile portray ing  it as the legitim ate successor of India 's
4 Ib id :  1 2 -1 5 .
5 Ib id :  4 .
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H indu  civilisation. Indeed, desp ite  the inclusion of Sikh and  B uddhist sym bols, this 
m ap does no t m ark  any of Ind ia 's  M uslim  heritage sites.
Fig. 3
Akhand Bharat
For the Sangh Parivar, this m ap w ithou t political bo rders  represents Akhand  
Bharat, und iv id ed  India. The concept of Akhand Bharat em erged  from nationalist 
historical narra tives and w as p a rt of the definition of Ind ia 's  national identity . It was 
G olw alkar w ho stressed the im portance of defining the natu ra l borders of H industan . 
In "W e or ou r nationhood  defined" (1939) G olw alkar refers to India or H industan  as 
the "lands from  sea to sea". A ccording to the H in d u tv a 's  ideologue, Akhand Bharat's 
cultural boundaries stretch from  A fghanistan  to Burm a and  beyond  including also Sri 
Lanka:
" ...th is  great country  of ours extending in the no rth  from  the H im alayas -  
w ith  all its branches sp read ing  north , south, east and  west, and w ith  the 
territories included in those great branches -  righ t up  to the sou thern  ocean 
inclusive of all the island is one great natu ral un it" [G olw alkar 1966:124-124 
in Basu et al:27].
Indeed, the m ap that the Sangh Parivar uses in its represen tations of India 
includes Burm a, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet and  A fghanistan  and beyond 
[Fig.4-7]. A ccording to A ssayag [1998:128] at the core of the ideal of India as Akhand  
Bharat lays "[t]he 'racial theory of Indian  civilisation' developed  by British O rientalists 
and ethnologists a t the end  of the n ineteenth  century" w hich saw  the Indian 
subcontinent as a culturally  uniform  and  hom ogenous en tity  d isru p ted  by the M uslim
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invasion. C entral to this redraw ing  of Ind ia 's  boundaries is an aggressive historical 
revisionism  according to w hich India lived th rough  an u n in te rru p ted  golden age of 
prosperity  before the M uslim  conquest and w hich in terp re ts the w hole of South A sia's 
history as an eternal w ar betw een M uslim s and H indus.
h
Fig. 4 Akhand Bharat
Fig. 5 RSS C alendar 1990s 
There is a distinction to be m ade here betw een boundaries and frontiers. W hile 
the first one is political, a frontier m arks a gradual dem arcation  betw een tw o distinct 
territories. The Akhand Bharat m ap that is usually  dom inan t in H in d u tv a 's  iconography 
has frontiers ra ther than  boundaries and  these frontiers do  no t coincide w ith  the 
political boundaries of independen t India nor w ith the boundaries of the British Raj. 
O n the contrary, they include the idea of Ind ia 's  cultural expansion  in the subcontinent 
and  in South East Asia. The slogan Akhand Bharat partly  conjures u p  the idea of a land 
w ithou t clear political borders because a cultural land can only have rather vague 
frontiers. Therefore, the Sangh P arivar's  basic creed rests upon  the establishm ent of
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Akhand Bharat and the undoing  of the India-Pakistan  partition . In the post­
independence national im agination, partition  w as crucial to "searing  the lineam ents of 
Ind ia 's  territorial boundaries deep into the national consciousness ... (through) the 
popu lar sacralization of territo ry" [G upta 1996:17]. This sacralization also m eant that 
India w ould  no t stand  any secession, division or separation. H ow ever, for H indu tva  
partition  no t only m eant the tearing apart of a sacred and  allegedly und iv ided  
hom eland (as conveyed by the slogan Akhand Bharat), bu t the even t of partition  also 
h indered  Ind ia 's  gaining of full independence: azadi abhi adhuri hai (Freedom  is still 
incom plete)6.
3m am to wr
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Fig. 6 Sangh P arivar's  D ipaw ali's Card. 1990s.
Fig. 7 Cover of Sangh Parivar's Pam phlet. 1994.
6 This is the title of a poem composed by Vajpayee at the time of India's independence. The 
poem was reproduced with some changes in 1997 on the occasion of Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra. 
The Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra took place from May to July 1997 and took the BJP leader Advani 
from Mumbai to New Delhi
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Indeed , the slogan A khand Bharat p lays on certain  linguistic  am biguities as the 
term  akhand also refers to the  negation  of partition  w hich  m ade  B harat khandita, or 
d iv ided. A ccording to Balraj M adhok Pakistan  w as carved  o u t from  w ith in  the 
"natu ra l boundaries of India" [M adhok 1982:28]. The RSS describes partition  in  quasi 
O edipal term s an d  equates it to a 'rap e  of the m o therland ' [H ansen 1999:112], 
A lthough  acknow ledging th a t a unification of 'G reater Ind ia ' is politically  unviable, the 
Sangh Parivar pushes for a cu ltu ral unification th rough  a vo lun tary  m erger of Ind ia 's  
ne ighbouring  countries.
In accordance w ith  this strategy, A khand Bharat extends beyond  Burm a and 
A fghanistan  to include the countries of die Ind ian  D iaspora. G iven that the Sangh 
P arivar's  definition of Ind ianness is n o t necessarily politically  territorial and  tha t 
Ind ianness is n o t dep en d en t on  country  of origin b u t on som e inherited  cu ltural 
characteristics, it follow s th a t Ind ians abroad  rem ain  Ind ians independen tly  of 
bird iplace or passport. For Savarkar, the "only geographical lim its of H indu tva  are the 
lim its of ou r eard i"  [Savarkar, 1949:98] and  diose H indus w ho reside abroad  and  even 
have a different citizenship, are still H indus:
"for d ie first essential of H in d u tv a  is n o t tha t a m an  m u st n o t reside in 
lands ou tside  India, b u t d ia t w herever he or his descendan ts m ay h ap p en  to 
be he  m u st recognize S indhusthan  as the land  of his forefathers" [Savarkar, 
1949:98].
The Sacred Land -  Punyabhu
The concept of Akhand Bharat rests firm ly on  the princip les of the sacrality and
in tegrity  of Ind ia 's  territory. Indeed, a p rom inen t e lem ent in  Savarkar's ideology 
regard ing  die Ind ian  nation  is the equivalence of pitrbhu  (fatherland) w ith  punyabhu  
(holyland). In  h is defin ition  of H indu ism , or H in d u  dharm a  as he calls it, he advances 
the no tion  th a t H in d u  dharma is linked n o t only cu lturally  b u t also naturally  to the 
env ironm ent in  w hich it developed. U sing the m etaphor of the river, Savarkar states:
"A s the G anges, though  flow ing o u t of d ie  lo tus feet of V ishnu him self is 
even to d ie  m ost ordiodox devotes and  m ystic so far as h u m an  p lane  is 
concerned, the dau g h te r of the  H im alayas, even  so, th is land  it the b irth ­
p lace -  d ie matribhu. and  pitrbhu  -  of d ia t tatvajnana  w hich in  its religious 
aspect is signified as H in d u  dharm a" [Savarkar 1949:90].
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Thus, h e  equates pitrbhu  w ith  punyabhu :
"H in d u  dharm a  of all shades and  schools, lives and  grow s and  has its being 
in  the a tm osphere  of H in d u  culture, and  the dharm a of a H in d u  being so 
com pletely identified  w ith  the  land  of the  H indus, th is land  to h im  is no t 
only a pitrbhu  b u t a punyabhu, no t only a fa therland  b u t a holy land" 
[Savarkar 1949:91].
Savarkar's  fam ous couplets: Aasindhu sindhu-paryanta yasya  bharat-bhuumikaf
pitrbhum ih pynyabhuscaiva sa vai h induriti sm rtah  ("A  H in d u  m eans a person  w ho
regards this Land of B harat V arsha from  the Indus to the Seas as his Father-Land as
w ell as h is H oly-Land that is the cradle land  of his religion") beautifu lly  encapsulate
H in d u tv a 's  ideal coincidence of ho ly land  w ith  fatherland. In Savarkar's  ow n w ords,
"the  H indus, they being the people, w hose past, p resen t and  fu tu re  are m ost 
closely b o u n d  w ith  the soil of H industhan  as pitrbhu  an d  punyabhu, they 
constitu te  the foundation, the bedrock, the reserved  forces of the Ind ian  
state" [Savarkar, 1949:116],
H ie  exceptionalism  of H in d u tv a  does n o t reside in  the  sacralisation of the land  
itself, as all pa triae  tend  to be trea ted  as sacred in nationalist discourse. In India, in the 
post-independence  national im agination, the dem arcation of the  national bo rders and 
the  consequent sacralisation of the national territo ry  w as founded  on a particu lar 
nationalist m ythology th a t p o rtrayed  Ind ia 's  secular, p lu ra l, m ulti-religious, m u lti­
ethnic, and  quasi-federal dem ocracy as tire containm ent an d  uph o ld er of Ind ia 's  
na tional territo ria l in tegrity  [Singh 2001:139], O n tire contrary , for H indu tva  Ind ia 's  
ascribed sacrality  is religious cum  political. Ind ia 's  rep resen ta tion  as a sacred land  is 
q u in te ssen tia l^  H indu . T hat is their innovation.
This is can be seen by the iconization of the geographical nation-space as bo th  a 
H in d u  goddess -  Bharat M ata  ~  and  a living being. W ithin  the Sangh P arivar symbolic 
reperto ire  tire na tion  is frequently  reduced  to its archetypal im age of Bharat M ata. 
Im ages of Bharat M ata  often dom inate tire v isual landscape du rin g  processions, 
political rallies, and  o ther im portan t Sangh Parivar's conventions. This gendered  im age
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of India hark s back to the  nationalist m ovem ent. Previously7 1 h a d  no ted  som e of the 
peculiar features of Ind ia 's  represen tation  as Bharat M ata  and  of its exceptional 
significance in  tire p re-independence  iconography. Bharat M ata 's  ex traord inary  appeal 
w as based  on its origins roo ted  in the  religious and  cu ltu ral trad itions of India. W hile 
m atrio tism  (the identification of tire na tion  as a n u rtu rin g  m other) is a feature com m on 
to nationalist m ovem ents, Bharat M ata  expresses devotionalism  steeped  in H indu  
trad itions. Bharat M ata  is n o t only an allegorical represen tation  of tire nation, b u t she is 
also a H in d u  deity  in  her ow n right, w ith  tem ples, p rayers  and  rituals specially 
ded ica ted  to h e r8. Iconographically  Bharat M ata  could be easily m istaken  for any o ther 
H in d u  goddess, being  herself m ostly  fashioned after tire goddesses D urga, Kali and 
Lakshm i. P icture 8 show s a typical p ictu re  of Bharat M ata  em erging  form  the m ap  of 
India. H ere Bharat M ata  resem bles prev ious represen tations of the  p re-independence 
nationalism  in  its iconographic traits [see C hapter 2], H ow ever, there is a crucial 
difference. In o rder to identify  tire deity  as M other India and  n o t as ano ther H indu  
deity, the iconography of Bharat M ata  of tire pre-independence period  included  som e 
specific m arkers of identity . O ne w as the Congress flag drat she he ld  usually  in  h e r left 
hand . A lternatively, she w ou ld  be p ictu red  flanked by tire heroes, m arty rs and  leaders 
of the  nationalist m ovem en t often po rtrayed  paying  hom age to her or receiving her 
blessings. In  the Sangh P arivar's  iconography, Bharat M ata  is u sually  depicted  alone 
ho ld ing  n o t tire na tional flag b u t the bhagwa dhwaj, the saffron flag of the RSS or the 
triden t (a sym bol of the VHP) fu rther signifying the H in d u  character of India [Figs. 8 
and  9].
7 See Chapter 2
8 The proliferation of the Bharat Mata icon and the erection of temples dedicated to her are both 
signs of the institutionalisation of this particular deity in the Hindu pantheon of gods and 
goddesses. There are three Bharat Mata Mandir. one in Benares built in 1936 by Shiv Prashad 
Gupt, one in Hardwar, that was built more recently in 1983 by Swami Satyamitranand Giri, a 
renouncer and activist of the VHP, and the third in Saket Nagar in Bhopal opened only in 2004. 
The Bharat Mata Mandir in Benares was inaugurated by none other than Mahatma Gandhi and it 
houses no image of any god or goddess but one of the most perfect relief maps of India carved 
out of marble. The Bharat Mata Mandir of Hardwar, a celebration of the Hindu nationalist view 
of Indian history, is built on seven floors, each one dedicated to different aspects of the Hindu 
nation.
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Fig. 8 Bharat M ata
Bhnmtfi Ekomuttu Shunt
Fig. 9 Bharat M ata from Bharat Ekatmata Stotra
261
In  add ition  to the m o therland 's  personification w ith  the im age of Bharat M ata , 
its sacred geography  is ep itom ised  by  the reverence to Ind ia 's  topograph ical features, 
based  on H in d u  trad itions. This is Sanatana Rashtra, Bharat M ata  in  its m ost visible form  
w here
"every  single m oun ta in  and  river, big  or sm all, n am ed  or unnam ed , 
covering the  body  of Bharat M ata, has d ie im p rin t of d iv in ity  and  history. 
B oundless m y ths and  historical events w oven  a ro u n d  every  one of d iem  
have becom e the woofs and  w arps of ou r one unify ing  N ational 
C onsciousness"9 [Seshadri preface to Bharata Ekatmata S totra  1997:3,4].
Significantly, the g rea t m oun ta in  ranges, in particu lar the  H im alayas and  its 
peaks beside being  the d iv ine residence of H in d u  gods and  goddess are also sym bolic 
pa lad ins of H in d u  in tegrity  hav ing  p ro tected  Ind ia  against the  foreign aggressors 
[ibid:4], In d ia 's  g rea t rivers -  d ie Ganges, Yam una, N arm ada, K averi to nam e a few -  
all resonate w ith  m ythological associations and  are sacred p o p u lar p ilgrim age 
destinations. They are d ie lok-matas " the m otherly  stream s n u r tu r in g  and  nourish ing  
ou r peop le  for countless generations" [ibid].
H in d u  p ilgrim age centres are physical associations to H in d u  m ytiiological
history. They are tirthas, crossing places w here "the gods have  'c rossed  dow n ' into this
w orld  as avataras" and  "w here  eartiily  p ilgrim s can m ake their sp iritua l crossings" [Eck
1998:65-66]. But it is also the en tirety  of Ind ia 's  land  th a t is sacred for die H indus. A
po p u lar p ilgrim age sees the devotees circum am bulate the en tire  coun try  as they  w ould
for a tem ple, passing  from  the four dhams -  w here  d ie d iv ine is sa id  to reside -  at the
four card inal po in ts  at B adrinath, Puri, Ram eshvaram , and  D varaka. For Seshadri these
hallow ed  p ilg rim age centres are the sym bols of:
" the na tion 's  psyche rich  w ith  the sp irit of cu ltu ral and  sp iritual oneness 
.. .In tertw ined  w itii all ancient m yths and  heroes and  A vatars, they, in  short, 
sym bolise the  un en d in g  flow  of our national life since those hoary  tim es".
9 Seshadri. Preface to The Integral Spirit of Bharat 1997:4
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A prom inen t feature of im agining India as a sacred geography  is H in d u tv a 's  
u se  of a w ell-articulated  riverine sym bolism  [Assayag 1998], O n  the sacredness of 
Ind ian  rivers, an d  of the Indus in  particular, Savarkar w as very  vocal. In his sem inal 
w ork  H indutva . W ho is a H indu?  the S indhu serves as the  crucial pa ram ete r for defining 
Indianness. For Savarkar, the S indhu n o t only p rov ided  the orig inal inhabitan ts of tire 
subcon tinen t w ith  a nam e, b u t it also gave them  a feeling of u n ity  [Savarkar 1949:66]. 
Looking for a definition, an  "essential m eaning" of the w ord  H indu , Savarkar 
identified  in  the river Indus the sym bolic h ea rt of the  Ind ian  nation , "the cradle nam e 
of our na tion" [ibid:12], " the  v ital sp inal chord drat connects the  rem otest p ast to the 
rem otest fu tu re"  [ibid:25]. H e argued  th a t indeed, the river, "w elded  them  [the Aryans] 
in to  a na tion  and  fu rn ished  the nam e w hich  enabled their forefathers to voice forth  
their sense of na tional and  cu ltural un ity"  [ibid:5]. For Savarkar, tire H in d u  w as not 
ju st p rosperous geographical features of India but, w as also a visible sym bol of 
nationality  [ibid:6] a sign of dem arcation, a border, w ith  w hich  to inscribe the H in d u  
nation  [ibid;21].
The g rea t procession  for un ity , the Ekatmata Yatra, e laborated  on this riverine 
sym bolism  to illustrate  H in d u tv a 's  a ttem pt at evoking In d ia 's  un ity  th ro u g h  the 
m obilisation of its sacred geography. It also illustrates h o w  the Sangh Parivar 
successfully m anaged  to rep resen t tire elusive concept of Akhand Bharat. Indeed, given 
the im aginary  character of Akhand Bharat, the latter canno t be seen and  experienced bu t 
th rough  those ritua l actions and  public processions organised  regu larly  by the Sangh 
Parivar. I have  a lready  no ted  how  public rituals in  their d ram atisation  of pow er and  
pow er relations are excellent sites for the corroboration and  legitim atioir of a g ro u p 's  
social v a lu es10. The H in d u tv a  alliance th rough  a series of jagaran -  aw akenings -  
arouses H in d u  m ilitancy, iden tity  and  aw areness, u sually  by  w ay of spectacular 
activities such  as processions, festivals, and  rituals (e.g., yatras and  yagnas) th a t have 
characterised  the recent h istory  of India and  th a t have carried  the H indu tva  m essage 
across India, in  every  tow n  and  village. Indeed, the p rom otion  of this p rogram m e of 
socio-cultural reform s and  ethno-religious m obilising cam paigns has becom e an
10 See Chapters 1, 4 and 5.
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in tegral aspect of H in d u tv a 's  strategy. Besides being vehicles for m obilisation, these 
processions have also p rom oted  and  popu larised  the im age of India as A khand Bharat. 
For exam ple, the Ekatmata Yatra, launched  in 1983 by the V H P 11, celebrated and 
sym bolised die subcon tinen t's  cu ltu ral and  geographical un ity , its sacredness and  m ost 
im portan tly  its H in d u  character. For this sacrifice, three g rea t processions w ere m ean t 
to crisscross Ind ia  from  n o rth  to sou th  and  east to w est12, converg ing  a t N agpur, the 
geographical centre of India. In  addition , several od ier13 sm all processions lasting five 
days each w ere m ean t to jo in  the m ain  processions. The processions touched a h o s t of 
sacred sites, all H in d u  holy  places, p ilgrim age centres or " traum atic  places" of inflicted 
hum ilia tion  [A ssayag 1998:141], D uring  diis yatra  w ater from  d ie  river Ganges w as 
carried  in  procession in  huge  receptacles w hile sm all vessels carry ing  die sacred w ater 
w ere sold along the w ay. W ater from  Ind ia 's  others m ain  sacred rivers w as also taken 
in  the procession an d  m ixed  w ith  the w ater from  the G anges. This in term ingling of 
w aters from  In d ia 's  num erous sacred sources w ith  w aters com ing from  other 
neighbouring  countries w as supposed  to sym bolise un ity  and  to redect H indus ' view  
of India as a sacred  land:
11 The Ekatmata Yatra was only one (and possibly the largest and most popular) of the many 
events launched by the Sangh Parivar in response to a mass conversion to Islam in 1981 of 1,000 
members of the Scheduled Castes in the southern village of Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu. In 
the following months, many more Dalits converted to Islam in South India. These mass 
conversions triggered a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability among the Hindus, to which the 
Sangh Parivar reacted by organising a large number of events for Jana Jagaran (People's 
Awakening), the first one of which took place less than seven months after the mass conversion 
in Meenakshipuram. The VHP launched two jnana rathams (chariots of religious wisdom) in 
which statues of the local Tamil deity Murugam were taken in procession across the state of 
Tamil Nadu [Bhatt 2001:188]. As part of the programme of the Hindu Samajutsav (Hindu 
Solidarity Conference), the religious authorities participating (among which the Swamis of 
Madurai, Tanjore, Madras and Vishvesh Tirth) appealed for an end of practices of 
untouchability. There, the next day, religious leaders organised a Vedic sacrifice -  homa -  open 
to all castes and a bhojanam a collective meal, where they shared food with local Dalits [Seshadri 
1984].
12 The first procession started in Kathmandu in Nepal and it ended in Rameshwaram, in Tamil 
Nadu; the second one travelled from Gangasagar in West Bengal to Somnath in Gujarat; the 
third Yatra winded its way down across the subcontinent from Hardwar in Uttar Pradesh to 
Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu. Sixty-nine other small processions setting off from several other 
sites in the interiors joined in.
13 The number of these processions varies. According to Assayag [1998:335] they were 47; but 
Jaffrelot sustains that they were 69 [Jaffrelot 1993:360]. However, it seems to Har Mohan Lai 
[Organiser 12 Feb. 1984:6, in Jaffrelot 1993:361], a total number of 312 yatras took place.
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"W hen the yatras reach their destination  at R am eshw aram  and  Som nath, the 
khumba (jars) w ill contain  w ater from  all the sacred  places, nam ely  the four 
D ham s, (the m ost revered  places of p ilgrim age being  Badrinath, Puri, 
R am eshw aram  an d  D w arka), the  tw elve Jyotirlinga  (natu ral stalagm ites 
considered  as lingam s of Shiva) ... and h u n d red s  of sacred rivers, lakes and 
w ells" [O rganiser 23 O ctober 1983:15 in  Jaffrelot: 360],
As A ssayag ingeniously  p u ts  it:
"It w as as if, by  follow ing trad itional p ilgrim age rou tes w hich  linked the 
m ain  religious centres, the processional rou tes m erged  in  the holy stream s 
of the M other so as to evoke the geographical u n ity  of Ind ia  (Bhdratvar§a) 
u n d ersto o d  as an  ancient sacred land  (ksetra), red raw n  today  by the m artial 
stride  of m o d em  H in d u  crusaders." [Assayag 1998:135]
T hat rivers constitute a po ten t sym bolic w eapon  in  the Sangh Parivar 
ideological arm oury, is fu rther dem onstrated  by  the Sindhu D arshan A bhiyan, a festival 
launched  to celebrate the river Indus (here called w ith  its Sanskrit nam e Sindhu). This 
festival is a new ly  inven ted  ritual, celebrated since 1997, th a t sp rang  from  an initiative 
of the BJP leader A dvan i du ring  a BJP electoral cam paign  v isit to Leh in Ladakh, 
C elebrating the im portance and  d iv in ity  of the river Indus in  In d ia 's  civilization, this 
cerem ony has taken  place every year near Leh. The festival is a th ree-day  affair that 
cu lm inates w ith  ritua l B uddhist p rayers follow ed by a series of Vedic rites he ld  on the 
banks of the river, a Sindhu Puja, and  a host of cu ltu ral p rogram m es. Being a cross 
betw een  a p ilgrim age and  a cu ltural festival, w ith  its range of cu ltu ral perform ances 
from  different p a rts  of the  country, the  festival is also rem iniscent of the  Republic Day 
parade . A ttended  by p rom inen t leaders14 the cerem ony seeks "to  streng then  the sp irit 
of national in tegration", th rough  the sym bolic use  of the river Indus as an em blem  of
14 During the years, the celebrity list has included, besides BJP leaders and prominent 
government personalities such as L K Advani and A B Vajpayee, several ministers of the BJP- 
led NDA government, (the Minister of Defence, the Union Minister for Tourism, the Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting), regional and local government functionaries (most prominent 
of which was the participation of Farooq Abdullah), and, most notably, a large number of RSS 
and Sangh Parivar officials such as Malkani, and the editor of the RSS mouthpiece Panchjanya, 
Tarun Vijay. Numerous spiritual leaders were also invited to the festivals. In 2003 these 
included: Sri Shankaracharyaji Swami Jayendra Saraswatiji, Kanchi Kaam Koti, Sri 
Shankaracharyaji Swami Divyanand Teerthji, Bhanpura Peeth, Swami Avdeshanandji, Swami 
Chinmayanandji, Swami Chidanand Saraswatiji (Pujya Muniji), Sant Rameshbhai Oza (Pujya 
Bhaishri), Roopchandra Muniji, the Archbishop of Delhi, the Archbishop of Agra, and many 
other leaders of different traditions.http://www.sindhudarshanindia.com/000news82003.htm 
Accessed on 2 December 2003
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national u n ity  and  identity . In the official literature on  the Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  the 
river -  "sym bol of s trength" -  is m ade to stand  for "peacefu l coexistence and 
com m unal ha rm ony" and  national in tegration. It is a sym bol of Ind ia 's  civilizational 
heritage, of " the perm anence and  pow er of the ancient Ind ian  civilization", "cradle of 
Ind ian  civilization"15, and  the source of Ind ia 's  nam e. The sym bolic po ten tia l of the 
Indus is n o t self-evident. As the ed itor of Panchjanya -  T arun  Vijay -  took pains to note, 
the Ind ian  popu la tion  neglected  this river for years. The S indhu  w as so neglected  as a 
sym bol of Ind ian  nationhood  th a t tire realisation th a t the river also flow s in Ind ian  
territo ry  is hailed  as a discovery by A dvan i himself. The river ru n s  m ostly  in  Pakistan  
and, for m o d ern  day  Indians, tire Indus does n o t entail airy strong em otional 
attachm ent, as opposed  to the river G anges w hich is central to the ritua l life of the 
w hole H in d u  com m unity16.
The significance the Sangh P arivar a ttribu ted  to  the river Indus in  the 
im agination  of tire Ind ian  nation  depends on tire river's  sym bolic potential. F irst and 
forem ost, it is a reflection of the pre-em inence given to tire geographical and  physical 
features of Ind ia  in H in d u tv a 's  literatu re  and  thought. I com m ented  earlier on tire 
im portance a ttribu ted  to it by  Savarkar. Indeed, for h im  the geographical characteristic 
of Ind ia  an d  in  particu la r tire river Sindhu, besides represen ting  the cradle of H indu  
civilization, m u st be the "first essential of H indu tva"  [Savarkar 1949:66]. That the 
im portance of the Indus river as a sym bol of un ity  and  civilization rests m ostly on 
Savarkar's H in d u tv a  is very  telling, w hen  w e consider th a t the  Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  
w as p rom oted  as a na tional cerem ony since its establishm ent. Indeed , in  inventing  this 
ritual tire Sangh Parivar n o t only p rom oted  one of its sym bols and, by  w ay of it, its 
ideology; b u t by  doing  so it also con tribu ted  to tire b lu rring  of the  boundaries betw een 
Ind ian /H indu , na tional/com m unal. It w as a clear case of im age transference. D espite 
being  p rom o ted  as one, the Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  is n o t a na tional official cerem ony.
15 All these quotes are from: Evolution of a Neiv Pilgrimage of National Integration [1997] from one 
of the RSS-related websites, http://delhi.vsnl.net.in/sindhu/sindhu.htnrl. Accessed 2 December
2003.
16 In order to remedy to this lack of affective attachment to the symbol of the Indus river, in 2003 
a touring photographic exhibition of the Sindhu Darsan Abhiyan was organised by Tarun Vijay 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Tourism and Culture. 
http://www.sindhudarshanindia.com/Q00news92003.htm Accessed 12 January 2004.
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The festival w as advanced  initially by  the then  BJP-led D elhi State G overnm ent w ith  
the participa tion  of A runchal P radesh  and  Jam m u and  K ashm ir G overnm ents. 
N evertheless, it rem ains a party  affair w ith  the trapp ings of a national one. This 
d issim ulation  w as ev iden t in  1997 w hen  the Sindhu D arshan A bh iyan  w as h y p ed  as part 
of the celebrations m arking  the fifty years of Ind ia  independence. Indeed, the official 
celebration logo w as rep roduced  on all the  publicity  posters, banners, and  leaflets to 
p rom ote the erroneous im pression  that the Sindhu D arshan A bhiyan  w as p a rt of the 
national celebrations calendar. This equivalence w as fu rtherm ore  streng thened  by the 
presence on the stage of the  "50 Years" celebrations logo w h ich  w as rep roduced  side 
by side the BJP p arty  sym bol and  flags17. This b lurring  of boundaries betw een national 
and  com m unal, governm enta l and  partisan , w as also ev iden t d u rin g  the celebration 
held  in  1999, w hen  the cerem ony becam e a stage for the p rom o tion  of patrio tic  feelings, 
h i  tha t year, the  Sindhu Darshan Abhiyan  w as celebrated in  late  July, w hen  the proxy 
w ar betw een  Ind ia  and  Pakistan  in  the H im alayan  d istric t of K argil -  only 230 Km 
aw ay from  Leh -  w as still raging.
Indeed , ano ther im portan t sym bolic aspect of the Indus is its location. A lthough 
born  in  Pakistan, the river runs briefly  in  India in  the contested  state of Jam m u and 
K ashm ir. D uring  the celebrations the organisers of the festival seized  the opportun ity  
to m ake the occasion a celebration of patrio tic  sentim ents and  th a t year the focus w as 
to rem em ber the m arty rs  of K argil ra ther than  a cu ltu ral ex travaganza18. Since then, the 
im portance of the  Sindhu Darshan  festival, resides n o t sim ply  in its cu ltu ral potential 
bu t also in  its patrio tic  significance. Thus the festival has since becom e "a symbolic 
salute to the brave soldier of India", the "karam boom i of Ind ia 's  w ar w arriors" w ho 
w ro te  h isto ry  w ith  "their b lood  on  h igh  m oun ta in  snow  clad peaks m aking  the nation  
p ro u d "19. D uring  the Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  of 1999, the Sangh P arivar created images
17 The case of Sindhu Darsan Abhiyan was not an isolated occurrence. In 1997, in parallel with the 
official calendar of celebrations organised by the central government mainly under the 
directives of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the BJP organised a host of public 
functions and often the official celebration logo was replicated on their promotional material. 
See for instance the literature published by the BJP for the Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra. The cover 
of both the booklet and the video produced for the occasion bore the official celebration logo.
18 Advani to go on pilgrimage to J&K. Ajay Suri. Indian Express. 27 July 1999
19 Daily Excelsior 6 June 2000.
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and rituals th a t b lu rred  the d istinction betw een patrio tism  and  m ilitarism , thus 
reinforcing H in d u tv a 's  m aster narra tive  of a resu rgen t m ilitan t H in d u  nation. Entire 
ba tta lions of the Ind ian  A rm y and  the Ind ian  T ibetan Border People p rov ided  logistical 
and  m ateria l su p p o rt to the festival, thus creating "an  even t in  w hich H in d u  rituals 
m ing led  w ith  m ilitary  salutes and  m ilitary  m en  w ere m ade to becom e the m asters of 
cerem ony."20 The 1999 Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  w as b u t one of the activities organised 
by the Sangh Parivar to w hip  u p  the already  heigh tened  nationalist sentim ents21. Thus, 
no t only d id  a p a rty  celebration of a b ran d  of cu ltural na tionalism  becam e a celebration 
of m ilitary  v ictory  and  prow ess, b u t the Sindhu Darshan A bh iyan  w as also m ade to  look 
like a na tiona l celebration.
A nd  finally, all the sym bolic practices centred on the celebration of the Sindhu  
D arshan A bhiyan  are also a Sangh P arivar a ttem pt to re-app rop ria te  one of the m ost 
p o ten t sym bols of India civilization and  ancient h istory. In  the  official literature  of the 
Sindhu D arshan A bh iyan  the  river Indus is often associated w ith  the Indus Valley 
civilization. H ow ever, since the p a rtition  w ith  Pakistan, Ind ia  lost the  archaeological 
sites of H a rap p a  and  M ohenjodaro. D eprived  of its m ost crucial sym bols of H indu tva, 
g iven  also th a t after p a rtition  m ost of the river's  flow  is n o w  in Pakistan, the Sindhu  
D arshan A bh iyan  has since becam e a substitu te  sym bol of na tional iden tity  and  
pa trio tism 22.
20 From Sindhu Darsan Abhiyan old official website: http://delhi.vsnl.net.in/sindhu/tv-leh.htm 2 
April 2000.
21 During the most acute stages of the conflict, the country showed great patriotism that found 
expression in many different forms. During the Kargil conflict, "[Pjublic funerals of dead 
soldiers with the entire civilian public administration in attendance were stage managed to 
create an appropriate stage for the RSS and the BJP functionaries to act out their parts of the 
guardians of guardians and of India". In general, the press was overwhelmed by tributes to the 
martyrs of Kargil. Every magazines and newspaper had articles about the medals and honours 
conferred to the dead, about the compensation granted to the families by the government, about 
the injured and their families. The 'blood spilled on the altar of patriotism' became the 
dominant theme. In this climate of raised nationalism instances of the Sangh Parivar's 
promotion of patriotism abounded. On one occasion, RSS and VHP functionaries visited injured 
and convalescing soldiers, and presented them copies of the Ramayana, while on another they 
offered them 20.000 rakhis "smoothly carried to the Military Intelligence office for the soldiers- 
on both occasions with press cameramen in tow." [ibid].
22 In Hindutva's literature the Indus Civilization is often referred to as Saraswati Civilization to 
reclaim its origins in India rather than in an area that now lies in Pakistan.
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Besides being  a vehicle for the prom otion  of H in d u tv a  ideology, of patrio tism  
and  of na tional p ride, the  Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  is also a new ly  inven ted  ritual. It is a 
cross be tw een  a p ilgrim age and  a cu ltural perform ance and  incorporates elem ents 
derived  from  d ifferen t ritua l sources in  a novel form at. The function is jointly 
conducted  by  the L adakh B uddhist A ssociation, Shia Majlis, Sunni A njum an, C hristian 
M oravian C hurch, H in d u  T rust and  Sikh G urdw ara  P rabhandak  C om m ittee. The ritual 
p rog ram m e includes B uddhist p rayers  led  by the m ost revered  Lam as of the region 
held  on the banks of the  river, follow ed by  a Vedic cerem ony, a puja  and  ritual bath ing  
of d irect H in d u  inspiration. R em iniscent of o ther rituals organ ised  by the Sangh 
Parivar, the cerem ony involves the m ixing of the  w aters of d ifferen t rivers23.
The novelty  of tire Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  is b o th  literal and  figurative. 
E stablished in  1997, the festival entailed  the acquisition of a n ew  sacred icon, drat of 
Sindhu M ata, in  tire Sangh Parivar pantheon. U ncontroversial like Gaumata and  Bharat 
M ata, it can be revered  by all H indus irrespective of their caste or sect. Thus, this highly  
sym bolic perform ance, desp ite  claim ing to be "a  tru ly  N ational In tegration  
P rogram m e", rem ains decidedly  H in d u 24. The Indus has since becom e a p o ten t sym bol 
of nationhood , patrio tism , and  H in d u  civilization and  culture. It is a sym bol of both  
identity , because it is Ind ia 's  eponym  -  follow ing S avarkar's  though t -  and  
nationhood, because it flow s th rough  the contested territo ry  of Jam m u and  Kashm ir, hr 
add ition  it acts as a sym bol of na tional in tegration  by being  co-opted hr tire ritual 
practices tire B uddh ist com m unities and  Scheduled Caste and  Tribes of Ladakh. In this 
operation  tire Sangh P arivar becom es the p rom oter of pa trio tism  an d  nationalism  w hile 
p ropogating  its ow n  braird  of nationalist sym bols, w hich it na tu ra lises as Ind ian25.
23 In 2003 Advani poured the waters of the Brahmaputra into the Indus, 
[http://www.sindhudarshanindia.com/000news22003.htmj Accessed 28 September 2003.
24 In this context, even the use of a Sanskritzed terminology is significant. The use of Sindhu 
instead of Indus is typical example of the Sangh Parivar's idiomatic language. On one hand, it 
denotes the Parivar's predilection of Sanskrit terms in its efforts to signify -  also with language 
-  India's cultural heritage. By using Sanskrit, the Sangh Parivar is claiming that India's culture 
is mainly Vedic/Hindu, while denying at the same time Islamic influences. On the other hand, 
Sindhu is reminiscent of Savarkar's famous Sanskrit couplets "asindhu sindhu...".
25 Given that the Sindhu Darsan Abhiyan festival is an initiative of one particular party in India -  
albeit the party that for some time led the government at the centre -  it is quite a surprise to see 
that even after the defeat of the NDA at the 2004 General Election, the Sindhu Darsan Abhiyan is
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still performed under the aegis of the Ministry of Tourism and Culture. Thus, the translation 
from a ceremony of one party to a celebration of national importance is this way fully 
accomplished. It is however interesting to note that the India's Minister of Tourism, Renuka 
Chowdhuri announced that the River Sindhu flowing in Ladakh should be known as River 
Singhe. Her contention is that the local Buddhist name of the Sindhu River is Singhe River and 
the River is known as Sindhu River "only in Pakistan". The Minister has, therefore, removed the 
word Sindhu from the Sindhu Darshan program and renamed it as Singhe Darshan.
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The Sangh Parivar d raw s u p o n  religious resources, trad itions and  custom s as 
m obilising tools at the service of H in d u  nationalism . Bharat, im ag ined  as the outline of 
the Ind ian  subcontinen t w ith  its fuzzy, unclear borders extending, b u t n o t m erging, 
w ith  the  A sian continent, is a H indu ised  landscape, hom ogeneous in  its character, 
desp ite  its varie ty  -  as ep itom ised  by the num erous sacred  sites devo ted  to the H indu  
religion. M oreover, the rep resen ta tion  of the nation  as Bharat M ata, n o t only identifies 
tire na tion  as a legitim ate goddess of the H in d u  pantheon, bu t, by  represen ting  India in 
an  an th ropom orph ic  form , also inscribes tire land  w ith in  the H in d u  trad ition  of seeing, 
for tire na tion  in  India m u st n o t only be im agined  b u t also darsan-ed  [C hakrabharty 
1999:204]. The Sindhu Darshan A bhiyan  is doing ju st that.
Hindu Rashtra (on the nature of the Indian State)
hr tire p rev ious section I argued  th a t the Sangh P arivar im agines India as a
territo ry  inscribed in to  a sacred geography, w hich is inhab ited  by a hom ogeneous 
H in d u  com m unity  u p o n  w hose  trad itions Ind ia 's  cu ltural m ake-up  is form ed. N ow  I 
w ill consider ho w  the Sangh Parivar perceives the Ind ian  nation-sta te  and  how  this is 
sym bolically represen ted . For the  Sangh Parivar, the concept of H indu  Rashtra provides 
the  gu id ing  principles for the  ideal nation-state. O n the con ten t of H indu Rashtra, w hich 
is no t a political ph ilosophy  b u t an  ideal m odel of political adm inistra tion , the  Sangh 
P arivar is qu ite  vague. Indeed, this H indu Rashtra is n o t a "theocratic  concept b u t is 
cu ltu ral in  conten t" [M alik and  Singh 1992:14], thereby  p rov id ing  the m oral 
justification for the  sta te 's  forays into questions of cu ltu ral policy, as dem onstra ted  by 
the recent controversies regard ing  the Sanskritization of Ind ian  culture. The ideal 
nation-state  also rests on issues of m ajoritarianism  and  organicity , w hich tire Sangh 
Parivar com m unicates by em ploying  tire symbolic of tire im agery  of tire virat-purusha  
and  by  articu lating  the concept of tire organic and  in te rd ep en d en t na tu re  of Indian 
society.
D espite stressing the geographical un ity  of the Ind ian  nation , the Sangh 
P arivar's  ideologues are against a civic and  territorial m odel of nationalism ; they reject 
"any  form  of na tion  state based  on  an abstract social contract and  thereby com prising 
ind iv idualised  citizens dw elling  w ith in  the coun try 's  adm in istra tive  frontiers"
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[Jaffrelot 1993:28]. G olw alkar w as adam antly  opposed  to the idea  p ropaga ted  by 
C ongress th a t the nation  "is com posed of all those w ho, for one reason  or the other 
h a p p e n  to live a t the tim e in the coun try" [G olw alkar 1939:59]. In sp ired  by the G erm an 
w riter B luntschli's criticism  of the no tion  of social contract, G olw alkar's ethnic 
nationalism  p ro v id ed  a definition of the Ind ian  nation  th a t rested  firm ly on the concept 
of race and  culture. Taking as a m odel G erm any u n d e r N azism , G olw alkar considered 
the H indu Rashtra  to be in  opposition  to the idea of com posite nationalism . In this 
sense, H in d u  becom es a m arker of identity  alw ays opposed  to o ther religious m arkers, 
such as M uslim  and  C hristian. Thus G olw alkar identifies H indu , w hich  for Savarkar 
d id  no t necessarily  refer to religious identity  -  albeit being  equally  exclusivist -  w ith  
H induism .
This ideology tha t identifies in the H in d u  com m unity  In d ia 's  original and
genuine inhabitants, suppo rts  the  u n ders tand ing  of dem ocracy as m ajority rule. A
notion  of m ajoritarianism  thus perm eates H indu tva  ideology, M ajoritarianism  m eans the
p redom inance of the cu lture of the  m ajority, w hich by  extension becom es national.
Indeed , in  the Sangh Parivar parlance, the adjective H indu , rashtriya  (national) and
bharatiya (Indian) are interchangeable [Jaffrelot 1993], thereby equating  the Ind ian
nation-sta te  and  H indu ism  and  su ppo rting  the notion  th a t H indu ism  is the essential
elem ent of Ind ian  nationhood. O n m ajoritarianism  -  or w hy  the  H in d u s  shou ld  ru le
India -  Savarkar claim ed th a t H in d u tv a  p rovides the essentials of na tionality  on w hich
to bu ild  Ind ia  [Savarkar 1949:114] and  th a t the foundations of the n a tion  rest on:
" th a t po rtion  of its citizens w hose interests and  h isto ry  and  aspirations are 
m ost closely b o u n d  u p  w ith  die land  and  w ho  thus  p rov ide  the real 
foundation  to the  structu re  of their national state ... [T]he H indus, they 
being  the people, w hose past, p resen t and  fu tu re  are m ost closely bound  
w ith  the soil of H in d u sth an  as pitrbhu  and  punyabhu, they constitute the 
foundation , the bedrock, the reserved  forces of the Ind ian  state" 
[ibid:115,116].
These concepts w ere recast into the m etaphor of the d ivine purusha, or 
p rim ord ia l m an  -  a p o p u lar them e in classical H induism , o rig inating  from  the RgVeda, 
the o ldest H in d u  sacred text. It depicts h u m an  society and  its four divisions (the varna  
system ) as evolving from  the p rim ord ia l m an, w ith  each d iv ision  corresponding  to a
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body  p a rt (head, arm s, th ighs and  feet)26. This m etaphor w as persuasive  in  a nationalist
context because it conveyed the im age of an organic and  in te rd ep en d en t social system .
Rejecting, like Savarkar and  G olw alkar d id , b u t insp ired  by  the no tions of the divine
purusha  and  of the social contract, U padhyaya -  another H in d u tv a  ideologue, fram er of
the  RSS's constitu tion  and  founder of the Jana Sangh -  considers the Ind ian  com m unity
as 'se lf-bom 7 and  as an 'o rganic  en tity ' [U padhyaya 1965:32]. H e em ployed tire
fram ew ork  of the varna  system  n o t to advocate the resto ra tion  of this social system
(itself resisted  by  the RSS, w ho considered it resistan t to  the creation of a hom ogenous
H in d u  com m unity), b u t to project the idea  that the roots of contem porary  Ind ian
society are to  be found  in an  in tegrated , harm onious, ideal and  organic society:
"In  ou r concept of four castes, they are th o u g h t of fou r castes, they are 
th o u g h t of as analogous to d ie different lim bs of V irat-Purusha. [...] These 
lim bs are n o t only com plem entary  to one another, b u t even  further, there is 
ind iv iduality , unity . There is a com plete iden tity  of interest, identity  of 
belonging. [...] If this idea is n o t kep t alive, the  castes instead  of being 
com plem entary , can p roduce  conflict. But then  this is d istortion. [...] This is 
indeed  die p resen t condition of ou r society". [U padhyaya 1979:41].
D espite  s itua ting  die ind iv idual as die basic u n it of d ie  social body, die organic 
society po rtrayed  by  d ie  p rim ord ia l m an  sym bolism  strongly  denies ind iv iduality  and  
em phasizes the in terdependence  of all society 's m em bers. In  d ie  ideal state, everybody 
recognizes tiieir oneness w ith  the o thers in  a spirit of sacrifice and  cooperation. Thus, 
this m etaphor signifies social unity , in terdependence, and  solidarity; how ever, it also 
exposes the Sangh P arivar 's  belief in  an  ordered, h ierarch ical society. It is die 
organicity  of society th a t is m ost forcefully im plied  by  the em ploym en t of the im agery 
of the virat-purusha. By articulating concepts of m u tua l com plem entarity  and  unity , the 
im plication en tailed  by  the  im agery  of the virat-purusha  is th a t conflict am ong the 
various lim bs of the n a tion  -  its various institutions: castes, fam ily, com m unity , trade 
unions, g ram  panchayat, janapada  and  the state [U padhyaya 1979:41-42] ~ is a 
distortion. Indeed , in the sam e w ay th a t there cannot arise any conflict am ong the
26 The principle of hierarchy is directly implied by this myth of origin of all men form the 
sacrifice by the gods of the primordial cosmic being, Purusha. According to the hymn of Rg Veda 
10,90 that celebrates this sacrifice, the different varnas are born out his different limbs of the 
primordial purusha: the Brahmins from the head, the kshatriyas from his arms, the vaisyas from 
his torso and the shudras from his feet,
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head , arm s, torso and  feet of the sam e body  for the body  to function and  survive, then 
there m u st be com plete iden tity  of in terest and  of belonging  for the H in d u  society to 
flourish.
C ertain ly  the Sangh P arivar's  recourse to the m etapho r of the  virat-purusha
betrays an  inclination for a h igh ly  h ierarch ised  society w here  dharma (considered as
one 's social, relig ious and  econom ic duties) plays a v ital regu la to ry  role in  m ain tain ing
order and  w here the ind iv idual m u st learn  to m erge h is/her iden tity  to th a t of the
com m unity  [Basu et al. 1993:78]. Indeed , for G olw alkar the  sta te  w as a superfluous
structu re  th a t could  be superseded . The Sangh Parivar aspires to realize tha t goal:
"The u ltim ate  v ision of ou r w ork, w hich has been  the living insp iration  for 
all ou r organisational efforts, is a perfectly o rgan ised  state  of our society 
w here in  each ind iv idual has been  m ou lded  into a m odel of ideal H indu  
m anhood  and  m ade in to  a living limb of the corporate  personality  of 
society" [Golwalkar, 1966:61].
Who's an Indian?
"I am  confident th a t Ind ia  w ill en ter tire next 
m illenn ium  w ith  its head  he ld  high, a strong  and  
p rosperous nation, p ro u d  of its p as t an d  confident of its 
fu tu re  as a lead ing  m em ber of the  com ity of nations."
[Vajpayee, 1997]
For H indu tva , Ind ia  is a sacred land, w hose bo rders  do n o t coincide w ith  the 
(arbitrary) adm in istra tive  frontiers of the  m odern  nation-state . The boundaries are 
unstab le  and  correspond  to H in d u ism 's  expansion in  tire subcon tinen t and  beyond. 
Based on  H in d u  sacred trad ition , w hich associated Ind ia 's  landscape w ith  divinities 
and  m ythological traditions, Basu e t al. [1993:76] described  th is process as a 
"h indu iza tion  of [Indians geographical, historical, even zoological features." Similarly, 
for tire Sangh Parivar, air Ind ian  is n o t som eone bo rn  w ith in  the geopolitical borders, or 
possessing air Ind ian  p assp o rt b u t one w ho fully satisfies H in d u tv a 's  prerequisites of 
belonging. D uring  the N eh ru  period  paradigm atic  Ind ian  citizens w ere sim ply 
characterised by  the trope  of m odern ity  and  their represen ta tions w ere bereft of any 
un ifo rm  cu ltu ral m arkers. O n tire contrary, for the Sangh P arivar national iden tity  is 
cu lturally  defined and  th is iden tity  rests firm ly on  H in d u  trad itions. The H in d u
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nationalists ' Ind ia  is p o p u la ted  by figures that epitom ise H in d u tv a 's  ideals. Thus, the 
typical Ind ian  is a personification of the H in d u  ethos. The na tiona l citizen is a natural 
born Indian27, m odern  yet trad itional ("m odem  in outlook, w ith  a sound  understand ing  
of global developm ents and  technological trends and  the  w ay they  im pact on India, 
and  yet is p ro u d ly  anchored  in  India 's va lue  system s an d  cu ltu ral trad itio n s"28), 
tolerant, peaceful an d  an im ated  by a sp irit of self-sacrifice and  cooperation  (because 
H indu ism  is so), yet strong  and  p ro u d  of h is/her national heritage.
H in d u tv a 's  hom ogeneous Ind ian  identity  is rep resen ted  th rough  sym bols 
derived  from  H in d u  w ay of life: language, social custom s, religious rituals, and 
cu ltural trad itions. Concepts of p ride  and  streng th  have also becom e im portan t 
sym bols of iden tity  w ith  the the construct of tire p ro u d  Ind ian  em erg ing  at the expense 
of o ther identities. N ational iden tity  sym bols w ere em ployed  in  a varie ty  of w ays and  
m edia. As no ted  earlier, public  rituals and  processions (e.g., official national 
cerem onies an d  various consciousness-arising \jagaran] p rocessions o rganised  by the 
Sangh P arivar's  affiliates) w ere p rom inen t vehicles for p a rad in g  sym bols. Elections 
w ere peak  periods for w aging  sym bolic w ars and offered an  oppo rtun ity  to articulate 
im ages of Indianness.
Tw o operations have characterised  the Sangh P arivar's  fundam entals of 
na tional belonging. Tire first one establishes the equivalence of Indianness w ith 
H induness by  em ploying  cultural sym bols of national belonging. In  this operation  the 
focus stressed  tire H in d u  character of the Ind ian  identity , by  establishing the e thno­
cu ltu ral core of Indianness. The search for a com m on denom inato r of Indianness -  
th ro u g h  the m obilisation of sym bols such as tire cow, tire river G anges, the H in d u  god 
Ram; the a ttem p t to im pose the singing of tire hym n Vande M ataram , tire p rom otion  of 
the found ing  narra tive /m yths of origin and  ancestry, and  of trad itions perta in ing  solely 
the H in d u /In d ian  w ay of life -  all characterise the dem arcation  of Ind ian  iden tity  in 
strictly cultural-ethno-relig ious term s. The second opera tion  focussed on the
27 This neologism was widely used during the 1999 general election. See below.
28 Bharatiya Janata Party, Delhi Pledge -  Adopted at the National Council meeting of the BJP at 
New Delhi on August 3, 2002
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articu lation  of the  a ttribu ted  characteristics of H in d u /In d ian  identity . Concepts of 
strength , tolerance, p ride , m asculin ity  w ere articulated  th ro u g h  the sym bols of the 
nuclear bom b, th ro u g h  rituals -  such  as the even t Satyam ev Jayate and  the 1999 
Republic D ay p a ra d e  w here  the sym bols of m o d em  w arfare  w ere  given am ple space. 
N eedless to say, the  p rom o tion  of H in d u  orig in  m yths, of m em ories of a d istinct H indu  
society, and  of trad itions perta in ing  solely to H indu  life, ignored  Ind ia 's  diverse 
cu ltu ral heritage and  den ied  alm ost seven centuries of Islam ic and  British dom ination 
in  India. A lthough  at tim es these tw o operations overlap , I shall approach  them  
separately.
The Ethno-cultural core of national belonging
For the Sangh Parivar, H in d u tv a 's  essentials are a com m on nation, a com m on
race and  a com m on civilisation (ek rashtra, ek ja ti, ek sanskriti). This m ono-cultural 
defin ition  of Ind ianness p resupposes th a t it w as H indu ism  -  tire basic fabric of India -  
th a t shaped  the  nation  and  resisted  the assault of he terogeneous cu ltu ral system s. In 
this process, cu ltu re  {sam skriti) and  tire coincidence of pitrbhu  w ith  the punyabhu  are 
necessary to the construction  of air exclusivist Ind ian  iden tity  (see above). M aps of 
India as A khand Bharat -  w hereby  the geographical landscape coincides w ith  a 
religiously dem arcated  space -  and  representations of Ind ia  as Bharat M ata -  the 
m other land  -  visually  identify  Ind ia  w ith  H in d u  traditions. H ow ever, the coincidence 
of the sacred lan d  w ith  pa tria  does n o t alone form  the bedrock  of Ind ian  identity . 
Because H in d u tv a  nationalism  prioritizes culture over politics, cu ltu ral traits and  
practices (rew riting  history, transform ing  H in d u  religious celebrations in to  national 
traditions) define identity . Because for H indu tva, cu lture is b u t a by -p roduct of H in d u  
d harm a [Panikkar 2004.], it identifies na tional culture w ith  H in d u  religious culture.
D espite the Sangh P arivar's  a ttem pts to m inim ize relig ious connotations by 
equating  H in d u  to B haratiya (i.e., Indian), the sym bols of na tiona l iden tity  reference 
H in d u s ' religious tra its  (e.g., Bharat M ata, G angaM ata , Gomata, an d  Ram). These H indu  
rituals and  trad itions assum e such sta tu re  in determ in ing  social iden tity  that, for 
exam ple, Sonia G andhi's  failure to read  H ind i in  the devanagari scrip t becam e 
sym ptom atic  of her foreignness. M oreover, these sym bols could  bo th  un ite  H indus,
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w ith o u t d istinction  to caste or sect, and  exclude non -H indu  com m unities. Similarly, for 
G olw alkar, respect for the cow  represen ted  the com m on denom inato r for Ind ian  un ity  
[Basu et al. 1993:76], w hich for Seshadri, is sym bolised by  a series of practices tha t are 
"m arks of orthodox  H in d u  p iety" [ibid].
The m etapho r of the "n a tu ra l b o m  Indian" 29 conveyed sim ilar concepts. 
A rticu lating  no tions of p rim ord ia l attachm ents to the Ind ian  soil, the term  acquired 
currency in  1999, du ring  the XIII Lok Sabha and  w as p rim arily  used  by those 
detractors of Sonia G andhi w ho  opposed  h e r cand idatu re  as P rim e M inister of Ind ia30. 
A ccording to an ed itorial pub lished  in  the O rganiser a "n atu ra l b o rn  Indian" is " ... one 
w ho is b o m  in  a country  and  is heir to its history, etiros an d  cu lture." Thus political 
allegiance for a "n a tu ra l b o m  Indian" is "a  na tu ra l p a rt of h is personality" because he 
or she has a n a tu ra l attachm ent to a p lace w here he  [sic] belongs"31. D uring  the 1999 
general elections, the BJP's official electoral cam paign  partly  replicated  these 
argum ents [Fig. 11],
F ortu itously  for the Sangh Parivar, the term  'n a tu ra l b o rn  Ind ian ' could convey 
no tions of a ttachm ent to the soil th a t w ere central to  H in d u tv a 's  definition of 
Indianness. M oreover, the term  im plicated  into the H in d u /In d ian  fold strategies of 
inclusions th a t w ere also re levan t to iden tity  questions of tire NRIs -  N on-R esident 
Ind ians -  and  of the PIOs -  Persons of Ind ian  O rigins. Since for the  Sangh Parivar
29The Indian Constitution does not distinguish the rights of citizens on the basis of how they 
acquired citizenship, be it by birth, descent, registration, naturalisation or incorporation of the 
territory. Therefore, the term 'natural born Indian' is not used by the Indian Constitution. The 
inclusive concept of Indian identity embraced by the Indian Constitution is based on the 
pluralistic traditions that became dominant in the nationalist movement and at the time of 
independence. The framers of the Indian Constitution made non-discrimination the basis of 
tolerance in independent India in order to dismantle the system of discrimination of the caste- 
system and pre-empty the risk of religion discrimination after the atrocious events that 
accompanied the partition of the British Raj in India and Pakistan. This term is used in the 
American Constitution (sec 1 Clause 5): "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the 
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United 
States".
30 For an analysis of the phenomenon, see Vittorini [2003].
31 Organiser 8 August 1999.
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Indianness is no t civic, bu t instead depends on both inherited  cu ltu ral characteristics 
and the coincidence of Punyabhu  w ith  Patribhu -  a mix of racial and  cultural theories of 
national iden tity  -  according to the H indu tva  forces Indians abroad  rem ain  Indians 
independen tly  of w here they are born  or the passpo rt they  carry. In this sense, 
nationality  is cu lturally  based and  genetically/genealogically transm itted . A ccording to 
some, this strategy  of inclusion serves to d issem inate H indu ism  by internationalizing it 
and  to streng then  the cu ltural concept of identity. N ot surprising ly , the Indian 
governm ent u n d er the leadersh ip  of the BJP launched a series of initiatives aim ed at 
s treng then ing  the ties of the NRIs and PIOs w ith India and  fu rthering  their inclusion 
into the hom ogeneous H indu  nation32.
Don’t vote for him 
because HE was born 
in India. 
Vote for him 
because YOU were.
He »*** te*o«n***d ■** 9*1 X  •  M cwMry AM
>tota*«OTN'CMr*> VMM*«l)*4orc
<A »«*. he oerl I « w *  M He
The leader you can trust. In war. In peace.
Fig. 11 BJP Poster -  1999 Election C am paign
32 Among the many initiatives launched by the Sangh Parivar, the three-day Pravasi Bharatiya 
Divas Conference organised by the BJP-led NDA Government in recognition and appreciation of 
the role of the Indian diaspora, while calling upon furthering their links with the motherland, 
deserves mention. During the same legislature, the NDA Government floated a special bond for 
NRIs, aptly called Resurgent India Bonds, in order to raise $2 billion. The government 
successfully raised $4.2bn from expatriate Indians [Arulanantham 2004:13]
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In  th is stra tegy  of inclusion and  exclusion from  the In d ian /H in d u  identity , the
process of o thering -  the  w ay in  w hich  otherness is constructed  -  is crucial to the
form ation  of identities. Savarkar h im self w as aw are of it [Savarkarl949: 32]. W hile
H in d u tv a  narra tives of iden tity  p roduce  cu ltural and  political u n ity  (here
heterogeneity  is glossed over to reinforce an idea of u n ita ry  identity), they also w ork  as
practices of exclusions. W hile Ind ia 's  depressed  castes and  tribes, as w ell as B uddhists,
Jains and  Sikhs are all believed to be p a rt of the hom ogenous H in d u  fold, the others,
variously  rep resen ted  as either the  M uslim  or the C hristians, are excluded from  the
Sangh P arivar's  m odel of national identity . They cannot be considered  H indus and
therefore p a rt  of the H in d u  nation, because as Savarkar explains, even
"in  the case of som e of our M oham edan [sic] or C hristian  coun trym en  w ho 
[...] have inherited  a com m on Father-land and  g rea ter p a rt  of the w ealth  of 
com m on culture -  language, law , custom s, folklore and  h isto ry" they 
"cannot be recognized as H indus. For though  H in d u s th a n  to  them  is pitrbhu  
as to  any  o ther H in d u  yet is n o t to them  a punyabhu  too. Their ho ly land  is far 
off in  A rabia or Palestine. Their m ythology and  G odm en, ideas and  heroes 
are n o t the ch ildren  of this soil." [Savarkar 1949:92].
Thus, against these stereotypical im ages of H in d u  iden tity  there  em erge 
stereotypical rep resen ta tions of the M uslim s. The d o m inan t represen ta tions of the 
M uslim  com m unity  in  Ind ia  ten d  to p roduce  a m asculin ised  im agery, w hich is 
com plem entary  to trad itional fem inine representations of the  na tion  (centred on the 
pa rad ig m  of Bharat M ata). M uslim s are typically depicted  as very  fertile and prolific. 
Inheren t to  this rep resen ta tion  is also a discourse of H in d u tv a 's  insecurity , w hich is 
evidenced by tire anxiety tha t the M uslim  popu la tion  w ill su rpass the H in d u  
com m unity  in  a n o t so d istan t fu ture. Tire latest census confirm ed dr is dem ographic 
trend  thereby  accentuating H in d u tv a 's  concern. Issues of fertility  obviously reproduce 
also im ages of virility, hr dreir virility, M uslim s are p rim arily  seen as lustfu l and  
therefore a constan t danger for v irtuous H in d u  girls and  w om en. M uslim s are also 
rep resen ted  as backw ard , barbaric  religious fanatics w hose faith  is u sually  considered 
rig id  and  non-to leran t. R epeatedly  tirese im ages w ere rep ro d u ced  in  H in d u tv a 's  
litera tu re  and  rhetoric.
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D uring  the 1999 electoral cam paign the slogan "videshi-swadeshi”, w hich 
articu lated  strategies of inclusion and  exclusion, gained  popu larity . It w as Sushm a 
Swaraj -  one of the BJP's m ost p rom inen t leaders -  th a t coined the fam ous w as cry: 
"svadeshi naarige purasJcara, videshi naarige tiraskara" ("rew ard  d ie  svadeshi w om an, reject 
die videshi one"). O bviously, Sushm a Swaraj sought to tu rn  d ie Lok Sabha contest into 
a fight be tw een  a native (swadeshi) an d  a foreigner (videsh i) and  filed her nom ination  
from  Bellary, Sonia G andh i's  sam e constituency. This d ichotom y w as even represen ted  
in  d ram atic form  w hen  Sushm a Swaraj appeared  on the political stage dressed  as the 
parad igm atic  Ind ian  w om an, thus sym bolically epitom ising Ind ian  identity . She w as 
d rap ed  in  the  BJP's colours -  a green  b louse and  a b righ t orange sari -  com plete w ith  
b rig h t bindi and  sindoor, bangles and  mangalsutra. She w as die d ram atic and  living 
enactm ent of the  BJP's ow n version  of die ideal Ind ian  w om an, theatrically  posing  as a 
housew ife and  behan33.
Since cu ltu re  is die p rim ary  ideological p lank  for the p rom otion  of this type of 
H in d u  culture, d ie Sangh Parivar sought to control In d ia 's  m ajor cu ltu ral institutions. 
A ccording to Pan ikkar [2003], H in d u tv a 's  cultural project is encapsu lated  in the slogan 
'nationalise  and  sp iritualise ' and  p a rt of its aim  is to "retrieve and  dissem inate die 
cu ltu ral trad itions of die 'g o ld en ' H in d u  past"  [ibid]. The p rom o tion  of H in d u  culture, 
w ay of life and  m yths of origins becom es central to d ie  H in d u tv a 's  b ran d  of 
nationalism  of 'one  culture, one country, one nation ' and  its defin ition  of national 
identity . Both die 1996 and  1998 BJP election m anifestoes openly  declared the pa rty 's  
in ten tion  to colonise In d ia 's  cu ltu ral sphere. W hile in  1996 die m anifesto identified  in  
H in d u tv a  -  there  ap tly  defined  as cu ltural nationalism  -d ie  d riv ing  force tiiat "will 
b ridge  our p resen t to ou r glorious p ast and  pave the w ay for an equally glorious 
fu tu re", in  1998 the m anifesto declared the prim acy of cu ltu re  over policy by claim ing 
th a t the BJP's na tionalist v iew  w as n o t "m erely bom id  by d ie  geographical or political
33 Interestingly, both Sonia Gandhi and Sushma Swaraj invoked family-related markers of 
identity. If Sonia Gandhi defended her Indianness by portraying herself as the official bahu 
(daughter-in-law) of India, Sushma Swaraj played with the image of the housewife and the 
behan (sister) [Vittorini 2002].
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iden tity  of B harat b u t it is referred  by  ou r tim eless cu ltu ral heritage  [...] a civilisational 
iden tity" [N oorani 2004]. D uring  the five years of BJP governm en t at the  centre, the 
M inistries of Education, Inform ation  and  Broadcasting, C ultu re  and  H u m an  Resource 
D evelopm ent w ere  all u n d e r  its firm  control, w hile V ajpayee an d  A dvan i w ere in  full 
control of the state ap p ara tu s  -  essential for the im p lem en ta tion  of the agenda of 
cu ltu ral nationalism . M oreover, the  V ajpayee governm ent ap po in ted  RSS sta lw arts in 
h igh  offices (such as Sunder Singh B handari, V ishnu K ant Shastri, Bhai M ahavir, K. R. 
M alkani and  Suraj Bhan as State G overnors, and  Bhairon S ingh Shekhw at as Vice- 
P resident) w ho exercised g rea t influence and  inform al pow ers.
A v iv id  exam ple of the Sangh Parivar's  in terven tion ism  in  cu ltural policy 
occurred at the E ducation M inisters' Conference held  in  D elhi on  22-24 O ctober 1998, 
w hen  die then  H u m an  Resource D evelopm ent M inister ~ M urli M anohar Joshi -  
subm itted  a set of controversial p roposals to "Indianise, nationalise  and spiritualise 
education"34. To the conference's official agenda M urli M anohar Joshi attached  a 14- 
page  annexure, w hich  reported  recom m endations of "u n n am ed  experts", apparen tly  
close to the  RSS education  b ranch  and  affiliate Vidya Bharati A khil Bharatiya Shiksha 
Sansthan35. Josh i's m ove to link  education  w ith  nationalism  d id  n o t sim ply p rom ote 
"ediics, pa trio tism  an d  classicism " (as D asgupta  [1998] euphem istically  p a rap h rased  
it). It w as a b la tan t a ttem p t a t saffronising education, a t enforcing "a  cu ltu ral agenda 
[...] by  changing the curricula on die basis of the Sangh P ariva r 's  ph ilosophy  of
34 Five CMs oppose HRD minister's plan to 'Indianise' education. Rediff.com 20 October 1998. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/20hindu.htm [accessed 3 November 2006] and 'Taking 
Hindutva to school'. Muralidharan Sukumar and S.K. Pande. Frontline. Vol. 15; No. 23; 7-20 
November 1998. Similarly, indigenous sciences such as Vastn Shastras and Vedic mathematics 
were promoted by the Education Ministry in an attempt of hinduize education, while the 
Ministry of Defence decided to sponsor research for the development of mythical weapons 
endowed with magical powers as mentioned in the epics.
35 Ibid. Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan is a scheme set up under the auspices of the 
RSS that runs about 6500 schools across India. In the Saraswati Sishu Mandirs run according to 
this scheme, a core curriculum is taught along with all the subjects stipulated by state education 
boards. This core curriculum comprises six subjects: physical education, Sanskrit, music, yoga, 
moral and spiritual education, and sanskriti gyan (knowledge of culture). Moral and spiritual 
education is taught with precepts and quotations from the Veda and the Upanishads. 
Contributions of Indians to physics, chemistry and architecture are particularly stressed 
[Panikkar 2003] in order to create confidence in the mind of India's young generations.
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n a tio n a lism "36. Indeed , w hen  Joshi declared that "education  shou ld  derive its 
sustenance from  the strong  po in ts  of Ind ia  culture, trad ition  and  h isto ry"37, he  w as 
m erely  reitera ting  the RSS position  according to w hich  " the  govern ing  v irtue of 
secularism  in  Ind ia  has only been the  denial of the ind igenous national cu ltu re"38. The 
p roposal included  the com pulsory  teaching of Sanskrit from  class III to X, stress on 
Ind ian  early  developm ents [Panikkar 2003] to increase "the essentials of Ind ian  culture 
from  10 to  25 p e r cent"39, m oral and  sp iritual education at all stages, hom e economics 
for girls, and  tire m andato ry  singing of Saraswati Vandana and  Vande M ataram  to open 
and  close the school day. As Saraswati Vandana is a hym n  ded ica ted  to the H indu  
goddess of L earn ing  (Saraswati) and  Vande M ataram  is In d ia 's  official national song -  
th is recom m endation  w as particu larly  controversial.
Ind ia  is in  the  singu lar position  of hav ing  an  official na tional an them  -  Tagore's 
poem  Jana Gana M ana  -  and  a na tional song -  Vande M ataram . In  C hap ter II, I discussed 
the  controversial n a tu re  of Vande M ataram  w hile m app ing  tire sym bolic reperto ire  of 
tire na tionalist m ovem ent. M urli M anohar Joshi's p roposal to requ ire  singing Vande 
M ataram  in  school, fu rther fuelled this sym bolically po ignan t issue. A  national an them  
is n o t sim ply a song, b u t a rep resen ta tion  of the coun try  th a t contributes tow ards 
defin ing its sense of nationhood. It is a sym bolic construction  th a t sim ultaneously  
perpe tra tes  and  reinforces the sp irit of nationalism . Principles of dem ocracy and  
secularism  as w ell as tire desire to keep divisive sym bols in abeyance insp ired  the 
C onstituen t A ssem bly 's decision to declare Jana Gana M ana  as tire national anthem . 
M urli M anohar Joshi's in terven tion  m ay  have appeared  innocuous, b u t in  his partiality  
to Vande M ataram  as In d ia 's  m ost influential patrio tic  song, h is p roposal is 
sym ptom atic  of the Sangh P arivar's  in tervention  in  cu ltu ral policy. N ot only does the 
decision to in troduce  tire singing of Vande M ataram  in  schools com prom ise the sp irit of
36 Five CMs oppose HRD minister's plan to 'Indianise' education. Rediff.com 20 October 1998. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/20hindu.htm Accessed 3 November 2006.
37 'Our students do not know India's problems'. Interview with Murli Manohar Joshi. The Week, 
15 November 1998.
38'Taking Hindutva to school'. Muralidharan Sukunrar and S.K. Pande. Frontline. Vol. 15; No. 
23; 7-20 November 1998.
39 Five CMs oppose HRD minister's plan to 'btdianise' education. Rediff.com 20 October 1998. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/20hindu.htnr Accessed 3 November 2006.
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secularism  and  violate Art. 28 (1) and  (3) of the C o n stitu tio n 40, b u t it is also 
sym ptom atic of the BJP-led governm ent's  political project "to  redefine the Indian  
nation  as H indu , euphem istically  claim ed as the realisation of cu ltu ral nationalism " 
[Panikkar 2003]41.
This project establishing H indu ism  and  H in d u  cu lture  as the  basis of Ind ia 's  
national m akeup  is m anifest in  d ie  BJP-led governm ent's  1999 decision to invite die 
Ind ian  Council of H istorical Research [ICHR] and  the N ational C ouncil of Educational 
Research and  T raining [NCERT] to revise h istory  textbooks. As P an ikkar [2003] noted, 
the n ew  textbooks pub lished  to date  p ro p o u n d  a H indu ised  version  of h istory  tha t "is 
likely to contribu te to die creation of a sense of popu lar u ltra  nationalism " and  a sense 
of pride. M ost im portan tly  though, this new  history is likely to p rom ote  and  up h o ld  
"an  ideology for organising the politics of identity , exclusion an d  ha tred "  [Panikkar 
2003]. Besides, the m an ipu la tion  of education  curricula by the BJP and  the appo in tm en t 
of people close to die Sangh Parivar in  the bodies p red isposed  for the w riting  of the 
h istory  textbooks raise issues regard ing  the functioning of the liberal state and  the 
stability  of a sense of nationalism  in  India. Education is one of the p rim ary  institu tions 
u sed  by the state to  p rom ote  its national reperto ire and  also to reinforce national 
identity . In a liberal state  there shou ld  be som e guaran tees for dealing w ith  the 
fundam en ta l issues such as th a t one of education. E ducation shou ld  n o t be at the 
m ercy of p artisan  desires and it shou ld  respond  to the  sta te  ra ther than  die 
governm ent. It is the state th a t m u st ensure  th a t culture is be ing  effectively p roduced  
[Gellner 1983] and  peop le  in  charge for it should  be independen t. Education  curricula
40 "(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly 
maintained out of state funds"; (3) No person attending any educational institution recognised 
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious 
instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that 
may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, 
if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto".
41 It is worth noting here that nowadays every session of parliament begins with the singing of 
Jana Gana Mana and ends with Vande Mataram. The decision to sing Vande Mataram at every 
Parliament session was not taken in 1947 but only in 1992 when the then speaker of the Lok 
Sabha -  Shivraj Patil -  insisted in implementing the unanimous resolution adopted by the 
General Purpose Committee of India's Parliament. [Bharatiya Janata Party. 1999. Secularism. 
Rooted in India's Culture and Traditions. New Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party Publications, page. 9],
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shou ld  n o t rep resen t partisan  in terests and  change every  tim e the governm ent change. 
If th a t w ou ld  happen , the character of nationalism  w ou ld  becom e increasingly 
unstable.
In  o ther w ords, M urli M anohar Joshi's p roposa l to requ ire  singing Vande 
M ataram  in schools n o t only v iolated  bo th  the sp irit of the C onstitu tion , b u t w as also 
sym ptom atic of the  Sangh Parivar's  design to reshape In d ia 's  cu ltu ral outlook42. By 
p rom oting  Vande M ataram  as the repository  of Ind ia 's  patrio tic  trad ition , the Sangh 
Parivar projected once again  an  im age of Ind ia  th a t is tho roughly  H indu . A lthough the 
h y m n  h ad  acquired  its ow n  significance independen tly  from  B ankim 's novel, Vande 
M ataram 's w ord ing  and  im agery  betray  a d istinct H in d u  religiosity. It p rom otes a 
H indu ised  conception of na tionhood  th a t is consistent w ith  the Sangh P arivar's  
ideology. This event is illustrative of the  Sangh P arivar's  a ttem p t a t saffronising Ind ia 's  
cu lture  and  education  system  in  o rder to inculcate "desirab le social and  national 
va lues"43 to create a m onolithic H in d u  nation, based  on H in d u  D harm a  and  Sam skriti. 
This p artisan  p rom otion  is eventually  justified by die articu lation  of the pow erfu l and  
persuasive  m etapho r of the d ivine purusha  th a t p ictures die ideal Ind ian  state as the 
organic com bination of d istinct yet in te rdependen t parts, "b o u n d  together by m utua l 
concerns and  com m onsense of self-preservation" [A nderson an d  D am le 1997:72].
42 To celebrate India's fifty years of independence, in 1997 Vande Mataram underwent a facelift. 
Produced by one of the finest young Indian film composers, A R Rahman, the album Vande 
Mataram was released on the eve of the 50 Years of India's independence. For the occasion, 
Rahman and his group gave a live performance at India Gate in Delhi in front of a wide 
audience comprising the Prime Minister Gujral. In 2000, to mark the 50 years of the Indian 
Republic Rahman released an album entitled Jana Gana Mana. Unlike Vande Mataram which 
became an instant success and stirred some controversy, the release of Jana Gana Mana was a 
negligible event. In Rahman's version of Vande Mataram the tone is combative and the rhythm is 
strong. There is an energy in Rahman's song that was absent from previous versions and that 
matched India's new image as a no-nonsense, macho nation. The reactions triggered by the 
release of Rahman's new rendering of Vande Mataram are indicative. Swapan Dasgupta, editor 
of one of the most prestigious English language Indian weeklies, India Today, felt the young 
composer had finally freed the song from 'Nehruvian distortions' by setting it to an aggressive, 
combative tune. Another India Today columnist, Tavleen Singh, said Rahman's song was the 
only cheering item at the 50th year Independence Day celebrations in Delhi.
43 Five CMs oppose HRD minister's plan to Tndianise' education. Rediff.com 20 October 1998. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/20hindu.htm Accessed 3 November 2006.
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Masculinization of the Nation
Sym bols of streng th  and  w eaponry , articulated  th ro u g h  im ages of a m ilitant
and  aggressive India, are im portan t attributes of the H in d u tv a 's  b ran d  of national 
identity . In this section I w ill a rgue  th a t Ind ia 's  nuclear explosions a t P okhran  in 1998 
and  the victorious w ar w ith  Pakistan  in  Kargil in  1999 becam e the sym bolic vehicles for 
the  articu lation  of the concepts of national strength, p ride  and  self-confidence. Tire 
1999 N D A  m anifesto  spelled  o u t this policy w hen  in  its in troduction  claim ed tha t this 
"N ational A genda is a sincere and  solem n covenant aim ed a t changing  the conten t and 
cu lture of governance of one great nation, freeing it of the  trip le  curses of hunger 
(ibhook), fear (bhay) and  corrup tion  (bharashtachar), and  transform ing  it in to  a N ew  India 
th a t is p rosperous, strong, self-confident and  at peace w ith  itself and  w orld ."44 These 
w ords w ere echoed in  V ajpayee's 1999 Independence D ay speech in  w hich he  called 
u p o n  all Ind ians to b u ild  a Parishrm ai Bharat (Industrious India), a Parakrami Bharat 
(Self-confident India), and  a Vijay Bharat (Victorious India)45.
From  tire 1999 electoral cam paign  I w ill d raw  events d rat exem plify H in d u tv a 's  
ideal of Irrdianness and  negotiate  im ages and  sym bols of tire na tion . Specifically, I will 
exam ine the Sangh P arivar 's  publications (electoral m anifestoes and  publicity  m aterial) 
and  tw o public  cerem onies (the show  Satyam ev Jayate, celebrating the BJP-led 
governm en t's  first year in  pow er, and  the 1999 R epublic D ay celebrations). These 
instances dem onstrate  the extent to w hich the articulation of concepts and  sym bols of 
p ride  and  s treng th  becam e constituent elem ents of the  m odel of Ind ian  identity  
p rom o ted  by  tire H in d u  nationalists.
I D ream  of a S trong  an d  P rosperous In d ia 46
Illustra tions of the Sangh Parivar articulation of p rid e  and  streng th  abounded
in  1998 and  1999, w hen  feelings of nationalism  and  patrio tism  grew  follow ing the 
Pokhran  nuclear testing  in  1998 th a t confirm ed Ind ia 's  nuclear capability  and  the w ar 
w ith  Pakistan  in  tire H im alayan  d istrict of Kargil in  1999. A t the tim e, every public
44 For a Proud and Prosperous India. An Agenda. National Democratic Alliance. 
http://www.bjp.org/manifes/manifest99.htnr Accessed 25 October 2006.
45 'Agni-2 to be inducted'. The Hindu, 16 August, 1999.
46 Interview to A B Vajpayee, in Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Man India Awaits. New Delhi: Bharatiya 
Janata Party Publication, 1997, page. 9.
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engagem ent w as ap p ro p ria ted  to fuel Ind ia 's  sense of p rid e  an d  to increase its new ly 
acquired  streng th  on  the w orld  stage. Official speeches delivered  by Vajpayee in its 
office of Prim e M inister, addresses to the nation, as w ell as sta tem ents released on 
special occasions by  various Sangh Parivar spokespersons, pub lic  cerem onies such  as 
Republic Day, Independence  Day, as w ell as electoral cam paign  speeches, p rov ided  
suitable occasions to articulate those sym bols of s treng th  and  p ride . Even for Sushm a 
Swaraj, to defeat Sonia G andhi in  tire 1999 Lok Sabha elections becam e a question  of 
national pride: "I feel allow ing a person  of foreign origin to becom e prim e m inister is 
an in su lt to India. Therefore, for m e this is no t an election to becom e an  MP. It is an 
election to fight for Ind ia 's  na tional p rid e"47. M anifestos w ere variably  en titled  "For a 
S trong and  P rosperous India" [1996] and  "For a P roud , P rosperous India" [1998 and
1999].
Ind ia 's  nuclear w eapons p rog ram  w as started  at the  B habha A tom ic Research 
C entre in  Trom bay. In  die m id  1950s Ind ia  acquired  dual-use  technologies u n d e r the 
"A tom s for Peace" non-pro liferation  program , w hich aim ed at encouraging  the civil 
use  of nuclear technologies in  exchange for assurances th a t they  w ou ld  n o t be u sed  for 
m ilitary  purposes. In d ia ’s first nuclear test on 18 M ay 1974 w as described by the Indian  
governm en t as a peaceful nuclear explosion. A fter 24 years w ithou t testing, India 
resum ed  nuclear testing w ith  a series of nuclear explosions know n as "O peration  
Shakti". P rim e M inister Vajpayee au tho rized  the tests on  8 A pril 1998, tw o days after 
the  G hauri m issile test-firing  in Pakistan. O n  11 M ay 1998, Ind ia  tested  three devices at 
the Pokhran  u n d e rg ro u n d  testing  site, follow ed by tw o m ore tests on 13 M ay 1998.
h i the m on ths tha t follow ed Ind ia 's  nuclear tests a t Pokhran  die arm s race 
betw een Ind ia  and  Pak istan  accelerated w hile tiieir d ip lom atic relations deteriorated . 
W ith in  a fo rtn igh t of In d ia 's  five nuclear explosions, at d ie  end  of M ay 1998, Pakistan  
carried  ou t six nuclear tests. A fter d isp lay ing  A gni II a t d ie  1999 Republic D ay parade, 
Ind ia  test-fired the w eapon  in  A pril 1999, w hile in d ie m id s t of a parliam en tary  crisis
47 ’This is an election to fight for national pride’: S. Swaraj http://www.bjp.org/ 
election'99/aug3099a.htm. Accessed 11 October 2000.
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th a t led  to V ajpayee's loss of a parliam entary  m ajority and  n ew  elections48. Three days 
later, Pakistan  follow ed suit, test-firing tw o of its in term edia te  range ballistic missiles: 
G hauri II and  Shaheen. The in ternational com m unity  w as quick to b lam e India for 
hav ing  started  this arm s race. In the sum m er of th a t sam e year, Ind ia  and  Pakistan  
becam e invo lved  in  a p ro tracted  arm ed conflict in  the  K argil district. The conflict's 
favourable reso lu tion  for Ind ia  allow ed the BJP to acquire political advan tage from  it in  
view  of the ensu ing  parliam en tary  elections. A t the follow ing Independence Day 
speech [15 A ugust 1999], Vajpayee w ithou t d ilu ting  his na tiona lis t tones announced  
th a t A gni II w ou ld  be inducted  into the coun try 's  arsenal soon. The Ind ian  Prim e 
M inister also u sed  the occasion of Independence Day to m ake bo ld  nationalist rem arks 
and  to exhort the m asses to consolidate their patrio tism , die la tte r already  heigh tened  
by  the nuclear explosions and  by die m ore recent Kargil conflict w ith  PakBesides 
strategic m ilitary  considerations, g rea t sym bolic value w as im bued  in  Ind ia 's  nuclear 
capability. N o t only  d id  P okhran  becom e a trium ph  of die V ajpayee's governm ent, "an 
achievem ent w hich deserves a m ention  in  Ind ian  h isto ry"49, b u t it  w as also a signifier 
of In d ia 's  streng th  (and  even  becam e a p ilgrim age centre!). Ind ia  now  possessed a 
m in im um  credible de te rren t and, by  end ing  die P-5 (the five p e rm an en t m em bers of 
the  Security Council hav ing  nuclear w eapons) nuclear m onopoly , Ind ia  now  possessed 
a h igher bargain ing  pow er and  could  therefore engage in  in te rnationa l and diplom atic 
relations from  a position  of strength.
In  add ition  to represen ting  an accreditation for fu ll participa tion  on the 
in ternational stage, d ie nuclear testing served as a fetish of scientific advancem ent by 
advocating  the ideal of science and  technology 's com m and in  Ind ia 's  narra tive  of 
m odern ity  tiiat partly  rep licated  N ehruv ian  discourse50. As a sym bol and  celebration of
48 The test-firing of Agni was seen by some as a divertive and a stratagem to gain political 
advantage in view of the elections: "Agni-II could be a useful missile in an election campaign" 
['Sparring in Thin Air, Seriously'. B R Shrikanth and Sunil Narula. Outlook, 26 April 1999]
49 'Anniversary of Pokaran II. The Crowning Achievement of Vajpayee Government'. Organiser. 
9 May 1999, vol 1, no. 40.
50 On the occasion of the 1998 nuclear explosions at Pokhran, Vajpayee added Jay Vigyan 
(Victory to the Scientist) to the slogan Jay Jawan Jay Kisan (Victory to the Soldier, Victory to the 
farmer) that was used in 1965 and 1971 during the wars with Pakistan. 
rhttp://www.indianembassy.org/inews/May 1999/TECHNOLOGY DAY OBSERVED.html
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scientific, m ilitary, and  technological achievem ents, the nuclear explosions becam e 
com m on signifiers of s treng th  and  their visibility increased. Vajpayee im m ediately  
declared 11 M ay -  the day  of P okhran51 -  "Technology D ay". Significantly, 11 M ay 
becam e also know n  "R esurgent India D ay"52. Similarly, a h o st of o ther publications 
and  public  cerem onies (such as A  Year o f  A chievem ents released b y  the H indu tva  party  
to celebrate the first anniversary  of the BJP's governm ent and  the governm ent paper 
released on the occasion of the  Pokhran  explosions) assigned enorm ous prestige to tire 
nuclear testing and  contribu ted  to m aking  P okhran  a sym bolic event. A  good exam ple 
can be d raw n  from  a booklet entitled  For a Proud and Prosperous India -  A n  Agenda , 
w hich  w as issued  on tire eve of the  1999 general elections by the BJP on behalf of the 
N ational D em ocratic A lliance [NDA]. A slight publication of tw en ty  pages, including 
n ine glossy p ho tog raphs of Vajpayee, the text's b rev ity  belied  tire laden  visual 
in form ation  it projected. If, at first glance, these p ictures appear to p resen t Vajpayee as 
the m ost suitable cand idate  for the office of Prim e M inister, th e ir com rotative m eaning 
em erges in  the last four im ages. These pho tographs show case four events th a t illustrate 
the governm en t's  achievem ents: nuclear testing, the K argil w ar, V ajpayee's H ind i 
speech a t tire U nited  N ation, and  the p rim e m inister celebrating H oly. If on  a 
denotative level these im ages h igh ligh t the qualities of the BJP's governm ent, on a
Accessed on 13 July 2005] Jay Vigyan was also visually reproduced [See Fig.24]. In the aftermath 
of the nuclear tests, the VHP immediately called for the construction of a temple some fifty 
kilometres from Pokhran to be dedicated to Shakti, the Hindu goddess of strength [Bhatt 2001:1 
and 'VHP Firm on Pokhran Temple. BJP Silent'. Indian Express, 21 May 1998].
51 In keeping with the Sangh Parivar's modus operandi the nuclear explosions were conducted 
on a day already set aside for a religious celebration. In fact, 11 May 1998 was also Buddha 
Pnrnima, a Buddhist festival celebrating the day when Buddha was born, obtained 
enlightenment and attained Nirvana. This festival is usually celebrated on the full moon of the 
month Vaisakh. Significantly, the coded message that informed the authorities of the successful 
outcome was "Buddha's smiling". At work here we can see the skilful appropriation by the 
Hindutva's forces of significant and already established religious celebrations for the promotion 
of their own agenda. By equating technological progress with Buddhism the Sangh Parivar 
aimed not simply at endowing the technological event of a religious significance (whereby 
modern technology is justified by the recourse to religious discourse as it was noted by Kaur
2000) but also at co-opting the Buddhist community by participating to their celebrations. On 
the Sangh Parivar's relation to Buddhism, see note 23 Chapter 5.
52 The decision was taken after Murli Manohar Joshi's suggestion. 
[http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/May 1999/TECHNOLOGY DAY OBSERVED.html 
Accessed on 13 July 2005]
288
connotative level they  are the v isual coun terparts and  sym bols of the Sangh P arivar's  
idea  of India: strong, p roud , cu lturally  H in d u  yet m odem .
D ram atic events and  public  cerem onies accom panied discursive articulations of 
p rid e  and  s treng th  as constituent elem ents of the  Sangh P arivar 's  na tional identity . The 
1999 R epublic D ay p arade  and  the show  Satyam ev jayate  w ere selected  from  am ong the 
h ighly  d iversified  calendar of public  celebrations set u p  b o th  by  the  Sangh Parivar and  
the BJP-led governm en t in  Delhi. The arm y alw ays features p rom inen tly  in the 
Republic D ay parade , b u t the  show  w as also designed  to show case Ind ia 's  cultural 
d iversity. In  1999, how ever, the festivities w ere dedicated  to celebrating m ilitary 
strength , and  m anifested  Ind ia 's  attack capability as w ell as its com m itm ent to 
deterrence. The short-range surface-to-surface Prithv i m issile w as on  display, along 
w ith  o ther m issiles (Trishul, A kash and  Nag), dem onstra ting  the  range of Ind ia 's  
m ilitary  arsenal. Ind ia 's  capability  to carry ou t long-range (nuclear) attacks w as also 
reflected by the inclusion of SU-30 p lanes and  Jaguars in the fly-past d isp lay  of Ind ia 's  
A ir Force. B ut it  w as A gni II, Ind ia 's  In term ediate Range Ballistic M issile, appearing  for 
the first tim e on  tire p a rad e  th a t stole tire show . The decision to d isp lay  A gni w as a 
political one rich  in  political m eaning. Indeed, for India, A gni w as a "sym bol of tha t 
resu rgen t Ind ia  w hich  is able to  say, yes, w e will s tand  on o u r ow n feet" [Vajpayee 
1999]. Such a show  of p row ess w as sym ptom atic of Ind ia 's  renew ed  m ilitary 
assertiveness. The inclusion of A gni in  the Republic D ay p a rad e  indicated  the 
G overnm ent in ten tion  to in troduce A gni in  its strategic arsenal in  particu lar if it 
w an ted  to bu ild  a credible m in im um  nuclear de terren t as, w ith o u t an In term ediate 
Range Ballistic M issile, Ind ia 's  nuclear capability w ould  be incom plete53.
A n even t organised  in  D elhi in M arch 1999 by  P ram od  M ahajan, M inister of 
Inform ation  and  B roadcasting p lanned  to celebrate BJP's first year in governm ent 
becam e ano ther arena in w hich sym bols of streng th  and  p rid e  w ere negotiated . H ie  
title g iven to  the even t w as the m otto  th a t is inscribed a t the bo ttom  of Ind ia 's  national 
sym bol, Satyam ev Jayate.
53 'Agni hogs limelight at R-Day Parade'. The Hindu, January 26 1999.
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P ok bar an Labors,
A spectacular show conceived by Aamir Raza Husain with more than 3 0 0  ortists 
on the slage at one time Loser shows, light & Sound show G reat donees 
A dded Attraction : Junoon & Siik Route on same stage for the first time.
Fig. 12 Publicity for the show  Satyam ev Jayate M arch 1999
The even t -  dubbed  by som e new spapers a 'cu ltu ra l ex travaganza ',54 -  took 
place in sou th  Delhi. The them e for the event w as Rashtra dharma, m eant to h ighlight 
the achievem ents of the V ajpayee's G overnm ent. Rashtra Dharm a  w as encapsulated  on 
stage by im ages of shakti 55(represented  on stage by rep roduction  of Pokhran, Ind ia 's 
second nuclear explosion) and  shanti (visualised by the recreation of the W agah border 
betw een India and  Pakistan and by the presence on stage of the very  bus that took 
Vajpayee to Lahore only a m onth  earlier56). A am ir Raza H ussa in 's  p lay aptly  entitled
54 'The 1947 Dream Betrayed'. Dixit, J N. Hindustan Times, March 311999.
55 The concept of strength was also symbolised in the publicity material issued to promote the 
event. The main logo carried the outline of a strong muscular man pictured holding the Indian 
flag. Along with the caption "Pokharan to Lahore, Journey to a destination -  Rashtra Dharma", 
the imagery employed evoked images of military might and just rule [see picture 16).
56 The bus was a direct reference to what became known as Vajpayee's bus diplomacy. In the 
months preceeding the Satyamev Jayate the Prime Minister travelled to Pakistan in a much- 
publicised diplomatic stunt that symbolically opened up diplomatic relationship with Pakistan.
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The Hon'ble Prime Minister
Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee
I  will grace lb* occasion.
6 ,30  p.m. 
vrlPHt ‘
-  ■% ■itrf) f
Watch it  LIYi. mi D um dursl iu i i- l  from  6.00 put. m uviirds
J o u r n e y  to  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  
- R a s h tr a  D h a r m a <
“Satyamev Jayate
V A  Concert o f India
y y
Satyam ev Jayate, w as the piece de resistance of the show . This even t p resen ted  in a 
d ram atic w ay  im ages of the Ind ia  th a t w as and  the Ind ia  th a t w ill be. This play, as a 
celebration of Ind ian  history, encapsulated  five thousand  yeof the  coun try 's  traditions. 
It fea tu red  ep isodes extracted from  Ind ia 's  m yths and  h isto ry  (such as K rishna 's 
serm on to Y udhish th th ira , B uddha 's  m essage of non-violence an d  C hanakya 's  political 
m an tra  to C h an d rag u p ta  M auria) and  included  references to  tire M ahabharata, 
A shok 's reign, to the  1857 M utiny, to the  m arty rdom  of Ind ian  revolu tionaries such as 
B hagat Singh, and  to G andh i's  D andi M arch  and  h is satyagraha  m ovem ent. A fter 1948, 
tire show  how ever jum p ed  stra igh t to  1998, the first year of V ajpayee's governm ent 
ignoring  com pletely In d ia 's  first fifty years of independence. By glossing over forty- 
o d d  years of C ongress rule, Satyam ev Jayate w as obviously  a rep resen ta tion  of the BJP's 
ow n  'try s t w ith  destiny57', a beginning  of a new  era in  In d ia 's  h istory .
The sym bolism  of the  even t w as articulated  in  different w ays. By represen ting  
the g rea t ru lers of India (including tire m y Urological ones of tire M ahabharata) this 
event a im ed a t connoting  th a t tire legacy and  continuity  of tire V ajpayee's governm ent 
stre tched  directly  from  the im m em orial p as t and  w as in  keep ing  w ith  Ind ia 's  cultural 
trad itions, a them e very  dear to the Sangh Parivar. M oreover, by  neglecting the first 
fifty years of independence  the show  w as an exercise in  the rew riting  of Ind ian  history  
and  a de-legitim ization of C ongress rule. Significantly, Pokhran  and  the re-opening of 
dip lom atic ties w ith  Pak istan  (sym bolised by  the reconstruction  of the  W agah border 
and  by  tire bu s  on stage) w ere chosen to h igh ligh t V ajpayee 's achievem ents. By 
selecting Pokhran  and  V ajpayee's bus diplom acy as the tw o m ost significant events of 
the  BJP's governm ent Satyam ev Jayate projected ideas of streng th  and  p rid e  and  of 
political and  m ilitary  m ight. Republic D ay celebrations and  Satyam ev Jayate are b u t tw o 
of the  official na tiona l cerem onies set u p  by the governm ent. O ther public  events -  
such  as the  Vayii Shakti, the annual fire p ow er dem onstration  (held at Pokhran  in  1999), 
or the R esurgent Ind ia  D ay/Technology Day (celebrated to m ark  the first anniversary
57 On 11 May 1999, speaking at a function held in Delhi to observe "Technology Day", and 
paraphrasing Nehru's famous speech, Vajpayee called the previous year's nuclear tests India's 
tryst with destiny and a symbol of a resurgent India.
rhttp://www.indianembassy.org/inews/May 1999/TECHNOLOGY DAY OBSERVED.hml. 
accessed on 13/07/2005 16:44]
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of Pokhran  nuclear tests) -  becam e useful vehicles for the articulations of the concepts 
of p ride  and  s treng th  as param eters of India iden tity58.
Besides the articulation of im ages of a m ilitan t and  aggressive India, the 
concept of national p ride  and  strength  also involves the "intensification of the  desire to 
be recognised in  the w orld  and  m ove u p w ard s  in  the im agined  global h ierarchy" 
[H ansen 1996:603]. Even the choice of language [Hindi] of V ajpayee's address to the 
53rd U nited  N ations G eneral Assem bly 1998 singularly  sym bolised th is grow ing  desire 
and  new found  attitude. Indeed, the Sangh P arivar's  desire to redefine Ind ia 's  role at 
the in ternational level is a reflection of the recently-em erged Ind ian  m idd le  class's 
asp ira tion  to place Ind ia  on "a new ly  liberated  p a th  of progress and  econom ic 
prom inence on the w orld  stage" [C hakravarty and  G ooptu  2000:91], W hereas before 
Ind ia  w as leader of the non-alignm ent m ovem ent, p a lad in  of the th ird -w orld , no w  the
58 The show Satyemv Jayate was only the culmination of a two-months publicity campaign 
launched by the BJP to highlight the achievements of the Vajpayee's government. Significantly, 
Vajpayee's government first birthday coincided with the beginning of the 52nd century of the 
Kalyug and Ugadi (the beginning of the Kannada and Telugu New Year), according to the 
Hindu calendar. Indeed, those were very hectic days for the Government. While on that day the 
Prime Minister took part to the Ugadi celebrations at a function in New Delhi, the next day he 
also celebrated one year of his government by participating at a community meal in the Sikheda 
Village in Ghaziabad district, before taking part to the Hauz Khas extravaganza. The 
government was also busy sponsoring other two official functions. Murli Manohar Joshi, the 
then Minister of Human Resources, on 18 March inaugurated the "Year of Sanskrit" at a public 
function, calling for the popularisation and long-term development of Sanskrit. At another 
official function, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting's present to Vajpayee was a 
cricket match organised to launch Doordarshan new sport Channel. These celebrations also fell 
on the Hedgewar's 110lh birth anniversary, which the BJP-led government did not fail to 
commemorate with the release of a commemorative stamp in honour of the Hindutva 
ideologue. Celebrating a broad spectrum of achievements, these public functions reflected 
Vajpayee's government success not only on the political arena, but also on the cultural and 
social fronts as well. However, during these celebrations, the government sent out contrasting 
signals. If on the one hand, with its two months publicity campaign it aimed simply at 
publicising the government achievements, on the other, with the Prime Minister participating to 
Hindu functions and the government openly supporting celebrations of Hindu culture (such as 
the Year of Sanskrit and the beginning of the 52nd century of the Kalyug), it was clear that the 
government -  under Sangh Parivar's pressures -  was celebrating Hindu culture and traditions 
as constituent of Indian make-up. For the occasion, MTNL -  India's main government-run 
telephone exchange company -  by government decision, put on thirty per cent of all telephone 
exchanges an automated greeting message for the Hindu New Year (there were three different 
messages: "Wish you a happy Ugadi"; Nav samvat ki shubhkamanayen" and Wish you a happy 
new samvat"). Incidentally, this was not the first time that MTNL had put an automated 
greeting. On 15 August 1998, callers were greeted by the words "Vande Mataram".
292
im age of the country  that is being projected is of a V ijay Bharat, "an  India that is 
p rosperous, strong  [...] an India that regains a place of honour in the com ity of great 
na tions"59. The fact that the nuclear explosions of 1998 guaran teed  India the acquisition 
of a h igher sta tus am ong the in ternational com m unity  m ade Pokhran  an obvious sign 
of p ride  and of acquired self-confidence. These sentim ents w ere articu lated  tim e and 
again in a variety  of occasions. Vajpayee variously described India, "w hose prestige in 
the w orld has gone up", as stand ing  "p roud ly  on the w orld  stage — tall, self- reliant, 
and  full of self-confidence" "her head  held high" [Vajpayee 2003]. India that is both a 
"m odern  nation  and an ancient civilization", is now  "an  em erging  global economic 
pow er [...], a pow erfu l country, dedicated  to the ideal of peace" and "on her w ay to 
a ttain ing  greatness" [Vajpayee 2001]. Ind ia 's  in ternational p restige w as also reflected in 
Ind ia 's  foreign policy. D ictated by a desire to attain  a m ajor pow er status in the area, 
since Vajpayee becam e Prim e M inister, India initiated a new  bold and forw ard foreign 
policy that called for a new  internationalism . Ind ia 's  pro-active foreign policy was 
m eant to streng then  diplom atic, econom ic and m ilitary ties w ith  countries of south, 
central and east-Asia. Breaking free of its "inw ard-looking strategic insularity", besides 
dealing w ith  its im m ediate neighbours Pakistan, China and  Bangladesh, India struck 
diplom atic deals w ith  A fghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, M yanm ar, and  Vietnam  "in an 
a ttem pt to carve ou t a larger regional role for itself in keeping w ith  its perceived vision 
and  streng th"60.
Fig. 13 A B Vajpayee A ddressing  an Election Rally in H aryana
59 'Agni-2 to be inducted' The Hindu 16 August, 1999.
60 'Strategic realignments' Frontline. Rahul Bedi Volume 20 - Issue 13, June 2 1 -4  July 2003
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Fig. 14 Poster in suppo rt of Kargil 1999
Fig. 15
The BJP together w ith its allies in the N ational D em ocratic Alliance [NDA] and
the Sangh Parivar aim ed at bu ild ing  a "p roud  and  p rosperous" India, and at
reposition ing  India into a new ly arranged  w orld m ap w here people are p roud  to be
called Indian. The nuclear explosions at Pokhran in 1998, the governm ent direct
involvem ent in the peace process w ith  Pakistan in itiated by Vajpayee in February 1999
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w ith  w h a t goes u n d e r the nam e of "Bus D iplom acy", the refusal of any in term ediary  to 
resolve the conflict w ith  Pakistan  in  Kashm ir, the strong  em phasis on swadeshi in 
econom ic m atters, are deliberately projecting a strong  an d  assu ring  im age of India. 
Public cerem onies, BJP publications, and  Vajpeyee's official speeches conjure u p  
d istinct and  w ell-defined im ages of the Ind ian  com m on m en  a n d  w om en that people 
the Sangh P arivar 's  im agined  nation.
Ram -  History in Full61
Is there a m an  in  the  w o rld  today  w ho is tru ly  
v irtuous? W ho is there  w ho  is m igh ty  and  yet 
know s bo th  w hat is rig h t and  h o w  to act u p o n  it?
W ho alw ays speaks the tru th  and  ho lds firm ly to his
vow s?
W ho exem plifies p ro p er conduct and  is benevolent 
to  all creatures? W ho is learned , capable, and  a
p leasu re  to behold?
W ho is self-controlled , hav ing  su b d u ed  his anger?
W ho is b o th  jud icious and  free from  envy? W ho,
w hen  his fury has a roused  in  battle, is feared even
by the gods?
[...] H is nam e is Ram  and  he  w as born  in  the house 
of the Ikshvaku. [Ramayan 1.1.2- 8]62
So far, I have  argued  th a t the  Sangh P arivar's  sym bolic reperto ire  is very vast 
and  h ighly  sophisticated. Time and  again, H in d u tv a 's  leadersh ip  h a d  skilfully 
em ployed  key H in d u  cu ltural sym bols and  public  cerem onies to m obilize and  com pact 
the H in d u  com m unity  by  po rtray ing  an  im age of un ity  in  sp ite  of sect, caste and 
reg ional differences. W ith  tire Ind ian  popu lation  over 80% H in d u , the appeal of these 
trad itional relig ious sym bols and  rituals w as often incontestable. The Sangh P arivar's  
m obilisation a ro u n d  sacred signs w as an  ex traord inary  even t of g rea t political 
significance. Yet one sym bol in  particu lar b rough t d ram atic  political and  electoral 
success to the Sangh Parivar w here m any  others failed. T hat sym bol is the H in d u  god 
Ram. The use of Ram  as a rally ing  political/m ythological figure, and  the subsequent
61 V D Savarkar cited in Udayakumar [1997:23]
62 If not otherwise specified, the Critical Edition of the Valmiki Ramayana will be used here and 
reference.
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m obilisation for the 'liberation ' of R am 's b irthp lace a t A yodhya, deployed  in  a 
cam paign  th a t lasted  several years (and  is no t concluded yet)63, h a d  been  conspicuous 
since the m id  1980s and  h ad  since dom inated  Ind ia 's  political debate, contributing to 
heigh ten  the process of com m unalisation of politics. Indeed , the use of the sym bol of 
Ram  is u sually  acknow ledged  to have p layed  a decisive ro le b o th  in  the 
"H indu isa tion" of politics an d  the affirm ation of H indu tva.
In  this last section I exam ine the reasons beh ind  this success and  establish how  
and  w hy  the Sangh Parivar w as able to capitalise on th is issue. I do so by first 
addressing  tire dram atic  sym bolic po ten tia l of Ram  and the R am ayan in  the H in d u  
cu ltu ral trad itions. Then I discuss how  the Sangh Parivar w as able to tap  on this 
sym bolic po ten tia l by  bu ild ing  a n ew  level of signification. I identify  three m otives: tire 
Sangh Parivar's  h igh ly  articu lated  m obilisation strategy, the  influence w aged  by  the 
m edia, in particu lar thanks to the televised serialisation of the Ram ayan  on state
63 Indeed, the signifying potential of this symbolic construct was not simply confined to the 
iconography of Ram and the use of the political potential of the Ramayan. On the contrary, it 
reached out, and actually hinged on the issue of the construction of a contested temple 
dedicated to Ram in Ayodhya in the exact place where the Babri Mosque once was erected. The 
Ayodhya dispute was a very long and emotional issue that was at the heart of Hindutva's 
mobilisation strategy. On 6 December 1992 the 16th-century Babri Mosque in Ayodhya was torn 
down by militant Hindus who vowed to replace it with a temple dedicated to Ram. The 
destruction of the mosque marked the highlight of a long mobilisation campaign of Hindu 
revivalism launched by the Sangh Parivar in the early 1980s. Interestingly, the idea of a 
campaign centred on the re-construction of a temple dedicated to Ram at Ayodhya was firstly 
put forward not by the Sangh Parivar, but by the former Uttar Pradesh Congress minister Day 
Dayal Khanna. It was he who initially wrote to Indira Gandhi in 1983 to demand the restoration 
of the temples of Ayodhya, Varanasi and Mathura. On 6 march 1983, at the Hindu Conference 
held in UP at Mazuffarnagar he made the same proposition. This time the RSS took up the 
issue. On Ramnavami 1983 Gulzarilal Nanda -  former acting Prime Minister -  founded the Ram 
Janmaotsav Samiti. On the same occasion the following year, during the celebrations he 
demanded the return of Ram's birthplace to the Hindus [Jaffrelot 1996:366; Organiser 1 May 
1983 and 29 April 1984 and Rajagopal 2001:288]. On 27 July 1984 Sri Ramjnmabhoomi Mukti Yajna 
Samiti was founded. In 1986, the orders of the District Judge to open the gates to allow Hindus 
to worship there contributed to the escalation of the campaign which led in 1989 to the laying of 
the foundations of a Rama temple on land adjacent to the disputed mosque during an 
elaborated Vedic public ceremony (which itself was the culmination of an elaborated and 
prolonged campaign, the Ram Shila Pujan). From then onwards, the issue of the liberation of the 
temple in Ayodhya has been the rallying point of a mobilisation campaign which is not yet 
concluded.
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television64 an d  the use  of new  form s of public affiliation to the  H in d u  com m unity  
along com m odity  logic [Rajagopal 2001].65
Ram -  Metonym of Hindutva66
For the Sangh Parivar, the sym bol of Ram  and  of h is m ythical birthplace
A yodhya becam e vehicles for the transm ission of H in d u tv a 's  ideology and  tools of 
m ass m obilisation. Their effectiveness derived  from  their ability  to convey a w ide 
range of accessible m ean ings to an  easy-to-reach public a lready  fam iliar w ith  the epic. 
Indeed , the Sangh Parivar, th rough  the m anipu la tion  of these sym bols articu lated  a 
large po rtion  of its sym bolic inventory. M oreover, the  sym bol of Ram  could be easily 
visually  rep ro d u ced  thus p rov id ing  v isual su p p o rt to the  H in d u tv a  p ropaganda. 
A ctualised  in  the  form  of videos, film s or sim ple im ages p laced  on posters, stickers and 
even bindi, the  political m essage becam e im m ediate.
The m obilisation around  the sym bol of Ram  is very  significant if w e consider 
th a t the  Ram ayana is one of the few  w orks of literatu re  w hich  has p roduced  an 
influence so p ro found  in the life and  though t of a people  [Thiel-H orstm an 1991]. The 
Ram ayana67 -  along w ith  the Mahabharata -  are the lead ing  Ind ian  epic poem s, rich 
m ines of m yths and  legends w hich  have p reserved  the m em ory  of historical events, 
rituals an d  cu ltu re  for over tw o th ousand  years. The Ram ayana -  as its title indicates: 
the advancing o f Ram  -  tells the story  of Prince Ram  -  an incarnation  of V ishnu68 -  of his 
exile in  the forest, of his quest to defeat the rakshasa R avana and  free his beloved
64 Other academics [see for instance Rajagopal 2001] have studied the role of the press [both 
English and vernacular] in the promotion of the Ayodhya issue, in order to assess their 
contribution to the communalisation of politics in India.
65 Much has been written on Ayodhya and on the Sangh Parivar's mobilisation centred on the 
god Ram. For a comprehensive account see Gopal [1993], Pandey [1993], Hansen [1999], and 
Nandy [1995].
66 Davis 1996.
67 While acknowledging the plurality of the Ramayana tradition in Asia [Whaling 1980:5 and 
Thapar, 1989:74], I refer here to what it could be called the popular version of Ram's legend, 
where "popular means the familiar version of the classical myths, the version most likely to be 
known to an ’average' Indian: those narrated by family elders of by professional religiosi at 
festive and sacral occasions, enacted in folk plays and dance or portrayed in the easily 
paperback accounts of the Hindu gods" [Kakar 1978:5-6].
68 Ram was not always conceived as an incarnation of Vishnu. It is generally agreed that the 
Ramayana has undergone a transformation from an original kshatriya poem into a Vaishnava 
work. On this subject, see Brockington 1984.
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consort Sita. It is a poem  of adven ture, loyalty and  m orality . The com pelling political 
po ten tia l of the sym bolism  of the  R am ayana is directly rela ted  to the role p layed  by the 
epic in  In d ia 's  con tem porary  society and  collective im aginary. The Ramayana p resents a 
num ber of behavioral m odels tha t have helped  m illions of people  to cope w ith  the 
difficulties of life, and  h e  and  Sita have  becom e m odels for countless generations of 
Ind ians [Kakar 1987]. Indeed, the identification w ith  Ram  an d  Sita, allow s the reader to 
cope w ith  and  control h is/her ow n  inner conflicts, as "bo th  the trad itional literature 
and  m o d ern  field observations show , m any  Indians, bo th  m en  and  w om en, act ou t in 
their ow n lives the central p lo t of the Ramayana w ith  all its negative en tailm ents in the 
areas of sexuality, relation to au thority  figures, and  em otional life in  general" 
[G oldm an 1986:59]. Ram  represents the ideal son, king, bro ther, husband , and 
u ph o ld er of dharma. Ram  is apparen tly  never angry arid he is n o t lustfu l because he is 
ideally  self-restrained. H e is endow ed  w ith  a h igher m orality  w hich  derives from  his 
serene deference to the elders -  and  to the  codified princip les of the elders ' dharma -  
w hich eventually  m anifests itself in  the lack of any em otion  in  accepting his ow n 
destiny, even w hen  he  renounces the throne and  w hen  he  finally banishes Sita to 
certain  dea th  in  the  forest. Even the com m on iconography of Ram  is faithful to this 
ideal: "Ram  is udar, com passionate, benign, and  graceful; he  is ever-serene and  ever- 
forgiving; he  is ever-youthful, boyish  alm ost, w ith  a conspicuous lack of m asculine 
pow er; and  yet, he is the lo rd  of the universe, the m aryada purnshottam 69" [Kapur 
1993:76-77].
To th is already  pow erfu l and  articulated  sym bolic reperto ire , the  Sangh Parivar 
has attached  fresh  m eanings. Beside the old trad itional m ean ings of tolerance, righ tfu l 
conduct, and  ideal fam ily life, the H indu tva  forces successfully reorien ted  the 
m eanings of Ram  by  m aking  it a sym bol of the  supposed  attribu tes of Indianness 
(virility, p row ess, p ride, strength , and  com passion), and  a sym bol of Ind ian  cu lture at 
large [H ansen 1999:174] encom passing alm ost everything. M oreover, by contracting
69 Mariada Purnshottam is an epithet that usually used for the god Ram. Maryada Purnshottam is 
therefore used to indicate an exemplary man and an inspiration for everybody to follow in the 
path of justice, morality and sacrifice. The term also represents the ideal of individual and 
collective conduct.
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Ind ia  into the im age of Ram, they  m ade  Ram  and A yodhya sym bols of Ind ia 's  sacred 
geography.
This policy of elaboration of "usable and  portab le  m essages" [Basu et al
1993:61] w as rep resen ted  by dissem ination  of stickers and  posters  d isplaying Ram  and
tire Ram  tem ple and  the im age of Ramlalla  w hich could  be found  in  abundance on
A yodhya stalls. Besides contribu ting  to the popu larisa tion  of the  m ovem ent, these
visuals p layed  an  im p o rtan t role in tire m odification of the  over-all legend of Ram.
Indeed, tire fam ous im age of Ram  pulling  his bow string, fierce and  bold , superim posed
the m odel of the  soon-to-be-built R am 's tem ple in  A yodhya con tribu ted  to the process
of slid ing  of values [Fig.5]. It transform ed  Ram  from  a passive, quasi fem inine, m artial
hero, in to  an  aggressive H in d u  k ing -  a Chakravartin, the  em pero r w ho continuously
expanded  h is territories -  busy  in  fighting tire invaders, tire others, the M uslims:
"[...] tire Janm abhoom i issue has transform ed  R am  in to  a hera ld  for 
dem arcating  geographic, territorial and  sp iritua l boundaries. This politics of 
space has inven ted  a Ram  w ho  is significantly d ifferen t from  the figure 
rep resen ted  in  tire trad itions of iconography available till now . The new  
im ages of Ram  have altered  tire m eanings of Ram  bhak ti and, as a 
consequence, of po p u lar H indu ism  as well." [K apur 1993:74]
hr these representations, the conventional com passionate and  benign  sm ile of 
Ram  w as rep laced  by  a w arlike im age. This ideal of m asculin ity70 -  explicated through  
the qualities of anger and  aggression -  is p a rt of the d iscourse of H in d u  self-assertion 
w here it s tands in  opposition  to  patience and tolerance, v irtues once a ttribu ted  to 
H in d u s as innate  and  then  identified  as sym bols of fem inin ity  and  therefore of 
w eakness and  passivity . In  the posters and  postcards available d u ring  tire m ovem ent, 
Ram  w as m ain ly  dep icted  in  tw o poses overhanging the im age of the tem ple. In both,
70 Symbols of masculinity and aggressiveness were also articulated by the slogans that changed 
from being simply assertive (saugandh Ram ki khate hain / ham vahin mandir banayenge [We swear 
by Ram we will build the temple right there] and bachcha-bachcha Ram ka/ Janmabhoomihe kaam ka 
[every child belongs to Ram and for Ram Janmabhoomi]) to being violent and hostile: (jis hindu 
ka khoon na khaule, khoon nahin vo pani hail janmabhoomi ke kaan na aye, vo bekaar jawanee hai [that 
Hindu whose blood does not boil has water in his veins, youth that does not serve Ram 
Janmabhoomi is youth lived in vain] or jis Hindu ka khoon na khola, zuoh Hindu nahin, woh bhangi 
hai [those Hindu who have not shed blood, they are not Hindu but of the sweeper caste]) hidia 
Today, Oct. 311989 and Basu et alii 1993:89
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contrary  to conventional representations that depict Ram en fam ille  [Fig.16] -  flanked 
by his brothers, valian t assistant H anum an, or in com pany of his wife Sita -  he is 
show n as a solitary hero. In one, despite  being sm iling and  looking alm ost fem inine, he 
is heavily arm ed, carrying the bow, a trishul, a sw ord, an axe and  a variety  of arrow s on 
his back [Fig.17].
Fig. 16 King Ram sitting in his court w ith Sita, his b ro thers and  H anum an
Fig. 17 Ram in traditional iconography
This is the im age of Ram the king, sym bol of the H in d u  golden Age and of 
m artial prow ess. D espite the usual androgyny and fem ininity of his conventional look, 
in this new  iconography Ram em bodied the virile, m uscular w arrio r hero, sym bol of 
streng th  and  pow er . S tanding against a storm y sky, his hair d isarrayed  by the w ind, 
his torso -  w ider than  usual -  and  his strong legs uncovered, he is d raw ing  his bow, in 
profile as if he w ere aim ing at som e indistinct enem y. In these tw o aggressive
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representations of Ram, he em bodied the angry H in du71. As a kshatriya  king he is 
rightfully  a w arrio r and the w eapons he is carrying are m ean t to be used  against 
today 's enem ies, the M uslim s72 [Fig. 18 e 19].
Fig. 18 Ram as a lone w arrio r
The Ram m ovem ent w as also delivering ideas of rejuvenation and aw akening. 
Because the story of Ram w as central to constructing a collective H indu  identity  in the 
nam e of nationalism , Ram as a w arrio r god becam e a g rea t sym bol of the resurgent 
H indu  nation. As the m ythical king of A yodhya, w ith his Ram Rajya he sym bolised 
H in d u s ' go lden  age of p rosperity73 that p rov ided  also a m odel for H in d u tv a 's  H indu
71This term is taken from a widely distributed article published by the RSS in 1988. Some 
excerpts can be found in A. Rajagopal 1994, N. Bhattacarya 1991 and in C. Jaffrelot 1996.
72 The representation of Ram as Ramlalla (infant Ram) was another popular image of Ram that 
circulated widely during the Ayodhya movement. Associable to the image of Bala Krishna, this 
image was a total innovation in the iconography of the Ramayana not only because the Ramayana 
tradition is particularly poor in details on Ram’s childhood, but also because representations of 
Ram as a child are almost non-existent. Opposed to the aggressive image of the adult Ram 
warrior, the infant Ram -  so vulnerable and helpless -  called for protection, thus reinforcing 
belief in a need of an aggressive and assertive Hinduism propounded by the Sangh Parivar and 
articulated by the other images [Kapur 1993]
73 The articulation of the myth of Ram becomes also a useful metaphor for the representation of 
Indian history as the Hindu nationalists present it. According to this perspective, Indian history 
has been reduced to a tripartite model that equates the ancient period to a presumed golden 
age, the Moghul period to an age of decadence, and the modern period to the age of revival.
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R ashtra to come. M oreover, R am 's w ar against the rakshasas represen ted  courage 
against oppression. Indeed, H in d u tv a 's  rhetoric (verbal and  processual) w as infused 
w ith  an im agery of m ilitant violence. W hile the infam ous A dvan i's  Rath Yntra w as 
likened to a m odern-day  Ashvam edha, and  pots of blood and  the tikka of blood which 
w ere offered to the BJP leader du ring  his m arch w ere rem iniscent of blood sacrifices, 
Bajrang D al's triden ts and bows, and K rishna 's sudarshan chnkrn74 d isp layed  by A dvani 
h im self reproduced  im ages of ancient w arfare [Davis 1996]. Besides being a sym bol of 
m asculinity  and  rejuvenation, Ram becam e also a m etaphor of the catholicity of 
trad itional H indu  form s of devotion articulated by appealing  to H indu  traditions of 
tolerance and  syncretism  (contra another perceived trad ition  of H indu  divisiveness 
and  heterogeneity  -  H ansen  [1999]). Indeed the represen tation  of Ram as a sym bol of 
the positive core of H indu ism  [H ansen 1999] is typical of the Sangh Parivar's  b rand ing  
of H indu ism  w hich is "synthetic  and  cum ulative" [Davis 1996:53], looking as it does 
for a com m on m in im um  denom inator for the H indu  com m unity75.
Fig. 20 RSS Postcard of A yodhya Tem ple w ith  Ram
G iven the m ultiplicity  of the Ramayana trad ition  and its psychological 
significance in the form ation of Indian  personality, fam ily and  society, the Sangh 
Parivar's  appropria tion  and m anipulation  of this trad ition  is extrem ely problem atic. 
For the Sangh Parivar, Ram and A yodhya becam e epitom es of H in d u tv a 's  strategy of
74 This discus is one of Krishna's weapons that he usually holds on either his little finger or 
index finger.
75 During the agitation for the construction of the Ram temple at Ayodhya, the Sangh Parivar 
singled out other common signs of affiliation to the Hindu community. Beside Ram, they chose 
the brick (shilas), common acts of devotion, water of sacred rivers, etc.
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m obilisation. Taking stock of the success of the m ovem ent and  of its contribu tion  to the
electoral victory of his party , V ajpayee candid ly  acknow ledged  that:
"[T]he A yodhya m ovem ent has no  do u b t con tribu ted  to  this success. W e 
jo ined  tire m ovem en t because Sri Ram  epitom ises tire cu ltu ral heritage of all 
Ind ians, he  sym bolises ou r cu ltural nationalism . T hrough  this m ovem ent, 
w e w ere  able to  un leash  tire suppressed  asp irations of m illions of Indians 
an d  canalise their nationalist fervour tow ards nation-bu ild ing . Indeed, the 
A yodhya m ovem ent has effectively d riven  hom e tire p o in t th a t if Ram 
rep resen ted  the ideal of conduct, Ram  Rajya, to w hich  tire BJP is dedicated, 
rep resen ted  the ideal of governance. The A yodhya m ovem en t seeks to 
restore  tire tem ple a t the  b irthp lace of Sri Ram  since th is w o u ld  contribu te to 
the  resto ration  of ou r cu ltu ral heritage as w ell as se t rig h t a grave historical 
w rong ." [Vajpayee 1997].
Activating the Symbol
A lthough  the Ram ayana  is endow ed  w ith  a pow erfu l illustrative political
potential, only du ring  the last decades of the tw entie th  cen tury  has Ram  becom e an 
icon of political H indu ism . Ram  is now  n o t ju st a m ythological or even historical 
figure, b u t a m o d ern  statesm an, endow ed  w ith  a political v ision  for India. Yet, the use 
of the Ram ayana  in  politics has n o t alw ays been consistent. Sheldon Pollock in his 
Ram ayana and political im agination in India has dem onstra ted  th rough  the study  of 
cu ltu ral p roduction , ho w  tire Ram ayana  began  to be p red o m in an t in  Ind ian  political 
im agery from  tire end  of the  tw elfth  century  onw ards. The Ram ayana  w ith  its political 
m ythology of efficacious sim plicity w as essentially a pow erfu l ideological w ork, and  it 
"w as repeated ly  in strum en ta lised  by the  Ind ian  ru ling  elites of the  m idd le  period  to 
p ro v id e  a theology of politics and  a sym bology of o therness" [Pollock 1993:286]. 
A ccording to Pollock, the im aginative resources of the  Ram ayana  as a m ytho-political 
narra tive  are rep resen ted  by  tw o basic statem ents p resen t in  each and  every version of 
the epic: the  d iv in ity  of k ings and  the dem onisation of others. Indeed ,
"[T]he peculiar appara tu s of o thering offered by the Ram ayana, along w ith  
the political theology it p rov ided , seem s to have  been  particu larly  well 
su ited  to the political tasks confronting an  em battled  cu ltu ral form ation for 
rep resen ting  -  and  perh ap s activating -  the conflicting agencies of the 
period" [Pollock 1993:284].
Even before the Sangh Parivar approp ria ted  tire sym bol, tire g rea t popu larity  
achieved by R am 's legend m ade  the epic an  easy vehicle for politicians and  orators to
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convey m eanings to an  easy-to-reach public. H ow ever, the m y  tiro-political po ten tia l of 
the R am ayana as a  sym bol of o therness and  a theology of politics w as n o t really 
exploited. D uring  the nationalist m ovem ent M ahatm a G andh i m ade  great use  of the 
Ram ayana  trad ition  and  of R am 's cult by  d raw ing  from  the g rea t sym bolic reservoir of 
the epic. H is personal success depended  on tire use  of H in d u  devotional discourse 
[Van der Veer 1994:94]. H in d u  trad itional discourse of ascetism  in form ed  h is symbolic 
language from  his agitational practices (satyagraha) to his choice of sartorial style (his 
khadi loin cloth)76. G andhi spoke to India th rough  the id iom s of H indu ism  and  used  
ideas and  im ages (sym bols and  m etaphors) d raw n  from  p o p u la r  H indu ism . H e even 
generated  an  alternative term inology to th a t of W estern  politics. H e inven ted  som e 
term s (satyagraha) and  used  other term s and  concepts th a t lay a t the h ea rt of H indu ism  
(ahimsa, brahmacharya, tapasya, moksha and  dharma)77 b u t w hose m eanings he  invested  
w ith  greater signification. G andhi u sed  to quote liberally from  bo th  tire Ram ayana and 
the M ahabharata, w hich  he considered  invaluable sources of H in d u  trad ition , culture 
and  civilisation, or as he  p u t it, "unfailing  guides th ro u g h  the  trials of life"78. The 
invocations of Sita-Ram, Victory to Ram, Ram  Rajya, the use of the  ep ithe t "Lord of 
Sita", tlrat accom panied G andhi's  daily  p rayers provoked  endless debates and  aroused 
resen tm en t am ong  the secularists or those w ho w ere n o t of h is religious faith. 
H ow ever, Ram  and  tire R am ayana rem ained  for G andhi a usefu l m etaphorical 
language th a t created m eans of com m unication and  u n d e rs tan d in g  betw een people, 
b u t n o t sources of sym bolic representations of otherness. C ontrary  to Savarkar w ho 
stressed R am 's m artia l aspect and  saw  in Ram Rajya  a sym bolic rep resen ta tion  of an 
ideal state of H in d u  dom ination, G andhi em phasised  tire peaceful aspect of the Ram  
sym bol. For h im  Ram Rajya  identified  a state of perfect justice and  harm ony, rather 
than  a H in d u  go lden  age. Indeed , because it w as no t the exclusivist and  divisive aspect 
of these p a ram o u n t H in d u  sym bolic reperto ires th a t w as em phasised , for G andhi, Ram  
w as n o t one of tire sym bolic resources used  to signify the boundaries w ith in  tire in ­
g roup  an d  the out-group.
76 On this, see Chapter 1
77 Sivaraj as a substitute term to 'home rule' and 'independence' was already active in the Indian 
nationalist vocabulary before Gandhi's entry into politics.
78 Harijan 24-8-1934, p.221
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The sam e cannot be said of Savarkar who, at about the  sam e tim e tha t G andhi 
invoked  the nam e of Ram  in his evening prayers, m ade use of sym bols of Ram  and 
Ram Rajya. In  iris Essentials o f H indu tva , he uses the term  Ram  Rajya as a m etaphor to 
p rov ide  a rally ing  po in t for cu ltural and  political assertiveness and  as a m odel for the 
Ind ian  nation-state . H ere Ram  Rajya w as a sym bol of H in d u  ru le  and  of "national and  
cu ltu ral un ity" [Savarkar 1949:10] tha t lasted th rough  tire centuries. This supposed  
national un ity  of Ind ia  w as reached w hen  Ram  defeated  R avana and  "brought the 
w hole laird from  tire H im alayas to the sea u n d e r one sovereign sw ay" [ibid]. W ith tha t 
victory and  w ith  the knitting  together of tire A ryans and  non-A ryan  popu lation  of 
India, the nation  w as bo rn  [ibid]. By prom oting  an im age of political and  geographical 
un ity  and  cu ltu ral hom ogeneity , Ram  and  the Ram ayana partly  articu lated  the sym bols 
of o therness in h eren t in  tire m ytho-political narra tive  of tire R am ayana.
H ow ever, desp ite  Ram 's versatile symbolic po ten tia l -  bo th  as a role of 
behav iour and  political ideal -  and  Savarkar's activation of the  R am ayana discourse of 
u n ity  and  otherness, Ram  and  the Ram ayana w ere n o t alw ays p a rt of the sym bolic 
reperto ire  of H indu tva. Indeed , the  Sairgh Parivar d rew  on the  com plex sym bolism  
p rov ided  by the R am ayana only relatively recently. This sym bolic po ten tia l rem ained  
u n tap p e d  by  the Sangh P arivar as, u n til 1973, Golw alkar, leader of the RSS, rejected the 
use of overt religious rituals and  im agery for m obilisation [G olw alkar 1980:24 in  
R ajagopal 1999:58]. H e chose indeed  a new  sym bolic appara tu s  for the RSS, b u t in  his 
ideal, religion w as subsum ed  to the idea of nationalism . O n the contrary, Deoras, the 
follow ing sarsanghchalak, believed in using  religious sym bols for m ass m obilisation 
[Malik and  Singh 1994:163] opening the door to u tilization  of im ages/sym bols derived 
from  H in d u  reperto ire. O nly m uch later, w ith  the creation of the  VHP, w ere religious 
rituals and  practices u sed  system atically for political m obilisation, hr this process Ram  
and  R am ayana cam e to p lay  a central role.
W hy w as the com plex sym bolism  of tire R anrayana activated only then? 
A ccording to som e scholars, the difference from  the p ast lays in  H in d u tv a 's  change of 
strategy. The H in d u tv a  alliance passed  from  a strategy based  on coalition politics to
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one of ethno-m obilisation [Jaffrelot 1996] and  launched  a series of j  agar an -  aw akenings 
-  to arouse H in d u  m ilitancy for the  creation of a consolidated  H in d u  vote bank  w hich 
could  cu t across caste and  sect lines. H ow ever, the Sangh P ariva r 's  u tilisation  of the 
R am ayana 's reperto ire  of im ages w ou ld  have been  unsuccessful w ere it n o t associated 
w ith  its elaborate ritua l activity, the contingent -  b u t all tire sam e crucial -  broadcasting  
of tire R am ayana on state television and  the em ergence of n ew  form s of affiliation to 
the  H in d u  com m unity  [Rajagopal 2001].
M ethods of M o b ilisa tio n
The use  of the  sym bol of Ram  in  processional ritu a l action w as effectively
launched  in  O ctober 1984 w ith  the Sri Ram Janmabhumi M u k ti Yajna Yatra (Sacrifice to 
liberate Ram 's Birth-place), a 130-kilometer m arch from  A yodhya to Lucknow  
organised  by  the  VH P w ith  the sole aim  of 'liberating ' R am 's b irthp lace. A day  after the 
m arch  reached  L ucknow  (O ctober 15) a Shri Ram Janaki Ratha w as launched  to m obilise 
public op in ion  an d  announce tire 'Janmasthan M u kti P ledge79' to the  people. O n that 
occasion, im ages of R am a an d  Sita w ere once again  carried  in  procession  across U ttar 
P radesh  an d  Bihar tou ring  25 sites. For the first tim e, the H in d u  nationalists exploited 
the trad itional fo rm at of bhakti rituals to w hich how ever, they attached fresh 
ideological m eanings, and  w hich eventually  resu lted  in  w h a t Jaffrelot dubbed  an 
"aggressive political bhakti" [1996:392]. Tire w ell-orchestrated  Ram  Shila Pujans and  the 
foundation  cerem ony of the tem ple dedicated  to Ram  follow ed in  198980. These large- 
scale processual activities cu lm inated  w ith  A dvan i's  1990 no to rious Ratha Y atra81.
79 A pledge for the liberation of Ram's birthplace.
80 Ram Shila Pujans were powerful and most effective mobilisation strategy launched by the 
VHP that allowed the combination of the motif of the religious pilgrimage with local initiatives 
[Datta 1993]. Villages and districts were invited to build bricks, or Ranr Shila, and send them to 
Ayodhya in order to contribute to the construction of the Ranr temple. Ram Shila Poojan 
ceremonies were held simultaneously on 30th September to consecrate these bricks which 
carried the name of Ram on one side and the name of the village on the other. Further collective 
ceremonies were held on 11th October and on 9th November when the foundation ceremony 
took place.
81 The BJP's basic political programme explicitly brought forward these ideals. The political 
spearhead of the Sangh Parivar candidly embraced the Ram issue. Not only was its leadership 
in the forefront of the Ayodhya campaign leading a series of yatras across the country, but the 
BJP's 1991 electoral manifesto was significantly entitled Towards Ram Rajya. The poster 
campaign that accompanied the electoral propaganda of that year was also inspired by the 
movement. One of the BJP posters was plainly entitled "Can 'Rome Raj' ever win against 'Ram 
Raj'". The picture that illustrated the poster reproduced a bow and quiver/ arrows and a pair of
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A dvani travelled across no rth  India on an air-conditioned Ind ian  m ade DCM Toyota 
van of the type used  by several politicians in 1989 electoral cam paign  b u t decorated in 
the style of the rath used by the w arrior god A rjuna in the televised Mahabharata serial, 
w ith  saffron flags and  w ith  the BJP electoral sym bol -  the lotus -  and  the Om .
It is in teresting to note that in som e instances -  such as d u ring  the Rath Yatra -  
the language (visual and verbal) w as no t overtly religious. H ow ever, a sense of the 
sacred w as conveyed by the use of the im agery articu lated  in the idiom  of religious 
processions, in the ritual language of pilgrim age, of sacrifice, m arty rdom  and 
initiation, in the devotional responses to the Rath Yatra, in the d isp lay  of m ilitant zeal 
w ith  ancient guerrilla  w arfare, in the presentation of the saffron flag and chanting and 
d isp lay ing  of the O m  m antra and sym bol [Fig. 21].
. C* .Vo?'.?- V
Fig. 21 A dvani as Arjun. Backcover of Swarna Jayanti Rath Yatra  Booklet
All these processional activities eventually  established Ram as the m ost 
p rom inen t H indu tva  sym bol. Beside aim ing at com pacting the H in d u  com m unity  and 
consolidating the H indu  vote by portray ing  an im age of un ity  in spite  of caste, sect,
sandals [paduka]. While Ram Raj was the basic model for the Hindu nation, the connotations 
elaborated by the representation of these attributes of Ram (as a ruler and as a warrior) were 
clear to all. The paduka were referring to a well-known episode in the Ramayati when Bharat -  
Ram's brother who's just become heir to throne instead of Ram to fulfil a vow of his stepmother 
Kaikeyi -  on Ram's leaving for his fourteen years exile, asks him for his paduka to place them on 
the throne to represent Ram in its absence. With its articulation of the symbology and imagery 
of the Ramayan the poster primarily symbolised self-sacrifice and devotion to duty of both Ram 
and Bharat, but the ultimate meaning was also to suggest anticipation and readiness for Ram's 
symbolic return [see Fig.22].
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and  regional differences, according to H ansen [1999:161], processions and events such 
as the Ram Shila Puja in tended  to give “m ateriality  [...] to the spatial im agination of a 
H indu  R ashtra" and  to foster a “new  sense of religious com m unity  im agined around  
the national geography and  sites like A yodhya" [H ansen 1999:157].
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Fig. 22 BJP Election Poster
The M edia  at the  Service of Ram
Rajagopal [2001] argues that the press (in particu lar the vernacular) and the
state-sponsored  TV channel D oordarshan  equally contribu ted  to the establishm ent of
the Ram sym bol as a crucial elem ent of national identity , a phenom enon  w hich led
eventually  to the reinforcem ent of a H indu tva-insp ired  national identity. M edia, as I
argued  (see chapter I), cannot by them selves generate cu ltu ral identities. H ow ever,
they are one of those national institu tions that contribute to creating, m aintaining, and
transform ing  a sense of national belonging.
In chapter I, I noted that a crucial characteristic of m ass m edia in their
contribution to the process of nation build ing w as that they create m om ents of shared
collective experiences. Between 1987 and 1989 the Ramayana serial becam e a pow erful
m edia event that contribu ted  to the creation of a feeling of belonging to a specific
cultural com m unity  and to the transm ission of particu lar com m on m em ories and
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trad itions. The serial w as d irected  by  a Bom bay film m aker, R am anand  Sagar. D uring  
the early 1980s, Sagar h ad  already approached  D oordarshan  w ith  the proposal of a 
serialisation of the Ramayana in fifty-two episodes, w hich w as categorically refused by 
the  D oordarshan  headquarte rs  w ith  the apparen t concern th a t it w ou ld  arouse 
com m unal sentim ents. It eventually  received the go-ahead only  in  1986 then becom ing 
a very p o p u lar show . The popu larity  of the serial w as such th a t for m illions of Indians 
n o th ing  w as allow ed to interfere w ith  the w atching of the Ram ayana . N ew spapers 
reported  h a t  in m any  cases w eddings and  funerals w ere delayed, Sunday m orning  
cinem a show s w ere cancelled, and  even h ighw ay traffic declined du ring  the airing of 
the serial. It is w ith in  h i s  fram ew ork  h a t  the serialisation of the R am ayana m ust be 
understood .
Ramayana goes on Air
O n January  25, 1987 D oordarshan  b roadcast h e  first ep isode of the serialised 
adap ta tion  of h e  Ramayana. T ransm itted  on Sunday m orn ings a t 9.30 a.m., it soon 
becam e the m ajor event ever show n on Ind ian  television. The serial w as originally 
scheduled  to ru n  fifty-two episodes of forty-five m inu tes each, b u t due  to popu lar 
dem and  it h ad  to be ex tended  three tim es. It finally g rew  to seventy-eight episodes 
and, after an in terval of a couple of m onths, w as follow ed u p  by  a sequel relating the 
events contained in  h e  Uttarakanda
The airing of the Ramayan  w as an  unpreceden ted  even t b o h  in  term s of 
audience reception  and  of its political significance. Partly  h e  success of the televised 
Ramayana could  be found  in  its in tegration  into h e  perform ance trad ition  and  religious 
culture of India. D espite h e  vociferous pro testations of m ostly  the  u rban ised  w estern- 
educated  m idd le  c lass82 reported  in  h e  English-language press w ho resented  h e  
overall low  quality  of the serial, h e  butchering [Lutgendorf 1995:226] of the epic 
trad ition  and  w ho  accused h e  Sagar Ramayana of being  a “poorly  acted, still m ore
82 To Lutgendorf [1995] the English-language press criticism of the Ramayan demonstrate their 
ignorance of the Indian performance traditions and aesthetic conventions and it was an 
expression of an urbanised western-educated middle-class, alienated from the India's genuine 
everyday life. The western-educated intellectuals were too detached from the folkloric-popular 
Indian tradition to understand the charm that the Sagar Ramayana exerted on the audience and 
to see that it could be integrated perfectly with the classical Ramayana tradition
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poorly  p roduced , lu rid  dram atisation  of the epic" [D eshpande 1988:2215], the 
serialised version  of the epic w as n o t only in  keeping w ith  h e  Ramayana trad ition  in 
Ind ia  b u t also w ith  In d ia 's  custom ary perform ative and  religious traditions. Thus, in  a 
w ay, h e  Sagar Ramayana  w as no th ing  b u t another retelling  of h e  epic. Sagar -  h e  
Tuslidas of the video A ge  [Lutgendorf 1995:228] -  p resen ted  som e original m odifications 
to h e  epic and  gave new  in terp reta tions to certain episodes of h e  story83. D ressed in 
w hite, beatific, Sagar often appeared  in  the in troductory  or concluding portions of h e  
cassette version  of h e  epic com m enting on  h e  events p resen ted  and  on general m oral 
issues. As such h e  Sagar Ramayana represen ted  an au tho rita tive  contem porary  
com m entary  of h e  Ramayana and  Sagar, w ho in  the very  last ep isode ven tu red  as far as 
to include him self am ong a party  of assem bled deities in  singing h e  praise of the 
new ly crow ned Ram, em bodied at the sam e tim e h e  figure of the story-teller and of 
the com m entator, thus reinventing  him self in  h e  trad ition  of sages w ho  have han d ed  
dow n  h e  epic.
M oreover, according to L utgendorf [1995], h e  televised Ramayana  revealed 
continuities w ith  katha and  ramlila perform ances in  som e represen tative conventions 
and  in  h e  perform ance scrip t w here certain, in terp reta tive decisions h ad  to be taken. 
These decisions w ere n o t totally arb itrary  b u t w ere restra ined  by  trad itional exegesis84. 
The scenes of devotional activities h a t  repeatedly  hap p en ed  d u rin g  the broadcasting  
of h e  serial w ere n o t signs of a w idesp read  hysteria b u t they  w ere ra ther consistent 
w ith  the religious trad ition  of darshan, taken as opposed  to the oral recitation of the 
epic and  com plem entary  to the shruti. In  keeping w ith  h e  relig ious m erits traditionally  
a ttribu ted  to the epic, a large audience found  h e  serial sp iritually  uplifting  [Ramayana 
1.1.77-79 and  G oldm an 1984:126], The focus on the facial expression and  gestures of h e  
characters -  in fact, m uch of the tim e h e  screen w as dom inated  by  large heads th rough  
repeated  close-ups to fully po rtray  h e  em otional state of the  character -  w as a 
convention p o p u lar b o h  to H ind i films and  the m im e techniques of Bharat N atyam
83 See for example the case of the Queen Kaikeyi whom he partly redeems from the guilt of 
being the cause of Ram's ruin and eventually of Dasharatha's death.
84 For an exhaustive report on the representative conventions adopted by Sagar, see Lutgendorf 
1995.
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and  K athakali. As such, the Sagar Ramayana  w as an in d ep en d en t retelling  of the  epic, 
cu lturally  authentic , and  in  touch w ith  the o lder perform ance traditions.
A part from  its im portan t aesthetic attribu tes th a t en su red  its belonging to a 
particu lar cu ltu ral trad ition  and  determ ined  its astonish ing  success, the Sagar 
Ram ayana  p layed  a crucial role in  tire process of the com m unalisation  of politics 
w itnessed  in  Ind ia  in  the late 1980s. Tire broadcasting  of the serial coincided w ith  the 
crucial phase  of tire R am janm abhoom i m ovem ent, w hen  "it changed  from  a relatively 
u n k n o w n  tala-kholo agitation to the dom inan t political issue before tire country" 
[Rajagopal 1994:1661], and  w ith  the escalation of com m unal violence. In this respect, 
tw o questions m u st be kep t in  m ind . F irst tire political im plication  of the  televised epic 
m u st be fram ed  w ith in  tire g rad u a l com m unalisation of s ta te-run  institu tions such as 
D oordarshan . A nd  second, the repercussions the b roadcasting  inevitably  h ad  in  tire 
political dom ain  have  to be analysed against the backg round  of the m obilisation 
stra tegy  of tire Sangh P arivar of those years.
The decision to p u t  tire Ram ayana  on  air represen ted  a significant change from  
earlier D oordarshan  policies. U ntil the late 1980s, a k ind  of secularism  w as operative in 
Ind ian  public  b roadcasting  drat m ean t tha t the national m ed ia  shou ld  refrain  from  
susta ined  p rogram m ing  targeted  to one specific com m unity. This w as in keeping  n o t 
only  w idr dre param eters  of N ehru ism  and  the dictates th a t the  no tion  of national 
m edia  (tire pa rad igm s of national m edia) entailed  [see chap ter I and  III]. U nlike first 
w orld  country  s state ru n  broadcasting, in  India s ta te 's  m onopoly  of national m edia 
w as p red ica ted  on the developm ent com m unication p a rad ig m  w hich correlated 
m odern ity , m ass m ed ia  and  deve lopm en t85. This deve lopm en t parad igm  cam e to 
include also a v igorous inculcation of a na tional identity . Tire m odern isa tion  parad igm , 
p red icated  a m erge betw een  m ateria l developm ent (in otirer w ords, tire prom otion  of 
socio-econom ic developm ent) and  national developm ent, according to w hich 
m odern ity  cam e to be equated  w ith  the creation of a na tional iden tity  and  tire fostering 
of a sense of loyalty  to it am ong Ind ia 's  citizens.
85 On this, see Farmer 2000.
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H ow ever, tire em ergence of state television -  w hich  m ade  its national official 
m aiden  appearance only in  1982 w ith  the broadcasting  in  colour of IX Asian Gam es 
(Asiad) -  signalled  a change of attitude. W hat changed w as the m onopoly  of the m edia  
by  tire ru ling  party , ra ther than  tire state. G iven the assum ed  persuasive  po ten tia l of 
the m edium , television w as b latantly  used  to ensure  C ongress re-election -  electoral 
success [Farm er 2000:265]. The justification for tire centralisation and  control of Ind ia 's  
m ass m edia  w as found  no  m ore in  the developm ental p a rad ig m s -  as, by  then  it w as 
pain fu lly  obvious to all th a t m aterial developm ent had  n o t occurred as prom ised. O n 
the contrary, it w as p red icated  on the language of cu ltural nationalism  and  television 
becam e associated w ith  tire p rom otion  of a national iden tity  w hose character and  ethos 
w ere identified  w ith  tire ru ling  national party . This shift h ap p en ed  du ring  the last 
years of M rs G andh i's  rule, b u t it w as u n d e r Rajiv G andhi th a t tire politicisation of 
Ind ia 's  state television w as fully accom plished. Between 1983 and  1991 the m onopoly 
of Ind ia 's  ru ling  pa rty  -  the Congress — over television infrastructure  and 
p rogram m ing  w as unrestric ted . A strategic decision w as then  taken  "to broadcast 
appealing, p o p u lar p rogram m ing  in  o rder to bu ild  a b road  audience for effective 
political com m unication" [Farm er 2000: 266]. Thus television w as used  as a tool to 
p rom ote  a na tional identity  th rough  the projection of an  Ind ian  na tional character and 
ethos identified  w ith  the ru ling  national party . Like o ther m ass m ed ia  ventures u nder 
N ehru , television p rogram m ing  in  India d id  no t reflect an  existing hom ogeneous 
national culture. O n the contrary, it strove to create one. Television w as thus used  to 
inculcate a na tional iden tity  th rough  m edia representations.
It is w ith in  this context that the serialisation of the Ram ayan  m ust be 
u n d e rs to o d 86. Indeed, according to Sagar, the airing of the Ram ayana received the 
b lessing of Rajiv G andhi him self87. M oreover, television becam e a contentious political 
issue in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections and Rajiv G andhi on different occasions w as
85 Before the Ramayan another serial -  the soap opera Hum Log -  had captured the Indian public.
87 Organiser, 20 Nov. 1987, p.12. According to Rajagopal [2000] initially Rajiv Gandhi expressed 
his reservations on the airing of the Hindu epic and Doordarshan's departure from previous 
policies.
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accused of p lay ing  the H in d u tv a  card  for electoral purposes. Therefore, D oordarshan  
p rogram m ing  con tribu ted  to the  p roduction  of a na tional iden tity  tha t w as no rth  
Indian, H indi-speaking , m idd le  class and  H indu . Several w ere  the consequences of this 
change of policy. O n the one hand , it p roduced  an  u n know ing  w iden ing  of the split 
be tw een  the n a tion  (m ajoritarian and  hom ogeneous -  as it w as p resen ted  on television) 
and  those w ho  w ere excluded. O n the other, it p roduced  a series of contradictions 
w hich  clashed w ith  tire -  till then  -  dom inan t im age of a secular, federal and 
developing India [Farm er 2000].
The political im plications of D oordarshan  in  the rise of com m unal politics in 
Ind ia  m u st be fram ed against th is background  of increasing com m unalisation of 
national m edia. The Sagar Ramayana  indeed  heavily  con tribu ted  to  the  creation of a 
na tional H in d u  identity  th rough  the p ropagation  of tire im age of Ram  as the 
p a ram o u n t religious idol and  national hero. Tire appeal of Sagar to tire Valm iki and 
Tulsidas Ram ayana and  to o ther regional an d  vernacular versions, instead  of being 
sym ptom atic  of a great cu ltural trad ition , w as an a ttem pt of transform ing  the Ramayana 
in  a po ten t un ify ing  national sym bol, denying tire m ultivocal trad ition  of the epic and 
p rom oting  a standard ised  version of it.
M oreover, tire serialised R am ayan created a v isual an d  sym bolic lexicon w hich 
form ed tire basis of the Sangh Parivar im agery em ployed in  its m obilisation strategy 
for the construction of the tem ple in  A yodhya. D ue to the trem endous im pact of the 
serial, H in d u  nationalist leaders d id  n o t have to spend  tim e projecting Ram  as the 
p a ram o u n t H in d u  god and  national hero; they could p roceed  d irectly  to bu ild ing  on 
tire them es ou tlined  by  the Sagar Ram ayana  by  p rom oting  a na tional character and  
ethos in  line w ith  the H in d u tv a  braird of national identity:
"V iew ed in tire privacy of the hom e, the no tion  of a g rea t H in d u  culture as a 
lib id inal collectivity cam e to exist in  the in tim ate spaces of people 's lives, 
an d  over tire lengthy  period  of broadcast, these im ages becam e fam iliar, 
dom esticated  and  com fortable. This w as arguably  a key sym bolic backdrop 
against w hich the Ram  Janm abhoom i m ovem ent can be seen to have taken 
off " [Rajagopal 1994:1662]
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New Forms of Affiliation
A ccording to R ajagopal [1999, 2000, 2001] tire expansion  of D oordarshan 's
p rogram m ing  and  in frastructu ral reach cannot by itself explain  the success of Ram  as a 
p ivotal sym bol of H in d u  iden tity  (and  of tire Sangh P arivar at tire centre-stage of 
Ind ia 's  politics). Indeed, this phenom enon  is situa ted  a t the  conjuncture of three 
contem poraneous events: expansion of com m unication, the  reshap ing  of the political 
panoram a and  finally the sp read  of consum er goods m arket. If this unpreceden ted  
expansion of com m unication in frastructu res and  p rog ram m ing  p rov ided  better 
com m unication and  a nation-w ide in terp re ta tive  public  [M ankekar 1999] and  the shift 
in  the political field allow ed the em ergence of a political language that drew  
increasingly on  ind igenous traditions, econom ic liberalisation an d  the expansion of the 
national m arke t fostered the rela tionship  betw een  the logics of politics and  
electioneering and  those of com m ercial advertising and  p rofit [Rajagopal 2001].
R ajagopal's analysis of H indu  nationalism  th a t focusses on political 
participation  based  on consum er choice, ra ther than  ideological preference, 
contextualizes Sangh P arivar's  b ran d  identification w ith  the serialised  Ramayan  and  the 
sym bol of Ram  th a t contribu ted  to the BJP's electoral success [Rajagopal 2000]. 
Rajagopal discusses the p rom otion  of Ram  and H in d u tv a  carried  ou t by H indu  
nationalists th rough  public ity  im ages. Rajagopal's d iscourse of retailing  H indu tva  rests 
on the question  of tire sp lit Ind ian  public  -  sp lit by division of language and caste. 
Thus, the  retailing  of H in d u tv a  p roduced  "discrete form s of H in d u  affiliation via 
m ultip le  m odes of participation  consum ption, and so cu tting  across d ivides of class 
and  caste" [Rajagopal 2001:26].
In o rder to b ro ad en  H in d u tv a 's  popu larity , the Sangh P arivar's  strategy 
focussed on changing  form s of public affiliation along com m odity  logic creating a 
hom ology betw een  consum ing and  voting  behaviour, religious iden tity  and  political or 
electoral affiliation. N o t religion alone, b u t m arketing  could  keep the H indu  
public/electorate com pact. This the H in d u  nationalists d id  b y  em ploying  a m ore 
participato ry  language th rough  the uses of sym bols and  im ages of religion tha t altered 
the m odes and  space of political participation  [Rajagopal 2001:66]. These sym bols
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could be rep roduced  relatively cheaply in  a variety  of m edia  and  form . Thus, affiliation 
to the  H in d u  com m unity  involved  acts of purchase (of stickers, replica of Ram 's 
sandals, bricks, sm all pots of holy  w ater, bindi, flags, scarves an d  shaw ls, coupons and 
bu ttons, aud io  and  video cassettes) th a t w ere m ean t bo th  for persona l consum ption  b u t 
also for public  display  to signal m em bership  to the H in d u  com m unity. W hile 
consum ption  of certain  articles becam e a sign of belonging and  an  affirm ation of a 
H in d u  identity , H in d u  religious practices becam e acts of na tional citizenship 
[Rajagopal 2001:67],
P rom oting  the sym bolism  of Ram  is based  on com m odity  consum ption  in 
advertisem ent. The m an ipu la tion  of p o p u lar sym bols redefined  a fam iliar im age of tire 
idol. A n equivalence is then  created betw een  the m eanings and  values of the im age 
and  those of the b ran d  nam e (in this case H in d u  identity) be ing  p rom oted , w hile a 
rew ard  is assessed for the  effort of purchase [Rajagopal 1994:1663]. A ccordingly, 
effective com m unication and  p ro p ag an d a  (articulated in d ifferen t registers [Rajagopal 
2001]), television 's influence as a facilitator and  the em ergence of a new  visual regim e, 
and  the retailing  of H indu tva , w hich allow ed for the em ergence of a com pacted H indu  
public, assured  tire success of the Ram  symbol.
The H in d u  rig h t's  political use of Ram  since tire 1980s has contribu ted  to 
heigh ten  the process of com m unalisation of politics. R am 's com plex sym bolism  
p rov ided  the H in d u tv a  b ro therhood  w ith  a captivating  and  w inn ing  set of 
represen tations for bo th  the nation  and  Ind ian  identity . Tire em ergence of this 
phenom enon  is difficult to explain. A fter all, the entire sym bolic reperto ire  centred  on 
the figure of Ram  w as h a rd ly  a novelty . As Pollock explains, tire political po ten tia l of 
the Ramayana epic is intrinsic to the text, w hile Ram Rajya  -  as a u top ia  -  w as 
repeated ly  u tilized  as a m obilising sym bol du ring  the nationalist m ovem ent. 
M oreover, a R am -inspired  party  w as already  active in  tire 1950s an d  1960s, and  early 
XX century  m ythological films cham pioned  epic stories in cinem atic m edia  for 
nationalist purposes. Rajagopal accounts for this u np receden ted  success in the 
historical conjuncture of three in dependen t events (political vacuum , expansion of 
com m unication technologies, and  econom ic liberalisation), and  in the intrinsic
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characteristics of the serialised epic (Sagar's realist conventions, the  epic 's serialisation 
form at, and  television 's pow er). W hile the first tw o aesthetic conventions gave the 
sym bol "discursive detail and verisim ilitude" [Rajagopal 2001:104], television -  seen 
here as a facilita tor ra ther than  an "unm oved  m over" [Rajagopal 2001:31] because it 
accelerated (rather than  created) events already in m otion -  facilitated tire em ergence 
of a new  visual regim e and  of a new  public language resonating  w ith  them es of 
collective em pow erm en t [Rajagopal 2001:32], B roadcasting the Ram ayan on  state 
television effectively situated  H in d u  m ythology in  the realm  of w h a t w as culturally  
considered 'na tiona l' and  'Ind ian '. M oreover, television established connections across 
a d iv ided  society [Rajagopal 1999:133], creating a nation-w ide in terp reta tive public 
[M ankekar 1999] and  the 'in stitu tion  of a visual regim e rig h t across social divides' 
[Rajagopal 1999:134]. The retailing  of H indu tva  suggests th a t consum erism  affirm ed 
political and  national identity . [Rajagopal 2001:63]. The Sangh P arivar's  intense 
p rogram m e of new  public spectacles centred on Ram  sym bolism  contributed 
enorm ously  to  the p rom otion  of H indu tva  revivalism , advocating  the creation of a 
s trong  and  definite sense of H in d u  identity.
Concluding Remarks
It w ou ld  be sim plistic to explain H in d u tv a 's  success by  po in ting  m erely to their 
ability in  tire m an ipu la tion  of the channels of com m unication, their in troduction  of new  
m odes of affiliation th rough  com m odity  logic or to the capillary d iffusion of the Sangh 
Parivar on tire Ind ian  territory. O n the contrary, the participato ry  character of Sangh 
Parivar m obilisation cam paigns and  the success of its sym bolic reperto ire can be 
a ttribu ted  to  the  fact tha t the language used  by  tire Sangh Parivar is fam iliar to a large 
num ber of tire m asses in  India. Therefore, one can argue th a t H in d u tv a 's  success has 
m ore to do w ith  the fam iliarity of the symbolic language em ployed  by the Sangh 
Parivar than  w ith  tire sh rew d m anipu lation  of m ass m edia  or of com m odity  logic. The 
cultural coding of H in d u tv a 's  vision for India is deeply roo ted  in  Ind ia 's  traditions and 
is quintessentially  H indu . Im ages of the nation  -  as a bountifu l, p rosperous and 
successful coun try  -  are crad led  in  an  essentially H in d u  idiom . The Sangh Parivar's 
reperto ire conjures u p  im ages and sym bols, w hich evoke ancient, tim eless, indigenous
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H indu  practices. It is in their tim elessness, indigenousness and  fam iliarity that these 
practices becom e authentically  Indian.
Indeed, the modus operandi of the Sangh Parivar consists in the m onopoly and 
innovative use of fam iliar sym bols. H indu tva  forces have b lended  together "structural 
elem ents of the H indu  religious trad ition  w ith the fabric of social m odernity  
confronted by the delocalising of practices and relocalising of references" [Assayag 
1998:140-141]. In search for new  orders of social connectivity [Rajagopal 2001] the 
Sangh Parivar has crafted a sophisticated, participatory  language and a range of 
appeals th rough  the use of the sym bols and im ages of religion [Rajagopal 2001:57]. 
The use of an articu lated  language m eant no t only the invention of new  symbols, 
public cerem onies and  rituals as m ode of participation to the H indu  com m unity. -  
'n ew  invented rituals ' [Bhattacharya 1991:130] -  bu t also the d iffusion of new  versions 
of old m yths and  sym bols p rom oting  new  icons. Public rituals organised by the Sangh 
Parivar passed from  being a sim ple m edium  of com m unication, to becom ing a 
sym bolic affirm ation of a H indu  public [Rajagopal 2001:61] and  of H indu  superiority . 
As Figures 23 and 24 suggest it is the com bination of trad itional and fam iliar im ages 
and  sym bols w ith m odern-day  issues that m akes the Sangh P arivar's  sym bolic idiom  
incontestable.
Fig. 23 Jay Vigyan
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Figure 23 rep roduced  the logo u sed  for publicising the 2003 Science and 
Technology Policy launched  by the BJP-led governm ent. This publicity  poster w as 
issued  to com m em orate Ind ia 's  57th Year of Independence and  "5 G olden Years of 
Science and  Technology" in 2003. A crouching naked  m ale ho ld s  a bow  and  arrow  
po in ting  to the sym bol of nuclear pow er a t the centre of w hich  is rep roduced  the im age 
of a cogw heel. The slogan Jay V ijyan  is w ritten  on bo th  sides of the  nuclear sym bol in 
Flindi and  in  English. D espite its m arginality  (this p icture  occupies a sm all space in the 
poster), I w ou ld  argue that it is im ages like this one that exem plify H in d u tv a 's  political 
iconography. This logo is a synthesis of p rev ious and  con tem porary  iconographies and 
sym bolism . It evokes fam iliar traditions: the crouched archer rem inds one of Arjun, the 
archer p a r excellence of the M ahabharat. The slogan Jay V igyan  is in stead  rem iniscent of 
the nationalist call Jay Jazoan Jay Kisan  (see note  48) thus evoking the sp irit of 
na tionalism  and  of patrio tism . The nuclear sym bol is hom age to Ind ia 's  scientific 
developm ents and  to the 1998 P okhran  nuclear explosions. The cogw heel is instead 
rem iniscent of the  iconography of tire N ehruv ian  era (see C hap ter 4). This nuclear 
A rjun88 of tire 21st century  thus  successfully b lends together fam iliar (H indu) cu ltural 
traditions, nationalism , patrio tism , scientific developm en t and  N ehruv ian  
iconography.
Sim ilar techniques are a t w ork  in  Fig. 24. The la tter w as p a rt of the 'Ind ia  
Shining ' cam paign  launched  by tire BJP-led ND A governm en t at tire end  of its 
legislature in  the ru n -u p  to the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. It m ean t to po rtray  the 
achievem ents of the governm ent and  the successes of the Ind ian  econom y during  the 
five years of BJP ru le 89. D espite its stark  sim plicity of com position, the poster 
rep roduced  here  is exceptionally significant. C reating a paralle l betw een na tu re  and  
econom ic success by using  the sym bolism  of flow ers and  by  p lay ing  w ith  m eanings of 
the w ord  'b loom ing ', the p icture  po rtrays air old m an  ho ld ing  a b unch  of lotuses. W hat
88 Hindu nationalists contend that ancient Hindus already possessed nuclear devices and point 
to a passage in the Bhagvad Gita in which god describes himself as "the radiance of a thousand 
suns" [cited in Nanda 2002:6] to support their statements [Bhatt 2001].
89 The 'India Shining' campaign was criticised by the opposition parties for its wasteful use of 
public funds (roughly $US20 million) and -  by featuring only the contented Indian middle- 
classes -  of ignoring the vast majority of the population that still lived in poverty with no access 
to the most basic facilities.
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I find particularly  significant is no t just the lotuses -  here used  as rem inders and 
sym bols of Ind ia 's  (H indu) civilization, of the nation-state (the lotus is the national 
flow er of India) and of the BJP all rolled into one -  bu t also the com position itself 
w hich is rem iniscent of the stereotypical portray  of the happy  farm er, a m ainstay  of 
N ehruv ian  iconography (see C hapter 4).
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Conclusions
This thesis has been about the (contested) ways, struggle, and  com petition of 
im agin ing  the nation  in India. I have  argued  drat political sym bols are fundam ental 
in strum en ts in  this process of im agination. It is the construction  of sym bolic reperto ires 
th a t allow s for dre im agination  of the nation. These practices are on going as national 
identities are flu id  and  socially constructed, particu larly  in  post-colonial contexts. In 
o rder to be tter u n d e rs tan d  tiris process of im agination of the nation, the study  has 
exam ined sym bolic reperto ires belonging to tirree crucial h istorical periods in  the life of 
the  Ind ian  nation: dre p re-independence anti-colonial period, the  N eh ruv ian  years, and 
dre contem porary  period, focussing b o th  on the continuities and  changes in their 
sym bolic reperto ires. The objective of this thesis has been  to show  how  a sense of 
national iden tity  and  belonging  to a na tion  is called u p o n  and  activated, created and 
re-created in  sym bolic form s and  ritua l practices in  India. This s tu d y  then  goes beyond 
questions of m ean ing  and  cu lture to in terrogate tire dynam ics of nationality  
construction  and  perform ance as p roducts  of pow er and  politics.
T hrough  extensive original fieldw ork, p rov id ing  a com parative analysis of 
Ind ia 's  na tional sym bolic reperto ires in a historical perspective, this w ork is a 
contribu tion  to d ie litera tu re  on nation-build ing  in  India, The conventional approach  to 
die study  of politics has m ean t th a t a large po rtion  of this very  w ide  literatu re  has been 
largely ideological in  character, and  focussed on the story  of ideas of the nation  in  India. 
V arious w orks how ever have also tu rned  their a tten tion  to d ie  analysis of the 
iconography of nationalism  in India (Pardia M ittar and  G uha T haku tar am ong others). 
This diesis is m ean t to be a contribu tion  in  this sense/to this.
Seeking to address a gap in  the extensive literatu re  on  d ie  subject, th is w ork  is 
also a contribu tion  to die w ider s tudy  of sym bolic politics in  Ind ia  w hich has so far 
focussed on a singu lar m om ent of die life of the nation  (be it a particu lar tim e in  the life 
of colonial or post-colonial India) or on specific sym bols (usually  religious ones). In 
contrast, by  recognising that the effectiveness of political sym bols of the nation
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em erges only w hen  one takes into accounts sym bolic reperto ires in  their entirety  ra ther 
than  single sym bolic constructions, (the national flag, the m ap  of India for exam ple) 
this diesis hopes to contribute to the  construction of a sym bolic g ram m ar and  syntax of 
Ind ia 's  na tiona l identity .
The findings and  em erging them es are also useful to the  b roader study  of 
political sym bolism . This area of scholarship is typically concerned w ith  the study  of 
first w orld  political system  or au tho ritarian  regim es w hose p ow er is believed to rest 
m ainly  on bo th  the th rea t of coercive force and  also on very  articu lated  p ropaganda  
structures. H ow ever, this thesis has show n how  politics in  general are sym bolically 
constructed. Indeed , if politics refers to the d istribu tion  and  m anagem en t of pow er and 
therefore to d ie creation of h ierarchies and  relations of subord ination , it is d irough  
sym bolic form s th a t diese relations are objectified, developed, m ain tained  and 
expressed.
This diesis additionally  has explored die em otional d im ension  of politics. The 
focus here  has been  on the role of d ie im agination in  politics an d  on the struggle d iat 
takes place for the establishm ent of a political im agery. Thus, politics is n o t only about 
the control of d ie m eans of coercion b u t also about the  m anagem en t and  m onopoly  of 
the  m eans of im agination. A ccording to a com m on view , the stu d y  of politics is 
u nders to o d  as die analysis of governm ent, political ideas, or die w ay pow er affects 
social relations. H ow ever, tiiis conventional approach  neglects die study  of passions 
and  em otions in  politics. Political analysts have long strugg led  w ith  passion  as a 
political conundrum ; yet one cannot fully u n d ers tan d  politics w ithou t looking a t its 
em otional aspect as a force tha t en thuses and  arouses people. W hen acting in  the 
political w orld , people  are driven  by em otions and no t ju st by  sim ple calculations of 
personal interests. It could  be argued  d ia t in  liberal dem ocracies the streng th  of 
political pow er is deeply  roo ted  in  em otions as no pow er -  regard less of its streng th  -  
could rely u p o n  coercion alone. Through the analysis of som e sym bolic strategies (such 
as the use of d ram aturg ica l techniques -  repetitive actions, songs, costum es, stage -  
u tilized  in  rituals to enhance em otions) this thesis a rgued  d ia t d ie affective dim ension
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of politics, the  s tu d y  of em otions and  persuasion  ra ther th an  c rude  force, are the 
p rim ary  m eans b y  w hich political consensus is built.
The thesis suggested  th a t sym bolic form s and  actions transform  political 
in terests into m ora l obligations for action w ithou t constrains th a t rest beyond issues of 
rew ards or th rea t of pun ishm ent. T hrough the study  of the  sym bolic reperto ires of the 
nationalist m ovem en t in India, this w ork  has sought to show  the m oral and ritual 
obligations th a t are developed  by institu tions and  organisations for the  m anagem ent 
and  d istribu tion  of pow er -  or in  our case for the  defin ition  of na tional identity .
In  these pages I have suggested  tha t the n a tion  em erges as a symbolic 
com m unity . In this respect, sym bols becom e crucial tools for v isualising  the nation  and  
consequently  they rep resen t ideology. In recognition of such, this thesis has s tud ied  
political sym bols th a t have characterised three different periods in  the life of the Indian  
nation. I have looked a t sym bols (visual and  verbal) an d  rituals of the nation. The 
thesis suggested  th a t one can evince th a t the sym bolic s truc tu res th a t becam e m ore 
significant in  this contest are the sym bols of distinctiveness: sym bols that em phasised  
tire n a tion 's  un iqueness and  exclusiveness. These w ere sym bols th a t he lped  the nation  
to establish its boundaries by  defining the shared  values and  characteristics of the in­
group, thus fostering national integration.
The thesis focussed in  particu lar on certain  types of sym bolic form s w hich 
favoured  a v isual and  ritual aspect (M erriam 's miranda of pow er) because it is in these 
sym bolic form s th a t relations of pow er becom e m ore apparen t. In  particular, certain 
sym bolic m anifestations (form s and  actions) w ere selected th a t w ere  considered crucial 
for the  articu lation  of no tions of identity . Analytically the thesis focussed on tire w ays 
in  w hich the nation  -  considered as a geopolitical body  -  and  tire na tional citizens w ere 
im agined  in the three crucial phases of national developm ent. By focussing on the 
official sym bols of tire na tion  (tire national em blem , tire na tiona l anthem , and  the 
national flag) as w ell as o ther im portan t sym bolic form ations (historic build ings, 
landm arks, posta l stam ps, currency, various insignia of na tional prestige and  pow er,
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legislations, education  policies, public  cerem onies and  rites of in tegration  and 
m obilisation) th is w ork  p resen ted  the sym bolic reperto ires p ro d u ced  and  dissem inated 
by  the Ind ian  ru ling  elites and  how  they  forged a na tional consciousness and  sentim ent 
of na tional belonging.
hr dris thesis I have p roposed  that national identity  can be v iew ed as a social 
construct w here new  constructions of the nation  and  of the national people are 
constantly  em erging  and  being  rearranged . In C hapter 2, I a rgued  that dom inant 
discourses d u rin g  the nationalist anti-colonial m ovem ent articu lated  concepts of 
cu ltu ral and  territo rial un ity , pan-Indianism , swadeshi (indigenousness), and 
in tegration. The sym bolic reperto ire  th a t em erged w as constitu ted  by a fam iliar 
inventory  of im ages and  representations th a t rested  on pre-colonial ind igenous m odes 
of expression and  resistance and  w as steeped  in  dom inan t relig ious idiom s. U nity  w as 
sym bolised by the represen tation  of n a tu ra l borders and  by  resorting  to im ages of 
Ind ia 's  sacred geography, w hile pan-Ind ian ism  w as typified  by elem ents of cultural 
syncretism  and  assim ilation. U nity and  in tegration  w ere also sym bolically enacted 
d u rin g  the celebration of public  rituals. Swadeshi w as sym bolised, am ong other things, 
th rough  tire choice of an  ind igenous lifestyle.
The p re-independence  trad ition  tha t u sed  the vocabulary  and  g ram m ar of a 
po p u lar id iom  w as eventually  d iscarded  w ith  the com ing of independence, A new  
national v isual language, sho rn  of its religious iconographies -  b u t also of its v itality  -  
dom inated  Ind ia 's  post-colonial panoram a. In  C hap ters 3 and  4 I argued  that 
independence  b ro u g h t a series of rad ical changes to the  sym bolic articulations of the 
narra tives of national identity . Them atically, the reperto ire  reflected the dom inan t 
ideology of post-independen t India. Them es of m odern isation , progress, 
industria lisa tion , reform , scientific advance, secularism , egalitarianism , and  national 
self-reliance w ere all w ritten  in  tire v isual narrative of in d ep en d en t India. M odern 
India becam e a landscape of techno-future w here the v isualisation  of m odern ity  w as 
articu lated  th ro u g h  tire rhetoric of developm ent and  im ages of dam s, m odem  
m achinery  and  progress in  general.
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Sim ilarly, the m ore recent period  of Ind ian  h istory  has been  characterised  by the 
em ergence of new  constructions of the  nation  tha t d rew  on  sym bols of Indianness and  
the rhetoric  of religious trad ition  in  o rder to consolidate a n ew  national identity . The 
Sangh P arivar p roposes a form  of cultural nationalism  and  it answ ers to questions of 
nation, na tionhood  and  national iden tity  by using  sym bols and  sym bolic constructions 
clearly derived  from  the H in d u  heritage. Through the uses of a h ighly-em otionally  
charged  and  very  effective language, H indu tva  constructed  a reperto ire  dom inated  by 
sym bols of the  p ast derived  from  the H in d u  tradition .
Besides analysing sym bolic constructions, an  im p o rtan t po rtion  of this thesis 
also focussed on tire rich array  of cerem onial activities th a t shaped  and  inform ed the 
political life in  India. A rguing  th a t the ritua l perform ances are  pow erfu l fora w here 
ideas develop, and  w here rules, sym bols and  discourses are contested, this thesis 
d iscussed the values and  beliefs u n derp inn ing  constructions of na tional iden tity  in a 
rap id ly  changing  and  com plex society. The am biguous m etaphorical language of the 
rituals w as exam ined, revealing ho w  nationalist ideologies w ere constructed  and 
reproduced , b u t also challenged and  appropriated .
The p rincipal conclusion of this w ork  is th a t questions of national identity  are 
flu id  and  constantly  renegotiated . N ation-build ing  is thus a h istorically-grounded 
creative process, particu larly  in  contexts like the Ind ian  one w here questions of 
na tional iden tity  are still contentious. By em ploying constructiv ist theories of 
nationalism  this thesis argued  in  favour of a process of construction  of national identity  
em phasising  the role of creative agents for the m anagem en t and  reproduction  of 
sym bolic reperto ires. In this process, these signifying agents b o th  select cu ltural 
elem ents d raw ing  u p o n  pre-existing cu ltu ral resources and  p a rtly  fabricate others.
The thesis also focussed on the strategies of d issem ination  of these sym bolic 
reperto ires, because it is th ro u g h  the analysis of these practices th a t symbolic 
inventories becom e m ost apparent. The aim  w as also to show  ho w  these strategies are
324
crucial for enhancing  the pub lic 's  perception  and  u n d e rs tan d in g  of the sym bolic 
vocabulary  and  g ram m ar of nationhood . A t d ifferent tim es, d istinct strategies of 
d issem ination  w ere used . C hapter 2 show ed  how , du ring  the anti-colonial m ovem ent, 
pre-existing form s of resistance to au thority  that revolved a ro u n d  the princip le of civil 
disobedience w ere w idely  used  to m obilise a w ide section of the popu la tion  even 
before G andh i's  satyagrahas. In  the post-independence years (C hapter 3 and  4), m ass 
m edia  w ere at the service of the nationalist cause, as it w as d em onstra ted  by the central 
role p layed  by  the M inistry  of Inform ation and  Broadcasting and  its m edia branches in 
the  process of 'na tionalisation  of the m asses'. In m ost recent tim es (C hapter 5 and  6), 
the Sangh P arivar dem onstra ted  particu lar adeptness at u tilising  the perform ative 
aspects of Ind ia 's  trad itional culture to show case its v ision of m odern  India. Political 
rituals such as the m ultilayered  cerem onies of the Sangh P arivar's  yatras are extant 
exam ple of this practice. In  this regard , an  im portan t d istinction  could be m ade 
betw een  institu tional and  oppositional discourses of the  nation. In  the first case, 
sym bolism  and  strategies of d issem ination  are m ainly  u sed  to indoctrinate  the public 
and  p rom ote  a particu lar form  of iden tity  and  specific na tional values. In oppositional 
discourses, how ever, there is u sually  a shift aw ay from  using  sym bolism  as a 
m echanism  of indoctrination  and  iden tity  form ation and  tow ard  a m ore explicit 
a ttem pt at u sing  it as vehicle to generate and  boost legitim acy of the  new  order.
M app ing  the changing character of Ind ian  national iden tity  th rough  the study  
of political sym bolism  also reveals no t ju st of the  changes b u t also of the continuities 
and  sim ilarities across tim e an d  sym bolic repertoires. Indeed , this approach, coupled 
w ith  a historical com parative perspective, show s how , ra ther than  being created ex 
novo, sym bolic reperto ires -  particu larly  visual ones -  have b u ilt u p o n  previous 
im aginations of the nation, bo th  iconographically and  them atically . This thesis has also 
a ttem pted  to show  th a t classical typologies of ethnic and  civic nationalism s seem  n o t to 
be applicable to the Ind ian  case as -  from  an  analysis of the political language and 
rhetoric of Ind ia 's  nationalist discourses -  it em erges th a t a t d ifferent tim es, the 
discursive logic of the  pre-colonial, N ehruv ian  and  H in d u tv a  ideologies em ployed 
different sym bolic codes to express national identity , ha the instances considered,
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prim ordial, civic and  cu ltu ral codes [Eisenstadt and  G iesen 1995] w ere used  and  the 
sym bolic id iom s d ia t em erged  w ere testim ony of the dialectic tensions em erging from  
the sim ultaneous usage of these codes. This is particu larly  significant w ith  regards to 
the N eh ruv ian  and  H in d u tv a 's  na tionalist discourses, w hich  in  general have been 
rep resen ted  as being  exclusively couched in  civic (the form er) and  in  ethnic (the latter) 
notions of nationalism .
D raw ing  on T urner's  [1967] contribu tion  to the  s tu d y  of ritua l sym bols, the 
thesis show ed  that, due  to a sym bol's m ultivocality, it is precisely the use of sym bols 
th a t help  to consolidate and  create un ity  in absence of consensus. This does no t 
necessarily  m eans th a t politics is or m u st be unders tood  as irra tional and  tha t people 
are a t the m ercy of their em otions w hen  th inking or acting politically. Em otions do, 
how ever, p lay  an im p o rtan t pa rty  in  ou r political behav iour and  orientation, and  it is 
n o t entirely  tru e  th a t peop les allow  them selves to be m oved  by  considerations of self- 
in terest only.
This w ork  also show s th a t on the w hole a h ighly  em otive sym bolic language 
tha t uses h igh -o rder sym bols couched in  p rim ord ial codes (d raw ing  u p o n  sym bols of 
b lood and  kinship) is s tronger th an  other languages em ploy ing  a d ifferent array  of 
sym bols of belonging. This w ork  how ever does n o t suggest th a t na tional identities are 
fixed and  prim ord ia l. A lthough  the streng th  and  resilience of som e sym bolic 
construction  of the na tion  m igh t seem  to indicate otherw ise, one m u st bear in m ind  
th a t the  Ind ian  na tion  is a w holly  m odern  phenom enon. Those trad itions tha t are 
m obilised  by  som e sym bolic reperto ires are in  fact partly  re-inven ted  and  there is 
no th ing  p rim ord ia l abou t them . Indeed  it is the adaptab ility  and  flu id ity  of traditions, 
ra ther than  their rigidity, th a t m ake them  valuable resources for the  construction of 
collective iden tity  in  tire contem porary  w orld.
H ere  tire distinction betw een  h igher-o rder and  low er-o rder sym bols has been 
particu larly  usefu l for an  u n d ers tan d in g  of Ind ia 's  na tional sym bolic repertoires. Elder 
an d  Cobb [1983] d istingu ish  betw een  w hat they call h igher o rder sym bols and low er
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order ones, also called situational sym bols. The form er p erta in  to tire political regim e 
and /o r its political com m unity; the latter usually  relate to cu rren t authorities, n o n ­
governm ental political actors, policies and  issues. The tw o au tho rs suggest th a t h igher 
o rder sym bols ten d  to be m ore inclusive, m ore durable, and  have  a stronger affective 
a ttachm ent th an  those situational sym bols that are re la ted  to cu rren t policies and 
political actors and  that, therefore, ten d  to be m ore transien t and  exclusive. This 
distinction w as particu larly  usefu l w hen  com paring the nationalist symbolic 
reperto ires of the three periods in question  to s tudy  the dynam ics of form ation of 
sym bolic reperto ires. By em ploying this category I w as in  fact able to describe no t ju st 
the h igher em otive significance and  durability  of certain  sym bolic constructs (crucial 
for fostering feelings of g roup  cohesion and  m utuality), b u t also to shed  ligh t on the 
im portan t process of rearrangem en t of Ind ia 's  sym bolic practices over tim e. In  fact, 
a lthough  nation  bu ild ing  requires a new  vocabulary, often the latter, rather than  
creating a sym bolic reperto ire  ex-novo, actually selects, adap ts  and  reorganizes older 
representations. This has been true of all the symbolic reperto ires analysed here. In fact, 
changes in the relationship  of pow er are often effected by m eans of sym bolic continuity  
and  n o t by  the creation and  im plem entation  of new  sym bolic form s. In particular, the 
distinction betw een  h igher-o rder sym bols and  situational ones (and  the possibility  of 
sym bols to change their sta tus a t any given time) has been  especially useful in 
u n d ers tan d in g  tire Sangh P arivar's  un ique  sym bolic strategies of nation-build ing 
(C hapter 5 and  6). It w as no ted  th a t tire Sangh Parivar -  desp ite  its ideological stand ing  
th a t is partly  inconsisten t w ith  tire p rev ious symbolic o rder -  has n o t tried  to radically 
change tire sym bols of nationhood. Rather, it has sough t to app rop ria te  pre-existing 
h igher-o rder sym bols by attaching to  them  fresh m ean ings consistent w ith  their 
ideology, w hile at tire sam e time, elevating situational sym bols rela ted  to polices and 
personalities to h igher-o rder ones.
The em phasis th roughou t this thesis has been on the w ays in  w hich nationhood 
and  a sense of na tional iden tity  arise from  the 'rearrangem en ts ' of these sym bolic 
practices. Because nations are n o t givens b u t historical p roducts  w hose concepts of 
nation  and  national identity  are constantly  renegotiated, the reorgan isation  of symbolic
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practices is a recu rren t phenom enon  in  the life of a nation . By focussing on three 
d istinct m om ents of the life of the Ind ian  nation  -  anti-colonial struggle, im m ediate 
post-independence  and  the contem porary  m om ent -  the thesis show ed  how  through  
the analysis of sym bolic represen tational practices u n d e rtak en  to defining the m eaning 
of Ind ia  and  of Indianness, the  latter h ad  changed over tim e. This phenom enon  also 
offers an im portan t insight in to  the changing aspirations of the  elites and  of their 
political objectives. Sym bols u sed  to define the borders of the political com m unity  have 
changed  over tim e and  n o t only "depend ing  u p o n  the elites w ho have done the 
defining" like Brass [1979:53] argued , b u t also because of the changed  context in w hich 
the defin ing has taken place.
These sym bolic system s are often renegotiated  at tim es of crisis. The historical 
and  struc tu ra l constrain ts of every period  w ith in  w hich ideological m ovem ents 
struggle for dom inance are very  im portan t for the tr iu m p h  of one ideology over 
ano ther and  the estab lishm ent of one particu lar sym bolic reperto ire  ra ther than  
another. The three periods chosen can be defined as m om ents of crisis -  periods of 
s trong  and  rad ical social transform ation  w hen  old w ays of v iew ing  the w orld  and  of 
organising  life w ere no longer valid. These are periods of ideological activism  w hen 
com peting w ays and  strategies develop and  com pete for dom inance. It is in  situations 
like these tha t sym bolic activity is at its highest, and  cu lture -  seen here  as a toolkit or 
reperto ire  from  w hich  political actors can select -  is m obilised.
Thus, C hap ter 2 a rgued  th a t it w as the change of m obilisation  techniques and  
the inclusion of the m asses in  the m ovem ent tha t b ro u g h t a change in  the  articulation 
of ideas of the nation  and  of na tional identity  and  w ere  responsible for an 
ind igenisation  of the nationalist idiom . C hapter 3 show ed  th a t it w as N eh ru 's  
acquisition of the levers of p ow er th a t fortu itously  m ade  N eh ru ism  tire w inning  
ideology, ra th e r than  an ideological victory because there  d id  no t exist b road  
consensus over h is idea of India. O n the contrary, at tire tim e of independence there 
existed d iverg ing  visions of India. G iven drat pow er relations determ ine  dre creation of 
na tional sym bolic reperto ires and sym bols are d irect reflections of dom inan t
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ideological form ation, I argued  th a t N ehru  becam e the signifying agent w ho selected 
and  articu lated  Ind ia 's  cu ltural elem ents tha t defined the national identity . The 
conjuncture of the dynam ics of partition  and  the extrem e com m unal violence that 
ensued, along w ith  Patel's  su d d en  death  and  die general consensus tha t the 
governm ent h ad  a p rim ary  responsibility  for the m odern isa tion  of the country, created 
the conditions for N eh ru 's  ideology to trium ph. These outcom es, in  turn, m ade the 
state the only agent w ith  the m eans and  resources to im p lem en t a national vision.
Sim ilarly, C hap ters 5 and  6 a rgued  tiiat d iere is considerable evidence to 
suggest d ia t the  in terp lay  of political and  econom ic circum stances com bined w ith  
elem ents of ascribed iden tity  w ere crucial for the em ergence and  the estab lishm ent of a 
H in du /Ind ian  identity . The dem ise of N ehruism  created the ideological space for the 
expression of a political identity , w hile econom ic liberalisation opened  u p  possibilities 
-  particu larly  for In d ia 's  em erging m iddle-classes -  to gain econom ically from  this new  
condition. M oreover, there the new  econom ic policies of globalisation and 
liberalisation con tribu ted  to the  rise of H indu tva  forces. Econom ic liberalisation 
p roduced  increasing econom ic dissatisfaction on the one h a n d  and  grow ing 
unem ploym en t on the other.
The foregoing analysis addressed  issues at the h e a rt of research  on national 
identity . The com parative h istorical approach  show s tha t collective identities are 
constantly  challenged by com peting definitions of iden tity  tha t are articulated  in 
sym bolic form s. The analysis adds to our u n ders tand ing  of n a tional identity  form ation 
by  show ing how  key sym bols and  sym bolic form ations are created, m anaged  and 
dissem inated  to allow  the im agination of the Indian  nation.
For sym bolic politics, a nu m b er of issues rem ain  for fu tu re  research. 
T hroughou t th is thesis the em ergence of com peting visions for Ind ia  has been  linked to 
changes in  the social, political and  econom ic panoram a. As In d ian  politics enters a new  
phase  w here ne ither of Ind ia 's  tw o dom inan t parties have  any defin ite ascendancy, it 
w ill be in teresting  to see how  this political shift, along w ith  the im pact of economic
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liberalisation and  globalisation, and  the em ergence of n ew  classes w ill influence the 
sym bolic reperto ire  of tire Ind ian  n a tion  in the near fu ture. Indeed , one of the thesis's 
underlin ing  distinctions has been  betw een  political sym bolism  of the nation  and  
political sym bolism  of d istinct parties. The thesis show ed  how , d u rin g  the N ehruv ian  
period , it seem ed th a t there w as coincidence betw een  tire political sym bolism  of the 
n a tion  and  sym bolic reperto ire  of tire dom inan t party , tire Congress. Later, w ith  tire 
em ergence of tire Sangh P arivar and  the establishm ent of the  H in d u tv a  ideology, it 
appeared  for a tim e th a t the national sym bolic reperto ire w as becom ing identical to the 
BJP's vision of natioxral identity . Thus, now  that tire political panoram a has again 
changed  and  a new  coalition of parties is at the pow er in  Delhi, a question  th a t rem ains 
is w hether and  ho w  the sym bolic reperto ire  of the nation  w ill change. W ithin  this 
context, fu rther s tu d y  of sym bolic politics of national iden tity  m u st also take into 
consideration  tire construction of representations of tire na tion  beyond  dom inan t 
discourses. The s tudy  of the em ergence of new  constructions of the national 
d issem inated  n o t by the national elites b u t by contesting political agents from  below  
w ill shed  ligh t onto in teresting  articulations of iden tity  and  onto tire dialectical 
rela tionship  be tw een  dom inan t discourses and  those of tire challenging groups.
The u n d ers tan d in g  of tire question  of sym bolic politics of national identity  in 
India w ill also be advanced  th rough  tire analysis of the role of relig ion  in contem porary  
nationalism  in  India. Religion has alw ays been  an im portan t e lem ent for the definition 
of na tional iden tity  in  India. W hile for N ehru  and  the secularists, religion w as a 
secondary sym bol of Indianness, in  the contem porary  m om en t an d  -  to a lesser extent 
-  du ring  tire anti-colonial m ovem ent, religion has been  an  im portan t sym bol of 
belonging. Indeed , iden tity  politics based  on the articulation of p rim ord ia l attachm ents 
is a characteristic of con tem porary  India. Indeed  practices of m odern ity  in post-colonial 
tim es in  Ind ia  have paradoxically  'p rim ord ia lised ' relig ion  in  confirm ing its 
constitu tive role as a fundam en ta l com ponent of Ind ian  identity . Therefore, despite the 
drive for secularisation of Ind ia 's  society, religion has rem ained  an im portan t m arker 
of identity .
330
A lthough  m uch  w ork  clearly rem ains to be done in this field, this analysis has begun  to 
sketch the b ro ad  contours of th is in trigu ingly  com plex topic. Because national identity  
is still a contentious issue in  India, u nders tand ing  die dynam ics of national identity  
form ation th rough  a sym bolic and  constructiv ist approach  is n o t ju st an  in trigu ing  
theoretical issue b u t one of im m ense practical significance as well.
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